Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Australasian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation (No 2) [1930] HCA 2; (1930) 42 CLR 558 (3 March 1930)

Caledonian Collieries Ltd. and Others Applicants and Claimants; and The Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation Respondent. [No. 2.]

Robert Menzies K.C. (with him J. A. Ferguson), for the applicants the Caledonian Collieries Ltd. and other proprietors other than the State of New South Wales.

Clive Teece K.C. (with him W. Gee), for the applicant the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales.

This controversy has certainly reached an amazing position. For the second time, in the name of the law of the Commonwealth, the coal-miners and the proprietors have been compulsorily brought into the Arbitration Court to compose by impartial methods a serious national industrial quarrel that has caused, and is still causing, widespread injury in the community; and for the second time, in the name of the same law, they are summarily ejected from that tribunal, with the conflict still active and its consequences unaverted. I am unable to agree that on the facts before us this is the true result of the relevant Australian law, imperfect as it undoubtedly is. I pass by the specific objections to the interim award of 23rd January, because, as my learned brothers have reached the major conclusion that no inter-State industrial dispute exists, the tap-root of the arbitration proceedings is cut, and the branch must fall with the tree. As to that major conclusion I emphatically dissent. I shall not stop to discuss minor legal formalities and technicalities. But there stand at the very threshold of this case two well-known principles of law, so closely allied to each other as to be practically different aspects of the same thing. The present applications are what is known as original jurisdiction, and it of course follows that the Court for the purpose of prohibition must act on its own view of the evidence as to whether there was a dispute or not. But in so doing, and before arriving at its final conclusion, there are the two guiding principles long established by Judges for the elimination of possible error, and to prevent, so far as may be, the miscarriage of justice. The first is that as to prohibition, "the party asking for it is bound to make out a clear case." This was pointed out in my judgment in the Tramways Case [No. 2][1], with citation of authorities. It was affirmed in The King v. President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Australian Agricultural Co.[2], by my brothers Gavan Duffy and Rich and myself. The second principle is that in circumstances like the present the Court will not interfere with the conclusion of the primary tribunal as to the existence of the jurisdictional fact unless it is manifestly wrong. On the previous occasion, a few days ago, I referred to and quoted the eminent judicial authorities for this principle, and, as they include the Privy Council, it is beyond question. I have no hesitation in saying that on those principles or either of them this Court, in accordance with settled practice, should dismiss the application as to the major question. Even the most optimistic view for the applicants could not rise to the height of asserting they had shown "a clear case." And it would, indeed, be a valiant heart that would maintain that Judge Beeby, with his special and extensive experience of the subject, was "manifestly wrong." On the contrary, he appears to me to have been manifestly right.

Now, in approaching the question "Was there on 23rd January 1930 an existing or probable inter-State industrial dispute within the meaning of the Constitution and the Act?" it is of the highest importance to bear in mind the essential nature of those enactments. It is, if I may venture to say so, the main essential vice of the contentions put forward against the "reality" or "genuineness" of the dispute, that the matter is regarded as if such a dispute concerned the immediate disputants only. That narrows improperly the conception of what will suffice to constitute a real dispute. I have so often expressed my own view that the public welfare is the governing consideration, and made allusion to skilled authorities, legal and economic, that I shall merely, as to my own expressions, refer to what I said on that subject in the Tramways Case [No. 2][3]. But it is desirable to quote the distinct confirmation of that view by Lord Dunedin, speaking for a most powerful Board of the Privy Council in Melbourne Tramway and Omnibus Co. v. Tramway Board[4]. The Act there under consideration was not nearly so strong as the present for the purpose I have indicated. It was an Act by which the Tramway Board was empowered to take over property of the Company on paying compensation. The question was as to the meaning and scope of "compensation." The majority of the Supreme Court of Victoria gave the ordinary meaning to the word. Madden C.J. agreed with the primary Judge, Cussen J., that it there had a larger meaning; and so the Privy Council held. The reasons are relevant here. After pointing out certain features of the Act, Lord Dunedin said[5]:—"But besides this position of the parties—each in a position to injure the other, neither in a position to compel benefit to himself—there was the position of the public. The more obstinate the parties were as against each other, the more the public would suffer. Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi. It was in the interests of the public that the Legislature intervened, and in their Lordships' view the Act must be construed in the light of this position and these considerations." His Lordship went on to point out that the Act expressed the object that there should be no interruption of traffic, just as the Arbitration Act sets itself against interruption of industrial service. And so the word "compensation" had to be read in a large and liberal sense to give effect to the commanding purpose of the Act.

