Australasian United Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shipping Control Board [1945] HCA 45; (1945) 71 CLR 508 (21 December 1945)

Australasian United Steam Navigation Company Limited Plaintiff; and The Shipping Control Board and Another Defendants.

Under the National Security (Shipping Control) Regulations (S.R. 1941 No. 20 as amended), the Commonwealth has power to requisition ships. The National Security (Shipping Requisition) Regulations (S.R. 1941 No. 230 as amended) modified the Shipping Control Regulations in application to requisitioned ships. The Shipping Requisition Regulations provide that the owner of a requisitioned ship shall be bound by the terms and conditions of the standard time charter party set out in the schedule. The plaintiff's ship Macumba was requisitioned by the Commonwealth on 14th July 1941 under the Shipping Control Regulations and, while under requisition, was lost by enemy action (bombs) in waters north of Australia. The plaintiff in its statement of claim alleges that the Commonwealth, by requisitioning the ship, took possession and control thereof and acquired property of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has instituted an action in which it claims a sum per day for the use of the ship. This claim has been settled by agreement, and it is unnecessary to refer to it for the purposes of this case. The plaintiff also claims fair compensation for the loss of the ship under the Shipping Control Regulations. Those Regulations provide that fair compensation shall be paid in respect of the use of a ship, the services of which have been requisitioned, and for services rendered during the use thereof, and for loss or damage occasioned thereby. The plaintiff alleges in its statement of claim that the loss of the ship was occasioned by her requisition and use under the Regulations. Regulation 11 (2) provides that the fair compensation "shall be settled by agreement between the Board and the parties interested or, in default of agreement, by arbitration or by a referee or referees appointed by the Governor-General or in such other manner as he directs." The plaintiff claims that these provisions for the method of settling compensation are inconsistent with the provision of just terms for the acquisition of property in the ship and are invalid, though the provision for fair compensation itself, i.e., independently of the manner of assessment, is said to be valid.

The defendants rely upon the Shipping Requisition Regulations and upon the terms of the standard time charter party contained in the schedule to those Regulations. Regulation 4 (2) of the Shipping Requisition Regulations provides that all ships requisitioned under the Shipping Control Regulations shall "be governed by the terms and conditions of the Standard Time Charter Party of the Shipping Control Board which shall be binding upon the owners and other persons concerned and they shall observe and carry out those terms and conditions." Regulation 5 provides that "the Shipping Control Board may, by resolution, modify, vary or add to the terms and conditions of the Standard Time Charter Party." Regulations 11 and 12 are as follows:—

Under the standard time charter party the Commonwealth assumes liability for war risks and, in particular, for loss or damage to the ship caused by bombs. The liability in the event of loss due to such risks is limited by reg. 27 (3) to "the established value" of the ship. The established value consists of a "basic value" which is fixed in relation to the amount for which the ship was insured with the Marine War Risks Insurance Board before the time of requisitioning, but subject to variation by the Shipping Control Board if, in the opinion of the Board, there was an over-insurance. The basic value is fixed by the Board after considering representations made by the owner, with provision for appointment by the Minister of a referee to review the value if the owner is dissatisfied. The other element of the established value is the "increased value," which is an amount to be paid in futuro subject to conditions as to the acquisition of a replacement ship. In the case of the Macumba, the basic value was fixed at £50,000, and the increased value is under the Regulations 25 per cent of that amount, viz., £12,500.

By its defence the Commonwealth relies upon the Shipping Control Regulations, upon the Shipping Requisition Regulations as modifying the Shipping Control Regulations, and upon the terms of the standard time charter party. The plaintiff, however, claims fair compensation to be assessed independently of any of these provisions, alleging that they are invalid. The plaintiff alleges that the value of the ship was £85,000, and also claims a further sum for loss of profits and damage due to the disturbance of its business. Alternatively, the plaintiff claims damages for wrongful conversion of the ship. The plaintiff has demurred to those paragraphs of the defence which rely upon the Regulations and the provisions of the standard time charter party.

The plaintiff contends that the requisition of the ship in the present case was an acquisition of property in the ship because, it is said, the possession of the ship passed to the Commonwealth under the standard time charter party in so far as the provisions of that charter party are valid. If the whole of the provisions of the standard time charter party are invalid, or if the compensation provisions contained therein are invalid, then the claim of the plaintiff is simply for fair compensation under the part of reg. 11 (2) of the Shipping Control Regulations which it contends is valid, or, alternatively, for damages for wrongful conversion.

The objection to part of reg. 11 (2) of the Shipping Control Regulations, to the Shipping Requisition Regulations, and to the provisions for compensation contained in the standard time charter party is in each case that those provisions do not provide for just terms for the acquisition of property. Commonwealth legislation for the acquisition of property from any person must make provision for just terms of acquisition: Commonwealth Constitution, s. 51 (xxxi.). If, however, the requisitioning of the ship did not amount to or involve any acquisition of property, the plaintiff's objection must fail and the demurrer should be disallowed.

"Requisition" is not a technical legal term. The word is used to include the taking of property in full ownership, the taking of the possession of property, and the acquisition of a right to use property in a particular manner without any taking of possession. In The Meandros[1], a ship was requisitioned and it was held that the terms of requisition in that case did not deprive the defendants of their property in the vessel, but it was said[2]—"A requisition is a process by which the State takes the use or the possession of, or the property in, chattels, and sometimes in land. But it is infinitely various"—and examples are given[3]: Cf. Swift v. Macbean[4], and The Steaua Romana; The Oltenia[5]—"Requisitioning may be, and usually is, nothing more than a hiring of the ship which does not take the property in the ship out of the owner." The same opinion was expressed in The Broadmayne[6]. Accordingly the requisitioning of a ship may or may not involve the taking of property in the ship, according to the actual terms of the requisition.

It has been decided by this Court that the taking of possession of property is an acquisition of property within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution (Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel[7]). The first question for determination in the present case is whether, by the requisitioning of the Macumba, the Commonwealth, though it did not become the registered owner of the ship, acquired property in the ship by taking possession.

All charterers of ships, by virtue of the charter party, have some control over the ship. Such control may relate only to a particular voyage; it may operate during a specified period. If the charter party is by way of demise, property in the ship temporarily passes to the charterer—for the duration of the charter. If possession, as well as some degree of control, passes to the charterer, then the property passes to the charterer and he is pro tempore the owner. But no property in the ship passes if possession is not given to the charterer by virtue of the terms of the charter. If the control of master and crew in the navigation of the ship passes to the charterer he has possession. If, on the other hand, he acquires only a right to the use of the ship—a right to use her carrying capacity (Carver, Carriage by Sea, 8th ed. (1938), p. 244, par. 153) there is no demise, but only a contract for services—locatio operis vehendarum mercium (Schuster v. McKellar[8]; Burnard v. Aaron and Sharpley[9]). Thus the general test is "whose servants the master and crew were" (Fenton v. City of Dublin Steam Packet Co.[10]). If the owner has the power of appointing and dismissing the master and crew, he remains owner of the ship, while if, under the charter, the charterer obtains that power, possession of the ship passes to him: The Great Eastern[11]; Omoa Coal & Iron Co. v. Huntley[12]; Baumvoll Manufactur von Scheibler v. Gilchrest & Co.[13], where it is said that a letting or a demise of a ship involves a parting with the whole possession and control of the ship, so that the captain is no longer the captain of the owner, the charterer having "a power and right independent of him (the owner) and without reference to him to do what he pleases with regard to the captain, the crew, and the management and employment of the ship. That has been called a letting or a demise of the ship. The right expression is that it is a parting with the whole possession and control of the ship." See also the same case[14], where Lord Herschell L.C. said that the registered owner of a ship may have "so dealt with the vessel as to have given all the rights of ownership for a limited time to some other person, who, during that time, may equally properly be spoken of as the owner. When there is such a person, and that person appoints the master, officers, and crew of the ship, pays them, employs them and gives them the orders, and deals with the vessel in the adventure, during that time all those rights which are spoken of as resting upon the owner of the vessel, rest upon that person who is, for those purposes during that time, in point of law to be regarded as the owner."

In order to determine whether possession of the Macumba passed to the Commonwealth by virtue of the requisition, it is necessary to ascertain the terms of the requisition. The plaintiff argued the case by reference to the terms of the charter party (apart from such provisions as were said to be invalid as amounting to an acquisition of property upon terms other than just terms).

Clause 1 of the standard time charter party as set out in the schedule to the Shipping Requisition Regulations provides that the owners let and the charterer hires the ship. Clause 2 refers to the ship being placed at the disposal of the charterer, other clauses refer to delivery, clause 7 to re-delivery, and clause 31 to sub-letting by the charterer. Such provisions would suggest a true letting of the ship so as to pass property in her by way of demise, but it has long been settled that the use of such terms, which are derived from forms of charter (namely, charters by demise) which have become almost obsolete, do not necessarily bring about this result: Christie v. Lewis[15] and Sea and Land Securities Ltd. v. Dickinson & Co. Ltd.[16], where MacKinnon L.J. says: "A time charterparty is, in fact, a misleading document, because the real nature of what is undertaken by the shipowner is disguised by the use of language dating from a century or more ago, which was appropriate to a contract of a different character then in use. At that time a time charterparty (now known as a demise charterparty) was an agreement under which possession of the ship was handed by the shipowner to the charterer for the latter to put his servants and crew in her and sail her for his own benefit. A demise charterparty has long been obsolete. The modern form of time charterparty is, in essence, one by which the shipowner agrees with the time charterer that during a certain named period he will render services by his servants and crew to carry the goods which are put on board his ship by the time charterer. But certain phrases which survive in the printed form now used are only pertinent to the older form of demise charterparty. Such phrases, in the charterparty now before the court, are: the owners agree to let, and the charterers agree to hire the steamer. There was no letting or hiring of this steamer. Then it is in terms provided that at the end of the period the vessel shall be redelivered by the time charterers to the shipowners. Redelivery is only a pertinent expression if there has been any delivery or handing over of the ship by the shipowner to the charterer. There never had been any such delivery here. The ship at all times was in the possession of the shipowners and they simply undertook to do services with their crew in carrying the goods of the charterers."

Clause 2 of the charter party provides that the ship shall be delivered to the charterer with master and full complement of officers, engineers and crew. I postpone reference to clause 3. Under clause 4 the owners are to provide and pay for all provisions and ordinary wages (with an exception as to increases in wages—clause 5 (b)) and for all services in connection with the navigation of the ship not otherwise expressly provided for, and clause 5 provides that the charterer is to provide and pay for coal and other fuel. Clause 7 provides for the payment of a hiring rate per day as determined under the Shipping Control Regulations. Under clause 10 the whole reach and burthen of the ship is to be at the charterer's disposal. Under clause 11 the owners are to provide and maintain in a thoroughly efficient state throughout the period of requisition all loading and unloading gear etc. I postpone reference to clause 13. Clause 14 provides that the master, officers and engineers shall be British subjects, and that the owners shall, so far as practicable, engage only British subjects as members of the crew, and shall not engage any person of enemy nationality. This provision in itself shows that the engagement of the ship's complement is made by the owners, and not by the charterer. Under clause 20, if the charterer has reason to be dissatisfied with the policy or conduct of a master or any officer, engineer or member of the crew, the charterer shall investigate the matter and "if required by the Charterer, the Owners shall make a change in the appointment as soon as practicable."

These clauses are consistent with the possession of the ship being retained by the owner, and in my opinion several of them are quite inconsistent with any other view of the relations of the parties. I refer particularly to clauses 2, 11, 14 and 20. The form of government charter party which was used in the 1914-18 war, known as T99, may be found in the regulations in "His Majesty's Sea Transport Service 1939, to be observed in respect of Ships employed by the Admiralty or Board of Trade as Transports or Freight Ships." T99 included in substantially identical terms the following clauses which are contained in the standard time charter party in the present case: 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 14, 20. A charter in the form of T99 is not a demise charter: Halsbury, Laws of England, 2nd ed., vol. 30, p. 274; Elliott Steam Tug Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioners for Executing Office of Lord High Admiral of United Kingdom[17]

Clauses 3 (a) and 13 of the standard time charter party have been added to the clauses which are to be found also in T99. The effect of clauses 3 (a) and 13, in my opinion, is to make it clear beyond question that the possession of the ship should not be delivered to the charterer. Clause 3 (a) provides that the owners shall, throughout the period of requisition, maintain the ship in a thoroughly efficient state in hull machinery equipment and cargo gear with master and full complement of officers, engineers and crew. The obligations of the clause cannot be performed unless the owners have possession of the ship. Clause 13 is as follows:—"The Master shall be solely under and obey the orders and directions of the Charterer or any officer or agent authorized by the Charterer as regards employment of ship, agency, or other arrangements, but he shall be solely responsible (on behalf of the Owners) for the management, navigation, and handling of the ship."

This clause, in my opinion, conclusively shows that possession of the ship was not delivered to the charterer. The owners retain in their control the management, navigation and handling of the ship.

Thus, in my opinion, the Commonwealth did not obtain possession of the ship. The ship remained in the possession of the owners. There was no acquisition of property and no question arises as to whether or not the regulations or the charter party provide just terms for the acquisition of property. The objection to the Regulations and to the charter party fails. The result is that the plaintiff's demurrer to the defence should be disallowed.

This is a demurrer to a statement of claim which seeks compensation or damages in respect of a ship owned by the plaintiff and lost by enemy action on 6th August 1943. By an order of the Minister for Commerce dated 14th July 1941 she had been "requisitioned" under reg. 11 of the National Security (Shipping Control) Regulations. Under reg. 4 (2) of the National Security (Shipping Requisition) Regulations the ship so requisitioned came to be governed by the provisions of the standard time charter party of the Shipping Control Board. Regulation 45 of the National Security (Shipping Co-ordination) Regulations continued the operation upon the ship of the standard time charter. The substance of the plaintiff's case is that the requisition, coupled with the subsequent loss of the vessel, entitles the plaintiff to just terms—that is of compensation—for the acquisition of property. The standard time charter party provides in par. 27 for the assumption by the Commonwealth of the war risk, i.e., loss of the vessel by enemy action. The plaintiff is entitled to the value of the ship as fixed by that paragraph, but is not satisfied apparently either with the valuation or with the division of the established value into two parts and the retention by the authorities of what is called the increased value. The plaintiff therefore falls back on s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution and says that the Commonwealth has acquired property in the ship and could only do so on just terms. Whether the case can be brought within that section depends upon the correctness of the contention that property in the ship was acquired. This in turn rests upon the provisions of the standard time charter party. That is a studied document bearing all the marks of the adaptation of the traditional terms of time charter parties and the terms of the requisition used in the last war, e.g., T99. I think that it is perfectly plain that the document is a charter in respect of the use or services of ships, and not a demise charter. It performs the ordinary function of a charter of affreightment, leaving the possession of the ship in the master as the servant of the owner. The owner has full control of the ship through the master and crew under a time charter of indefinite duration giving the Commonwealth a power of direction as to the voyages to be made and, within limits, the cargoes to be carried. It includes, of course, the undertaking of war risk, a responsibility by way rather of insurance than of compensation. The Commonwealth acquired no interest in the ship, whether possessory or proprietary, and the case is, in my opinion, entirely outside the provisions of s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to consider what might have been the consequence had s. 51 (xxxi.) been applicable. It is enough to say that the foundation of the plaintiff's action is wanting and the demurrer should be overruled.

The plaintiff in this action claimed, inter alia, compensation for the use of its steamship Macumba which was requisitioned pursuant to the National Security (Shipping Control) Regulations. The defendants pleaded that the ship had been requisitioned under the Shipping Control Regulations and was governed by the terms and conditions of the standard time charter party of the Shipping Control Board which was scheduled to the National Security (Shipping Requisition) Regulations and was binding upon the owners and others concerned therein. And it was further alleged that the whole of the terms and conditions governing the requisitioning of the ship were contained in the standard time charter party and that the defendants were not liable to pay any amount not provided for in the standard time charter party.

The plaintiff demurred to this plea on the ground that the Shipping Requisition and the Shipping Control Regulations were invalid substantially upon the ground that the requisition of the ship was an acquisition of property within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution in respect of which "just terms" had not been provided. The standard time charter party contains many clauses usual in time charters: cf. Carver, Carriage by Sea, 5th ed., p. 971.

