Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd v CEPU [2001] FCA 106 (21 February 2001)

Last Updated: 21 February 2001

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd v CEPU [2001] FCA 106

INDUSTRIAL LAW - Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) - industrial awards and certified agreements binding on Telstra Corporation Ltd - whether appellant a "successor, assignee, or transmittee" of part of the business of Testra - appropriate test - insufficient to ask whether Telstra has disposed of an important aspect of operating its business - necessary to determine whether the character of the business of the appellant is in substance identical with the business or part of the business of Telstra

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 149(1)(d), 170MB(1)

North Western Health Care Network v Health Services Union of Australia [1999] FCA 897; (1999) 92 FCR 477, considered

PP Consultants Pty Limited v Finance Sector Union of Australia [2000] HCA 59; (2000) 176 ALR 205, followed

Finance Sector Union of Australia v PP Consultants Pty Limited [1999] FCA 1251; (1999) 91 FCR 337, not followed

STELLAR CALL CENTRES PTY LIMITED v CPSU, THE COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION, CLARE MOORE, DAVID LETIZIA and STEPHEN JONES

N 978 of 1999

STELLAR CALL CENTRES PTY LIMITED v CEPU, THE COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA

N 1298 of 1999

RYAN, LEE and BRANSON JJ

SYDNEY

21 FEBRUARY 2001

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	N 978 of 1999

BETWEEN:	STELLAR CALL CENTRES PTY LIMITED Appellant
AND:	CPSU, THE COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION, CLAIRE MOORE, DAVID LETIZIA and STEPHEN JONES Respondents
JUDGES:	RYAN, LEE and BRANSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	21 FEBRUARY 2001
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Each of the orders of 3 September 1999 be set aside and in lieu thereof the application be dismissed.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	N 1298 of 1999

BETWEEN:	STELLAR CALL CENTRES PTY LIMITED Appellant
AND:	CEPU, THE COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA Respondent
JUDGES:	RYAN, LEE and BRANSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	21 FEBRUARY 2001
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The declaration of 3 September 1999 be set aside and in lieu thereof the application be dismissed.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

BETWEEN:	STELLAR CALL CENTRES PTY LIMITED Appellant
AND:	N 978 of 1999 CPSU, THE COMMUNITY AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNION, CLAIRE MOORE, DAVID LETIZIA and STEPHEN JONES Respondents N 1298 of 1999 CEPU, THE COMMUNICATIONS, ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, ENERGY, INFORMATION, POSTAL, PLUMBING AND ALLIED SERVICES UNION OF AUSTRALIA Respondent

JUDGES:	RYAN, LEE and BRANSON JJ
DATE:	21 FEBRUARY 2001
PLACE:	SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

1 By these appeals the appellant, Stellar Call Centres Pty Limited ("Stellar"), challenges the determination of the learned primary judge that in operating a call centre on behalf of Telstra Corporation Limited ("Telstra"), Stellar is bound by certain awards and certified agreements of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission by which Telstra is bound.

2 The central issue on the appeals is the proper construction of ss 149(1)(d) and 170MB(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ("the Act"). These provisions are respectively concerned with the identification of persons bound by an award determining an industrial dispute and the identification of the employer bound by a certified agreement in circumstances in which the business or part of the business of an employer has been "transmitted" or "assigned" to another.

3 We have concluded that the appeals should be allowed. Our reasons for so concluding are set out below.

BACKGROUND FACTS

4 There is no challenge to the factual findings of the learned primary judge. This outline of the background facts is taken from his Honour's judgment.

5 Stellar was incorporated on 13 May 1998 as a joint venture between Telstra and Excell Asia Pacific Pty Ltd ("Excell"), a subsidiary of Excell Global Services LLC, a company based in the United States of America. The Chief Executive Officer of Stellar gave evidence, which his Honour appears to have accepted, that Stellar's business was "to assist organisations to improve their interface with their customers through call centre solutions".

6 Although Stellar was established to compete with other call centre providers for Telstra and non-Telstra work, at the date of the hearing before the primary judge Stellar's most significant contract was that which gave rise to these proceedings.

7 Telstra maintains a dedicated telephone number, 132200, to deal with customer inquiries concerning billings, consumer products and the availability and connection of services, but not service difficulties. Until the end of 1998, all calls to this number were answered by Telstra employees working from Telstra operated centres. However, in late 1998 Telstra was experiencing difficulty in coping with all calls made to the 132200 number in busy times. It invited tenders to provide a service to assist customers "during periods of high call traffic flow".

8 Stellar was the successful tenderer. After learning in mid-November 1998 of its success, Stellar commenced to recruit and train staff, using for that purpose premises on the Gold Coast that had previously been used by Telstra for training purposes. On 14 December 1998, Stellar commenced taking Telstra customer calls from the Gold Coast premises. From 21 December 1998, Stellar's call centre work for Telstra was conducted from new Stellar-owned premises at Robina that provided 150 workspaces for personnel answering customer calls.

9 Stellar commenced to provide call centre services to Telstra pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the two companies. Negotiations for a detailed agreement were commenced in late 1998 and a draft agreement was admitted into evidence by the primary judge. It appears that the draft agreement reflects the way in which Stellar provides call centre and "benchmarking" services to Telstra.

10 Stellar has accepted obligations to provide a level of service at least equal to that provided by the Telstra call centres, to comply with Telstra's Code of Conduct and Privacy Protection Policies, to attend meetings and training sessions as required by Telstra and to keep records and provide reports for Telstra. Stellar has also accepted obligations to ensure that infra-structure at its call centre used for Telstra services is physically and electronically isolated from any infra-structure used for providing services to any of its other clients, and to allow Telstra free access to its call centre at any time.

11 The primary judge accepted the affidavit evidence of the Chief Executive Officer of Stellar that:

"Modern call centre technology means that the precise location of the performance of the work is often irrelevant, as it is in the performance of the Overflow Contract, which operates in the following way. Telephone calls are networked nationally, so that each call finds the next available operator, wherever that operator is located. In other words the whole national network operates as a virtual single centre."

It is thus a matter of chance whether a person who dials 132200 is answered by a Stellar employee or a Telstra employee.

12 Stellar owns most of the equipment used at its call centre at Robina although Telstra owns and operates the computing equipment necessary for Stellar's computing system to connect with Telstra.

13 There was no agreement between Stellar and Telstra that Stellar would offer employment to current or former employees of Telstra and Stellar did not give preference in employment to current or former employees of Telstra.

14 On 12 March 1999 David Letizia, an industrial organiser employed by the Queensland branch of CPSU, the Community and Public Sector Union ("CPSU") wrote to Mr Zisis, the Corporate Operations Manager of Stellar, indicating his intention to enter Stellar's Robina premises pursuant to s 285C of the Workplace Relations Act. That section provides:

"(1) A person who holds a permit in force under this Division may enter premises in which:

(a) work is being carried on to which an award applies that is binding on the organisation of which the person holding the permit is an officer or employee; and

(b) employees who are members, or eligible to become members, of that organisation work;

for the purposes of holding discussions with any of those employees who wish to participate in those discussions.

(2) The person may only enter the premises during working hours and may only hold the discussions during the employees' meal-time or other breaks."

15 Mr Zisis responded by challenging Mr Letizia's right to enter the premises. On 16 March Mr Letizia and another organiser, Claire Moore, went to Robina and sought entry. Mr Zisis refused entry. Mr Zisis made clear to Mr Letizia and Ms Moore that he did not think the Telstra awards and certified agreements bound Stellar, or that CPSU had coverage of any of its employees.

THE PROCEEDINGS

16 On 29 March 1999 CPSU, Ms Moore, Mr Letizia and Stephen Jones, CPSU's National Telecommunications Secretary ("the CPSU applicants"), commenced a proceeding in this Court by filing an Application seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and the imposition of a penalty. The form of the orders sought by the applicants was subsequently amended on two occasions, most recently to read as follows:

"1. A declaration that, in relation to employees of the Respondent engaged on work required to be done by the Respondent in the performance of a contract or contracts between Telstra Corporation Ltd (`Telstra') and the Respondent by which the Respondent is to operate a Call Centre at Robina which provides call management services of a Telstra Call Centre, the following awards apply:

(i) Telstra/CPSU Consolidated Award 1996 [Print N7759]

(ii) Telstra Corporation General Conditions of Service Award 1996 [Print Q2734]

2. A declaration that, in relation to employees of the Respondent engaged on work required to be done by the Respondent in the performance of a contract or contracts between Telstra Corporation Ltd (`Telstra') and the Respondent by which the Respondent is to operate a Call Centre at Robina which provides call management services of a Telstra Call Centre, the following certified agreements apply:

(i) Telstra Corporation 1995 - 97 Enterprise Agreement

(ii) Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Redundancy Agreement 1993

(iii) Telstra Customer Service representative Competency Based Training and Pay Structure Agreement 1996.

And orders that:

3. The Respondent by itself, its servants or agents, refrain from contravening or cease contravening Section 285E of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (`the Act') by refusing or unduly delaying entry to the premises at the Robina Centre by officers of and employees of the Community and Public Sector Union (`CPSU') entitled to enter those premises under section 285C of the Act.

4. A penalty be imposed on the Respondent.

5. Under Section 356 of the Act the penalty be paid to the First Applicant."

17 It was agreed between the parties at the time of the hearing before the primary judge that the awards and agreements referred to in the above draft orders bound Telstra in respect of the persons it employs at its customer call centres. It was also agreed that, as at 16 March 1999, at least one of the persons employed by Stellar at Robina was a member of CPSU, but without prejudice to a contention by Stellar that persons employed by it fall outside the eligibility criteria in CPSU's rules.

18 Shortly before the projected hearing day before the primary judge another union, Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia ("CEPU"), gave notice to the parties of its intention to apply for leave to intervene. Ultimately the CEPU filed a separate Application which was heard by the primary judge with that of the CPSU.

19 The CEPU Application sought the following relief:

"1. A declaration that in relation to employees of Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd engaged on work required to be done by Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd in the performance of a contract or contracts between Telstra and Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd by which Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd is to operate a call centre at Robina which provides call management services of a call centre, the following awards of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (the `Commission') are binding upon Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd:

(i) Telstra Corporation General Conditions of Service Award 1996 [Print Q2734] (now known as the Telstra Corporation General Conditions of Employment Award 1998 - Print Q9145)

(ii) AOTC/APTU Award 1993.

2. A declaration that in relation to employees of Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd engaged on work required to be done by Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd in the performance of a contract or contracts between Telstra and Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd by which Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd is to operate a call centre at Robina which provides call management service of a call centre, the following Certified Agreements of the Commission are binding upon Stellar Call Centres Pty Ltd:

(i) Telstra Corporation 1995-97 Enterprise Agreement

(ii) Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Redundancy Agreement 1993

(iii) Telstra Customer Service Representative Competency Based Training and Pay Structure Agreement 1996."

20 Again, it was agreed before the primary judge that the awards and agreements mentioned in the draft orders bound Telstra in respect of its call centre employees.

21 By its amended statement of claim ("the Statement of Claim") the first respondent pleaded:

"13. Telstra has, for some time, organised its operations into distinct business units. These business units are usually based around distinct functions, operations or clients of Telstra. Telstra business units include its Commercial and Consumer business unit.

14. At all material times Commercial and Consumer has been responsible for providing services to Telstra's residential and business customers who have between 1 and 2 telephone lines. It also has and had responsibility for Telstra's payphones. The functions of the business unit include and included:

a. connecting new services;

b. fixing faults;

c. receiving and responding to customer complaints and enquiries;

d. selling new products;

e. billing customers for services used; and,

f. providing directory assistance.

15. At all material times within Commercial and Consumer there is and was a distinct part of the business called Commercial and Consumer Sales (`C&C Sales'). The work of C&C Sales was performed in Call Centres located throughout Australia.

16. The business of a C&C Sales Call Centre is to take and respond to calls from customers regarding:

a. phone bills;

b. payments including credit card payments which can be made over the phone;

c. requests for new products;

d. requests for connections;

d. [sic] complaints about a service or a billing matter;

e. making appointments for technical or lines staff to connect or fix a service;

f. ensuring that the field staff have the details of the products that the customer wants;

g. encouraging customers of a competitor to switch over to Telstra.

17. In or about May 1998 Telstra and Excell Global Services (a US based company) formed Stellar as a joint venture company.

18. At or prior to 9 November 1998 Telstra contracted with Stellar for Stellar to operate a Call Centre or Call Centres and conduct in part, that part of Telstra's business conducted by C&C Sales referred to in paragraph 16."

LEGISLATION

22 Section 149(1) of the Act provides:

"Subject to any order of the Commission, an award determining an industrial dispute is binding on:

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute who appeared or were represented before the Commission;

(b) all parties to the industrial dispute who were summoned or notified (either personally or as prescribed) to appear as parties to the industrial dispute (whether or not they appeared);

(c) all parties who, having been notified (either personally or as prescribed) of the industrial dispute and of the fact that they were alleged to be parties to the industrial dispute, did not, within the time prescribed, satisfy the Commission that they were not parties to the industrial dispute;

(d) any successor, assignee or transmittee (whether immediate or not) to or of the business or part of the business of an employer who was a party to the industrial dispute, including a corporation that has acquired or taken over the business or part of the business of the employer;

(e) all organisations and persons on whom the award is binding as a common rule; and

(f) all members of organisations bound by the award."

23 Section 170MB(1) of the Act provides:

"If:

(a) an employer is bound by a certified agreement; and

(b) the application for certification of the agreement stated that it was made under Division 3; and

(c) at a later time, a new employer becomes the successor, transmittee or assignee (whether immediate or not) of the whole or part of the business concerned;

then, from the later time:

(d) the new employer is bound by the certified agreement, to the extent that it relates to the whole or part of the business; and

(e) the previous employer ceases to be bound by the certified agreement, to the extent that it relates to the whole or the part of the business; and

(f) a reference in this Part to the employer includes a reference to the new employer, and ceases to refer to the previous employer, to the extent that the context relates to the whole or the part of the business."

REASONS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

24 The primary judge considered that this case was governed by the decision of the Full Court of this Court in North Western Health Care Network v Health Services Union of Australia [1999] FCA 897; (1999) 92 FCR 477. His Honour at [47] of his reasons for judgment identified the critical point in North Western Health Care as the "substantial identity of work between that performed by employees of the new employer and that previously performed on behalf of the old employer". He concluded that "[t]hat is this case", and observed:

"Once attention is paid to the matter of substantial identity of work, as distinct from the nature of any legal transaction between the old employer and the new employer, it is apparent that an `outsourcing' arrangement may fall within s 149(1)(d) or s 170MB(1)."

25 The primary judge rejected the contention that for s 149(1)(d) or s 170MB(1) to operate in respect of a part of a business, the transmitted part must itself be a viable business. However, his Honour concluded that:

"In a real sense, the Robina call centre is a commercially viable, free standing business."

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

26 The grounds of appeal are the same in each appeal. They are:

"1. His Honour erred in the construction of the test formulated in North Western Health Care Network v The Health Services Union of Australia (1999) FCA [sic].

2. His Honour erred in the application of the test in North Western Health Care Network v The Health Services Union of Australia in finding that there was a `substantial identity' between the business of Telstra and the business of the Applicant.

3. His Honour erred insofar as he found that result in these proceedings was governed by the decision of the Full Court of this Court in North Western Health Care Network v The Health Services Union of Australia.

4. His Honour erred in the construction of Section 149(1)(d) and Section 170MB(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996.

5. His Honour erred in the application of Section 149(1)(d) and Section 170MB(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in finding that the Applicant was a `successor, assignee, or transmittee' of part of the business of Telstra.

6. His Honour erred in the application of Section 149(1) and Section 170MB(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 in finding that the Applicant's business was `part of the business' of Telstra.

7. His Honour erred in failing to have any regard to the evidence concerning the eligibility of the First Respondent and the Fifth Respondent to represent the industrial interests of the Applicant's employees at Robina.

8. His Honour erred in failing to have proper regard to the evidence concerning the engagement of the Appellant in activities with clients other than Telstra.

9. His Honour erred insofar as he accepted that the certified agreements which bound Telstra Corporation Limited as at the date of hearing were those identified in the declaration which His Honour made.

10. His Honour erred in finding that an agreement made otherwise than under the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 could be transmitted for the purposes of that legislation.

11. Upon such other grounds and reasons as appear to this honourable Court appropriate at the hearing of this appeal."

CONSIDERATION

27 The delivery of judgment in this matter was delayed to allow the Court and the parties to have the benefit of the then pending decision of the High Court in PP Consultants Pty Limited v Finance Sector Union of Australia [2000] HCA 59; (2000) 176 ALR 205 ("PP Consultants"). PP Consultants is concerned with whether, for the purposes of s 149(1)(d) of the Act, the operator of a pharmacy business in Byron Bay is the successor, assignee or transmittee of the business or part of the business of St George Bank Limited. Following the closure of the St George Bank branch at Byron Bay, a branch agency of the Bank has been conducted by the operator of the pharmacy from the pharmacy.

28 In PP Consultants, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in a joint judgment at [13-15] said:

"While the notions of `profit' and `commercial enterprise' will ordinarily be significant in determining whether the activities of a private individual or corporation constitute a business, [see eg Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247 at 258 per Jessel MR; White v FCT [1968] HCA 41; (1968) 120 CLR 191 at 216 Barwick CJ; Thomas v FCT (1972) 46 ALJR 397 at 401 per Walsh J; Ferguson v FCT (1979) 26 ALR 307 at 311 per Bowen CJ and Franki J, 318-19 per Fisher J; cf Tweddle v FCT (1942) 180 CLR 1 at 6 per Williams J] they play little, if any, role identifying whether one government agency is engaged in the business of government previously undertaken by another government agency. In that situation, it is sufficient to ascertain whether or not the activities of the former are substantially identical to the activities or some part of the activities previously undertaken by the latter. That is because the word `business' takes on a special or particular meaning in the expression `the business of government'. It is not because, as a matter of ordinary language, `business' means or includes activities undertaken in the course of business.

The question of whether one person has taken over or succeeded to the business or part of the business of another is a mixed question of fact and law. For this reason and, also, because `business' is a chameleon-like word, it is not possible to formulate any general test to ascertain whether, for the purposes of s 149(1)(d) of the Act, one employer has succeeded to the business or part of the business of another. Even so it is possible to indicate the manner in which that question should generally be approached, at least when a non-government employer succeeds to the commercial activities of another non-government employer. ...

As a general rule, the question whether a non-government employer who has taken over the commercial activities of another non-government employer has succeeded to the business or part of the business of that other employer will require the identification or characterisation of the business or the relevant part of the business of the first employer, as a first step. The second step is the identification of the character of the transferred business activities in the hands of the new employer. The final step is to compare the two. If, in substance, they bear the same character, then it will usually be the case that the new employer has succeeded to the business or part of the business of the previous employer."

29 In the judgment of the Full Court of this Court in Finance Sector Union v PP Consultants Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1251; (1999) 91 FCR 337, which was overruled by the High Court in PP Consultants, it was observed at [32]:

"Counsel for PP Consultants argue that the bank's business was unchanged; it had disposed of nothing, it had merely replaced a branch by an agency. We accept the bank still carried on a banking business in which it sought to earn profits by exploiting lending margins and charging fees of various kinds. But it disposed of an important aspect of operating that business in Byron Bay: the maintenance of premises, and employment of staff to service the customers who were the source of its loan funds, lending margins and bank fees. It substituted PP Consultants for itself, in relation to this aspect of the business. It seems to us this amounted to a transmission of a part of the bank's business, notwithstanding that the transmission was revocable on one month's notice or immediately on breach of the agency agreement."

In the light of the observations in the joint judgment in the High Court, especially at [15] quoted above, it is no longer sufficient to ask whether the putative transmittor, the first employer, has "disposed of an important aspect of operating" its business. Rather, one must characterise the business or the relevant part of the business of the first employer, and see whether, so characterised, it substantially corresponds with the character attributable to "the transferred business activities in the hands of the new employer".

30 The High Court must be taken impliedly to have rejected the suggestion of the Full Court in Finance Sector Union v PP Consultants at [33] that "it is logical to focus on the nature of the activities undertaken by the two employers and the question whether there is any material change in the nature of the employees' duties or working conditions". As we understand it, even if there be complete identity between the duties and working conditions of the relevant employees of both employers, that will not attract the application of s 149(1) unless the business in which those duties are performed for the new employer is in substance identical in character with the business, or a distinct part of the business, of the presumptive transmittor.

31 It is thus necessary to identify, within the confines of the case pleaded by the first respondent, what it is that the appellant is alleged to have taken over from Telstra. It is asserted by the first respondent in paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim that "Telstra contracted with Stellar for Stellar to operate a Call Centre or Call Centres and conduct in part, that part of Telstra's business conducted by C&C Sales referred to in paragraph 16". Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim refers to C&C Sales Call Centres taking and responding to particular types of calls from Telstra customers. That is, it is the case of the respondents that the appellant has taken over from Telstra part of Telstra's business, namely that part of Telstra's business which involves the taking and responding to part only of the total number of telephone calls of particular types from Telstra customers. So understood, in our view, the respondents' case is untenable.

32 The activities conducted by C&C Sales are neither the business, nor are they or were they part of the business, of Telstra. The learned trial judge did not hear detailed evidence as to the nature of Telstra's business. However, by its Statement of Claim the first respondent pleaded that "Telstra is a corporation which conducts businesses in the telecommunications industry". This plea is admitted by the appellant in its defence. The activities of Telstra conducted by C&C Sales are activities in support of Telstra's businesses in the telecommunication industry; they are not themselves, in our view, the business or part of the business of Telstra. That business can appropriately be characterised as providing telecommunications services to its customers. In the course of conducting that business, Telstra is called upon to respond to enquiries, requests for services and complaints from its customers, including those made by telephone. However, the making of those responses is not a distinct "part" of Telstra's business within the meaning of s 149(1), as explained by the High Court, any more than, for example, cleaning undertaken as a necessary aspect of the conduct of a restaurant is a "part" of the business of the restaurateur. An analogy may be drawn with the business of banking considered in PP Consultants. Both the St George Bank branch, when operating, and the branch agency subsequently conducted from the Byron Bay pharmacy accepted deposits and processed withdrawals. However, the High Court did not consider that these activities could themselves be seen as part of the Bank's business which was banking. They were merely activities which facilitated the conduct of the Bank's business. The answering of telephone calls from actual and potential customers of Telstra similarly facilitates the conduct of Telstra's business. It is not Telstra's business or part of Telstra's business. The reliance of the respondent on evidence that Telstra employs some 12,000 employees at 100 call centres is thus, in our view, misplaced.

33 Stellar's business is the provision of telephone answering services. The fact that it may be required by a particular customer, like Telstra, to provide those services for it at "a centre that is physically and electronically isolated from any infrastructure used for the purposes of providing services to anyone other than [Telstra]" may indicate that the provision of services for that customer is a distinct or identifiable part of the business of Stellar. However that is not the inquiry on which the Court is required to enter. The inquiries mandated by s 149(1) on the construction adopted by the High Court are whether the answering of telephone calls was a distinct part of Telstra's business and, if so, whether there has been a transmission of that part of its business from Telstra to Stellar. For the reasons explained above, the first of those questions must be answered in the negative.

34 In any event, there was no finding by the learned trial judge of a shifting of any service obligation or other business function from Telstra to Stellar. Telstra continues to operate its own call centres. It has not withdrawn from this activity or contracted out its own call centre operations. His Honour did not find that any person who had been employed by Telstra in a call centre had been transferred to the employment of Stellar or, indeed, that any person had had his or her employment with Telstra terminated by reason of the operation of the Stellar call centre. None of the facilities used by Telstra to operate its call centres has been transferred or assigned to Stellar. His Honour's findings support the conclusion that Telstra entered into an arrangement with Stellar for Stellar to undertake a function under contract to Telstra that Telstra did not itself have the capacity to undertake without expanding its own call centre capacity. That is to undertake the handling of its "overflow" calls. Telstra has apparently chosen not to expand its own call centre capacity so as to prevent there being "overflow" calls. It cannot realistically be said, in our view, that the appellant has "taken over" any commercial activities of Telstra (PP Consultants at [15]).

CONCLUSION

35 In our view the appeals should be allowed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court.

Associate:

Dated: 21 February 2001

Counsel for the Appellant:	Mr JN West QC, Mr G Hatcher, Mr F Parry
Solicitor for the Appellant:	Freehill Hollingdale & Page
Counsel for the Respondents in N 978/99:	Mr M Bromberg, Mr D Langmead
Solicitor for the Respondents in N 987/99:	RL Whyburn & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent in N 1298/99:	Mr R Reitano
Solicitor for the Respondent in N 1298/99:	RL Whyburn & Associates
Date of Hearing:	10 February 2000
Date of Judgment:	21 February 2001