Here the argument for the applicants eliminates the public aspect, looks at the matter as concerning merely the relations of the contestants, and treats it in the narrowest possible way by urging, for instance, that for two years prior to December 1929 there had been no demand made on the proprietors. What does that matter to the public so long as the demand when made in December was intended to be persisted in to the point of insistence in the Arbitration Court, which the law has made the only lawful duelling ground? The reality of an "industrial dispute" in the sense required by the Constitution is satisfied whatever the motives or objects of the demand and whatever its reasonableness or unreasonableness, whether it is of long standing or a creation of yesterday, whether there was prior dissatisfaction or not, and whether the defendants expect their claims to be yielded or granted in full or not, so long only as the demandants now insist on their claims and in some way seek to enforce them, even if that way be through the legitimate avenue of the Arbitration Court, which is the constitutional substitute for force. All those and similar considerations are non-essentials, for, whether they are present or absent, the public loss in case of stoppage is just the same. In my opinion we should abandon any attempt to confine industrial disputes by applying technical limitations in order to test reality. Such disputes are hard facts of life, they are not rigid in character, they are of constantly changing form and methods of origin to meet advancing circumstances, and they are easily recognizable as facts—too often by their effects—whenever and however they arise. Judge-made limitations of reality are just as effective to control the existence and extent of industrial disputes as was King Canute's command to stay the waves of the ocean. If only the simple principle, so clearly enunciated by the Privy Council, be applied to the present case—the touchstone of public welfare—and the relevant legislation interpreted with that as a guide, we should at once escape from this labyrinth of confusion. There is, in this connection, a matter which appears to permeate the argument for the applicants and to give it a false colour. It is the artificial doctrine of the "reality" of an industrial dispute. That a dispute must be "real" or "genuine" is in one sense undoubted. We know there are sham-fights, mere simulacra of battles, where everything is in show, and no one intends to strike a blow or fire a bullet. It is possible that industrial demands may be made and refusals given merely for parade, everyone aware that nothing serious is intended and that all is a pretence and a form and never to be pursued. But the "reality" or "genuineness" of that dispute, like that of any other legal relation between citizens, must be determined by the reasonable effect upon each that is to be attributed by what is actually said and done by the other in the given circumstances. According to accepted methods in British Courts, it is not to be attained by a system of thought-reading to the disregard of actual acts and words, and more especially to the disregard of direct reputable testimony. And when it is seen that the claims are in earnest and are persisted in to the fighting point, notwithstanding firm refusals, we are not to wait for casualties to convince us that the combat is real.

The answer to the question I have formulated for this case depends entirely on the effect which the demands contained in the log and the express refusals to comply had, or can reasonably be assumed to have had, on the respective parties. It was contended before us that there was no real demand for the log claims, and therefore no real dispute, because, for one reason, the object of the claim was to supply a deficiency of jurisdiction in Judge Beeby to hear the case then before him, and thereby get a hearing in the Arbitration Court, and therefore was not real. The matter then before him was a dispute as to non-reduction of pre-stoppage wages and rates. The new demands covered a complete series of eighteen sets of working conditions, and a nineteenth clause requiring the terms to be embodied in an award of the Court and to last for three years. The objection taken admits necessarily that the demands of the log include a claim for pre-stoppage rates; otherwise it would be meaningless, for otherwise the log could not aid in giving jurisdiction on that subject then before Judge Beeby. The objection also admits necessarily that the demandants were in earnest as to going to the Court to get pre-stoppage rates for a period of three years as so much security. If so, does not the very objection itself set up the most cogent reason for permitting Judge Beeby to hear and determine the dispute, so far at least as it relates to the pre-stoppage terms? No answer to the contrary seems possible. There are many instances of claims that have been prohibited quoad hoc, as it is called, which would mean here that all but the pre-stoppage rates would be eliminated, and, at the very worst, that would still leave a beneficial opportunity to Judge Beeby to adjust a very serious contention that has produced, and is still producing, severe loss to the proprietors, dreadful privations to thousands of families and incalculable injury to a long-suffering people. But even going beyond that, it is said that the desire to carry in the whole log was merely to seek entry to the Arbitration Court. Is that not a strong testimony to genuineness? In 1927, when the log was presented and refused, it was dropped. The failure to carry it on to the Arbitration Court, it is said, showed the claim was not real. I prefer to believe the sworn explanation that the failure was due to a then policy of avoiding arbitration. But if failure to go to arbitration betokens want of sincerity, surely determination to arbitrate a denied claim, at expenditure of time, money and energy, is a weighty proof of sincerity and reality. Further, if all that was desired was to get pre-stoppage rates, what was there to prevent the claim being limited to them? And if that claim is real, why is not the whole log real? Learned counsel bestowed on the log the epithet of "paper claims." But the evidence shows that they were substantial and represented the dormant claims of 1927 revived and added to, in fact brought up to date.

