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Federal Court of Australia |
INDUSTRIAL LAW - interpretation of award and certified agreement - entitlement of payment of wages on "days observed as a public holiday" - meaning of the words "viz.", "public holiday".
Workplace Relations Act 1996 , ss 178, 179
Public Service Act 1974 (Vic)
Bank Holidays Act 1958 (Vic)
Local Government Act 1989 (Vic)
Public Sector Management Act 1992 (Vic)
SUE OPHEL v YARRA CITY COUNCIL
VG 394 of 1997
NORTHROP J
MELBOURNE
23 FEBRUARY 1998
|
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | |
| VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY | VG 394 of 1997 |
|
BETWEEN: | SUE OPHEL
Applicant |
|
AND: | YARRA CITY COUNCIL
Respondent |
|
COURT: | northrop j |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 23 february 1998 |
| WHERE MADE: | MELBOURNE |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The application be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
|
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA | |
| VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY | VG 394 of 1997 |
|
BETWEEN: | SUE OPHEL
Applicant |
|
AND: | YARRA CITY COUNCIL
Respondent |
|
COURT: | NORTHROP J |
| DATE: | 23 FEBRUARY 1998 |
| PLACE: | MELBOURNE |
The question raised by this application is the proper construction and application of Clause 8 of the City of Richmond (Officers) Agreement 1993, a certified agreement under s 134C of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 ("the Agreement"). The Agreement, which was certified on 19 March 1993 was entered into between two organisations of employees and the Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Richmond ("the City of Richmond"). At the time the Agreement was certified, the City of Richmond was a municipality under the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic). It was a statutory body created under legislation passed by the Parliament of the State of Victoria. It formed part of the third arm of government in Victoria, namely, local government. It was a Victorian Local Government authority. These facts are of importance in the resolution of the issue raised by this application.
The Agreement is ancillary to the Victorian Local Authorities Interim Award 1991 ("the Interim Award") made under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1974 . The parties to the Agreement are parties to the Interim Award. Clause 4 of the Agreement provides that except as otherwise provided in the Agreement, the conditions of employment of officers shall be those conditions that are contained in the Interim Award.
As from 22 June 1994, the City of Richmond became merged with other municipalities to constitute the Yarra City Council ("Yarra City") which became a local government authority under the Local Government Act. Yarra City is the successor in law to the City of Richmond and is bound by the Agreement and the Interim Award.
At all material times the applicant was a member of one of the organisations party to the Agreement and the Interim Award. At all material times she was employed by Yarra City which was bound to apply the provisions of the Agreement and the Interim Award in relation to her employment.
The applicant was absent from work on Tuesday 9 April 1996. That Tuesday was Easter Tuesday. Clause 33 of the Interim Award provided that salaries of officers employed by Yarra City be paid periodically. On 9 April 1996, Cl 33(ii) provided that where an employee was absent from work, other than on paid leave, the employee should be paid for the hours worked only. Relying on this provision, Yarra City did not pay the applicant for the time she was absent from work on Easter Tuesday 1996.
The applicant claimed she was entitled to be paid for that day despite her absence from work. She was not absent on paid leave but relied upon Cl 8 of the Agreement. Clause 8 is set out in full:-
Further, all officers shall be entitled to be absent without any deduction of pay on a day to be observed within the municipality as Union Picnic Day, which shall be treated as a public holiday for the purposes of this Agreement.
(b) Where any officer is required to be on duty on any holiday or holidays prescribed in subclause (a) hereof he/she shall be paid in accordance with subclause 7(c) of this Agreement."
Clause 7(c) of the Agreement provides for payment on overtime rates for time worked on public holidays. The sub-clause is not relevant to the question raised by this application.
The issue between the parties is whether Easter Tuesday 1996 was a public holiday under Cl 8(a) of the Agreement. The opening words of the sub-clause confer a benefit on an officer which, under cl 4 of the Agreement, takes precedence over sub-clause 33(ii) of the Interim Award. The structure of Cl 8(a) of the Agreement gives rise to some difficulty. The opening words of the sub-clause prescribe in general form the nature of the benefit namely that all officers shall be entitled to be absent on the days observed as public holidays without any deduction of pay. Questions could arise under this general provision whether any particular day was a day observed as a public holiday. Where this occurred it would be necessary to construe the words "days observed as public holidays", to determine the relevant facts, and to apply the words as construed to the facts found.
The essence of the submissions made by counsel for the applicant was that no matter what was meant by the words "days observed as public holidays", the identification of specific days after the word "viz", by prescription, made those days "days observed as public holidays". Easter Tuesday was identified and thus Easter Tuesday 1996 came within the general prescription of the opening words of sub-clause 8(a). In other words, the identified days constituted a definition of days observed as public holidays while the last part of the first paragraph of sub-clause 8(a) permitted additional days to become days observed as public holidays.
The essence of the submissions made by counsel for Yarra City was that the prescription of the Agreement was contained in the opening words of sub-clause 8(a) only and that the identified words after the word "viz" were merely examples or illustrations of what, in 1993, were observed as public holidays. The identified days were not prescribed as "days observed as public holidays". Thus it was contended particular days may cease to be "observed as public holidays" while other days may be proclaimed to be public holidays. The latter part of sub-clause 8(a) makes specific reference to additional days but this of itself does not prevent an identified day ceasing to be a public holiday.
The submissions of counsel were directed primarily to the construction and effect of the word "viz" contained in sub-clause 8(a). Less attention was directed to the proper construction of the phrase "days observed as public holidays". Any meaning to be given to the phrase "days observed as public holidays" was not, in the submissions of counsel for the applicant, of great importance since in any event Easter Tuesday was prescribed as a day observed as a public holiday. Neither counsel was able to refer the Court to any authority of assistance in determining the proper construction of the words.
Before turning to consider the word "viz", it is desirable to consider the meaning of the phrase "days observed as public holidays". This is a composite phrase or a concatenation of words. It is not to be construed by reference to the meaning of each separate word. It must be construed as a composite phrase. Even then it can be helpful to look at the meaning to be given to the individual words. The phrase appears in an agreement made in an industrial context but the general rules of construction of a contract or statute apply.
Some general comments are made. The Interim Award and the Agreement were made under the provisions of a Commonwealth Act. For present purposes, the Agreement is made by one employer being a State instrumentality with activities limited to an area within the State of Victoria and in fact within the Melbourne metropolitan area. The word "holiday" has a well known and understood meaning. A holiday is different from leave. In its context, the word "holiday" is not used in the sense of a vacation. It is used in the sense of a day fixed by law or custom on which ordinary business is suspended in commemoration of some event or in honour of some person, being a day of exemption from labour, a religious feast, or holy day: see The Macquarie Dictionary. The word derives from the word "holy-day" being a day set apart for religious purposes. But not all "holy-days" of all religions observed in Victoria are holidays for all but are restricted to those persons observing the particular religion concerned. Even within different denominations of the Christian religion, Easter is observed at different times.
The use of the word "public" suggests a limitation or restriction on the word "holidays" which otherwise would come within the meaning of holidays. The use of the word "public" is used as an adjective meaning pertaining to or affecting the people as a whole or the community, state or section; see The Macquarie Dictionary. The same dictionary defines the words "public holiday" as an official holiday for members of the public generally throughout Australia or throughout the whole of a particular State. The present case involves public holidays within the State of Victoria.
Finally, reference is made to the word "observed" as used in the phrase "observed as public holidays". The word "observed" is used also in the second paragraph of Cl 8(a). In its context, where appearing in each of the paragraphs, the word "observed" should be given the same meaning. The verb "observe" has many different meanings. The most appropriate meanings attributed to it by the Macquarie Dictionary are "6. to obey; comply with; conform to: to observe a law. 7. to show regard for by some appropriate procedure, ceremonies, etc.: to observe a holiday." Many more meanings are attributed to the verb "observe" by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. The most appropriate meanings are: "I. 1. To adhere to or abide by in practice (anything prescribed or fixed) ...... 3. To celebrate duly (a religious rite, fast, festival etc.)" To this list included as examples, it is noted the word "holiday", legitimately, could be included.
In its context, the phrase "days observed as public holidays" should be understood to mean those days which, within the State of Victoria, or parts of that State, are prescribed or fixed by an appropriate authority to be celebrated as a holiday for members of the public generally throughout the State of Victoria or parts of Victoria. In this context, the appropriate authority would include the Parliament of Australia or of Victoria or by executive action taken by the Executive of Australia or of Victoria. The executive action could include a proclamation or other prerogative action.
The Agreement does not adopt the form of providing that officers shall be entitled to be absent on specified days such as New Years Day, Australia Day etc., without deduction of pay. The form adopted is to confer the benefit by reference to days coming within a general description namely "days observed as public holidays". Where a specific day is to be included it is achieved by a fiction, namely the specified day is to "be treated as a public holiday for the purposes of " the Agreement.
Having construed the meaning to be given to the phrase "days observed as public holidays", it is necessary to determine whether Easter Tuesday 1996 constituted a day observed as a public holiday within Yarra City. The Court was not referred to any statute whether of the Commonwealth or of the State of Victoria, which prescribed that day a public holiday in Victoria generally or in Yarra City specifically. The Public Service Act (Vic) contained provisions relating to holidays in public offices. In this respect, specified days were, by legislation, directed to be observed as holidays within the public service of the State of Victoria. Other State Acts adopted the same provisions. Many other State Acts made specific provisions for holidays in specified industries or with respect to particular locations. Reference can be made to the Local Government Act 1958 and the Bank Holidays Act. Awards made under the provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cwth) and the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cwth) could contain, in an appropriate case, prescriptions for holidays without loss of pay but these holidays would be limited to the persons having the benefit of the awards. Similar provisions could be included in State awards and determinations. Subject to any specific provisions contained in Commonwealth Legislation or by Commonwealth proclamations, within Victoria the holidays specified in the Public Service Act 1974 , were treated as public holidays in Victoria. In this respect s 71 provided:-
"71 (1) The following days shall be observed as holidays in the public offices:-
(a) Good Friday and the day after Good Friday, and Easter Monday and Easter Tuesday;
(b) New Year's Day: Provided that when New Year's Day falls upon a Sunday the day after New Year's Day shall be a holiday;
(c) Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day: Provided that when Christmas Day falls upon a Sunday the following Monday and Tuesday shall be holidays and that when the day after Christmas Day falls upon a Sunday the following Monday shall be a holiday;
(d) The 26th day of January and the second Monday in March:
Provided that when the former day falls on any day other than a Monday the following Monday shall be a holiday instead thereof;
(e) The anniversary of the birthday of Her Majesty - which shall be observed on a day appointed annually by the Governor in Council by proclamation published in the Government Gazette;
(f) The 25th day of April - Anzac Day;
(g) The fourth Thursday in September so far only as regards the public offices situate within any of the municipalities mentioned in Schedule Five."
It is noted that Melbourne Cup Day is not included. This holiday was provided for in other legislation. Paragraph (g) refers to Melbourne Show day and the municipalities set out in Schedule 5 are within or close to the Melbourne Metropolitan area. Other subsections of s 71 contain provisions for the proclamation of other "public holidays" and the deletion of public holidays for the whole or part of the State of Victoria.
On the facts of this case, the Court concludes that "days observed as public holidays" contained in the Agreement refer to those days specified in the Public Service Act. The "public holidays" themselves do not apply directly to officers employed by Yarra City, but are incorporated by the general words contained in the opening part of Cl 8 of the Agreement. Other provisions may have made other days public holidays but they are not relevant to the issue before the Court.
On this construction of Cl 8, Easter Tuesday was a day observed as a public holiday and thus came within the general description of that clause. The Public Sector Management Act 1992 (Vic) however repealed the Public Service Act 1974. The purpose of the Public Sector Management Act, broadly, was to reform the management of the Victorian Public Service with an object that officers and employees of the Public Service, including public authorities, which as defined, were not local government authorities, be brought under the general industrial framework established under the Employee Relations Act 1992 (Vic). Under s 84 and Schedule 4 of the Public Sector Management Act, public holidays to be observed in the public service were, for present purposes, identical with those specified in s 71 of the Public Service Act.
The Public Holidays Act 1993 came into operation on 7 December 1993. Its stated purpose was to make new provisions with respect to public holidays. By s 4, the Public Holidays Act is expressed to apply to all persons not covered by a federal award who, in substance, are employed under a Victorian Act or a contract of employment in Victoria. Section 6 is set out in full:-
"6. The following days are appointed as public holidays -
(a) New Year's Day or the day after New Year's Day when New Year's Day is a Sunday;
(b) 26 January (Australia Day);
(c) the second Monday in March (Labour Day);
(d) Good Friday;
(e) Easter Monday;
(f) 25 April (Anzac Day);
(g) the second Monday in June (the day on which the anniversary of the birthday of the Sovereign is observed);
(h) the first Tuesday in November (Melbourne Cup Day ) but only in metropolitan municipal districts;
(i) Christmas Day;
(j) The day after Christmas Day (Boxing Day) or the following Monday when Boxing Day is a Sunday."
It is noted that in this provision Easter Tuesday is not appointed a public holiday. Show day is not a public holiday while Cup Day, in the Melbourne Metropolitan area is a holiday. The Public Holidays Act 1992 contained other provisions relating to public holidays none of which are presently relevant. In particular s 10 has no application to the present case; c/f s 4. The Act repealed the corresponding provisions of Schedule 4 of the Public Sector Management Act.
The position relating to the entitlement of officers employed by Yarra City to be absent on days observed as public holidays without deduction of pay can be summarized. The Agreement was entered into in 1993 and came into force on 22 March 1993. It remained in force pursuant to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act and the Workplace Relations Act. It was certified by the Industrial Relations Commission on 19 March 1993. At the time the Agreement came into operation, Easter Tuesday was a day observed as a public holiday in Victoria. Accordingly at that time, Easter Tuesday came within the general description of the opening words of Cl 8 of the Agreement conferring the entitlement referred to in the clause on officers employed by Yarra City pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. Commencing in 1994 Easter Tuesday was not a day observed as a public holiday in Victoria. Accordingly, the benefit conferred on the relevant officers employed by Yarra City did not apply to Easter Tuesday 1996. The Agreement did not by express words prescribe the particular days to be treated as public holidays for the purpose of Cl 8; compare the second paragraph Cl 8(a).
It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the major contention put on behalf of the applicant that, irrespective of the opening words of Cl 8, the days specified after the word "viz" had the effect of identifying the days that were to be treated as public holidays for the purpose of Cl 8 of the Agreement, even though the day was not a day observed as a public holiday under the opening words of Cl 8.
The proper construction of the word "viz" followed by identified days, in the context of Cl 8 of the Agreement gives rise to great difficulties. The word "viz" is an abbreviation of the Latin word videlicet. According to the Macquarie Dictionary, the meaning to be given to the adverb videlicet is "namely; that is to say (used to introduce examples, details, lists, etc.) abbrev: viz. [L. for videre licet it is permitted to see]". Normally the abbreviation "viz." is used in the sense of namely as introducing items or things that were within a generally expressed statement. Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage gives an example "(For three good reasons; viz 1 ......, 2 ......, 3 ......) or a more particular statement of what has been vaguely described (My only means of earning, viz my fiddle".
Reference is made also to the meanings attributed to "Videlicet" by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary:-
"A. adv. That is to say; namely; to wit; used to introduce an amplification or more precise explanation of a previous statement or word. Abbrev. viz. One of Rob's original profession, v. a drover SCOTT.
B. sb. The word itself as used to introduce an explanation or amplification, esp. in legal documents 1658."
Likewise, reference is made to Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage:-
"viz. is an abbreviation of the Latin word videlicet (fr. videbere = to see; licet = it is permissible). The English-language equivalents are namely or that is to say, either of which is preferable to this LATINISM. Like its English counterparts, the term signifies that what follows particularizes a general statement, without contradicting what precedes, or that what follows explains certain obscurities that the writer acknowledges to be lurking in what has just been said."
The effect of all these definitions is that the word "viz" has no clear meaning and its use should be avoided.
The issue for determination is whether, in Cl 8, the specified days are to be treated as the substantive provision specifying the days on which an officer is entitled to be absent from work without deduction of pay or whether they are to be treated as illustrations or examples only and have no substantive effect.
Clause 49 of the Interim Award is headed "Holidays". That Award applies throughout Victoria generally but it is interesting to note the wording of Cl 49(a) of that Award:-
"(a) Subject to further provisions of this Clause all employees, other than casual employees or part-time employees who are in receipt of an allowance in lieu, shall be entitled to the following public holidays without any deduction of pay, viz: Labour Day, New Year's Day, Foundation Day, Good Friday, Easter Saturday, Easter Monday, Easter Tuesday, Anzac Day, Queen's Birthday, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and any other day which from time to time is proclaimed or provided for under the Public Services Act of Victoria as a public holiday throughout the State of Victoria. In addition, employees employed in the metropolitan area of Melbourne shall be entitled to the following days, viz: Show Day and Cup Day. Employees employed outside the metropolitan area of Melbourne shall be entitled to two days in lieu of Cup Day and Show Day, and such days shall be regarded for award purposes as part of the employee's annual leave entitlement, but shall not attract annual leave loading as prescribed in subclause (e) of Clause 48 of this Award."
Two observations are made, viz 1. the clause makes express reference to the Public Services Act of Victoria and 2. the references to Show Day and Cup Day illustrate that these public holidays are determined on a locality basis. The word viz. is used in the sense of more particular statements of the two observations.
It is noted that in Cl 49 the provision is that the employee is "entitled to the following public holidays without any deduction of pay, viz Labour Day etc.". This phraseology is to be contrasted with that of Cl 8 of the Agreement that an officer is entitled to be absent on the days observed as public holidays without deduction of pay, viz: New Year's Day etc.". The former tends to support the view that the specified days are to be treated as public holidays while in the latter the suggestion is that the specified days are examples. Each formulation makes provision for additional public holidays to be included if, under Cl 49 the day "is proclaimed or provided for under the Public Service Act of Victoria" while under Cl 8 the day is proclaimed as a public holiday. Neither provision refers to what is to happen if a specified day ceased to be a public holiday.
Finally, Cl 8 contains a provision deeming the Union Picnic Day to be a public holiday. This provision suggests that in Cl 8 the operative provision consists of the general provisions of Cl 8 and the specified days are examples only otherwise the Union Picnic Day could have been stated to be a public holiday.
An interesting example of the construction and application of the word "viz" appears in Ambatielos v Anton Jurgens Margarine Works [1923] AC 175, the House of Lords comprising Viscount Cave LC, Viscount Finlay, Lord Atkinson and Lord Sumner. That appeal involved the construction and application of an exception clause contained in a charterparty. Under the charterparty demurrage was to be charged if the ship did not complete loading and discharge within a specified period, but an exception applied:- "Should the vessel be detained by causes over which the charterers have no control, viz., quarantine, ice, hurricanes, blockade, clearing the steamer after the last cargo is taken over, etc., no demurrage is to be charged and lay days do not count". At Rotterdam the discharge of the vessel was delayed beyond the stipulated time by a general strike of dock labourers at that port. The strike was a fact over which the charterers had no control.
Viscount Cave at 182-3 concluded that it was necessary to consider the general words of the exception before turning to the words commencing after the word "viz" and ending with the word "etc." His Lordship expressed the view that if the exception had ended after the general words, the exception would apply since the strike was something over which the charter had no control. Reference was then made to the added words and his Lordship continued at 182:-
"........ the question is whether that addition is sufficient to cut down and limit the effect of the preceding general words and to confine the operation of the clause to the particular cases stated in the added words and cases of a similar kind - in other words, whether the added words are defining and limiting words, or are simply added in order to provide examples of what is meant by the general words, but not to cut them down."
His Lordship then referred to the added words commencing with "viz" and ending with "etc." and concluded:-
"I think the effect of what I have called the added words is this, that the draftsman shows an intention, first, of giving examples of what the general words mean and cover, and, secondly (and this is equally important), of showing to those who read the clause, by the use of the word "etc.," that those examples are not intended to cover the whole ground, that they are not intended to be exhaustive, but, that the general principle is still to include all the other cases which fall within its general terms. In other words, the clause must be read as referring to all causes over which the charterers have no control, in particular to the five causes specified, but also to all other cases which fall within the general words. That is the meaning which for myself I should give to the clause."
In the result his Lordship held the opinion that the word "viz" introduced, by way of example only, the specified words but the class of words were not to be limited to those specified words. His Lordship would have refused the appeal.
Lord Finlay was of a similar opinion but placed greater weight on the word "etc.". At 187 his Lordship said:-
"Now looking again, and looking more narrowly, at the words which follow those stating the general and governing principle, as I think, they are these: "viz., quarantine, ice, hurricane, blockade, clearing of the steamer after the last cargo is taken over, etc." Now I so far go with the appellant in his argument that I think that the word "videlicet," in the correct sense of the word, does not denote - is not equivalent to - "for instance" or "for example." I think that "videlicet" really is correctly rendered in English by "to wit" or "that is to say"; that is the force of the word standing by itself. But that "videlicet" does not stand by itself here; although these interposed lines begin with "viz." they end with the phrase "etc.", and it appears to me that the effect of these interposed lines taken as a whole is to provide that, if there is any cause beyond the control of the charterers which occasions delay, the charterers are not to be liable."
Lord Atkinson gave a cryptic opinion at 187-8:-
"My Lords, I concur. I entirely agree with the construction that has been put upon the clause in dispute here by my to noble and learned friends who have preceded me, and I do not think it necessary to add anything further."
Lord Sumner dissented. He would have allowed the appeal. He construed the word "viz" as having a defining and limiting effect not extended by the word "etc.". At 190 His Lordship expressed the opinion that "viz" should be construed as "that is to say" and thus limited and defined the general words previously used. His Lordship continued:-
"If you have once concluded that these specific matters are substituted for the general phrase "should the vessel be detained by causes over which the charterers have no control," I do not think that the word "etc." undoes that effect and prevents "viz." from having a defining and limiting effect, nor is it so far self-explanatory as to add to these enumerated and specially named things such as exception as exception as strikes. The notion of strikes may be there or it may not, but it was for the charterer to clear the matter up, and as he is not chosen to do so, I do not think he can claim to have exempted himself from the liability which, in the absence of exemption, undoubtedly rests upon him."
This authority illustrates how legal reasoning can lead to conflicting conclusions. The present case is the obverse to that considered in Ambatielos. In the present case the general words have a clear meaning. The express inclusion of other days is limited to days "which may from time to time be proclaimed as public holidays". This is to remove any doubts that it is the general words of the days observed as public holidays which constitute the conditions of the entitlement. This provision is not to be taken as excluding the deletion of other days which may no longer be observed as public holidays. Further support for this view is derived from the deeming provision relating to the Union Picnic Day. The structure of the clause is not to identify particular days but to use a generic description.
In the result, the Court concludes that following the coming into operation of the Public Holidays Act, Easter Tuesday has not been a day observed as a public holiday within the meaning of Cl 8 of the Agreement. The express reference to Easter Tuesday in the list of identified days is used by way of example. These identified days do not limit or extend what are not public holidays within the general description. Therefore, the applicant did not obtain the benefit conferred by Cl 8 with respect to Easter Tuesday 1996.
The application was for the imposition of a penalty pursuant to s 178 and for payment of salary not paid pursuant to ss 178 and 179 under the Workplace Relations Act. Those sections include claims based on certified agreements. The Agreement in the present case is not a certified agreement under the Workplace Relations Act. Yarra City had given notice that the application should be dismissed on that ground. Counsel for the applicant referred in detail to the appropriate amending provision of the Industrial Relations Act and the Workplace Relations Act involving the definition of the words "certified agreements" and the transitional provisions relating to certified agreements under the earlier legislation. As a result, counsel for Yarra City did not pursue the objection. The Court accepts the submissions made by counsel for the applicant and is satisfied it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the application but in the circumstances does not find it necessary to discuss the legislation in detail.
For the reasons given, the application is dismissed.
|
I certify that this and the preceding thirteen (13) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice
R M Northrop |
Associate:
Dated: 23 February 1998
|
Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr S Howells |
| Solicitor for the Applicant: | Ryan Carlisle Thomas |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr R Jackson |
| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Maddock Lonie Chisholm |
| Date of Hearing: | 4 February 1998 |
| Date of Judgment: | 23 February 1998 |
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