Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd [1937] HCA 17; (1937) 56 CLR 605 (22 April 1937)

Cowell Plaintiff, Appellant; and The Rosehill Racecourse Company Limited Defendant, Respondent.

The plaintiff appellant sued the defendant respondent for damages for assault. The defence was that the plaintiff was trespassing on the defendant's land and that the defendant's servants and agents requested him to leave the land, which he refused to do, and the defendant's servants and agents thereupon removed him, using no more force than was necessary for that purpose, and that the said removal of the plaintiff was the alleged assault. The plaintiff, for reply on equitable grounds, said that the defendant was conducting a race meeting on the said land and that in consideration of the plaintiff paying four shillings the defendant promised to allow him to remain on the racecourse and view the races, gave him leave and licence to enter and remain on the racecourse for that purpose and promised not to revoke the licence; that the plaintiff paid four shillings, but the defendant, in breach of the promise alleged, revoked the leave and licence and assaulted the plaintiff in ejecting him from the racecourse. The defendant demurred to this pleading and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales upheld the demurrer, following Naylor v. Canterbury Park Racecourse Co. Ltd.[1], and ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The question which arises in the appeal is whether this court should follow the decision in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[2]. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Naylor's Case[3] refused to apply Hurst's Case[4] in New South Wales. The facts pleaded in this case are indistinguishable from those in Hurst's Case.

In Hurst's Case it was held that Wood v. Leadbitter[5], even if originally rightly decided, was no longer good law. In Wood v. Leadbitter it was decided that a mere licence, that is, a permission to do something which without permission would be unlawful, was revocable, whether it was under seal or not, but that a licence coupled with an interest was not revocable. Kerrison v. Smith[6] shows that where a licence is revoked the actual revocation may (if there be a contract) be a breach of contract for which damages are recoverable. Thus a person ejected from a place of entertainment could in such a case at least get back the price of admission which he had paid. It was not suggested in Wood v. Leadbitter that the existence of a contract not to revoke the licence made the licence irrevocable in the sense that it could not be effectually (though possibly wrongfully) revoked.

The doctrine of Wood v. Leadbitter is clear and coherent. If a man creates a proprietary right in another and gives him a licence to go upon certain land in order that he may use or enjoy that right, the grantor cannot divest the grantee of his proprietary right and revest it in the grantor, or simply determine it, by breaking the agreement under which the licence was given. The grantee owns the property to which the licence is incident, and this ownership, with its incidental licence, is unaffected by what purports to be a revocation of the licence. The revocation of the licence is ineffectual. Easements and profits à prendre supply examples of interests to which licences to enter and remain upon land may be incidental.

The majority judgment in Hurst's Case modified, if it did not reject, the law of Wood v. Leadbitter by holding that a "right to see" a spectacle was an interest which could be granted so that a licence to go into a theatre or a racecourse to see a play or to witness races was, when given for value, irrevocable because it was a licence coupled with an interest. Further, the majority judgment held that, in so far as Wood v. Leadbitter[7] rested upon the rule that no incorporeal hereditament affecting land can be created or transferred otherwise than by deed, the Judicature Act had radically changed the position. The court was now bound to give effect to equitable doctrines and would therefore ignore the absence of a seal and would (as in Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace[8]) grant an injunction to protect the right granted.

The first ground of the decision, in my opinion, ignores the distinction between a proprietary right and a contractual right. In Wood v. Leadbitter there was obviously a contractual "interest." The plaintiff had bought and paid for a contractual right to go upon land for the purpose of witnessing a spectacle. But this fact, which was treated as irrelevant in Wood v. Leadbitter, is made the foundation of the first ground of the judgment in Hurst's Case[9]. In that case Buckley L.J.[10] interpreted "interest" in a sense quite different from that in which the word was used in Wood v. Leadbitter. The learned judge said that there was a grant of a right to come to see a spectacle. The licence is described as "only something granted to him for the purpose of enabling him to have that which had been granted to him, namely, the right to see." The "right to see" is treated as the "interest" which has been "granted."

It is clear that the learned judge used the word "grant" in a sense very different from that in which it was used in Wood v. Leadbitter. It was there used in relation to interests in land which were, if they existed at all, clearly proprietary interests. The right to see a spectacle cannot, in the ordinary sense of legal language, be regarded as a proprietary interest. Fifty thousand people who pay to see a football match do not obtain fifty thousand interests in the football ground. A contrary view produces results which may fairly be described as remarkable. The Statute of Frauds would be applicable. A person who bought a reserved seat might be held to have what could be called "a term of hours" in the seat. The "interest" of persons without reserved seats would, if regarded as proprietary interests, be more than difficult to describe. If the interests were held to be incorporeal hereditaments they would be quite new to the law—notwithstanding the strongly established principle of Keppell v. Bailey[11]. The feat would have been achieved of creating an easement in gross—an easement with a servient tenement, but without any dominant tenement. There is nothing in the majority judgments in Hurst's Case[12] to show that these consequences were appreciated when the case was decided. For the reasons mentioned, I cannot regard the transaction of buying a ticket for an entertainment as creating anything more than a contractual right in the buyer against the seller—a right to have the contract performed. For the breach of such a right there is a remedy in damages, but the remedies applicable to the protection of proprietary rights are not legally (or equitably) appropriate in such a case. There is, strictly, no grant of any interest. What is created is something quite different, namely, contractual rights and obligations. In Wells v. Kingston-upon-Hull[13] Lord Coleridge C.J. pointed out the difference between the creation of a proprietary interest in land by a contract relating to the possession or enjoyment of land and the creation of a contractual right to use land under conditions, the owner of land retaining possession and all rights over it. In that case a dock was "let" to a ship-owner for the purpose of repairing a ship, but it was held that no interest in land was created (See also Frank Warr & Co. Ltd. v. London County Council[14]; J. C. Williamson Ltd. v. Lukey and Mulholland[15]; Commissioner of Stamp Duties (N.S.W.) v. Yeend[16]—cases of rights to sell refreshments in a theatre or on a racecourse).

In my opinion, the first ground upon which Hurst's Case was decided (that there was in that case a licence coupled with an interest) cannot be supported.

The second ground of the decision in Hurst's Case is based upon the opinion that the plaintiff in Wood v. Leadbitter[17] failed because he did not have a grant under seal of the right which he claimed. It is true that the absence of a seal was a complete reply, in an action at law, to the contention of the plaintiff that he had an interest in the land upon which a race meeting was being held. But in fact the presence of a seal would not have assisted the plaintiff to establish the impossible proposition that he had an easement in gross. It is true that, as the majority judgments in Hurst's Case[18] state, a grant of an interest in land need not, in order to be effective in a court of equity, be made by deed, and that, since the Judicature Act, this rule is enforced in all divisions of the High Court in England (Walsh v. Lonsdale[19]). But this proposition does not justify the assertion that interests in land can, since the Judicature Act, be created by simple contract even though, before that Act, they were of such a character that they could not be created by deed as interests in land. Buckley L.J. applies to the facts of Hurst's Case the statement of Parker J. in James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[20] that an injunction restraining the revocation of a licence "merely prevents" the defendant "from breaking his contract, and protects a right in equity which but for the absence of a seal would be a right at law, and since the Judicature Act it may well be doubted whether the absence of a seal in such a case can be relied on in any court." This statement was made with respect to a proprietary right (a profit à prendre) and it is a begging of the question to apply it to a case in which the matter in dispute is whether the alleged interest is such that it can be an interest in land, whether created by deed or not. Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace[21], which is relied upon in Hurst's Case, was a case of an agreement for a profit à prendre, an incorporeal hereditament. Thus the second ground for the majority judgments in Hurst's Case cannot, in my opinion, be supported. I regard the dissenting judgment of Phillimore L.J. as a convincing statement of the true position both at law and in equity.

In New South Wales the Judicature Act is not in force, but the Common Law Procedure Act 1899, sec. 97, provides that "the plaintiff may, in answer to any plea, reply facts avoiding such plea upon equitable grounds."

In this case the plaintiff relies upon an equitable replication containing an allegation that the defendant for consideration agreed not to revoke the licence to enter and remain upon the racecourse. Whether this replication is good or not depends upon whether such an agreement, if proved, prevents in equity the revocation of the licence in such a sense as to make entirely ineffectual anything purporting to be a revocation of the licence. Except in Hurst's Case[22] there is no authority for the proposition that such a licence cannot be revoked at law in cases where no proprietary interest has been granted. The question is whether there is any principle of equity which prevents the effectual revocation of such a licence even though the revocation be a breach of contract. No authority apart from Hurst's Case has been cited to show that this is a principle of equity. Whether the replication is good or bad depends, not upon rules of pleading, but upon whether the facts alleged constitute a good answer in equity to the plea raised by the defendant that the plaintiff was a trespasser. If his licence was effectually revoked, though wrongfully, he was a trespasser, and the removal of him from the racecourse without the use of undue force did not constitute an assault. The plaintiff can escape from the position of being a trespasser only by showing that the licence was not effectually revoked. The only argument to support this proposition is to be found in the contention that the defendant cannot be heard to rely upon his own wrongful act in revoking the licence which he had agreed not to revoke. If the principle to be applied is a principle that the defendant cannot rely upon his own breach of contract, then that principle would surely have been mentioned in the reports of decided cases. No reference, however, has been made to any cases decided upon the basis of this principle.

It is common ground that an equitable replication under the Common Law Procedure Act 1899, sec. 97, can be sustained only where the facts pleaded are such that a court of equity would upon the basis of those facts have granted an absolute unconditional and perpetual injunction (See Stephen's Principles of Pleading, 7th ed. (1866), at p. 210; Gee v. Smart[23]).