One of the most cogent pieces of testimony as to the reality of the demands for increased wages and rates is that given by more than one witness to the following effect. For many months thousands of miners have lost their wages altogether, and were suffering privations; other thousands had, in their own defence, contributed out of their own wages 12½ per cent to the support of their fellow-employees out of work, and they thought, together with beliefs they entertained as to owners' profits, that it was a convenient time and a just occasion to renew their claims for higher remuneration. They may have been putting forward just or unjust claims; it is not my province to know or suggest which: that is the function of the Arbitration Court. But that they put forward the log as a real claim to be fought for and obtained so far as they could, seems to me clear beyond the shadow of a doubt. The Council of the organization, it is sworn, by its responsible officers, men whose veracity is, in my opinion, unassailable, were pushed by the general body of men into greater activity, and they formulated the log and sent it out to the various branches for confirmation with a request for expedition. That confirmation was given and the approval conveyed to the Council, and then with the express imprimatur of many thousands of men upon it, the log was in due form presented as the real demand of the miners composing the organization. And yet it is said it was not real.

First, let us see how the Northern Colliery proprietors understood the demand. On 17th January 1930 Mr. McDonald, the chairman of the Associated Northern Collieries, wrote in answer to the demand. He wrote on behalf of twenty-three collieries. Having in view objections to jurisdiction apparently on technical grounds, he first very properly guarded himself against any admissions as to that. Then he dealt with the substance of the demand. He did not treat it as wholly unreal nor as confined to increases. He said: "Assuming power and jurisdiction, we are of opinion that the whole question of wage rates and conditions of employment is open under the claim made by your organization." No such answer would, I am sure, have been made if the proprietors had considered the demand wholly unreal or limited to increases, even though its voluntary concession was not to be seriously expected from the Northern Collieries. Equally can this be said of the replies from the owners in Victoria and Queensland and Tasmania, who were well aware of the whole position and whose answers were simple refusals without any suggestion of unreality in the demands. And it is important in this connection that in the Federated Engine-Drivers' and Firemen's Association of Australasia v. A1 Amalgamated[6] it was laid down in this Court by the learned Chief Justice that the important thing in considering a demand is "not what the organization intended to demand, but what it did demand," and that we have to read it "as it would present itself to anyone to whom it was addressed"[7]. My own view was similar. I said[8]: "I ask myself what would an employer reasonably consider was the demand made upon him?" In that case "reality" was not the issue, but the test stated is just the same, for it is universal. The demands in this case were therefore not only real and covering the whole ground of working conditions, but were made in terms and circumstances that must reasonably have made them understood as put forward in earnest and to be persisted in. When, therefore, the demands were definitely rejected and were clearly persisted in, there was formed a true industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State.

In my opinion Judge Beeby's order should stand in its entirety, and these applications should be dismissed.

The main question which the applicants, who are the State of New South Wales and certain proprietors of collieries in the northern district, have raised by these proceedings for our decision is whether an alleged industrial dispute between them, among others, and the respondent, the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation, is an actual or threatened, impending or probable industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of New South Wales.

Upon 20th January 1930 his Honor Judge Beeby referred the supposed industrial dispute into the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Upon 23rd January 1930 he made an interim award by which he awarded, ordered and prescribed "that until 18th February 1930 or further order of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration the wages, hewing rates and conditions of employment set out in the awards of the special tribunal" (scil., under the Industrial Peace Act 1920) "of 23rd October and 6th November 1925 and ... any subsequent variations thereof should be paid and observed" and "that this interim award should bind the proprietors who were represented at a compulsory conference" on 20th January "as to their employment of members of" the respondent Federation, and should bind it and its members. In fact the awards of the special tribunal to which Judge Beeby's interim award refers do not govern the hewing rates, and they deal with day wages only, but we were told that the interim award was intended to prescribe wages and conditions for coal-miners generally, and that its failure to do so was due to mistake. The order by which Judge Beeby referred the alleged dispute into his Court describes its subject matter. The principal items said to be in dispute are claims by the Federation for an increase of 9d. per ton in the hewing rate; for a minimum wage of 25s. 1d. per shift, or £5 10s. per week for contract workers; for an increase of 3s. per day for adult off-hand labourers and wheelers; for 40 hours bank to bank, together with provision by the employers for transporting or conveying employees below ground to and from their working-places in the mines; for freedom from lock-out and for preference. These claims were made by a formal log of demands which the secretary of the Federation despatched by post on the evening of 24th December 1929 to the principal mine-owners in the Commonwealth requiring compliance by 1st January 1930. It was in fact a new and revised edition of a log which the Federation had formulated and delivered on 2nd September 1927. The employers had then refused the claims, and the Federation had not pursued them. This log had been delivered with a view of obtaining a further award from the Coal Industry Special Tribunal, which for some years had dealt with the coal industry, but its chairman was said to be ill and, whether for that or for other reasons, it was considered wiser not to persist. The claim for a weekly minimum had in fact been refused by the Tribunal in October 1925, with the result that the Tribunal, like the Court of Arbitration itself, fell into disfavour and disuse. Although from time to time dissatisfaction with the course taken by the Council was expressed by, or in, some of the lodges, the Council did not again formulate the demands until they were revived in December 1929. As time went on events appeared less and less propitious. The price of coal was high and the demand for it diminished. The inter-State trade declined as well as the export of coal overseas, and the sale of bunker coal. In July and August 1928 the Premier of New South Wales intervened, and he propounded a scheme for the lessening of the price of coal which involved a reduction of one shilling a ton in the amount paid for wages. It was made clear that the proprietors insisted upon a reduction of wages. After many conferences and much negotiation and discussion the mines of the members of the Northern Collieries Association on 2nd March 1929 were closed and some 12,000 men were dismissed or thrown out of employment. A reduction was steadfastly resisted by the men, and in the course of this protracted dispute it seems not unlikely that some of their leaders reinforced their opposition to a reduction by asserting that the men considered their wages should be increased. But at length the Council of the Federation agreed to submit to combined meetings of the lodges of the closed collieries the question whether they would agree to a reduction equivalent to 9d. per ton. An opinion to which the general secretary deposed that, if rates and wages at these collieries were reduced, a reduction in rates and wages in all other collieries in Australia would follow, was very generally held, and lodges elsewhere claimed the right to vote upon this proposal and urged its rejection, and rejected it was at various meetings between 4th and 10th December.

On 16th December the New South Wales Government commenced to work a colliery it had taken over, and employed men who were not members of the Federation at wages representing a reduction of 9d. per ton. Scenes of violence took place, and on the same day the Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, by telegram, summoned a compulsory conference before Judge Beeby in Sydney for 17th December 1929. On 13th December, at a meeting of the lodges of the Northern District at which the central executive of the Federation and representatives from the Newcastle and Sydney Trades and Labour Councils attended, a resolution was passed recommending a "policy to extend and intensify the present dispute beyond the limit of this State." But, except for this and similar resolutions of other bodies, it is difficult to see what ground there was for supposing at that stage that the dispute actually did or was likely to extend beyond New South Wales so as to fall within the cognizance of the Commonwealth Court. It is not surprising, therefore, that on 16th December the general secretary sent a telegram to the secretary at Wonthaggi in Victoria, in which, after referring to the occurrences at Rothbury, he said: "stop Wonthaggi to-morrow without fail send me urgent wire in the morning that Wonthaggi has stopped." The inference seems irresistible that this instruction was given in order that evidence might be available in Sydney upon which it might be contended that a two-State dispute existed. Upon 17th December those members of the Council who were summoned to the conference went before the Judge. But the others addressed themselves at once to a consideration of the log of September 1927. At the conference on that and the following day, the representatives of the proprietors objected that there was no two-State dispute. On 18th December Judge Beeby referred the alleged dispute into Court. On 19th December, in Court, counsel for the proprietors again objected to the jurisdiction and said the question would be brought before this Court. His Honor, however, at once made an interim award prescribing that existing rates and conditions should be paid and observed, if members of the Federation were employed; where-upon counsel announced that the validity of the award would forthwith be attacked before this Court, which did, in the result, hold that it was made without jurisdiction. On 20th December the Council of the Federation proceeded with the consideration of the log of demands which was adopted. On 22nd December "Mr. Crofts (secretary of the All Australian Trades Union Council) addressed the Council (of the Federation) at length tendering certain advice in regard to procedure to be adopted in serving the claims, which Council had adopted, on the owners," and on 24th December the log was put in the post. On the same day the general secretary sent to each district secretary the following letter:—"Dear Comrade,—Enclosed you will find a copy of the log of claims which has this day been served on the owners, and I desire that, wherever possible, you will have this matter placed before your members and endorsed prior to 1st January 1930. At the same time get the meeting to carry a resolution threatening to cease work if the claims and demands are not acceded to within the time specified. Have this done as early as possible, and inform me of the actual resolutions carried by the members not later than the 3rd January 1930. I shall be glad if the northern district delegates will kindly place this urgent matter before the meeting of lodge delegates to be held on 27th December instant. Yours faithfully." These instructions were carefully carried out. In his reply refusing the demands the secretary of the Northern Collieries Association said: "It is difficult to imagine that you are serious in making the claims set out in the document under review so far as they relate to members of this organization."

In The King v. Hibble; Ex parte Broken Hill Pty. Co.[9], Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy J., Powers J., Rich J. and Starke J. said in their joint judgment:—"It is settled law under the Arbitration Act that a dispute must be real and genuine (Tramways Case [No. 2]2(1914) [1914] HCA 58; 19 C.L.R. 43.). Whether it be real and genuine is always a question of fact, and upon proceedings in prohibition the fact must be determined by this Court on its own independent view of the evidence." Nothing in the Burwood Cinema Case[11], or in the unreported case of the Australian Workers' Union (1926 No. 5) which we were referred to since the argument and have examined, conflicts in any way with this proposition, which is, indeed, only a restatement of the view long held and frequently acted upon by this Court that "in all cases the Court is bound to be satisfied of the existence and reality of the dispute" (per Isaacs J. in the Builders' Labourers' Case[12]). In this case there was and is a very real and grave dispute between the parties to these proceedings, but, as we have held in our previous judgment, it was, on and up to 19th December, the date of Judge Beeby's first award, confined to New South Wales. The matter of the dispute was whether wages should be reduced on the northern coalfields. It was generally believed that if, as a result of such a reduction of wages, the price of coal upon that field fell, wages must be reduced upon all other fields. The question we have to decide is, in substance, whether the formulation, five days later, of a paper demand for increased wages, shorter hours and more advantageous conditions and its refusal could and did operate upon the circumstances which we have attempted briefly to summarize to bring into being a real and genuine dispute, or a real and genuine extension of the existing dispute. We think that it is quite clear that the Council revived and remodelled the demands of 1927 for the purpose of attempting to confer upon Judge Beeby authority to deal with the existing dispute upon the northern coalfields of New South Wales. The rejection by the men at the meetings between 4th and 10th December of the terms which their leaders had put before them, and, as the President of the Federation said, "recommended as the best possible terms which could be secured from the proprietors for a resumption of work," the opening of Rothbury by the New South Wales Government with non-union labour, and the excitement and violence displayed on the fields on 16th December, had combined to make the intervention of the Federal Court welcome. The resolution of 13th December to extend and intensify the dispute beyond the limit of this State shows that this intervention was already contemplated. The telegram on 16th December to Wonthaggi calling for a stoppage there, and asking for an urgent wire reporting it, leaves no doubt of its purpose and of the plan followed. When next day members of the Council who were not at Court turned to the consideration of a log of demands, can it be doubted that they were animated by the same purpose? The service of a log would be the natural way in which an attempt to give jurisdiction would be made. Indeed, in ordinary circumstances where the remaining materials were at hand for the manufacture of a real inter-State dispute, it might be enough to create one. But in this case particular difficulties were inherent in the situation. A determined struggle had been long in progress in New South Wales for the reduction of wages. The closing of the northern mines had made it possible for other mines to work profitably, but while this in some districts prompted thoughts of increased wages, it was clear to all concerned that ultimately wages on the northern field would determine wages elsewhere. At the same time while the northern mines remained closed there was no question of reduction elsewhere. This made it impossible to extend the real issue in the north beyond the boundaries of the State. Its extension could come about only by the opening of the northern mines under conditions enabling the sale of coal at lower prices, which meant, of course, the settlement of the question there. Accordingly, if an industrial dispute extending beyond New South Wales was to be promoted upon the subject of wages, no course was open but to demand that wages should be raised. But is it credible that at this juncture the Council of the Federation sincerely propounded to the proprietors of the northern collieries for immediate answer a bona fide demand upon which they were resolved to insist that the proprietors should raise wages, shorten hours and afford further advantages? We think that the truth is that all parties regarded the formulation of these demands as nothing but a step towards enabling the Arbitration Court to deal with the trouble in New South Wales.

Much of the argument addressed to us by counsel for the Commonwealth depended upon the proposition that once a real industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State existed, it was not material to inquire into its genesis, and in particular it was nothing to the point that it arose by reason of the desire of one party to obtain an award of the Court. While this may be so, yet when the existence of a genuine dispute is in question the purpose and object with which paper demands were delivered may be decisive. Again much of the same argument was founded upon the view that the Federation and its members intended to press for a code to be formulated by the Court's award or by an agreement having the force of an award which would regulate future conditions. This contention illustrates some of the confusion which attends a jurisdiction which can be exercised when, and only when, an inter-State dispute exists, but when it does arise enables the arbitrator in some measure to regulate industry. The two-State dispute must exist between the parties antecedently to the award or agreement which composes it, and the dispute must arise out of their disagreement about the manner in which they shall regulate their own industrial relations. Experience has shown that the desire for an award regulating industrial relations has been the cause of the creation and extension of industrial disputes which the Arbitration Court exists to prevent and settle. But in such cases the jurisdiction arises because of the existence of a two-State dispute, and in spite of, and not because of, the motives which generate that dispute. Indeed, the argument may well be said to conceal but to contain the reality of this case, namely, that paper demands were conceived as part of a proceeding requisite to enable the Arbitration Court to regulate an industry in which a serious dispute confined to one State was in progress. In our opinion the log of demands was not effective to create a new dispute with the proprietors nor to extend the existing dispute beyond New South Wales. Nor do we think that there is a threatened, impending or probable industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State.

We think the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had and has no jurisdiction over the alleged dispute, and upon this occasion we think the remedy of prohibition is proper to be applied.

The King v. Beeby and Others (Ex parte Caledonian Collieries Ltd. and Others) and The King v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and Others (Ex parte the Attorney-General for New South Wales).—Orders nisi made absolute.

Caledonian Collieries Ltd. and Others v. Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation.—Summons under sec. 21AA: (1), (2), (3)—The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had no jurisdiction to make the interim award of 23rd January 1930 and the same is bad in law and void.

The Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Australasian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation.—Summons under sec. 21AA: (1) to (6)—The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had no jurisdiction to make the interim award of 23rd January 1930 and the same is bad in law and void.

Solicitors for the Caledonian Collieries Ltd. and the Northern Colliery Proprietors' Association, Blake & Riggall, for Sly & Russell, Sydney.

Solicitor for the State of New South Wales, J. V. Tillett, Crown Solicitor for New South Wales.

Solicitor for the Commonwealth, W. H. Sharwood, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.

[1] (1914) 19 C.L.R., at pp. 84, 85.

[2] [1916] HCA 56; (1916) 22 C.L.R. 261.

[3] (1914) 19 C.L.R., at p. 85.

[4] (1919) A.C. 667.

[5] (1919) A.C., at p. 674.

[6] [1924] HCA 64; (1924) 35 C.L.R. 349.

[7] (1924) 35 C.L.R., at pp. 351-352.

[8] (1924) 35 C.L.R., at p. 352.

[9] [1921] HCA 15; (1921) 29 C.L.R. 290, at p. 299.

[10] [1914] HCA 58; (1914) 19 C.L.R. 43.

[11] [1925] HCA 7; (1925) 35 C.L.R. 528.

[12] (1914) 18 C.L.R., at p. 246.

High Court of Australia

Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Australasian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation (No 2) [1930] HCA 2; (1930) 42 CLR 558 (3 March 1930)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA