Beckett v R [1922] HCA 48; (1922) 31 CLR 246 (11 December 1922)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Beckett Appellant; and The King Respondent.

H C of A

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland.

11 December 1922

Knox C.J., Isaacs, Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ.

Salkeld, for the appellant.

C. E. Weigall, for the Crown.

Salkeld, in reply.

Knox C.J.

In this case I agree substantially with the reasons given by Lukin J. for the conclusion at which he arrived. Under the Criminal Code of Queensland certain offences were, until recently, punishable by death; certain others were punishable by imprisonment. In that state of the law the State Children Act of 1911 was passed, which provides by sec. 24, as expanded by the definitions of "child" and "convicted" in the interpretation clause, sec. 4, that "if any boy or girl under the age of seventeen years is found guilty or convicted of any crime or offence punishable by imprisonment, the Court having cognizance of the case shall not sentence such child to imprisonment, but shall" proceed in accordance with the section. At that stage it was clear, I think, that any conviction in any Court for any offence punishable by imprisonment could only result in the consequences provided in sec. 24 if the offence were committed by a boy or girl under seventeen years of age. At that time, there being certain offences punishable by death, it may be assumed that sec. 24 did not apply to those offences.

In R. v. Beeston[1] the Court of Criminal Appeal held, rightly in my opinion, that the provisions of sec. 24 applied to verdicts and convictions in the Supreme Court as well as to convictions before Courts of Petty Sessions. In giving their reasons for that decision the learned Judges invited the attention of Parliament to the extraordinary results which might follow from the interpretation which they felt constrained to put upon sec. 24. But when in 1917 the Parliament of Queensland amended the State Children Act of 1911, the suggestions made by the Judges in R. v. Beeston were apparently ignored, and sec. 24 was left exactly as it was, although certain other sections were amended. Then in 1922 an Act was passed "to abolish capital punishment and to amend the Criminal Code and other enactments accordingly." By sec. 2 of that Act the punishment of death was abolished, and by sec. 3 (xiv.) it was provided that in sec. 305 of the Criminal Code the words "the punishment of death" should be repealed, and in lieu thereof the words "imprisonment with hard labour for life, which cannot be mitigated or varied under section nineteen of this Code." The present appellant was convicted of the crime of wilful murder in August of this year, the Act to abolish capital punishment having been assented to on 31st July. It follows that by reason of that Act capital punishment could not be inflicted on the appellant and the punishment to which he was liable was imprisonment. Under those circumstances it appears to me that the appellant comes exactly within the description contained in sec. 24 of the State Children Act of 1911: he was a boy under the age of seventeen years who was found guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment.

For these reasons I am of opinion that the sentence passed upon the appellant must be quashed.

Isaacs J.

I agree. I think that the case of R. v. Beeston[2] was well decided, and on the substance of the case I agree with the reasons given by Lukin J.

Higgins J.

I also agree with the judgment of the Chief Justice.

Gavan Duffy J.

I agree.

Starke J.

I agree.

Appeal allowed. Sentence quashed. Appellant to remain in custody until order of the Court of Criminal Appeal of Queensland. Matter remitted to that Court to be dealt with according to law consistently with this decision.

[1] (1915) S.R. (Qd.), 101.

[2] (1915) S.R. (Qd.), 101.