It is clear that equity would never have decreed the specific performance of a contract to provide an entertainment. Equity would never have granted an unconditional injunction restraining the proprietor of a place of entertainment from excluding from that place a person who had bought a ticket of admission. Any injunction granted would necessarily have been subject at least to the condition that the plaintiff coming into equity should behave himself with due propriety during the entertainment.

But it is urged that equity would have granted an unconditional and perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from setting up an unconscientious plea, namely, a plea based upon his own wrongful withdrawal of a licence. This argument is suggested in a note to the article of Sir John Miles criticizing Hurst's Case[24] in the Law Quarterly Review, vol. 31, p. 217. In the first place there is no authority to support the contention in such a case as the present case. The real rule is that an equitable defence to a common law action is admissible under the Common Law Procedure Act only "where it discloses facts which would entitle the party pleading it to an absolute and unconditional injunction in a court of equity against the judgment which the opposite party might otherwise have obtained at law" (Stephen's Principles of Pleading, 7th ed. (1866), at p. 210). If the suggested principle were sound, it is remarkable that it was never advanced as a practical means of avoiding the law as laid down in Wood v. Leadbitter[25]. Secondly, the contention appears to me to be based upon an idea that equity will always do whatever it can to bring about the specific performance of any contract according to its terms. The argument rests upon a vague assumption that equity would, by limiting the pleading in a common law action of a party who had broken a contract, seek to prevent him from merely paying damages for his breach if an injunction against his pleading would prevent him from gaining some "unconscientious" advantage by his breach. There is no such general equitable principle (see per Pollock C.B., Hyde v. Graham[26]). In cases of wrongful dismissal, for example, the only remedy for the breach of contract is to be found in damages. Even though the employer admits the wrongful dismissal, he cannot be ordered to re-employ his former servant. If the servant under an ordinary contract of service sues for wages in respect of a period after dismissal, the employer would never have been restrained from pleading that he had dismissed him, though wrongfully. In such cases—and there are many others, for example, sale of goods and commercial contracts generally—equity left the parties to their remedies at law. The equitable remedies of injunction and specific performance were never applied merely or generally on grounds of unconscientiousness. They would be used to protect proprietary rights, to enforce negative agreements, and, in special cases only, to enforce affirmative agreements (Doherty v. Allman[27]). These agreements never included contracts to provide an entertainment in a particular place in return for payment. Thus I am unable to accept the contention that equity would at any time have restrained the defendant from pleading the replication in question.

This aspect of the case should be considered in relation to established principles of equity and not in relation to the arguments ab inconvenienti which are so prominent in the majority judgments in Hurst's Case[28]. There are arguments from inconvenience on both sides. The right to see an entertainment is doubtless a valuable right. It is a right for which people are prepared to pay and which they esteem. There are other rights, the exercise of which involves entry upon land, which are still more valuable from a practical point of view. Consider, for example, the case of a servant who is employed for a term to do work upon certain premises. He is wrongfully dismissed. He is then excluded from the premises. His right to earn a living in accordance with a lawful contract is a right at least as important as a right to witness an entertainment. The principle approved in Hurst's Case would entitle him to go into and remain upon the premises, although he had been dismissed from his employment, and to obtain damages for assault if he were forcibly removed. Similarly an ordinary building contract enables the building contractor to go upon land for the purpose of conducting building operations so that he can perform his contract and earn his expected profit. This right continues to exist even if the building owner wrongfully repudiates the contract. But the only remedy of the building contractor for an infringement of the right is in damages. If he goes on the land against the will of the owner he may be treated as a trespasser. The adoption of the principle involved in Hurst's Case would alter these established rules. Consider further a case where a building devoted to entertainment becomes overcrowded by persons who have bought tickets. This may happen without any default on the part of the person in control of the building. If, however, the legal position is as stated in Hurst's Case[29], it is impossible for anyone (except possibly a constable) to remove any of the persons, either for the safety of the audience as a whole or in order to secure the observance of the law, without subjecting himself to the possibility of numerous actions for assault. It is doubtful whether such consequences were realized in Hurst's Case.

On the other hand it might be said that there is an implied condition that the licence to each member of the audience might be revoked in the interests of the safety of the audience or in order to secure the due observance of the law or for some other lawful reason. Such a view really constructs or invents a complicated contract between the parties and it would raise new and rather difficult questions. Why, for example, should A be asked to leave the building rather than B? Would it be left to the judgment of the controller of the building to determine how many persons should be asked to leave? In other cases it might be sought to avoid what would be described as an unreasonable extension of Hurst's Case by saying that the facts show that the parties intended that the licence should be revocable in certain conditions. I refer again to the case of a dismissed servant. Here, it appears to me, it is difficult to suggest in explicit terms an appropriate condition. It would be necessary to attach to the contract an implied condition that the employer might revoke the implied licence to come upon his premises if at any time he should determine the contract of employment even though he did so wrongfully. Such a view appears to me to be an unreal method of dealing with the position. A much more realistic approach is provided by the application of the simple principle of Wood v. Leadbitter[30], namely, that no "grant" of any proprietary right, that is, of any jus in rem, has been made to the plaintiff. He has simply obtained a contractual right which is enforceable in personam by an action for damages.

The denial of this principle will create more difficulties than are thought to be involved in its continued assertion. I agree with what Jordan C.J. says as to "common sense and practical convenience" in Naylor's Case[31].

Hurst's Case[32] has been criticized again and again by learned writers, although it has necessarily been accepted as an authority in Great Britain by subordinate courts (See references given in Hanbury's Modern Equity (1935), p. 118). The question, therefore, as it presents itself to me, is whether this court should hold itself bound by Hurst's Case for the simple and single reason that it is a decision of the Court of Appeal in England.

In matters affecting title to property, where rights have been paid for and where persons have acted upon the faith of established decisions, it is very desirable that those decisions should be followed, if possible, even though a court not strictly bound by a particular decision should be of opinion that it was wrong. So also in cases affecting mercantile practice. See Sexton v. Horton[33] where it was also said by Knox C.J. and Starke J. that unless a decision of the Court of Appeal was manifestly wrong it should be followed. In Smith v. Australian Woollen Mills Ltd.[34] a decision of the Court of Appeal was not followed because it was held to be inconsistent with established principles. I am of opinion, for the reasons which I have stated, that Hurst's Case is manifestly wrong, and that it is not possible to extract from it any general principle which is consistent with well-recognized principles of law. Hard cases may be put on both sides. One cannot but sympathize with the position of a person who is asked to leave a place of entertainment without just cause. On the other hand, there are grave inconveniences involved in the adoption of Hurst's Case as sound law, and it may be added that, if the law is not correctly stated in Hurst's Case, such a person may successfully avoid indignity by recognizing the law and going quietly.

The decision in Hurst's Case has never been considered by the Privy Council or the House of Lords, and in view of my clear opinion that it is a wrong decision I think that it is proper so to hold and to refuse to follow it in this court. In my opinion Naylor's Case[35] was rightly decided, and the Full Court was right in this case in upholding the demurrer. The appeal should be dismissed.

The plaintiff's action was trespass for assault. Plea that the defendant was possessed of certain land, and that the plaintiff was trespassing, whereupon the defendant requested him to leave the land, which he refused to do, and thereupon the defendant removed him from the land, doing no more than was necessary for that purpose. A replication upon equitable grounds was pleaded to this plea. It was as follows:—"The plaintiff for reply on equitable grounds as to the defendant's ... plea says that on the day of the committing of the grievances alleged ... the defendant was about to conduct and was conducting a certain race meeting at which horse races were to be and were run on the said land under the control and management of the defendant, and thereupon in consideration of the sum of four shillings paid by the plaintiff to the defendant the defendant promised the plaintiff that it would permit and allow the plaintiff to enter upon the said land, and to attend at the said race meeting, and remain on the said land, and view all of the said horse races to be run thereat and for the consideration aforesaid the defendant gave to the plaintiff leave and licence to enter upon the said land and there remain continuously during the period of the said race meeting for the purpose of viewing the said horse races and until the conclusion of the said race meeting and for the consideration aforesaid the defendant also promised the plaintiff that it would not during the period of the said race meeting and before the conclusion thereof revoke the said licence; and the plaintiff duly paid to the defendant the said sum of four shillings and entered upon the said land pursuant to the terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant hereinbefore alleged and the said leave and licence and not otherwise and for the purposes hereinbefore mentioned and all conditions were fulfilled and all things happened and all times elapsed necessary to entitle the plaintiff pursuant to and under the terms of the agreement and the said leave and licence to remain upon the said land for the purposes aforesaid and to entitle the plaintiff to a performance by the defendant of its said promises; and the plaintiff having entered upon the said land continuously remained thereon until the revocations hereinafter alleged pursuant to and under the terms of the said agreement and the said leave and licence and not otherwise and for the purposes thereof and not otherwise; yet the defendant during the period of the said race meeting and before the conclusion thereof in breach of its said promise revoked the said licence and the plaintiff remained upon the said land after such revocation but whilst the said race meeting was in progress and before the conclusion thereof which is the trespass by the plaintiff alleged in the defendant's said plea whereupon the defendant by its servants and agents committed the trespass alleged in the declaration for the purpose of ejecting and removing the plaintiff from the said land." To this replication the defendant demurred, and the Supreme Court of New South Wales entered judgment for the defendant in demurrer for the reasons given by it in support of its decision in Naylor v. Canterbury Park Racecourse Co. Ltd.[36]. An appeal from that judgment is now brought to this court. The decision of the Supreme Court is founded upon the well-known case of Wood v. Leadbitter[37], and the court distinguishes Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[38], on the ground that it was based upon the provisions of the Judicature Acts, which were not in force in New South Wales—though the court shared the difficulty of Phillimore L.J. in Hurst's Case[39] in understanding the relevance of the Judicature Acts to the matter under consideration.

