Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst [1940] HCA 45; (1940) 64 CLR 538 (19 December 1940)

Adelaide Stevedoring Company limited Respondent, Appellant; and Forst Applicant, Respondent.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia consisting of Angas Parsons and Napier JJ., who allowed an appeal from an award of a special magistrate sitting under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1932-1935 (S.A.).

The special magistrate's award refused compensation to the now respondent, the widow of a deceased workman who collapsed while at work and died. A post-mortem examination disclosed evidence of a coronary thrombosis which would cause occlusion and consequent cardiac insufficiency. Having heard an abundance of medical evidence from witnesses whose attainments and eminence neither were nor could be challenged, but whose opinions exhibited no greater degree of unanimity than is commonly met with in other departments of abstruse knowledge and of scientific research, the learned magistrate arrived at a negative conclusion. His finding was, in substance, that coronary thrombosis could not, in the present state of knowledge, be connected with exertion and accordingly that it was not established that the workman's employment materially contributed to the cause of his death.

The learned judges of the Full Court considered the whole of the medical evidence, as, under the Act, they are entitled to do, and, having described the duty of the court to arrive at some conclusion on an issue of fact, however "difficult or invidious" it might be made by the state of scientific knowledge and opinion, their Honours proceeded, by a course of reasoning which combined common sense with the application of logic to physiological facts, to infer "on the preponderance of probabilities" that the thrombus was precipitated as the result, in part, of some unusual exertion undertaken by the workman before his collapse.

In my opinion the conclusion of the Full Court is correct. I am greatly impressed by the sequence of events. The deceased, who had arrived at an age when arterio-sclerosis and atheroma afflict mankind, was a stevedore's labourer. On the day of his death he climbed up the jib of the crane and lay prone on the crane with his arms outstretched, trying to replace a wire which had come off the gin. He failed to do so, returned to the deck and for some time, with his arms in a position raised over his head, helped in holding up a wire rope. Immediately after performing this task he collapsed. What weighs so much with me is the fact that he was brought to a standstill, as an ordinary lay observer would think, by the exertion he had undergone: Cf. Partridge Jones and John Paton Ltd. v. James[1]. I do not see why a court should not begin its investigation, i.e., before hearing any medical testimony, from the standpoint of the presumptive inference which this sequence of events would naturally inspire in the mind of any common-sense person uninstructed in pathology. When he finds that a workman of the not-so-young standing attempts in a posture calculated by reason of the pressure on the stomach to disturb or arrest the rhythm of the heart a very strenuous task not forming part of his ordinary work and then collapses almost immediately and dies from a heart condition, why should not a court say that here is strong ground for a preliminary presumption of fact in favour of the view that the work materially contributed to the cause of death? From this standpoint the investigation of physiological and pathological opinion shows no more than the current medical views find insufficient reason for connecting coronary thrombosis with effort. Be it so. That to my mind is not enough to overturn or rebut the presumption which flows from the observed sequence of events. If medical knowledge develops strong positive reasons for saying that the lay common-sense presumption is wrong, the courts, no doubt, would gladly give effect to this affirmative information. But, while science presents us with no more than a blank negation, we can only await its positive results and in the meantime act on our own intuitive inferences. The conclusion of the special magistrate may prove to be in advance of its time, but, as matters stand, I prefer that of the Full Court.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of South Australia, which declared that the appellant was liable to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1932-1935 to the respondent, the widow of Carl H. M. Forst and sole dependant of Forst, in respect of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and discharging and setting aside an award to the contrary in an arbitration under the Act.

Forst was employed by the appellant as a waterside worker. He was engaged in June 1938 in discharging cargo from the s.s. Maloja. He started work at 8 a.m., and throughout the day, until he died at about 4 p.m., he appeared to be in normal health. At about 4 p.m. the wire of the crane that he was working ran off its sheave, and when that happened Forst climbed up the lattice-work of the crane and attempted to replace the wire. It was a job which required muscular exertion, and he was in an awkward position to perform it. He was unsuccessful and decided to leave the job to the crew, to whom it strictly belonged. So he came down. He was then ordered to assist a fellow workman to pull down the wire of another crane. This work also needed effort. He had to pull the wire with his hands over his head, pulling down each hand alternately until his hand would be somewhere near the level of his face. Forst walked away when the pulling was for all practical purposes complete, and within a few seconds, during which time he walked about twelve yards, he fell down, lost consciousness, and died within a very short time.

The arbitrator found, and the Supreme Court affirmed his finding, that Forst's death was due to coronary thrombosis. There is ample evidence to support this finding and no reason that would justify this court in overruling the concurrent finding of fact of the arbitrator and the Supreme Court.

It is now well settled that, when a man in a diseased condition dies, and it is found that the disease and the work contribute to his death, then his death results from accident within the meaning of the Act (Partridge Jones and John Paton Ltd. v. James[2]; Hetherington v. Amalgamated Collieries of W.A. Ltd.[3]). The question is in all cases one of fact: Cf. Jones v. Blaenavon Co. Ltd.[4].

The arbitrator, however, found that "on the science of medicine ... death from coronary thrombosis cannot generally be related to exertion but that death in such cases is a mere happening in the chronological order of things. If death does occur concurrently with or closely connected in point of time with exertion by Forst, I am unable ... to connect the two in such a way as to say that exertion caused the death... In other words, merely because shortly before his death Forst was exerting himself and shortly afterwards died of coronary thrombosis does not cause me to reach the conclusion that the exertion had anything to do with his death."

The Supreme Court, to which an appeal lay as well upon matters of fact as upon matters of law (Act, sec. 41), reached a different conclusion. "We agree," said the learned judges, "that ... it must be difficult and probably impossible to relate an attack of coronary thrombosis to any particular activity of the patient and we concede that even in this case it is difficult to feel any great confidence in the inference but it seems to us that we have here the coincidence of strenuous physical exertion occurring at or about the time when the thrombosis must have commenced to precipitate. If the expert evidence shows, as we think it does, that physical effort is commonly—although not invariably—the inciting cause of that phenomenon, we think that we are entitled to draw the inference that" a medical witness "felt unable to draw. We fully accept his view that the evidence is in some measure inconclusive. For the purpose of a scientific deduction it may be insufficient, but we repeat that courts of justice are entitled and bound to act upon the probabilities of the case."

It is thus apparent that the determination of the question of fact in this case is not easy. Medical science gives no certain answer to the question, and the medical witnesses differ among themselves as to the proper conclusion in this case. The medical aspects of the class of cases now under consideration have, I think, had more detailed consideration in New Zealand than elsewhere, as is suggested by the following cases: Harvey v. E. & H. Craig Ltd.[5]; Wynyard v. Daily Telegraph Co. Ltd.[6]; Gwyer v. Auckland Harbour Board[7]; Jarvis v. One Tree Hill Borough[8]. "Until quite recently it was generally agreed that excessive physical exertion or emotion was intimately connected with the precipitation of coronary thrombi." This statement is taken from an article by Dr. J. C. Paterson in the Journal of the American Medical Association of March 1939: See also the report of Dr. Fitchett[9]. And two of the medical witnesses called in the present case still, I think, adhere to it, namely, Drs. Cherry and Covernton. Medical opinion recognizes that the precipitation of coronary thrombi is not always due to effort or exertion. And many eminent men, I gather, are of opinion that effort and exertion does not contribute to and is not connected with such precipitation. Dr. Gartrell expounded this view. On the other hand, Dr. Paterson in his paper suggests that high coronary blood pressure, the result of strenuous exercise or of emotion (or of persistent hypertension), is one of the underlying causes of capillary rupture and intimal haemorrhage in arteriosclerotic coronary arteries. If conditions are favourable, he suggests that the various changes which result from capillary rupture may then be the initiating factors in the disposition of coronary thrombi. He thus summarizes his views and conclusions:—"The formation of coronary thrombi is a gradual process, sometimes occupying several days before occlusion of the coronary lumen, with its resultant cardiac pain, is produced. Therefore the activities of a patient immediately preceding the onset of an attack of coronary thrombosis have no relation to the etiology of the precipitation of a thrombus but are purely coincidental. The pathologic appearance in a series of fatal cases of coronary thrombosis suggests strongly that excessive exercise and emotional stress are intimately concerned in the mechanism of coronary artery thrombosis." Both Professors Cleland and Hicks of the Adelaide University were impressed, I think, with this theory. Another theory may be found in the report of Dr. Fitchett[10], that effort or exertion provoke a demand from the heart for extra blood, which defective coronary arteries cannot supply, thus inducing a relative ischaemia and exciting ventricular fibrillation which leads in a material degree to a fatal issue. But, in all this uncertainty, there is a passage in Professor Hicks' evidence which appeals to my mind and justifies the conclusion that Forst's death was due to an accident, in the relevant sense, which arose out of and in the course of his employment. "In my opinion," he said, "assuming that it was ante-mortem clot I think it is ignoring too great a functional disturbance occasioned by this effort to say that the formation of the clot was not due to disturbances produced by that effort. The effort in other words is the most noteworthy fact in relation to this cardiac death on the day of the death."

In the present case the deceased was engaged upon heavy work and, whilst so engaged, collapsed and died almost immediately. A post-mortem examination disclosed a thrombus three-quarters of an inch from the orifice of the coronary artery descending along the front of the heart. The clot not only occupied part of the lumen of the artery but extended through an aperture in the inner lining of the wall, being continuous with a further clot situated between the layers of the wall of the coronary artery and underneath a patch of that wall, which was affected by atheroma. The clot must have been quite recent, said Dr. Gartrell, and formed within hours of death and certainly before death, because, unless there had been this aperture leading from the lumen of the artery underneath the diseased patch, there would not be any blood underneath that layer to form a clot post mortem. All this satisfies me, as it satisfied the Supreme Court, that the functional disturbance occasioned by the work of the deceased was intimately connected with and contributed to the conditions observed upon the post-mortem examination.

By the order under appeal the Supreme Court of South Australia allowed an appeal from a special magistrate presiding at a Local Court and set aside his decision or award refusing a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1932-1935 and in lieu thereof declared that the employer (who is the appellant in this court) was liable to pay compensation under that Act to a deceased workman's widow, the respondent.

The workman died, as it has been found, in consequence of a coronary thrombosis. The finding that the cause was a thrombosis has been sustained by the Supreme Court.

Immediately before his collapse the deceased workman had undergone some exertion unusual in kind and degree. The question now at issue is whether the special magistrate ought to have found that the work done by the deceased, and, in particular, the exertion, contributed in any material degree to the condition from which his death so arose. The Supreme Court held that such a finding should be made.

If the work done by the deceased did contribute in any material degree to the formation of the thrombosis, then, as the law has been interpreted, the facts would warrant the conclusion that he died by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. In Hetherington v. Amalgamated Collieries of W.A. Ltd.[11] the court examined the state of the law governing a claim that death from coronary occlusion or cardiac insufficiency amounts to death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The issue of fact is defined by that decision and by the cases upon which it depends, and it is unnecessary now to say more than that the issue involves a medical question which must be decided as a matter of fact upon the evidence adduced in each given case. The issue having been defined, it is impossible to treat the question raised as anything but an unmixed question of fact, medical and scientific in character, and therefore to be decided upon expert testimony. No doubt such cases fall into a well-defined class and raise the same problem or similar problems, and it may be a matter for regret that the courts are unable to establish an absolute rule by which the decision of every such case would be governed. But the problems are medical, and the fact that in the present state of medical knowledge and opinion a uniform and decisive answer cannot be given on each occasion when the question is raised is anything but a ground for the courts of law attempting to supply by legal reasoning a solution to what is entirely a question of fact. The difficulty can be met only by legislation.

In the present case the special magistrate heard and considered testimony ably given by experts of great knowledge and experience. How far work or exertion brings about or contributes to coronary thrombosis was one of the matters to which that testimony was directed. The learned special magistrate's conclusion was "that death in such cases is a mere happening in the chronological order of things. If death does occur concurrently with or closely connected in point of time with exertion, it cannot satisfactorily be said to have been caused by such exertion." This conclusion appears to me to be fully supported by the evidence and to represent what, according to the evidence, would seem to be the fair result of competent medical opinion at the present time.

I think the special magistrate's finding gives proper effect to the evidence adduced. In the Supreme Court, Angas Parsons and Napier JJ., after a close consideration of the evidence, formed the contrary view. Their Honours based their opinion in no small degree upon deductions, which they drew, of a physiological and pathological nature. Professor Cleland, the Professor of Pathology in the University of Adelaide, had said in evidence that he thought, as far as he could see, that the evidence of the times in which such cases occurred did not seem to associate the onset with effort and that the impression was (and it was mentioned to students) that coronary thrombosis does not seem to be related to effort. In reference to this statement, their Honours say: "It may be difficult for us to draw an inference that medical men hesitate to draw, but we do not think that we can refuse to enter upon an inquiry because it is difficult or invidious, and it seems to us that Professor Cleland has given us the material for a conclusion." The judgment then sets out a course of reasoning of a medical nature, some of the materials for which are drawn from contributions to medical literature that were in evidence and contained an exposition which Professor Cleland appeared to their Honours to accept. After citing a passage from Professor Cleland's evidence, the judgment continues as follows:—"We agree with the witness that, speaking generally, it must be difficult and probably impossible to relate an attack of coronary thrombosis to any particular activity of the patient, and we concede that, even in this case, it is difficult to feel any great confidence in the inference, but it seems to us that we have here the coincidence of strenuous physical exertion occurring at or about the time when the thrombus must have commenced to precipitate. If the expert evidence shows, as we think it does, that physical effort is commonly—though not invariably—the inciting cause of that phenomenon, we think we are entitled to draw the inference that Professor Cleland felt unable to draw. We fully accept his view that the evidence is in some measure inconclusive. For the purposes of a scientific deduction it may be insufficient, but we repeat that courts of justice are entitled and bound to act upon the probabilities of the case." The difficulty I feel in adopting these views lies in three considerations.

First, I think that upon a question of fact of a medical or scientific description a court can only say that the burden of proof has not been discharged where, upon the evidence, it appears that the present state of knowledge does not admit of an affirmative answer and that competent and trustworthy expert opinion regards an affirmative answer as lacking justification, either as a probable inference or as an accepted hypothesis.

Secondly, I do not read the evidence, considered as a whole, as meaning that physical effort is commonly, although not invariably, the inciting cause of coronary thrombosis.

Thirdly, whether an inference can or should be drawn from the fact that in the present case the collapse of the deceased occurred after unusual exertion seems to me to depend on the answer first given to the pathological question whether there is any natural connection between exertion and the formation of a thrombus.

Tempting as it always is, particularly in matters of bodily health, to argue from a sequence of external events, such reasoning is justified only when positive knowledge or common experience supplies some adequate ground for believing that the events are naturally associated. The evidence upon which the special magistrate acted is to the effect that there is no such ground.

The question in this case is whether the Supreme Court was in error in reversing the decision of the court of first instance, which found that the death of the respondent's husband did not result from personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellant. The decision of the Supreme Court was given upon an appeal which it entertained under sec. 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1932-1935 of South Australia. This section gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to decide questions of fact and law and to rehear the case.

There are concurrent findings of the two courts that the cause of death was coronary thrombosis. The widow's advisers put forward that death was due to another cause, which is more plainly connected with physical exertion. There is ample evidence to support the conclusion at which both courts have arrived as to the cause of death, and I do not think that it ought to be disturbed.

Coronary thrombosis comes within the definition of "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment" (Hetherington v. Amalgamated Collieries of W.A. Ltd.[12])— See also Falmouth Docks and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Treloar[13].

The court of first instance and the Supreme Court reached opposite conclusions on the question whether the deceased's work accelerated the progress of the disease, which the post-mortem examination revealed was affecting his heart, to the condition resulting in his death.

We have now to decide whether the evidence justifies the inference that the exertion brought about by the strenuous work done by the deceased immediately before he died accelerated or materially contributed to his death. The appellant contends that the inference is not justified because it is equally probable or more probable that the artery leading to the heart became occluded without any extraneous causation but merely by the progress of the disease from which the deceased was suffering.

It was proved that he was apparently a strong energetic man, and on the day on which he died he had worked with his normal vigour and efficiency as a winchman in the appellant's employment. He had worked on that day from 8 a.m. until 4.15 p.m., when he collapsed and died. He had not during the day exhibited any sign of pain or distress.

The special magistrate who constituted the court of first instance described the particular operations which the deceased carried out immediately before he died in these words:—"Forst was a winchman —a powerful man weighing fifteen to sixteen stone. On the 4th June 1938 he was on the Maloja. About four o'clock in the afternoon the wire ran off one of the sheaves on the crane which Forst was operating. He stopped operations and climbed up the crane to life the wire on the sheaf. The crane was then at an angle of about forty-five degrees. Forst lay along the crane and taking hold of the wire tried to lift it and shove it at the same time to lift it over the gin. After two or three unsuccessful attempts he came down again and gave every appearance of being quite normal. He came down because he found it was going to be difficult, and he would leave the job to the crew whose job strictly it was. It was a job which required muscular exertion and the man was in an awkward position to perform it. He then spoke about the quantity of cargo to Harmsdorf who had worked with him at different times for years. The foreman Hodgson then instructed him to assist Strudwick to pull down the wire of another crane. He then wheeled around quite normally, and began that job which meant that he had to pull the wire with his hands over his head pulling down each hand alternately until his hand would be somewhere near the level of his face. This work again needed effort. It was not easy. Strudwick had been on it and Forst had been sent to lighten the latter's task, and finally a Lascar joined in... With the pulling for all practical purposes completed Forst walked away. Strudwick who was working face to face with him noticed nothing wrong with him. Within a few seconds of his ceasing work during which time he walked about twelve yards he fell down. He hit and cut his head in falling but there is no evidence of fracture of the skull. Apparently Forst did not regain consciousness and it is clear on the evidence that his death was due to cessation of heart action." There would be no doubt that all these facts would amply justify the inference that the work that the deceased did immediately before he collapsed accelerated or materially contributed to his death if there was not a strong body of medical evidence that physical exertion is not required to cause the fatal onset of coronary thrombosis.

The weight to be given to the facts of this case standing alone is well illustrated by the observations of Lords Loreburn and Atkinson respectively in Woods v. Thomas Wilson Sons and Co. Ltd.[14]. It is sufficient to quote the views of Lord Loreburn:—"He" (the County-Court judge) "had to choose between a variety of possible explanations, and he found that the physical condition of the man at his age would be likely to produce, and did produce, a weakened bowel, and that an accident of this sort is just the sort of thing to have caused, and did cause, acute injury to the weakened bowel which otherwise might have lasted for a considerable time and not interfered with his efficient work, and that the injury so caused gradually produced perforation and so accelerated his death. In choosing between the view that this blow accelerated death and the view that it did not, he looked at events as well as opinions: The evidence appears to me to be overwhelming that before the accident he was an efficient workman though old, and that immediately after it he was completely ineffective and thrown into such a condition that he first collapsed and then died within a few days. I come to the conclusion, therefore, that his death was accelerated, that is to say caused, by the injury resulting from the accident. In my opinion that ends this case. To my mind this reasoning was quite legitimate. The blow was instantly followed by disablement from work and by pain in the region struck and almost immediately by vomiting. Pain in the same region and vomiting continued to some extent at all events, and in a week the man died. If there were nothing else, I should say that these facts were evidence of an injury by accident and a resulting death. It is conceivable, as counsel argued, that the commencement of the illness, though simultaneous with the blow, may have been due simply to appendicitis seizing him at that precise moment. It would be a curious coincidence. It seems infinitely more probable that the commencement of the illness was due to the blow. But there is something else, namely, the medical evidence both of physical fact and of opinion. The doctors somewhat differ as to the inference they draw from those physical facts, but two of them think that the condition which led to death might have been brought about by a blow. This does not displace or contradict, but in some degree confirms, the conclusion which would be warranted from the story of what happened to the man and how it affected him on the instant and soon after. The learned judge thought so, and the medical assessor agreed, for it is clear, when his judgment is read, that he took the opinion of the assessor on the medical effect of the evidence in the light of his medical experience and knowledge, and judged of the legal effect for himself. It is quite true that every case must be proved, and something more is needed than a state of facts which is consistent with one view or the other. That something more is supplied if the facts show a probability one way or other. No one can frame a formula by which you can measure probabilities. We must judge in each case as we would in other affairs of life"[15]: See also McArdle v. Swansea Harbour Trust[16].

With due respect to the learned special magistrate it seems to me that he gave not enough weight to the facts of the case as distinct from the medical opinion. In an abstract way he endeavoured to reason from those opinions to a general conclusion of a scientific character, which he then applied to defeat the widow's claim. He said:—"You have an elderly man of sixty-three. Unbeknown to himself he was suffering from coronary sclerosis. Whether he had any previous trouble from his heart either at the time Dr. Covernton saw him or at any time I am unable to say. From the results of that disease in all probability sooner or later he would have died, whether waking or sleeping, working or idling. On the science of medicine as I find it on the evidence before me, death from coronary thrombosis cannot generally be related to exertion, but that death in such cases is a mere happening in the chronological order of things. If death does occur concurrently with or closely connected in point of time with exertion, it cannot satisfactorily be said to have been caused by such exertion. In these circumstances, when I find death to be closely connected in point of time with exertion by Forst, I am unable, notwithstanding the suggestions of the experts called by the applicant to connect the two in such a way as to say the exertion caused the death. In my view I would be merely jumping to a conclusion if I did so." The conclusion there expressed that death from coronary thrombosis "cannot generally be related to exertion" does not deny that death from that cause can ever be related to exertion. Indeed, there is substantial medical evidence in the present case that exertion can produce coronary thrombosis and that where there is danger of its supervening the patient should avoid physical exertion. It seems to me that the special magistrate has erected the guardedly advanced theory of some of the medical witnesses that coronary thrombosis is independent of exertion into the decisive presumption "that death in such cases is a mere happening in the chronological order of things." Such a presumption is not justified even by the evidence adduced to contradict that part of the medical evidence which tends to prove that coronary thrombosis may sometimes result from exertion.

The Supreme Court took a more balanced view and considered what was the proper inference to draw from the whole of the evidence, that is to say, the facts and circumstances of the case and the medical opinion. The substance of their conclusions is carefully and cautiously expressed in these terms:—"If the formation of the thrombosis is a gradual process, which may sometimes occupy several days before occlusion occurs, it follows that the activities of the patient immediately preceding the onset of the attack may be purely coincidental. But the evidence in this case is that the thrombus must have formed very quickly. We think that all the experts are in agreement upon the point that the clot must have formed after the deceased had been working on the jib although, as Professor Cleland points out, the antecedent changes might have occupied several days. It seems to us that the effect of the evidence is clearly and impartially stated by the same witness in the following passages:—In Forst's case he could not have done any severe exercise with that portion of the vessel nearly occluded or one would not expect him to undertake much severe exercise and that is why I think that the final clot that killed him was formed rapidly immediately prior to his death ... I remember the exertion that Forst had been engaged in. It is my opinion that the final clot formed after he came down from the crane. I think that as soon as the clot formed he would be unable to do anything. I can't see any special connection between the work done and the formation of the clot. At first sight one would naturally be inclined to associate any unusual effort with the fatal result. That is I would. I would try and see some reasonable association between the two but in the case of thrombosis in the coronary artery one's previous experiences being taken into consideration one fails to see an association that appeals to one as being right. If you hold your breath I understand that your pulse becomes weak. I understand that it would be expected to slow the circulation if the exercise done by Forst involved his holding his breath. That would facilitate clot formation. If the clot had been formed on the jib he would have fallen down. The slowing of the circulation tends to let the platelets drop out and it would facilitate the formation of the clot. We agree with the witness that, speaking generally, it must be difficult and probably impossible to relate an attack of coronary thrombosis to any particular activity of the patient, and we concede that, even in this case, it is difficult to feel any great confidence in the inference, but it seems to us that we have here the coincidence of strenuous physical exertion occurring at or about the time when the thrombus must have commenced to precipitate. If the expert evidence shows, as we think it does, that physical effort is commonly—although not invariably—the inciting cause of that phenomenon, we think that we are entitled to draw the inference that Professor Cleland felt unable to draw. We fully accept his view that the evidence is in some measure inconclusive. For the purposes of a scientific deduction it may be insufficient, but we repeat that courts of justice are entitled and bound to act upon the probabilities of the case." The basis of these conclusions is well established by the evidence, but the decision of the court of first instance rests on an inadequate and somewhat abstract basis. I do not think it should be restored.

[1] (1933) A.C. 501, at p. 505.

[2] (1933) A.C. 501.

[3] [1939] HCA 36; (1939) 62 C.L.R. 317.

[4] (1931) 24 B.W.C.C. 148.

[5] (1933) N.Z.L.R. Supp. 102.

[6] (1934) N.Z.L.R. Supp. 137.

[7] (1937) N.Z.L.R. 808.

[8] (1940) N.Z.L.R. 280.

[9] (1934) N.Z.L.R. Supp., at p. 147.

[10] (1934) N.Z.L.R. Supp., at pp. 138-150.

[11] [1939] HCA 36; (1939) 62 C.L.R. 317.

[12] [1939] HCA 36; (1939) 62 C.L.R. 317.

[13] (1933) A.C., at p. 486.

[14] (1915) 8 B.W.C.C. 288, at pp. 295, 296, 300.

[15] (1915) 8 B.W.C.C., at pp. 295, 296.

[16] (1915) 8 B.W.C.C. 489, at pp. 495, 496.

High Court of Australia

Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst [1940] HCA 45; (1940) 64 CLR 538 (19 December 1940)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA