![]() |
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
High Court of Australia |
The King against Snow.
H C of A
2 October 1919
Barton, Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ.
Piper K.C. (with him Blackburn), for the accused.
Cleland K.C. and F. Villeneuve Smith K.C., for the Crown,
Barton J.
The sections in Part IX. of the Judiciary Act have very properly been brought before the Court by counsel for the accused; but, having regard to the definitions in sec. 2 of that Act, and to the largeness of sec. 26, I do not think that the contention which has been rather suggested than urged by Mr. Piper can prevail. A "suit" is an action or original proceeding between parties, and sec. 64 is limited to that kind of proceeding. "Cause" is a larger word than "suit," and includes also criminal proceedings. "Matter" is larger still, and includes all proceedings which are included in "suit" and "cause," and more: it includes all proceedings before the Court. Then we find that the scope of sec. 26 extends to "all matters." In those the High Court has jurisdiction to award costs, and we find no other section which qualifies or controls, at least in any relevant way, that jurisdiction, which, not qualified or controlled, must, in my opinion, be exercisable according to judicial discretion. That being so, it seems to me that my brother Isaacs was right in awarding costs. The question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative.
Isaacs, Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ.
concurred.
Question answered in the affirmative.
Solicitor for the Crown, Gordon H. Castle, Crown Solicitor for the Commonwealth.
Solicitors for the accused, Bakewell, Stow & Piper.
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1919/48.html