The critical question on the present appeal is whether Hurst's Case was rightly decided. It was a decision of a majority in the Court of Appeal consisting of Buckley and Kennedy LL.J. (Phillimore L.J. dissenting), and it has been accepted as law in England by Lush and McCardie JJ. in British Actors Film Co. Ltd. v. Glover[40] and Said v. Butt[41] respectively, and in Ireland in David Allen & Sons Billposting Ltd. v. King[42]. But it has not escaped the criticism of many learned lawyers (Cf. Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. vii., pp. 327, 328; Ashburner's Principles of Equity, 2nd ed. (1933), by Denis Browne, p. 19; Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property, 2nd ed. (1927), pp. 253, 254, 292, 293; Hanbury's Modern Equity (1935), pp. 117, 118; Gale on Easements, 9th ed. (1916), p. 63). The decision in Hurst's Case[43] does not bind this court, but uniformity of decision is desirable. And the decisions of the Court of Appeal may well, I think, be taken as accurately stating the law of England unless some manifest error is apparent in them, or other special circumstances exist. Here we have, at variance with the decision of the Court of Appeal, the dissenting opinion of Phillimore L.J.[44], much professional criticism, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Naylor's Case[45], followed in the case now under appeal. In these circumstances, I think this court should enter upon a consideration of the decision in Hurst's Case and the reasons given for it. The reasons were two:—

(a)

The plaintiff had a licence coupled with a grant or interest. At law, a licence to use land, whether given by deed, writing, or parol, coupled with a grant or interest, was irrevocable, provided only, in the case of a licence by parol, that the grant was of a nature capable of being made by parol (Wood v. Leadbitter[46]). But "what is the sort of interest that must be conferred to make a licence irrevocable"? (Taplin v. Florence[47]). It must be an interest in the thing to which the licence extends[48]. Or, as Parker J. said in James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[49], "a licence to enter a man's property is prima facie revocable, but is irrevocable even at law if coupled with or granted in aid of a legal interest conferred on the purchaser, and the interest so conferred may be a purely chattel interest or an interest in realty." Grants of easements, or of profits à prendre or the right of taking natural produce or profits from the lands of others, are well-known instances of licences coupled with grants or interests in realty, and are irrevocable. At law, such interests could only be created by deed (Wood v. Leadbitter[50]; Bird v. Higginson[51]; Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace[52]; James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[53]; and see Webber v. Lee[54]). And a licence to enter and take goods upon the lands of the seller is a licence coupled with an interest in personalty, and also is irrevocable (Wood v. Manley[55]; and cf. Taplin v. Florence[56]; Williams v. Morris[57]; Cornish v. Stubbs[58]; James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[59]). On the other hand, it was held that a ticket of admission to a theatre or a racecourse operated as a mere licence justifying the act licenced, but conferring no other interest and therefore was revocable (Wood v. Leadbitter[60]; and cf. Hill v. Tupper[61]). The reason for the distinction is indicated by Parker J. in James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[62]: the mere licence is not coupled with any chattel interest or any interest in realty. Or, to use the language of Sir William Holdsworth (Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. vii., p. 328), "it is obvious, firstly, that when the court" in Wood v. Leadbitter "talked of a grant, they meant the grant of some ascertainable property which is capable of being granted, and, secondly, the court itself decided in that case that such a grant must have been validly made, so that if (as in that case) the grant was of an incorporeal right over land which could not be granted without a deed, and no deed was executed, the licence was revocable." The majority of the learned judges in Hurst's Case treated a "right to ... hear ... or see" on the same footing as a grant of some ascertainable property. But there, I think, lies the fallacy: the licence was not coupled with a grant or interest in any ascertainable property, it was simply a right, subsisting in contract, to see a performance. It was therefore, according to the doctrine of the common law, revocable, though no doubt a breach of the contract would sound in damages (Kerrison v. Smith[63]; Butler v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co.[64]). The majority of the learned judges in Hurst's Case sought, however, to buttress their decision by reference to the doctrines of equity. Assuming, they suggested, that the plaintiff's interest was incapable of being supported at law upon the footing of Wood v. Leadbitter[65], still, the ticket issued to the plaintiff conferred on him a good interest in equity, which, but for the absence of a seal, would have been enforceable at law, and since the Judicature Acts could it not be said "as against the plaintiff that he is a licensee with no grant merely because there is not an instrument under seal which gives him a right in law" (Hurst's Case[66]; Walsh v. Lonsdale[67]). Again the fallacy is, I think, in the assumption that the ticket issued to the plaintiff conferred on him a right to some ascertainable property in equity: it did not do so in equity any more than at law. The relationship created by the issue of the ticket was merely contractual. It was immaterial whether the ticket was under seal or not, for the licence to hear and see the performance was not coupled with any grant or interest in any ascertainable property, either in equity or at law. Consequently, it should follow that the licence to hear and see the performance was revocable.

(b)

The plaintiff had a licence given for value, coupled with an agreement not to revoke it. That was an enforceable right, and it was a breach of contract to revoke the licence. The replication in the present case expressly alleges that for a certain consideration the defendant "promised the plaintiff that it would not during the period of the race meeting and before the conclusion thereof revoke the said licence." On demurrer, that allegation must be accepted as a fact, however improbable it may be as a matter of proof. It is, of course, true that a court of equity had jurisdiction to restrain the violation of stipulations in contracts. Normally, it so restrained the breach of purely negative stipulations, but exercised a wide discretion in the case of affirmative stipulations (Doherty v. Allman[68]). But rights in property and contractual stipulations must not be confused. In Hurst's Case the plaintiff did not establish any right at law or in equity in any ascertainable property, but at best the breach of a contractual obligation. Assuming that a court of equity had jurisdiction to restrain and would by injunction have restrained such a breach—and cases may be put even of rights "to hear and see performances," for instance, a contract for a box or a seat during a season of opera, in which equity might so act—still, the contract would not create a licence coupled with a grant or interest in any ascertainable property, which is the relevant consideration. The question is not whether a court of equity would grant an injunction for a breach of the contract, but whether an action of trespass is maintainable. Further, as Ashburner (Principles of Equity, 2nd ed. (1933), p. 19) observes, citing Cooper v. Chitty[69], "there is no case in the books in which a court of common law held that an action could be maintained for trespass on account of some act of the defendant which was not a trespass at law at the time when it was committed and only became so ex post facto if the effect of a decree of specific performance were related back."

Consequently, in my judgment, the decision in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[70] ought not to be accepted in this court as an accurate statement of the law. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales should, therefore, be affirmed and this appeal dismissed.

The defendant seeks to justify the assault of which the plaintiff complains, as a lawful exercise of force for the purpose of removing the plaintiff from the defendant's racecourse which he refused to leave upon request. The plaintiff alleges that for valuable consideration, viz., the price of admission, the defendant contracted to allow the plaintiff to enter the racecourse and remain and view the races and not to revoke his licence to do so. Do these facts deprive the defendant of its justification?

At common law they would have no effect upon the justification for the alleged tort. And, what is of much importance, they would not do so even if the contract were under seal and took the form of a grant of a right to enter and view the spectacle.

Such a right could not constitute an easement. The acts to which it relates do not form the subject of any class of easement hitherto recognized. But, apart from this consideration, the right is not appurtenant to any tenement. Strangely enough, Alderson B. in Wood v. Leadbitter[71] appears to concede that such a right might exist as an easement in gross, a concession which has tended to confuse principle. But "it seems not improbable that in the middle of last century the doctrine that a dominant tenement is necessary to the existence of an easement was not so clearly held as it is at the present day" (Sir John Miles, Law Quarterly Review vol. 31, p. 217n; cf. Gapes v. Fish[72]).

Such a right could not constitute a profit à prendre, because its subject is not the taking of something capable of ownership, of some material profit of the land (See Race v. Ward[73]).

It could not constitute a licence coupled with a grant. For it does not purport to confer any interest in any corporeal thing. "A licence to enter a man's property is prima facie revocable, but it is irrevocable even at law if coupled with or granted in aid of a legal interest conferred on the purchaser, and the interest so conferred may be a purely chattel interest or an interest in realty. If A sells to B felled timber lying on A's land on the terms that B may enter and carry it away, the licence conferred is an irrevocable licence because it is coupled with and granted in aid of the legal property in the timber which the contract for sale confers on B (Wood v. Manley3(1839) [1839] EngR 1030; 11 A. & E. 34; 113 E.R. 325.") (per Parker J., James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[75]). The licence to go upon the land is incident to the grant and depends upon it. But the purpose must be to take away something which is upon the land or forms part of the soil or otherwise to deal with an ascertainable subject of property. For the licence is irrevocable because it is necessary to the enjoyment or effectuation of a right of property that has been conferred. Thus, if the attempt to confer the proprietary right or interest proves void, the licence subsists but is countermandable (Carrington v. Roots[76]; Wood v. Leadbitter[77]).

A licence which is not coupled with or granted in aid of an interest is revocable at law. It operates as a bare permission to do what would otherwise be an invasion of the licensor's rights. If the permission is terminated, further continuance of the acts it authorized becomes wrongful. A licensee does not become a trespasser until he has received notice that the licence is countermanded and until a reasonable time has elapsed in which he may withdraw from the land and remove whatever property he has brought in pursuance of the licence (Cornish v. Stubbs[78]). But, if he then refuse to leave the premises, he cannot complain of his forcible removal.

"A licence under seal (provided it be a mere licence) is as revocable as a licence by parol" (per Alderson B., Wood v. Leadbitter[79]). Further, a licence is revocable at law notwithstanding an express contract not to revoke it. By revoking it, the licensor commits a breach of contract exposing him to an action of damages ex contractu. But the licensee cannot further avail himself of the licence and the licensor is not precluded in an action of tort from relying upon the termination of the licence (Wood v. Leadbitter[80]; Taplin v. Florence[81]). This is in accordance with the general rule of the common law that a landowner's possessory rights cannot be renounced or altered by mere contract. The rights continue to subsist notwithstanding the contract, which operates only to impose obligations and not otherwise to prevent the exercise of rights arising from property.

In Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[82] after describing how the plaintiff, who had been ejected from a picture theatre, had duly paid for his admission "to enjoy the sight of a particular spectacle" Buckley L.J. said:—"That which was granted to him was the right to enjoy looking at a spectacle, to attend a performance from its beginning to its end. That which was called the licence, the right to go upon the premises, was only something granted to him for the purpose of enabling him to have that which had been granted him, namely, the right to see. He could not see the performance unless he went into the building. His right to go into the building was something given to him in order to enable him to have the benefit of that which had been granted to him, namely, the right to hear the opera, or see the theatrical performance, or see the moving pictures as was the case here. So that here there was a licence coupled with a grant. If so, Wood v. Leadbitter does not stand in the way at all. A licence coupled with a grant is not revocable." With all respect to his Lordship, this statement entirely misconceives what is meant by a licence coupled with a grant. The opportunity of witnessing a performance is not an interest in property; it is not a tangible thing to be taken away from the land or out of the soil. It is no more than a personal advantage arising from presence at the place where the licence, while unrevoked, authorized the plaintiff to go and remain.

There can, I think, be no doubt that at law the plaintiff could not recover in tort in respect of his forcible expulsion. His remedy in contract does not include damages for the assault. As it was the plaintiff's legal duty to leave the premises after notice that his licence to remain was withdrawn, and as the assault was the lawful consequence of his failure to do so, the assault could hardly be considered a reasonable and probable consequence of the defendant's breach of contract in withdrawing the licence. Perhaps it does not follow that in no circumstances can anything beyond repayment of the price of admission be recovered ex contractu. But if there be any cause for dissatisfaction with the common law rule, it arises less from the substance of the rule than from the measure of damages allowed in an action of contract (See Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd.[83]). For the assault, the defendant is under no liability at common law.

Is there a liability in equity? Does any equity arise out of the plaintiff's situation entitling him to relief against the consequences of the defendant's reliance upon its legal rights? Would the Court of Chancery have granted an unconditional injunction restraining the defendant from justifying the assault complained of in the plaintiff's action on the ground that he was a trespasser? If so, in New South Wales the justification pleaded by the defendant is well answered by a replication on equitable grounds setting forth the facts which would entitle the plaintiff to such an injunction. Under the Judicature system the justification would be well answered by a reply setting out facts which formerly would have entitled the plaintiff to an injunction restraining the defendant from relying at law on such a justification, even if the injunction would have been conditional and not absolute.

But I am unable to believe that any equity exists as a result of which the plaintiff could meet the defendant's justification. This opinion I base upon the substantial ground that a patron of a public amusement who pays for admission obtains by the contract so formed and by acting on the licence it imports no equity against the subsequent revocation of the licence and the exercise by the proprietor of his common law right of expelling the patron. The rights conferred upon the plaintiff by the contract possess none of the characteristics which bring legal rights within the protection of equitable remedies, and the position of the plaintiff at law gives him no title under any recognizable equitable principle to relief against the exercise by the defendant of his legal rights. No right of a proprietary nature is given. The contract is not of a kind which courts of equity have ever enforced specifically. It is not an attempt to confer a right by parol agreement which at law might have been effectually granted by a deed. There is no clear negative stipulation the breach of which would be restrained by injunction.

On the other hand, there is a fugitive or ephemeral purpose of pleasure, mutual undertakings, mostly implied, affecting the behaviour of the parties, and a complete absence of material interest. The purpose is not to enjoy the amenities forming part of the land, but to witness the races and, perhaps, to use the facilities provided for adding to the pleasure and excitement of the spectacle.

Without entering upon an examination of the legal relations to their patrons of the proprietors of a racecourse, it may be assumed that the charge for admission involves some obligations on their part. The racegoer, on his side, is subject to an implied condition that he will behave in an orderly manner and do nothing to hinder or obstruct the proceedings. The implication that the licence to remain upon the course will not be revoked is subject to many conditions. If it is found necessary to suspend the proceeding owing to weather, to the disorderly conduct of a crowd, to some sudden public emergency, or to some other unforeseen event, the contractual right to remain upon the course will be brought to a premature end. If the individual racegoer behaves in a disorderly, insulting, or objectionable manner, he may be expelled notwithstanding that he has paid for his admission. The nature of such a contract takes it outside the scope of the equitable doctrines regulating the application of the remedies of specific performance or injunction. Except for Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[84] no precedent or dictum has been found giving any countenance to the notion that a court of equity would intervene. The reason for this is not the shortness of time in which the licence operates. No doubt if an equitable interest or an equity were considered to arise out of a contract the performance of which was limited only to a few hours, it might be difficult to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity in time to secure its performance or prevent a specific breach. But on the hypothesis that the contract fell within the cognizance of equity, the parties would, after the event, be compellable so to deal with the rights and liabilities resulting at law from what had been done as to give effect to the equities. Thus, if it were true that the licence conferred an equitable interest or the contract gave rise to an equity against the revocation of the licence, then although practical considerations might prevent the Court of Chancery from giving effect antecedently to the rights with which its doctrines supposedly invested the licensee, yet ex post facto it would not permit the other party to assert at law any right inconsistent with the equitable position. On the hypothesis stated, there would be no difficulty in a court of equity restraining a licensor who had purported to revoke a licence revocable at law but irrevocable in equity from asserting in any legal proceeding, whether by way of defence or otherwise, that he had revoked the licence. Nor do I see why after the event any conditions should be attached to the injunction. In other words, if the hypothesis were sound, I do not see why in New South Wales by means of an equitable replication the same result would not be produced, as would, in that event, ensue under a Judicature system. At the same time, in considering the correctness of the hypothesis, it is impossible to disregard the transient nature of the contractual rights out of which the alleged equity or equitable interest is said to grow. Nor can the conditions attending the licence be ignored in dealing with the claim that the contract is, except for practical difficulties, susceptible of specific performance. But, in any case, the notion that equitable doctrine would give such a licence any special quality appears to me quite unwarranted. The hypothesis is false and it is for that reason that no precedent can be found for relief in equity in any such case. For that reason too neither under the Judicature system nor under the system prevailing in New South Wales can the defendant's common law justification for the assault be denied to it on equitable grounds.

Yet in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[85] the contrary view was adopted by Buckley and Kennedy L.JJ., Phillimore L.J. dissenting. The explanation lies in a misapprehension by their Lordships as to the effect at common law if the contract for admission had not been by parol but under seal. The use of a seal would in truth have made no difference at all at law. The licence was a bare licence and, therefore, revocable whether granted under seal or by parol. If the licence had been coupled with a grant, it would have been irrevocable at law, if the grant were valid. If the supposed grant had been of an interest in land, as for instance in a standing tree or building (Lavery v. Pursell[86]), the grant would not have been valid unless under seal. Again, if a grant were made of a profit à prendre, it would include a right on the part of the grantee to enter for the purpose of taking the profit. But a profit à prendre is an incorporeal hereditament and a deed is necessary to grant it. If a grant of a profit à prendre or of a thing annexed to the land were attempted by parol, it would be regarded as a contract to make the grant by deed. If the contract were one enforceable by the remedy of specific performance, as it would be in the second case, and, according to circumstances, might be in the first, then in equity as between the parties the grant would be considered as made. The absence of a grant under seal would not in equity be allowed to affect their substantive rights. Both Buckley L.J. and Kennedy L.J. treated admission to a picture theatre as if these considerations applied to it. They based their judgment on the view that an agreement had been made for consideration for the acquisition of a right which at law could be conferred only by deed. Buckley L.J. cited Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace[87]; James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[88], both of which related to profits à prendre. He and Kennedy L.J. were, I think, misled by the references by Alderson B. in Wood v. Leadbitter[89] to the absence of a deed. They did not perceive that these references were based on the concession he made that the right to go upon the racecourse might have been the subject of an easement. This concession was, as we would now think, quite without foundation. But in it can be discerned the real source of a misunderstanding which operated through Frogley v. Earl of Lovelace[90] to lead the Court of Appeal into the very remarkable confusion of principle which appears in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[91]. In that case there was no contract to which the remedy of specific performance applied, there was no grant to which the licence was incident, no attempted grant of any interest in land requiring a seal and no profit à prendre. There was a bare licence revocable whether under seal or not. Yet it was held that there was a licence coupled with an interest and, in any case, that there was a contract for a licence which, if granted under seal, would be irrevocable. I think that we ought not to follow the decision. The errors upon which it is founded are fundamental and it is impossible to support it on any other grounds. To treat it as law, is to introduce into a coherent and well settled body of legal doctrine a source of confusion the consequences of which cannot be foreseen.

The decision has commended itself to some as substantially just in the result and to others as a development of a liberalizing kind. I think there is much to be said against the result in point of policy and, except that it may establish an otherwise unknown head of equity, I see nothing liberalizing in it. But it supplies an example of Bacon's observations upon innovations:—"It is true that what is settled by custom, though it be not good, yet at least it is fit; and those things which have long gone together, are as it were confederate within themselves; whereas new things piece not so well; but, though they help by their utility, yet they trouble by their inconformity." It is because the decision tends to destroy the "confederacy" of principles and "corrupteth the fountain," not merely the stream, that I think that, although a decision of the Court of Appeal, we ought not to follow it. For the same reason it has provoked the criticism of many eminent writers.

The decision is condemned by Sir William Holdsworth, who says: "Unfortunately a desire to do substantial justice has recently led the Court of Appeal to disregard the rule that a grant must be the grant of some ascertainable property, and, in consequence, both to make a wholly new extension of the equitable modification of the legal rule, and to cast unfortunate and undeserved doubts upon the principles laid down in Wood v. Leadbitter1(1845) [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351." (Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. vii., p. 328). The editor of Ashburner's Equity, 2nd ed. (1933), p. 19, says that the decision "appears to give to a party in an action relief which he could not have obtained under the old dual procedure." This, of course, means that it depends upon a previously unknown equity. Mr. Hanbury, in his work, Modern Equity (1935), pp. 117, 118, gives it as an example of spurious equities and says that it "has been subjected to more criticism than has been the fate of any other decision of the present century." His discussion of the decision contains references to the chief writers who have condemned or commended it. He ends his examination of the decision with the statement:—"The decision is approved of in Allen v. King2(1915) [1916] UKHL 1; 2 I.R. 213; (1916) 2 A.C. 54., where it was not, however, strictly necessary to express an opinion upon it. But it cannot but have repercussions on other established legal and equitable doctrines which will lead to situations of extreme difficulty." The decision is, indeed, approved in the case cited, but only in the Irish Court. In the House of Lords the argument of the appellant, which was based upon it, was rejected and, as it appears to me, in a manner consistent only with the view that a licence of a much more enduring nature than that to be present at a spectacle gave no interest legal or equitable in the land and did not bind those who took the land with notice. See the argument[94] and the opinions of Lord Buckmaster[95] and Lord Loreburn[96]. The opinions contain no reference to Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[97], which is perhaps significant in view of the judgments below and the argument. Dr. Cheshire considers that neither the reasoning nor the conclusion in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd. can be supported (Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property, 3rd ed. (1933), pp. 261, 301, 302). In a learned paper Sir John Miles gave convincing reasons against its soundness (Law Quarterly Review, vol. 31, p. 217).

In the United States the Supreme Court and most other courts have adhered steadily to the principle that a ticket of admission to a place of amusement does no more than confer a contractual right and imports a licence and gives no proprietary right, legal or equitable. For the amusement proprietor to require the ticket holder to leave without justification is a breach of contract for which he may recover damages. But the American doctrine is that of the English common law, namely, that, notwithstanding the contract, the licence remains revocable. In spite of the breach of contract involved, the licence is effectually revoked and the ticket holder cannot complain of assault if he refuses to leave and is forcibly removed, that is, if no undue violence is used. It does not appear to have occurred to any one in America that an equity might be discoverable entitling the ticket holder to an injunction against revocation of the licence and expulsion from the place of entertainment, or, if he brought an action for assault, to an injunction restraining the defendant from justifying on the ground that the ticket holder had become a trespasser because the licence was revoked. Perhaps the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Burton v. Scherpf[98] may be regarded as the leading authority. It was an action for assault and battery brought by a coloured man who, because of his colour, had been forcibly ejected from a public concert, although he had bought a ticket. Without contesting the general proposition that a licence to enter upon land may commonly be revoked at any time before the purpose for which it is given is accomplished, it was claimed on his behalf "that as the contract under which the licence was derived was either wholly or in part executed, and as he was in the actual enjoyment of the privilege conferred upon him at the time when the defendant undertook to revoke it, the right of revocation was lost, and could no longer be asserted"[99]. After distinguishing between bare licences which are revocable, and licences coupled with a grant or arising from a sale of property to be taken and carried from the land where it is situated, which are irrevocable, and referring to American and English cases, including Wood v. Leadbitter[100], the court concluded that the plaintiff had a mere licence which was revocable and revoked. "Upon his refusal to leave the hall to which his ticket gave him admittance, the defendant had a lawful right to remove him. For such removal, an action of trespass cannot, upon the facts reported, be maintained. He may have a remedy in another form of action for breach of the contract, but that cannot affect the decision of the present case"[101].

When the Supreme Court of the United States gave its authority to the rule it spoke through Mr. Justice O. W. Holmes. He described the argument as hardly going "beyond an attempt to overthrow the rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases, and adopted below, that such tickets do not create a right in rem." He said:—"We see no reason for declining to follow the commonly accepted rule. The fact that the purchase of the ticket made a contract is not enough. A contract binds the person of the maker but does not create an interest in the property that it may concern, unless it also operates as a conveyance. The ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the race track, not only because it was not under seal but because by common understanding it did not purport to have that effect. There would be obvious inconveniences if it were construed otherwise. But if it did not create such an interest, that is to say, a right in rem valid against the landowner and third persons, the holder had no right to enforce specific performance by self-help. His only right was to sue upon the contract for the breach. It is true that if the contract were incidental to a right of property either in the land or in goods upon the land, there might be an irrevocable right of entry, but when the contract stands by itself it must be either a conveyance or a licence subject to be revoked" (Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club[102]). See further Meisner v. Detroit, Belle Isle and Windsor Ferry Co.[103] where the distinction between the position of common carriers and amusement proprietors is discussed, and Johnson v. Wilkinson[104].

In my opinion the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by Jordan C.J. in Naylor v. Canterbury Park Racecourse Co. Ltd.[105] is right. I go further than he did, because he leaves open the question whether Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[106] may find a justification under the Judicature system. I hold that it cannot.

The question has arisen upon a demurrer by the defendant to a replication of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in his declaration alleged an assault upon him by the defendant. The defendant, in its third plea, justified the assault, alleging that, at the material time, the plaintiff was trespassing upon certain land of which the defendant was possessed, whereupon molliter manus imposuit.

The plaintiff's replication (purporting to be on equitable grounds under sec. 97 (1) of the Common Law Procedure Act 1899 N.S.W.) made the following allegations, which must here be taken as established:—

The questions raised are, first, whether, in the circumstances I have summarized above, according to the law of England and of every State in Australia where law and equity are administered concurrently, the forcible ejection of the plaintiff by the defendant amounts to an actionable assault; and, second, whether in the State of New South Wales the plaintiff is deprived of his remedy for damages for assault by reason of the fact that, although equitable principles must be taken cognizance of by the Supreme Court of New South Wales on its common law side, this is subject to the requirements of sec. 97 of the Common Law Procedure Act (which allows equitable replications), and those requirements have not been observed.

Of course, the first of these two questions is of supreme importance, and the argument of the respondent to this court was a direct challenge to the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[107], which was pronounced in July 1914, nearly twenty-three years ago. No doubt that decision, or part of the reasoning for the decision, was subjected to criticism at the hands of some commentators. One writer asserted that Hurst's Case was based on a "spurious" equity, but the supposedly spurious coin has become part of the accepted currency of the law. For, though at first a little grudgingly perhaps, its accuracy has long since been recognized by the leading text writers, and works like Smith's Leading Cases and Pollock on Torts and Salmond on Torts have long declared the law of England in strict accordance with it. I shall refrain from lengthy quotation, but one observation of Professor P. H. Winfield should be referred to:—

Why should this court not follow Hurst's Case[108]? So far as I can ascertain, it has always been regarded as declaring the law of England by the Courts of the Dominions and of Ireland before the establishment of the Irish Free State. For instance, in Heller v. Niagara Racing Association[109], Hodgins J.A., of the Ontario Appellate Division said:—

In the case of Sexton v. Horton[116], decided by this court ten years ago, it was stated by Knox C.J. and Starke J. that

If this court declines to follow Hurst's Case on the present occasion the legal situation created will be most confusing. Hurst's Case has been regarded as a binding authority by those courts in the several States of Australia where equity and law are administered concurrently. In future, they will be placed in the dilemma of deciding between a decision of this Court, and a long-established decision of the Court of Appeal. If they follow the decision of this court, an appeal to the Judicial Committee may be brought direct from any of the Supreme Courts of the various States. In England, moreover, Hurst's Case[117] would certainly be followed, only the House of Lords being at liberty to overrule it. Sec. 74 of the Commonwealth Constitution was devised to preclude or restrict appeals to the Judicial Committee in constitutional cases of Australian concern only. But the prerogative to allow an appeal by special leave was left remaining, so that there might be no contradictory ruling of Empire courts as to the general principles of the common law or of equity. I feel strongly that it is a mistake on the part of this court to proceed to an independent review of the correctness of Hurst's Case, and, with all respect, I think the Supreme Court of New South Wales should not have taken liberty to re-examine that decision as it did very recently in Naylor's Case[118]. As a result of that action, it is Naylor's Case[119] which is really under review on the present appeal.

But, if Hurst's Case is to be reviewed, I am unable to agree that it was "manifestly erroneous," to use the expression of this court in Sexton v. Horton[120]. In his judgment, Buckley L.J. emphasized that the patron of the entertainment had expressly bargained for "the right ... to attend a performance from its beginning to its end"[121]. That being so, it was a very inadequate legal description of the relationship between the parties to say simply that the patron was a licensee upon the theatre proprietor's ground; it was an essential feature of the relationship that, during the currency of the performance, the occupier of the land was bound to refrain from exercising his legal rights as occupier for the purpose of ejecting the patron from the place of entertainment. And it is to be noted that, in the present case, the pleadings specifically allege that it was a definite part of the contract between the parties that the defendant should not exercise its legal power or right to revoke the plaintiff's licence to remain on the racecourse throughout the period of the race meeting.

But, before proceeding to examine certain aspects of the decision in Hurst's Case, it is convenient to dispose at once of the second part of the present appeal, and determine whether the Common Law Procedure Act, although it allows equitable pleas and replications, does not enable the Supreme Court on its common law side to give effect to Hurst's Case[122]. I am clearly of opinion that the New South Wales statute can be applied so that, if Hurst's Case is to be regarded as good law in England, the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment on the present demurrer. That opinion is, I gather, shared by other members of this court.

There can be no question that Hurst's Case decided that, under circumstances closely corresponding to those admitted to exist in the present case, the person forcibly removed from the place of entertainment became entitled to recover damages for assault. In other words, by virtue of the Court of Appeal's application, concurrently, of the principles of common law and of equity, the plaintiff succeeded in an action at law. In New South Wales, sec. 97 (1) of the Common Law Procedure Act entitled the present plaintiff to answer the defendant's plea by alleging facts "avoiding such plea upon equitable grounds." Similarly, under sec. 95 (1) of the Act, a defendant at law who would have become entitled to obtain equitable relief against a judgment at common law is given a statutory right to plead the facts showing that he has a right to obtain equitable relief against the enforcement of the common law judgment and to plead such facts at law by way of equitable defence. It is true that, in England, between the passing of the Common Law Procedure Act in 1854 and the introduction of the Judicature system some twenty years later, a rule was established in accordance with which equitable pleas and replications were allowed by the courts of common law only where, on the facts there pleaded, a court of equity would have decreed an absolute, unconditional and perpetual injunction (Bullen and Leake's Precedents of Pleading, 3rd ed. (1868), p. 568). In the case of Wood v. Copper Miners' Co.[123], Jervis C.J. suggested (in the year 1856) that the rule as to "perpetual, unqualified and continued injunction" was not necessarily applicable to every case of an equitable pleading. But the general rule was applied until the passing of the Judicature Act, and it has always been recognized in New South Wales in administering the equitable pleading provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act. Of course, the reason for the rule lay in the practical necessities of the case, the common law courts possessing no machinery for doing more than pronouncing judgment either for the plaintiff or for the defendant on specific issues. But, as Ferguson J. pointed out of equitable pleas in Rance v. Kensett[124], "where the issue raised can be effectively dealt with by such a judgment, there is no reason why the plea should not be pleaded."

The present defendant's argument is that the facts admitted by the demurrer do not enable the plaintiff to recover damages for assault, because if, at the time of the plaintiff's ejection from the racecourse, he had applied to the Supreme Court in equity to restrain the revocation of his licence, the Supreme Court would not have granted him an injunction which was "absolute, unconditional and perpetual." This is the gist of the Supreme Court's decision in Naylor's Case[125]. The argument is that, under the contract between the parties, there was an implied obligation upon the plaintiff to behave himself properly during the progress of the race meeting; therefore an injunction restraining the revocation of the licence would have been subject to the condition that the plaintiff should behave himself properly during the race meeting.

In my opinion this method of argument quite misunderstands the purpose of secs. 95 and 97 of the Common Law Procedure Act. Those sections look to the situation as it exists when the proceedings at law are being taken. If at that time the Supreme Court in equity would give relief (a) to a defendant at law against the enforcement of a common law judgment which was being sought by the plaintiff at law in respect of a good common law claim, or (b) to a plaintiff at law against a defendant at law who was setting up a plea contrary to the equities then existing between the parties, then the defendant or plaintiff in the common law court was entitled, by the statute, to allege and prove before the court of common law the facts which would have justified the Supreme Court in equity in interposing its jurisdiction to restrain the defendant or plaintiff in the common law action from enforcing mere legal rights. In other words, the "absolute, perpetual and unconditional injunction" to which the established rule refers is an injunction restraining the bringing of a claim or the setting up of a defence contrary to equitable principles, not restraining some act as at some earlier point of time. Stephen points out that an equitable pleading should disclose facts entitling the party pleading to an absolute and unconditional injunction "against the judgment which the other party might otherwise have obtained at law" (Principles of Pleading, 6th ed. (1860), p. 197; italics are mine). It is clear that the relevant time is the time when the common law action is proceeding.

No doubt, in determining the present existence of an equity to relief against the inequitable use of the common law courts, the court of equity would necessarily have to pay regard to the antecedent transaction between the parties which was entered into prior to the commencement of the action at law. But, none the less, the Supreme Court on its common law side, once seized of the issues raised by equitable pleadings, has to look at the matter from the point of view which the Supreme Court in equity would take if it was hearing the case simultaneously with the common law action, and was placed in possession of all the facts pleaded and proved at common law.

If we apply the principle just elaborated to the present case, it is plain that the argument suggesting that any injunction granted would be conditional upon the plaintiff's behaving himself properly during the race meeting, merely confuses the issue. The relevant time to define the attitude of a court of equity is the time of the proceedings for assault, i.e., here and now. The facts material to the question of intervention by a court of equity have all been pleaded, and they are now before us. It must be assumed that, throughout the race meeting, the plaintiff was not guilty of any such improper behaviour or conduct as would have justified the defendant in rescinding the contract between the parties. And the question is whether, by the operation of equitable principles, the equitable replication pleaded avoids the plea. It does avoid the plea if, on the facts, a court of equity should restrain the defendant from pleading that the plaintiff was a trespasser at a time when, according to Hurst's Case[126], in the eyes of a court of equity he was not a trespasser but the holder of an irrevocable licence to remain on the property. Assuming Hurst's Case to be good law, it seems equitable that a court of equity should restrain the defendant at law from pleading that, by effectively revoking what he could not in equity revoke, and by deliberately repudiating his negative undertaking not to exercise his legal right to revoke, he became entitled to treat the plaintiff as a trespasser. Such an injunction, if granted at all, would be, not a conditional, qualified or temporary injunction, but an absolute, perpetual and unconditional injunction, restraining the defendant at law from setting up an obviously inequitable defence (Cf. Professor Geldart's note, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 31, p. 219, note (i)).

Such an injunction would not only be perpetual, absolute and unconditional according to its terms, but it would leave the present plaintiff in the position at law established by Hurst's Case, viz., the position of being successful in his action for damages for assault, for the only defence relied on would be avoided. As an illustration of the fact that no outstanding equities remain between the parties as at the time of the common law action, Hurst's Case itself is conclusive. There the judgment was for the plaintiff for the damages caused by an unjustified assault. Nothing else was ordered to be done except that the defendant pay such damages.

Further, even if the court had to consider the question as to the character of the injunction as at the time of the original revocation of the licence, the injunction ordered would still, I suggest, be "absolute, perpetual and unconditional." It would have addressed itself to the contract between the parties and restrained the defendant from "revoking the licence in breach of the contract." It is nothing to the point that the defendant could have lawfully revoked the licence or rescinded the contract on and by reason of the plaintiff's breach of his own obligation to behave himself properly. For such revocation or rescission would not be "in breach of the contract," but would be permissible under the contract. So far as I know, it is not the practice of the equity court, when granting an injunction to restrain a particular breach of a contract containing a series of mutual promises and forbearances, to make the grant of the injunction conditional upon the continued performance by the plaintiff of his contractual obligations or to so express its order. For instance, when the court grants an injunction based upon the lessor's covenant for quiet enjoyment, it is not necessary to state that the injunction is only to operate so long as the plaintiff, the lessee, continues to pay rent and otherwise perform the covenants on his part. As Lord St. Leonards said in relation to covenants as between landlord and tenant,

Therefore, I think it is plain that despite the continued separation of the common law and equitable jurisdictions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the introduction of equitable principles into the former jurisdiction by the Common Law Procedure Act enables the present plaintiff to succeed in his action at law. The plaintiff in Hurst's Case was able to succeed by virtue of equitable principles according to which the defendant's attempt to set up the fact of trespass on land was defeated.

But the question remains, was Hurst's Case[128] correctly decided? There are several aspects from which the decision may be regarded. First, it is critical of the strictly legal position laid down in Wood v. Leadbitter[129]. And certainly the judgment of Dodderidge J. in Webb v. Paternoster[130] (quoted Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. vii., p. 328) contains a far more valuable analysis of licences than was given in Wood v. Leadbitter. The Court of Appeal in 1915 thought it somewhat extraordinary that the rights and liabilities created by a contract to admit to an entertainment conducted publicly and for the profit of the entrepreneur, and perhaps the education or pleasure of the patron, could be treated, even by a court of law, as assimilable to a mere dispensation to the theatre patron to commit what otherwise would be a trespass on land. In actual fact, the rights and liabilities are not so assimilable and, in its modern developments, even the common law has recognized the inadequacy of the "bare licence" theory as a description of the relationship between the parties (Cox v. Coulson[131]).

The main part of the reasoning in Wood v. Leadbitter[132] was based on the well-known judgment of Vaughan C.J. in Thomas v. Sorrell[133], distinguishing there between licences or "dispensations" (e.g., to come into a man's house), and licences coupled with a grant of property (e.g., a licence to hunt and carry away the deer). It must be conceded that the "grants" intended to be referred to in Wood v. Leadbitter (a licence "coupled with a grant") was a grant of some ascertainable property which is capable of being granted (Holdsworth's History of English Law, vol. vii., p. 328). It may therefore be admitted that Lord Wrenbury went too far in assimilating the right to view an entertainment with the grant of a proprietary right in or over land or chattels.

