Dickson v Commissioner for Railways (Qld) [1922] HCA 30; (1922) 30 CLR 579 (24 June 1922)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dickson Plaintiff, Appellant; and The Commissioner For Railways (Queensland) Defendant. Respondent.

H C of A

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland.

24 June 1922

Knox C.J., Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ.

Stumm K.C. and Watson, for the appellant.

Hart, for the respondent.

Stumm K.C., in reply.

The Court delivered the following written judgment:—

June 24

Knox C.J.,

Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ.

The plaintiff, whilst a passenger on the defendant's railways, sustained injuries which resulted in the loss of part of the first finger of her right hand, and brought an action in the District Court of Queensland at Brisbane, alleging that these injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant or his servants. The action was tried with a jury; and the facts proved, or which might have been found by the jury, were substantially to the following effect:—The plaintiff entered a carriage and took a seat, leaving a space almost sufficient for one other person between herself and the door. She closed the door of the carriage behind her, but did not fasten it. Soon afterwards the train started and quickly gathered speed. A porter noticed that the carriage door was unfastened, and, running along the platform, he opened the door, and then slammed it hard. At the moment he was closing the door, the train, which was on an S curve at the time, gave a lurch or jerk, causing the plaintiff to sway towards the door. As the plaintiff did so, she threw her right hand towards it to steady herself, and it so happened, during the interval between the porter's opening and slamming the door, that the plaintiff's fingers reached the hinge; and, on the door being slammed, they were crushed between it and the framework of the carriage.

The defendant moved for a nonsuit or judgment, but the learned Judge who tried the case adjourned the motion, and put the following questions to the jury:—(1) Was the defendant guilty of negligence (a) in failing to take care that the side door of the carriage was fastened before starting the train? (b) in failing to take care, when closing the door to avoid causing injury to passengers? (2) Was the plaintiff injured by such negligence? (3) Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence? The jury answered questions 1 and 2 in the affirmative, and question 3 in the negative. They assessed damages at £200. Subsequently the adjourned motion was argued before the learned Judge, who was of opinion that, assuming there was evidence to support the finding of negligence under question 1 (a), such negligence was not the cause of the accident, and that there was no evidence to support the finding of negligence under question 1 (b). He therefore entered judgment for the defendant.

On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed this decision. Special leave was given to appeal to this Court against the decision of the Supreme Court, and this appeal now comes before us for determination.

Both the primary and the appellate Judges thought the case indistinguishable in principle from the cases of Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson[1], Drury v. North-Eastern Railway Co.[2] and Taylor v. Great Southern and Western Railway Co.[3]. The only principle of law, however, that can be extracted from the cases is authoritatively stated by Cairns L.C. in Jackson's Case[4]:—"The Judge has a certain duty to discharge, and the jurors have another and a different duty. The Judge has to say whether any facts have been established by evidence from which negligence may be reasonably inferred; the jurors have to say whether, from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence ought to be inferred. ... The negligence must in some way connect itself, or be connected by evidence, with the accident." The cases relied upon by the learned Judges are valuable illustrations of the application of this principle to the circumstances of these cases, but they can hardly be relied upon as authorities in a case in which the facts are not identical.

Might negligence be reasonably inferred from the facts proved in this case? This depends upon "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the act or omission relied upon as negligent would or might probably cause damage." The facts in this case must be looked at as a whole. The defendant allowed the plaintiff to enter his train as a passenger, but omitted to see that the door of the carriage in which she was seated was securely fastened before the train started. The defendant's own Regulations provide (reg. 278 (a)):—"Care must be taken that the side doors and end platform gates and bars of all carriages and other vehicles are fastened before starting the train, and doors must not be opened to allow passengers to alight from or enter a train before it has come to a stand or after it has started. When closing doors care must be taken to avoid injury to passengers." This regulation was evidence to go to the jury that it was a reasonable and proper precaution to fasten the carriage doors before starting the train. In addition, the jurors were entitled, apart from the Regulations altogether, to consider the probable danger of unfastened doors in railway trains. A passenger might easily fall through the door, or have his body injured or his fingers crushed by a swinging door. Consequently there was evidence from which a jury might reasonably infer negligence in omitting to securely fasten the carriage door before the train started.

It would be difficult to impute negligence to the porter in closing the door. But that act was an endeavour to rectify the earlier default. The hurried nature of the act gave the porter little or no opportunity of appreciating the plaintiff's unstable position or the risk of injury to her, and this condition of things was brought about by the defendant's earlier default. The defendant cannot protect himself against liability for his original default by attempting to amend it at the risk of the plaintiff, if injury results from the combined effect of the negligent act and the attempt to amend it. Here, but for the original default the door would have been securely fastened and the plaintiff's fingers would not have been crushed. The injury to her fingers connects itself, and is connected by evidence, with the original default on the part of the defendant. It is "directly traceable to" that default, and is not "due to the operation of independent causes having no connection with" the default. It is quite immaterial in this view that the injury to the plaintiff's fingers was unexpected, or could not have been anticipated or foreseen by the defendant or his servants (In re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co.[5]).

The judgments of the Courts below must, therefore, be reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiff.

Appeal allowed. Judgment of Supreme Court reversed. Judgment of District Court for defendant set aside. Judgment for plaintiff for £200 with costs in the District Court and Supreme Court and in the High Court.

Solicitors for the appellant, J. B. Price & Daly.

Solicitor for the respondent, H. J. H. Henchman, Acting Crown Solicitor for Queensland.

[1] (1877) 3 App. Cas., 193.

[2] (1901) 2 K.B., 322.

[3] (1909) 2 I.R., 330.

[4] (1877) 3 App. Cas., at pp. 197-198.

[5] (1921) 3 K.B., 560.