R v Whitfeld [1913] HCA 7; (1913) 15 CLR 689 (20 February 1913)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

The King against Whitfeld and Others.

Ex parte Quon Tat.

H C of A

20 February 1913

Griffith C.J., Barton and Isaacs JJ.

M. J. Clarke, for the applicant.

Hall, for the informant, was not called on.

Griffith C.J.

This application purports to be founded on sec. 39 (2) of the Judiciary Act, which provides that "The several Courts of the States shall within the limits of their several jurisdictions, whether such limits are as to locality, subject matter, or otherwise, be invested with federal jurisdiction" in certain cases.

This provision was considered by this Court in the case of Ah Yick v. Lehmert[1], where the question was as to the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions in Victoria. I quote a few words from my own judgment[2]:—"This enactment relates to all the Courts of the States, and may be read as if all those Courts were enumerated. Let us take the Court of General Sessions of Victoria and apply the section to this Court, and it will read thus:—Courts of General Sessions of the State of Victoria shall within the limits of their jurisdiction be invested with federal jurisdiction in all matters enumerated in secs. 75 and 76 of the Constitution. Then we have to inquire what is the jurisdiction of Courts of General Sessions in Victoria? On that inquiry we find that they have both original and appellate jurisdiction."

Applying that to the present case, sec. 39 (2) may be read thus:—"Courts of General Sessions of the State of Tasmania shall within the limits of their appellate jurisdiction be invested with federal jurisdiction." The question then arises: What are the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of Courts of General Sessions in Tasmania? Appellate jurisdiction must be conferred by Statute, and Courts of General Sessions have only such appellate jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on them. But we find that they have no general appellate jurisdiction, but only jurisdiction in particular cases, conferred by particular Statutes which do not cover the present case.

It is clear, therefore, that they have no appellate jurisdiction in this case.

The order nisi must therefore be discharged.

Barton J.

I am entirely of the same opinion. I was inclined to refuse Mr. Clarke's application for an order nisi when it came before me in vacation, but taking into consideration the nearness of these sittings and the importance of the subject matter, I thought it desirable that a final decision of the Full Court should be obtained.

Isaacs J.

I am of the same opinion, and have nothing to add.

Order nisi discharged.

Solicitor, for the applicant, M. J. Clarke, Launceston.

Solicitors, for the respondent, Law, Weston & Archer, Launceston.

[1] [1905] HCA 22; 2 C.L.R., 593.

[2] [1905] HCA 22; 2 C.L.R., 593, at p. 605.