Re Daley [1907] HCA 32; (1907) 5 CLR 193 (13 August 1907)

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

In re Daley.

H C of A

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

13 August 1907

Barton, Isaacs and Higgins JJ.

Delohery, for the applicant.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

Aug. 14

Barton J.

This appeal is on a matter affecting the professional conduct of one of the officers of the Supreme Court. It is not to be looked at with reference to the personal or legal relations between the counsel concerned and the solicitor whose conduct is called in question. If there is jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to deal with one of its officers in the circumstances here alleged, and believed by that Court to have existed, then it seems to us to be a case in which we certainly ought not to interfere.

A representation has been made by this solicitor to a barrister for the purpose and with the result of inducing him to accept a brief which otherwise he might not have accepted. That representation is believed by the Supreme Court—and we cordially agree with them in that respect—to have been false. As Mr. Daley has urged that there is nothing fraudulent in the transaction, we are bound to say that, in our opinion, the conduct of Mr. Daley was as nearly fraudulent in its essence as one can well conceive, whether it is conduct that is subject to a certain class of proceeding or not.

We have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to deal with its officers when their conduct, considered in a purely professional aspect, is misconduct tending to uproot the confidence which should exist between solicitor and client.

In the case of In re Coleman[1] we used these expressions:—

"That Court" (that is the Supreme Court) "was of opinion that the applicant had been guilty of professional misconduct which merited punishment, and we see no reason to differ from them." We apply the same statement to this case.

"That being so, it is difficult to see how we can properly interfere with the exercise of the Court's discretion in inflicting punishment upon one of its own officers." We adhere to that opinion.

"In such cases the nature of the punishment is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Supreme Court itself."

Holding that opinion also, it seems to us that this is a case within the lines which the Court there laid down, and therefore that we ought not to grant special leave to interfere with the decision of the Supreme Court in any matter of such a character.

Special leave refused.

Solicitors, for applicant, Sullivan Bros.

[1] [1905] HCA 19; 2 C.L.R., 834, at p. 836.