But, in my opinion, as an application of equitable principles to the complex relationship between entrepreneur and patron, Hurst's Case[134] is a convincing decision. As early as 1901, Cozens Hardy M.R. suggested that Wood v. Leadbitter might be of "very doubtful" validity if equitable principles were to be applied to its facts (Lowe v. Adams[135]). From the point of view of equitable principles, the essence of the judgment of Buckley L.J. is to be found in his references to Lord Parker's judgment in James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[136], and to the passage on page 10 commencing: "There is another way in which the matter may be put." Buckley L.J.'s view was (a) that a contract giving a licence to enter and remain on land solely for the purpose of viewing an entertainment should be regarded by a court of equity as not subject to arbitrary revocation during the entertainment by a party to the contract in his capacity as occupier of the land, and (b) that a court of equity should give efficacy to a contract not to exercise the legal right of revocation of the licence, by restraining the occupier, either from exercising such legal right, or, at any rate, from subsequently setting up to his own advantage his own breach of contract and his own attempted revocation of the licence.

It is true that the observations of Lord Parker quoted by Buckley L.J. were not made in a case precisely analogous to that of Hurst's Case[137], because a recognized proprietary right, i.e., a "grant" was under consideration in James Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Tankerville (Earl)[138]. But Buckley L.J. clearly thought that a court of equity should intervene in a case like Hurst's Case by restraining the revocation of a licence in breach of contract. No doubt, Buckley L.J. dwelt upon that part of the judgment in Wood v. Leadbitter[139] which emphasized the absence of an instrument under seal; and he indicated that pending the bringing into existence of the necessary deed a court of equity would make short work of such an objection. But, in so doing, Buckley L.J. was answering the reasoning of Alderson B. so far as it asserted or assumed that the plaintiff in Wood v. Leadbitter would have succeeded if he had possessed an instrument under seal giving him the right to view the race. It is a fair comment that the critics of Hurst's Case can hardly be allowed to set up as against Buckley L.J. any error of pure law to be discovered in Wood v. Leadbitter.

But a broad and just principle of equity appears from the judgments of Buckley L.J. and Kennedy L.J. to the effect that, although a court of law will still treat the transaction between entertainment proprietor and patron as creating only a revocable licence, a court of equity should regard the licence as irrevocable in all proceedings in which equitable principles have to be recognized. A consequential rule is that a defence to an action of assault that the licence had been duly revoked by the proprietor, though good at law, would be contrary to the equitable principle of irrevocability of licence and the equitable principle should prevail so as to avoid the defence.

It was the contrary view which, according to Kennedy L.J., led to "an astonishing conclusion" (at p. 12). He also regarded the contract as creating "an irrevocable right to remain until the conclusion of the performance" (at p. 13). I hope it is superfluous to add that neither Buckley L.J., nor Kennedy L.J., was unaware of the fact that the right to see a theatrical performance was not a proprietary right in the nature of an easement. Indeed, Kennedy L.J. said that the plaintiff's "interest," "whether you call it an easement or not, is an interest which I can now acquire in equity by parol" (at p. 14). And he referred to an important passage in Pollock on Torts, 9th ed. (1912), at p. 390, which I mention below.

Further, the dissenting judgment of Phillimore L.J. is of great significance, for he is not unwilling to concede (at p. 18) that equity would give specific performance of the contract to see the entertainment. The main difficulty of Phillimore L.J. was that, assuming that equity would intervene, the plaintiff in equity could not necessarily be regarded as having already occupied the legal position which springs into existence only after he obtains specific performance. In other words, although the licence would be regarded in equity as irrevocable, still, until a court of equity actually pronounced its order, the existing legal relationship between the parties should be deemed to continue. In support of this view Phillimore L.J. adopted Pollock's suggestion in the passage mentioned above, that the plaintiff might have obtained an injunction, and so have been restored to the enjoyment of his licence, but that, in the meantime, he should be deemed a trespasser. With respect, it is difficult to appreciate the force of the difficulty which alone seemed to prevent Phillimore L.J. from concurring. The plaintiff in Hurst's Case[140] did not need to invoke the principle of Walsh v. Lonsdale[141], for the assumption of Hurst's Case was that no estate or interest in land was intended to be created by the contract. But equity's intervention in order to prevent a party from exercising his legal rights in breach of a contractual obligation is based on broader grounds than the principle of Walsh v. Lonsdale[142]. If, as Phillimore L.J. was prepared to admit, a court of equity would have restrained the revocation of Hurst's licence, it could hardly treat the defendant as having improved his position at law solely because, in the nature of things, Hurst was unable to approach a court of equity before his forcible removal from the theatre. In other words, if a court of equity regarded the licence as irrevocable, why should it allow the wrongdoer, by subsequently saying "I revoked it," to obtain an advantage at law. This view subsequently seemed to commend itself to Sir F. Pollock, who said:

I think the fallacy in the criticism of Hurst's Case[143] lies in the continuous insistence upon discovering a proprietary right as a condition of equitable intervention. Sir J. C. Miles, whose criticisms of the decision in Hurst's Case have been little more than re-echoed by the later commentators, seemed mainly concerned with "the purely legal grounds of the decision" (Law Quarterly Review (1915), vol. 31, pp. 219-221), and was not so ready to deny its validity as an extension of equitable principles; nor did he seem to consider the equitable question as affected in any way by the supposed difficulty upon which Phillimore, L.J. really based his dissent. As a Canadian commentator has recently said, in relation to the theory that a strict "property" interest must be the foundation of the intervention of equitable jurisdiction,

In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed, and judgment entered for the plaintiff on the demurrer.

To the appellant's action for assault the respondent pleaded that the appellant was a trespasser on its racecourse and justified the supposed assault as the lawful removal from its land of a trespasser who had had warning to go. The appellant replied on equitable grounds that the respondent for valuable consideration promised to permit him to enter and see all the races which it was conducting or about to conduct on the racecourse and gave him leave and licence to enter and remain there until the conclusion of the races, and promised that it would not before then revoke the licence, and that the respondent in breach of these promises had him removed from the racecourse.

There is no fusion of law and equity in New South Wales, but the Common Law Procedure Act 1899 provides for equitable pleadings in an action at law, (secs. 95 and 97). In its common law jurisdiction the Supreme Court of New South Wales is not empowered to mould its judgment as if it were a decree in equity, and a plea or replication on equitable grounds is followed by the ordinary common law judgment. "Accordingly, it is a settled rule, that an equitable pleading is only admissible where it discloses facts which would entitle the party pleading it to an absolute and unconditional injunction in a court of equity against the judgment which the opposite party might otherwise have obtained at law" (Stephen's Principles of Pleading, 6th ed. (1860), p. 197).

The appellant's replication is founded on the assumption that, because of the existence of the contract in the terms alleged, it is inequitable for the respondent to plead that the appellant was a trespasser, and that a court of equity would grant an absolute and unconditional injunction restraining the respondent from pleading this defence to the action. The respondent demurred to the replication. The demurrer challenges the correctness of the assumption on which the replication is based. Its correctness depends upon whether any right which is within the scope of the equitable remedies was violated by the revocation of the licence (Cf. Hyde v. Graham[144]).

The appellant had become entitled to exercise on the respondent's land a contractual right to see all the races to be run at the race meeting, and to use the facilities, within the contemplation of the contract, which the respondent provided for its patrons. The licence to go and remain on the land was incident to and comprised in this contractual right. The alleged terms of the contract, relating to the giving of the licence and the promise not to revoke it, are pleaded as having been expressed in the contract, but the inclusion of these terms did no more than make explicit what would have been implied in the contract. Whether the appellant exercised this contractual right for profit or pleasure, the advantage which it gave him was not a right in rem or an interest in the land or in anything in or upon the land. If the appellant had an equity to enjoy the licence for the duration of the race meeting it was not because the licence was coupled with any interest of a proprietary nature.

The effect of the contract was to impose a personal obligation on the respondent not to revoke the licence until the conclusion of the meeting; accordingly, the revocation of the licence was a breach of contract, but it did not amount to the impairment of any proprietary interest of the appellant. The breach of contract gave rise to an action at common law for damages, but the plaintiff has instituted an action for assault.

The replication cannot be sustained as an answer on equitable grounds to the fundamental allegation in the plea, that the appellant was a trespasser, unless equity would by a decree for specific performance or by an injunction enforce the contractual right which the appellant had to go and remain on the racecourse until the conclusion of the meeting. The positive terms of the contract pleaded are not of the class of contractual promises of which a court of equity would decree the specific performance or which it would enforce indirectly by injunction.

The contract pleaded, however, purports to reinforce its positive stipulations by a stipulation in the negative form whereby, as this stipulation is pleaded, the respondent promised not to revoke the appellant's licence to go and remain on the racecourse until the conclusion of the meeting. Equity will in certain cases restrain the breach of a negative covenant and the foundation of the relief in such a case need not be the protection of property. It has been observed that in the replication the stipulation in the negative form is pleaded as an express term of the contract. But this stipulation does not add a new obligation to that contained in the two positive stipulations which are pleaded as preceding it. The obligation imposed by the negative stipulation is equivalent in substance to that expressed in the positive terms of the contract. The stipulation in the negative form does not impose any obligation that is accessory to the respondent's main obligation; it is only verbiage amplifying the expression of the contractual relationship between the parties. In Davis v. Foreman[145] an application was refused for an injunction to restrain the breach of a negative clause in a contract providing that an employer would not, except in the case of misconduct or breach of the agreement, require the manager to leave his employ. Kekewich J. said that, to his mind, that clause was distinctly equivalent to a stipulation by the employer that he would retain the manager in his employ. He added:—"It is only the form that is negative. If the court comes to the conclusion that that is really the substance of the agreement (which, being an agreement of service, cannot be specifically enforced), is it right, having regard to the line the authorities have taken, to say that merely because the agreement is negative in form an injunction ought to be granted? To my mind, I should be going distinctly against the last decision in the Court of Appeal if I were to apply the doctrine of Lumley v. Wagner1(1852) [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); 1 DeG.M. & G. 604; 42 E.R. 687., which is not to be extended, to a case of this character"[147]. The same principle was applied by Eve J. in Kirchner & Co. v. Gruban[148].

The substance of the agreement pleaded is that the respondent for valuable consideration permitted the appellant to go upon its racecourse to see all the races to be run at the meeting and to remain there for that purpose until the conclusion of the meeting. That agreement is not of the class which equity will enforce. The stipulation which is in the negative form expressed substantially the same obligation and does not give the appellant any equity to the performance of the promise in specie. In my opinion the contract pleaded created no equity in the appellant which enabled him to say that, in the contemplation of a court of equity, he would not be a trespasser although the respondent assumed to revoke his licence to go on the land and see all the races.

For these reasons the matters pleaded in the replication disclose no ground for asserting that the respondent's plea that the appellant was a trespasser could only be sustained at the cost of violating a right in equity which the appellant had to remain on the racecourse at the time when he was removed.

This conclusion is opposed to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd.[149]. I share the difficulty of Jordan C.J. expressed in Naylor v. Canterbury Park Racecourse Co. Ltd.[150], and of the majority of the members of this court in reconciling that case with principle and applying it to the present case. That decision seems either to have made the anomalous addition of a right arising from contract, but hardly recognizable as a proprietary interest, to the category of property, or to have made an anomalous extension of the relief which is granted by a court of equity for the enforcement of a contractual right.

The judgment of the Supreme Court was, in my opinion, right, and the appeal should be dismissed.

[1] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[2] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[3] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[4] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[5] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[6] (1897) 2 Q.B. 445.

[7] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[8] (1859) Johns. 333; 70 E.R. 450.

[9] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[10] (1915) 1 K.B., at pp. 5-9.

[11] [1834] EWHC J77 (Ch); [1834] EWHC J77 (Ch); (1834) 2 My. & K. 517; 39 E.R. 1042.

[12] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[13] (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 402.

[14] (1904) 1 K.B. 713.

[15] [1931] HCA 15; (1931) 45 C.L.R. 282.

[16] [1929] HCA 39; (1929) 43 C.L.R. 235.

[17] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[18] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[19] (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9.

[20] (1909) 2 Ch., at p. 443.

[21] (1859) Johns. 333; 70 E.R. 450.

[22] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[23] (1857) 8 E. & B., at p. 319; 120 E.R., at p. 119.

[24] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[25] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[26] (1862) 1 H. & C., at p. 598; 158 E.R., at p. 1022.

[27] (1878) 3 App. Cas., at p. 720.

[28] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[29] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[30] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[31] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.), at pp. 286, 287; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.), at pp. 83, 84.

[32] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[33] (1926) 38 C.L.R., at p. 244.

[34] [1933] HCA 60; (1933) 50 C.L.R. 504.

[35] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[36] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[37] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[38] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[39] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[40] (1918) 1 K.B., at p. 307.

[41] (1920) 3 K.B., at p. 499.

[42] [1916] UKHL 1; (1915) 2 I.R. 213; (1916) 2 A.C. 54.

[43] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[44] (1915) 1 K.B., at pp. 15-20.

[45] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[46] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[47] [1851] EngR 368; (1851) 10 C.B. 744, at p. 762; [1851] EngR 368; 138 E.R. 294, at p. 301.

[48] (1851) 10 C.B., at p. 763; 138 E.R., at p. 301.

[49] (1909) 2 Ch., at p. 442.

[50] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[51] [1835] EngR 469; (1835) 2 A. & E. 696; 111 E.R. 267; (1837) 6 A. & E. 824; 112 E.R. 316.

[52] (1859) Johns. 333; 70 E.R. 450.

[53] (1909) 2 Ch. 440.

[54] (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 315.

[55] [1839] EngR 1030; (1839) 11 A. & E. 34; 113 E.R. 325.

[56] [1851] EngR 368; (1851) 10 C.B. 744; 138 E.R. 294.

[57] [1841] EngR 752; (1841) 8 M. & W. 488; 151 E.R. 1131.

[58] (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 334.

[59] (1909) 2 Ch. 440.

[60] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[61] [1863] EngR 493; (1863) 2 H. & C. 121; 159 E.R. 51.

[62] (1909) 2 Ch., at p. 442.

[63] (1897) 2 Q.B. 445.

[64] (1888) 21 Q.B.D., at p. 213.

[65] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[66] (1915) 1 K.B., at p. 10.

[67] (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9.

[68] (1878) 3 App. Cas. 709.

[69] [1756] EngR 128; (1756) 1 Burr. 20; 97 E.R. 166.

[70] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[71] (1845) 13 M. & W., at p. 843; 153 E.R., at p. 354.

[72] (1927) V.L.R. 88.

[73] [1855] EngR 168; (1855) 4 E. & B. 702, at p. 709; [1855] EngR 168; 119 E.R. 259, at p. 262.

[74] [1839] EngR 1030; (1839) 11 A. & E. 34; 113 E.R. 325.

[75] (1909) 2 Ch., at pp. 442, 443.

[76] [1837] EngR 47; (1837) 2 M. & W. 248; 150 E.R. 748.

[77] (1845) 13 M. & W., at p. 845; 153 E.R., at p. 355.

[78] (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 334.

[79] (1845) 13 M. & W., at p. 845; 153 E.R., at p. 354.

[80] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[81] [1851] EngR 368; (1851) 10 C.B. 744; 138 E.R. 294.

[82] (1915) 1 K.B., at p. 7.

[83] [1909] UKHL 1; (1909) A.C. 488.

[84] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[85] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[86] (1888) 39 Ch. D. 508, at p. 516.

[87] (1859) Johns. 333; 70 E.R. 450.

[88] (1909) 2 Ch. 440.

[89] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[90] (1859) Johns. 333; 70 E.R. 450.

[91] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[92] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[93] [1916] UKHL 1; (1915) 2 I.R. 213; (1916) 2 A.C. 54.

[94] (1916) 2 A.C., at p. 57.

[95] (1916) 2 A.C., at p. 61.

[96] (1916) 2 A.C., at p. 62.

[97] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[98] (1861) 1 Allen 133; 79 Am. Dec. 717.

[99] (1861) 79 Am. Dec., at p. 719.

[100] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[101] (1861) 79 Am. Dec., at pp. 720, 721.

[102] [1913] USSC 94; (1913) 227 U.S. 633, at pp. 636, 637; [1913] USSC 94; 57 Law. Ed. 679, at p. 681.

[103] (1908) 154 Mich. 545; 129 Am. St. R. 493.

[104] (1885) 139 Mass. 3; 52 Am. R. 698.

[105] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[106] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[107] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[108] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[109] (1925) 2 D.L.R. 286, at p. 287.

[110] (1915) 1 K.B., at p. 10.

[111] (1916) 2 K.B. 177.

[112] (1918) 1 K.B. 299.

[113] (1920) 3 K.B. 497.

[114] (1918) 46 D.L.R. 583; 44 O.L.R. 545.

[115] (1925) 2 D.L.R., at p. 289.

[116] (1926) 38 C.L.R., at p. 244.

[117] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[118] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.), at pp. 287, 288; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.), at pp. 83, 84.

[119] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

[120] [1926] HCA 25; (1926) 38 C.L.R. 240.

[121] (1915) 1 K.B., at p. 7.

[122] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[123] (1856) 25 L.J. C.P. 166, at p. 173; [1856] EngR 179; 17 C.B. 561, at p. 592; [1856] EngR 179; 139 E.R. 1195, at p. 1208.

[124] (1916) 16 S.R. (N.S.W.) 285, at p. 294; 33 W.N. (N.S.W.) 119, at p. 121.

[125] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.), at p. 288; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.), at p. 84.

[126] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[127] (1852) 1 DeG.M. & G. 604, at pp. 617, 618; [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); 42 E.R. 687, at p. 693.

[128] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[129] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[130] [1676] EngR 560; (1619) 2 Rolle 143, 152; [1676] EngR 560; 81 E.R. 713, 719.

[131] (1916) 2 K.B. 177.

[132] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[133] (1674) Vaughan 330, at p. 351; [1673] EWHC J85 (KB); [1673] EWHC J85 (KB); 124 E.R. 1098, at p. 1109.

[134] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[135] (1901) 2 Ch., at p. 600.

[136] (1909) 2 Ch. 440.

[137] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[138] (1909) 2 Ch. 440.

[139] [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); [1845] EWHC J83 (Exch); (1845) 13 M. & W. 838; 153 E.R. 351.

[140] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[141] (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9.

[142] (1882) 21 Ch. D. 9.

[143] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[144] [1862] EngR 1073; (1862) 1 H. & C. 593; 158 E.R. 1020.

[145] (1894) 3 Ch. 654.

[146] [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); [1852] EWHC J96 (Ch); (1852) 1 DeG.M. & G. 604; 42 E.R. 687.

[147] (1894) 3 Ch., at p. 658.

[148] (1909) 1 Ch. 413.

[149] (1915) 1 K.B. 1.

[150] (1935) 35 S.R. (N.S.W.) 281; 52 W.N. (N.S.W.) 82.

High Court of Australia

Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd [1937] HCA 17; (1937) 56 CLR 605 (22 April 1937)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA