Goldring v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [1916] HCA 71; (1916) 22 CLR 336 (13 November 1916)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Goldring Plaintiff, Appellant; and The National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited Defendants, Respondents.

H C of A

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

13 November 1916

Griffith C.J., Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ.

Rolin K.C. and Waddell, for the appellant.

Leverrier K.C., Lingen and R. K. Manning, for the respondents, were not called upon.

The judgment of the Court, which was delivered by Griffith C.J., was as follows:—

Griffith C.J.,

Isaacs and Gavan Duffy JJ.

This is a suit by the plaintiff to set aside a judgment given by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1895 in a suit for foreclosure of mortgages, in which mortgages the present plaintiff was the mortgagor and the present defendants were the mortgagees. They were mortgages of a reversionary interest. The plaintiffs in that suit alleged authority to carry on their business and to lend money on the security of real and personal estate, and that the mortgages had been given to secure money duly lent. The decree for foreclosure when made settled all questions between the parties to the transaction. The principle is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. xviii., p. 209, in these words: "When judgment has been given in an action the cause of action in respect of which judgment is given transit in rem judicatam, i.e., is at an end, and its place is taken by the rights created by the judgment." That judgment finally determined the rights of the parties. The doctrine in question is founded upon reason. In this case, nearly twenty years after judgment, the present plaintiff finds some ground for impeaching its validity, that is, she says the mortgagees had no right to lend money on the security in question. A judgment may be impeached for fraud, but I do not know of any other ground; certainly mistake is not such a ground. On that judgment being pronounced all the remaining rights of the parties were extinguished by the judgment. The matter was not decided by the learned Judge below on the ground of estoppel, but the point was taken in the pleadings, and it is a question in the foreground of the case. The Court therefore is precluded from considering the case on its merits, that is, as to the validity or not of the mortgage transactions, and it would not be right to express an opinion on that point. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant, Minter, Simpson & Co.

Solicitors for the respondents, Norton, Smith & Co.