Prentice v Amalgamated Mining Employees' Association of Victoria & Tasmania [1912] HCA 37; (1912) 15 CLR 235 (31 May 1912)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prentice Defendant, Appellant; and The Amalgamated Mining Employés' Association of Victoria and Tasmania Complainants, Respondents.

H C of A

On appeal from a Court of Petty Sessions of Victoria.

31 May 1912

Griffith C.J., Barton and Isaacs JJ.

Starke, for the appellant.

J. R. Macfarlan, for the respondents, took preliminary objections.

Starke.

Starke.

J. R. Macfarlan.

Starke, in reply.

Griffith C.J.

Some very serious questions have been raised in argument in this case, some of them questions of difficulty, which it is not necessary to decide. Indeed, it is never desirable to decide questions in which the construction of the Constitution, or the effect or validity of a Commonwealth Statute, is involved unless it is necessary to do so. But there is one point in the case which is very clear, and which disposes of it. The action was one brought by the respondents against the appellant to recover a sum of nine shillings alleged to be payable by him as a member of the respondent society as "dues." Supposing that all other difficulties were out of the way of the respondents, the appellant's answer is "I never entered into any agreement by which I became bound to pay anything to the respondents." The respondents are a voluntary association, which has the status of an organization under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. That, however, does not alter the nature of the bargain between themselves and their members. By the bargain the appellant became liable to a Branch of the Association to pay levies or contributions to that Branch. The Branch in turn undertook liabilities to the respondents, but the appellant entered into no contract to pay to the respondents what he owed the Branch. That is a sufficient ground for allowing the appeal, and I see no reason why the respondents should not pay the costs.

Barton J.

I am of the same opinion, and have nothing to add.

Isaacs J.

I agree. The section under which this proceeding was launched is sec. 68 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, which provides that:—"All fines fees levies or dues payable to an organization by any member thereof under its rules may, in so far as they are owing for any period of membership subsequent to the registration or proclamation of the organization, be sued for and recovered in the name of the organization in any Court of summary jurisdiction constituted by a Police, Stipendiary or Special Magistrate."

The question whether this levy was payable to the organization that sued by the member who was sued depends upon the construction of the Rules. They form the compact under which the appellant became and was a member of the organization. On the construction of those Rules it seems to me that the appellant did not undertake to pay this levy directly to the organization which is one specific body, but that he might have been made liable under those Rules to his particular Branch. Whether he was or was not so liable by reason of the executive levy and without further action by the Branch I do not say. But I am clear that the appellant was not a debtor of the organization directly under the agreement by which he was a member, that is, under the Rules as they stand. That disposes of the case.

Appeal allowed with costs. Complaint dismissed with costs.

Solicitors, for the appellant, Maddock, Jamieson & Lonie.

Solicitors, for the respondents, Murphy & Murphy for Murphy & Connelly, Bendigo.