The owners let and the charterer hires the ship for the period of the requisition upon the terms and conditions of the charter party. The whole reach, burthen, including lawful deck capacity and passenger accommodation, if any, of the ship, is placed at the charterer's disposal, reserving only proper and sufficient space for master, ship's officers, crew, tackle, apparel and so forth. The owners, it is provided, shall maintain the ship in an efficient state with master and full complement of officers, engineers and crew and provide and pay for all provisions and wages of master, officers, engineers and crew subject to certain provisions for refunds. The charter party on its proper construction does not operate as a demise or lease of the ship, but gives the charterer the temporary right to have goods loaded and conveyed in the ship; the ownership and also the possession of the ship remaining in the owners through the master and crew who continue to be their servants: Cf. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 14th ed. (1939), p. 5. A demise or lease of the ship might, I should think, be described as an acquisition of property (Cf. Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel[18]), but, in my opinion, a temporary right to have goods loaded and conveyed on a ship which confers neither possession nor a right of ownership of the ship cannot be described as an acquisition of property. Consequently the provision in the Constitution, s. 51 (xxxi.), granting power to the Parliament to make laws with respect to the acquisition of property on just terms has no bearing upon this particular case. In any case, I heard no argument which convinced me that the Regulations which have been attacked do not provide just terms of acquisition.

And I would add that the Shipping Control and the Shipping Requisition Regulations have not been attacked on the ground that they are ultra vires the defence power or the powers contained in the National Security Act 1939-1940.

The s.s. Macumba, a ship owned by the plaintiff company, was sunk by enemy action on 6th August 1943. At the time of the loss, the ship was under requisition to the defendant the Shipping Control Board, a body constituted under the National Security (Shipping Control) Regulations; and, in accordance with reg. 4 of the National Security (Shipping Requisition) Regulations, was governed by the terms and conditions of the standard time charter party set out in the schedule to these Regulations. Under this charter party, the plaintiff company became entitled, in respect of the loss of the ship, in accordance with clause 27, to an immediate payment in respect of her basic value, and it will also become entitled in the future, subject to performing the necessary conditions, to a further payment in respect of her increased value. But the plaintiff company is dissatisfied with these amounts, and claims that the requisition of the ship was an acquisition of property within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution. The placitum does not itself give a right of action. But it requires that legislation of the Commonwealth Parliament providing for the acquisition of property shall provide for the acquisition on just terms. Otherwise the legislation will not comply with the Constitution, and will be void, so that, if the Commonwealth takes possession of the property, it will commit a tort for which it will be liable in damages. It is claimed that either the plaintiff company is entitled to sue for compensation under reg. 11 (2) of the Shipping Control Regulations, or that the Regulations do not contain just terms, and the requisition was unlawful and the plaintiff is entitled to sue for damages.

Since the action is based on the assumption that the requisition was an acquisition of property within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.), it follows that, if this assumption is unfounded, the action fails.

In my opinion, the requisition of a ship upon the terms and conditions of the standard time charter party does not vest any property in the Shipping Control Board. The first clause of this charter party refers to the owner letting and the charterer hiring the ship, and the seventh clause to the delivery of the ship to the charterer and her redelivery to the owner. The words "let" and "hire" by themselves would point to a demise of the ship, and such a demise would be an acquisition of property within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.) (Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel[19]). But the whole of the clauses must be considered, and I venture to repeat the statement in Scanlan's New Neon Ltd. v. Tooheys Ltd.[20] that "it must be remembered in considering the charter party cases that the modern time charter although often expressed to be a lease of the ship, does not provide for the transfer of the possession of the ship to a charterer who engages his own crew to navigate her, but for the placing of the ship complete with officers and crew at his disposal, so that the owner retains throughout the possession of the vessel through the officers and crew (per Viscount Haldane in Tamplin's Case3(1916) 2 A.C., at pp. 408-9.; Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton4(1903) 2 K.B. 683, at p. 689.). This is made clear in Sea and Land Securities Ltd. v. William Dickinson and Co. Ltd.5(1942) 2 K.B., at pp. 69, 70., where MacKinnon L.J. pointed out that between the old and the modern form of contract there is all the difference between the contract which a man makes when he hires a boat in which to row himself about and the contract he makes with a boatman that he shall take him for a row." There is a close correspondence between the standard time charter party and the charter party contained in the form known as T99 used by the Admiralty during the first world war. It was held in Elliott Steam Tug Co. v. Admiralty Commissioners[24] that the terms and conditions of this charter party did not constitute a demise of a ship. There is an even closer correspondence between the standard time charter party and the charter party contained in the form T99a used by the Admiralty during the recent world war. We were supplied at the hearing with a copy of this charter party. It provides, inter alia, clause 1, that the owners agree to let and the charterer agrees to hire the ship, she being then ready to receive cargo and tight, strong, and in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service, and with a master and full complement of officers and crew, and for the delivery, redelivery and right to sublet the ship. Clause 2, that the owners shall provide for and pay for all the wages, provisions, and all other expenses in connection with the master, officers, and crew, ... and for all services in connection with the navigation of the ship and for the maintenance of the ship in a thoroughly efficient state in hull machinery and equipment for and during the service. Clause 9, that the master shall prosecute his voyage with the utmost despatch and shall render all possible assistance with ships, officers and crew and boats, cranes, derricks, and winches on board, and although appointed by the owners he shall be under the orders and direction of the charterer as regards employment, agency, and other arrangements. Clause 10, that if the charterer shall have reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the master, officers, or crew, the owners shall, on receiving particulars of the complaint, investigate the matter and, if necessary, make a change in the appointments.

Referring to this charter party, Lord Wright said, in Larrinaga Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The King[25], that it was not a demise of the ship. The standard time charter party like T99 and T99a is a charter party which provides for the owner placing the ship complete with officers and crew at the disposal of the charterer, he retaining possession of the ship through the officers and crew who are his servants. He is responsible for their wages and the hire is calculated on what is termed in Elliott's Case[26] "a gross basis of hire." As in clause 9 of T99a, clause 13 of the standard time charter party provides that the master shall be solely under and obey the orders and directions of the charterer as regards employment of the ship, agency, or other arrangements; but clause 13 also provides that the master shall be solely responsible (on behalf of the owners) for the management, navigation and handling of the ship. These additional words make it even clearer than it is in the case of T99 and T99a that the terms and conditions of the standard time charter party are not a demise of the ship. There was, therefore, no acquisition of property in the Macumba within the meaning of s. 51 (xxxi.) of the Constitution and the action fails in limine.

Solicitor for the defendants, H. F. E. Whitlam, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.

[1] (1925) P. 61.

[2] (1925) P., at p. 65.

[3] (1925) P., at p. 66.

[4] (1942) 1 K.B. 375, at p. 379.

[5] (1944) P. 43, at p. 48.

[6] (1916) P. 64, at p. 70.

[7] [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 C.L.R. 261.

[8] (1857) 7 El. & B. 704 [119 E.R. 1407].

[9] (1862) 31 L.J. C.P. 334.

[10] [1838] EngR 963; (1838) 8 Ad. & E. 835, at p. 843 [1838] EngR 963; [112 E.R. 1054, at p. 1057].

[11] (1868) L.R. 2 Ad. & Ec. 88.

[12] (1877) 2 C.P.D. 464.

[13] (1892) 1 Q.B. 253, at p. 259.

[14] (1893) A.C. 8, at p. 17.

[15] [1821] EngR 141; (1821) 2 Brod. & B. 410 [129 E.R. 1025].

[16] (1942) 2 K.B. 65, at p. 69.

[17] (1921) 1 A.C. 137, at p. 141.

[18] [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 C.L.R. 261, at p. 290.

[19] [1944] HCA 4; (1944) 68 C.L.R. 261.

[20] [1943] HCA 43; (1943) 67 C.L.R. 169, at p. 224.

[21] (1916) 2 A.C., at pp. 408-9.

[22] (1903) 2 K.B. 683, at p. 689.

[23] (1942) 2 K.B., at pp. 69, 70.

[24] (1921) 1 A.C. 137.

[25] (1945) 172 L.T. 177, at p. 180.

[26] (1921) 1 A.C. 137.

High Court of Australia

Australasian United Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shipping Control Board [1945] HCA 45; (1945) 71 CLR 508 (21 December 1945)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA