![]() |
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
Federal Court of Australia |
Last Updated: 31 October 2008
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZKCS v Minister for Immigration [2008] FCA 1489
Migration
Act 1958 (Cth)
Iyer v Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
SZJDS v
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1093
Jackamarra v
Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 156
SZAIX v Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 3;
(2006) 150 FCR 448
SZKCS and SZKCT v MINISTER FOR
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
NSD484 OF
2008
REEVES J
24 JULY 2008
DARWIN
|
AND:
|
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Leave is granted to the appellant to amend
the notice of appeal.
Note: Settlement and
entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court
Rules.
|
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
SZKCS
First Appellant SZKCT Second Appellant |
|
AND:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent |
|
JUDGE:
|
REEVES J
|
|
DATE:
|
24 JULY 2008
|
|
PLACE:
|
DARWIN
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1 I give the appellant leave to file the amended notice of appeal. I do so taking into account the relevant questions that are set out in Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [22] to [24].
2 In relation to the question whether the proposed grounds have reasonable prospects of success, I take the approach that I outlined in SZJDS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1093 at [30] and [31] (‘SZJDS’), namely that I should grant leave unless I consider the prospects of success are such that the proposed grounds of appeal are devoid of merit, or will clearly fail, or are hopeless or unarguable.
3 Further, I take into account what I said in SZJDS in reliance on the High Court’s decision in Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 156, about the need for the assessment, at this stage, to be a rough and ready one. On that approach, I could not conclude that the proposed grounds of appeal are devoid of merit, or unarguable, or fall within any of the other terms I identified in SZJDS, such that I should refuse leave.
4 The explanation given as to why the matters were not raised below is that there has been a change of legal representation. That is commonplace, I suppose, in this sort of situation.
5 As to the dislocation to the court and the efficient use of judicial resources, I express the same concerns Justice Madgwick did in SZAIX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 3; (2006) 150 FCR 448 at [68]. However, like his Honour, I consider that the interests of justice in allowing the appellant to pursue this appeal outweigh those considerations.
6 The proposed bias ground does not raise an issue that is of importance beyond this case; though the proposed ground alleging a breach of s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) may, depending upon how the argument is developed at the hearing of this appeal.
7 Mr Mitchell, on behalf of the first respondent, has not alleged any actual prejudice, apart from costs, and that of course can be remedied with an order for costs. I take into account also that on the appellant’s side, it is, I think, a matter of quite significant potential prejudice if she is unable to pursue these proposed grounds of appeal and is thereby deprived of the opportunity to obtain a protection visa in this country.
8 So, for those reasons, I grant leave to the appellant to amend the notice
of appeal.
|
|
|
|
Solicitor for the Appellants:
|
Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Respondents:
|
Mr J Mitchell
|
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2008/1489.html