Wu Guo Xiong & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 76 (19 February 1997)

C A T C H W O R D S

IMMIGRATION - refugees - refusal of refugee status by Refugee Review Tribunal - whether applicants had a well-founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds if returned to China - illegal departure from China - whether such departure amounts to statement of political opinion - Tribunal found that there was no prospect that, if returned to China, either applicant would be punished in harsh or oppressive manner for illegal departure - whether any error of law.

Migration Act 1958 ss.31(3), 36(2)

Migration Regulations Schedule 2 clause 866

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 136 ALR 481

WU GUO XIONG & ANOR v. MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &

MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

No. WAG 92 of 1995

LEE, CARR & R.D.NICHOLSON JJ.

PERTH

19 FEBRUARY 1997

IN THE FEDERAL COURT )

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA )

DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. WAG 92 of 1995

GENERAL DIVISION )

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

B E T W E E N : WU GUO XIONG & ANOR

Appellants

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &

MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: LEE, CARR & R.D.NICHOLSON JJ.

PLACE: PERTH

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1997

MINUTE OF ORDERS

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT )

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA )

DISTRICT REGISTRY )

GENERAL DIVISION ) NO. WAG 92 OF 1995

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

B E T W E E N: WU GUO XIONG

First Appellant

and

JIAN XIU FENG

Second Appellant

and

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: LEE, CARR, R D NICHOLSON JJ

DATE : 19 FEBRUARY 1997

PLACE: PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

The relevant facts in this matter are set out in the reasons for judgment prepared by Carr J.

The application for review as argued before the primary Judge relied upon the following grounds:

"4(i) The persecution feared by the First Applicant results from the Applicants' membership of the social group of persons persecuted by reason of being unwilling to comply with China's one-child family policy and therefore is persecution for reasons within the ambit of the Refugees Convention.

(j) In the alternative, the Applicants' departure from China was an expression of political opinion which arose from the Applicants' dislike and fear of the Chinese government and its officials, including the local Family Planning officials and the First Applicant has a well-founded fear that he will suffer persecution as a result of such departure."

Only formal submissions were made to his Honour in respect of ground 4(i) it being considered that his Honour was bound by the decision of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Respondent A [1995] FCA 1305; (1995) 130 ALR 48.

With regard to ground 4(j) his Honour determined that "it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to reach the conclusion which it did on the material before it and to which it referred in its reasons" and, therefore, the Tribunal had not erred in law in deciding that the application for a protection visa be refused.

In particular, his Honour found that the acts of the appellants in departing China without authority could not be considered to be expressions of political opinion and, therefore, any penalty imposed by the country of nationality in respect of such conduct could not amount to persecution for a "Convention reason".

The appellants contended that the Tribunal, and his Honour, applied an incorrect meaning to the words "political opinion" and erred in law accordingly.

As stated by James C. Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) at pp40-41, establishment of a well- founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (to wit, political opinion), where a person has departed the country of origin without authorization, depends upon two conditions. First, the country of origin must punish the unauthorized exit, or stay abroad, in a harsh or oppressive manner. Second, the illegal departure, or stay abroad, must either, be explicitly motivated by political considerations, or the country of origin must view the unauthorized departure, or stay abroad, as an implied political statement of disloyalty or defiance.

The circumstances which fulfil the two conditions may overlap. For example, if the punishment for making an unauthorized departure is oppressive it may be inferred that rejection of the country of origin is viewed by that country as a political statement of defiance of authority or disloyalty to the State.

The circumstances in which the appellants departed China make it unlikely that the manner of their departure would be considered by China as anything other than an expression by the appellants of their refusal to accept the form of governance of Chinese citizens administered by Chinese authorities. That is, a statement of political opinion, necessarily, was implied in the appellants' conduct. The remaining question to be determined was whether there was any prospect that the authorities, as a means of repressing such political statements would inflict discriminatory or oppressive punishment on the appellants for their conduct.

The Tribunal found as a fact that there was no prospect that, if returned to China, either applicant would be punished in a harsh or oppressive manner for the acts of illegal departure. Therefore, whether the Tribunal erred in its understanding of the meaning of the words "political opinion" as used in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was irrelevant.

By reason of that finding of fact the Tribunal concluded, properly, that it was unable to form the opinion that it was "satisfied" that the appellants had the status of refugees. (See: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 136 ALR 481.) The appellants have not shown that the failure of the Tribunal to be so satisfied can only be explained by an unidentified error of law on the part of the Tribunal.

On the hearing of the appeal the appellants pressed an argument in support of ground 4(i). For the reasons expressed by Nicholson J I agree that this ground of appeal has not been made out by the appellants.

The appeal must be dismissed.

I certify that this and the preceding

three pages are a true copy of the Reasons

for Judgment of his Honour Justice Lee.

Associate:

Date: 19 February 1997

IN THE FEDERAL COURT )

OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA )

DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. WAG 92 of 1995

GENERAL DIVISION )

On appeal from a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

B E T W E E N : WU GUO XIONG & ANOR

Appellants

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &

MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: LEE, CARR & R.D.NICHOLSON JJ.

PLACE: PERTH

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1997

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CARR J:

Introduction

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of this Court, Tamberlin J, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the respondent's delegate that the appellants, Mr and Mrs Wu, and their two infant children were not refugees and accordingly were not entitled to protection visas under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act").

Factual Background

In essence, the appellants based their claims to refugee status on problems which they encountered as a result of China's population control policy, commonly referred to as the "one child policy", and their illegal departure from China. The appellants married in China in 1987. Their first child, a daughter, was born in August 1987. Both appellants were dismissed from their respective employment, following refusal to take a particular contraceptive measure. They were able to obtain alternative employment in the private sector and there was no evidence of either Mr or Mrs Wu being unemployed since 1988. Until 1991 Mr and Mrs Wu had no further difficulties with the family planning officials in China. In 1991 Mrs Wu made enquiries about obtaining permission to have a second child. The local family planning office told her that permission was needed from a higher office. In February 1992 Mrs Wu was visited at home by family planning officials and told that permission had been granted for her to have another child provided that she went to their office and made application. Mrs Wu's evidence to the Tribunal was that, because she was too busy, she did not go to the office to apply for a permit until March or April 1993. When she did so, she was told that she would have to pay a fee of 1,000 yuan for the permit. Mrs Wu refused to pay the fee for the birth permit. Mrs Wu told the Tribunal that she and her husband could not afford to pay that fee. The Tribunal did not believe that evidence. The Tribunal's reasons included reference to their ability to repay a 20,000 yuan loan over three or four years.

In May 1994 Mrs Wu gave birth to a second child, a son. In June 1994 local family planning officials demanded payment of a fine of 3,000 yuan for having her second child without a permit. She paid some of this amount and was given until February 1995 to pay the balance.

In July 1994 the family planning officials forcibly removed Mrs Wu from her home, took her to a local hospital and caused her to be sterilised. In August 1994 Mr & Mrs Wu started making plans to leave China. The purchase of the boat, subsequently codenamed "The Cockatoo" was a co-operative effort. Each adult paid 5,000 yuan for the passage. Mr and Mrs Wu raised 8,000 yuan by selling everything they owned of any value. Relatives helped them with the balance of the required fares. Mr Wu claimed that with four others he was a principal organiser and was appointed captain because of his skills and experience and because only he knew the route to be taken. He told the Tribunal that, at one point in the voyage, the Cockatoo was chased by public security bureau officers and that it was he who steered the boat away from them. The boat arrived in Australia on 27 November 1994. On 18 January 1995 all four members of the Wu family applied for protection visas. On 10 February 1995 a delegate of the respondent determined that they were not entitled to those visas. They then sought review by the Tribunal of those decisions. The Tribunal heard those applications on 8 March 1995 and gave its decision on 12 April 1995. On 9 August 1995 Mr and Mrs Wu applied for judicial review of that decision.

Legislative Framework

The prescribed criteria for the grant of a protection visa are set out in s.36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act") and Clause 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations ("the Regulations"): see s.31(3) of the Act and Reg. 2.03 of the Regulations. One such criterion is that, at the time of the decision, the Minister for Immigration is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention or is a member of the family unit of such a person: s.36(2) of the Act and Clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. For the purposes of s.36(2) and Clause 866 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, "Refugees Convention" means the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: Clause 866.111 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. As a party to both instruments, Australia has protection obligations to persons who are refugees as so defined. Article 1 of the Convention relevantly provides that a refugee is any person who:

"... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

The issue ventilated before the Tribunal was whether the appellants had a "well-founded fear", on an objective examination of the facts, of persecution for one of the reasons set out above.

The Tribunal gave detailed reasons for its conclusion that the appellants did not qualify as refugees because they did not satisfy the above criteria. Their application for judicial review complained of error of law. It was common ground that the application at first instance and before this Court was made under s.476(1)(e) of the Migration Act. That sub-paragraph limits this ground of review to the decision involving an error of law being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision.

In their notice of appeal from the Tribunal's decision, the appellants raised only two grounds. They were to the effect that the Tribunal erred in law in that it should have found that the punishment feared by the applicants on their return to China by reason of their illegal departure was persecution for reasons within the ambit of the Convention because:

"4(i) The persecution feared by the First Applicant results from the Applicants' membership of the social group of persons persecuted by reason of being unwilling to comply with China's one-child family policy and therefore is persecution for reasons within the ambit of the Refugee's Convention.

(j) In the alternative, the Applicants' departure from China was an expression of political opinion which arose from the Applicants' dislike and fear of the Chinese Government and its officials, including the local Family Planning officials and the First Applicant has a well-founded fear that he will suffer persecution as a result of such departure."

At the hearing at first instance the first of the above grounds was the subject only of a formal submission but no argument. The only ground pursued was the second ground set out above. Tamberlin J reviewed the evidence and findings of the Tribunal and concluded that there had been no error of law on its part.

The Appeal

In their notice of appeal, the appellants again raised only two grounds. They were that:

"1. The learned trial judge erred in not making a determination in respect of the ground of review as to whether the persecution feared by the first applicant results from the Applicants' membership of the social group of persons persecuted by reason of being unwilling to comply with China's one-child family policy and therefore is persecution for reasons within the ambit of the Refugee's Convention.

2. The learned trial judge erred in finding that in the circumstances the Applicants' illegal departure was not an expression of political opinion."

In my view, there is no substance in the first ground set out above. This ground was the subject only of a formal submission before his Honour that the Full Court decision in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Respondent "A" and Respondent "B" [1995] FCA 1305; (1995) 130 ALR 48 was wrong. Otherwise, as his Honour noted, the only ground pursued before him was the matter of whether the applicants' departure from China was an expression of political opinion. In Respondent A the Full Court held that even if the respondents had been able to show that there was a law of general application in China that parents of one child must be sterilised and forcibly if necessary, persons facing that fate would not be members of a particular social group. The Full Court said (at p.61):

"While such a law would be considered by Australians to be abhorrent and contrary to internationally accepted standards of human rights, the law would be one regulating the conduct of individuals. To apply the reasoning of Morato [a reference to an earlier Full Court decision of Morato v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs [1992] FCA 637; (1992) 39 FCR 401], such a law would be dealing with what people did not with what they are."

In my opinion, the principles underlying the decision in Respondent A apply to the facts of the present case and I would so apply them. I would add that in the present matter, the applicant Mrs Wu, has already suffered the abhorrent persecution of forcible sterilisation in what must have been most distressing accompanying circumstances. We were told that the High Court of Australia heard the appeal in Respondent A in March 1996 and its decision is currently pending. Mr H Christie, who appeared as counsel for the appellants, suggested that we should await the High Court's decision in that matter before giving judgment. Mr Christie submitted that this case differs from Respondent A to a "small but very significant extent" in that in this matter the appellants have already suffered persecution and the social group can be thus defined as those who oppose the one child policy and have suffered persecution. Mr Christie was obliged to concede that no evidence was produced to the Tribunal that parties having been sterilised would on return to China suffer detriment by reason of membership of such a group. In those circumstances, regardless of the outcome of the High Court appeal in Respondent A, the appeal is, in my view, fatally flawed.

I turn to the second ground of appeal. Counsel for the appellants referred to what he described as his client's "long running dispute" with the family planning authorities in China and the sterilisation. In that context he submitted that the departure within one month of such sterilisation was an expression of the appellants' political opinion. The fact that, as the Tribunal found, the Chinese Government did not regard illegal departure by boat to Australia as having a political motivation was not determinative. Regardless of how the Peoples' Republic of China regards the matter, so it was put, the appellants have left for political reasons. Their reasons were stated as being their dislike of the government and what government officials had done to them. There was no need, so it was submitted, to show a persecutory intent; a persecutory effect was sufficient. The appellants relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward (1993) 103 DLR (4th) 1 and C, L, J & Z v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, O'Loughlin J, 30 March 1995, No. 184 of 1995). In my view those authorities do not take the appellants as far as they claim. In Ward the Supreme Court of Canada held that a member of a terrorist organisation who feared persecution by other members of that association because he had released hostages rather than kill them contrary to his beliefs, was not a member of a "particular social group" for the purposes of the Convention. In C, L, J & Z, O'Loughlin J (but for lack of jurisdiction) would have remitted the matter to the Tribunal because it fell into error of law. The error of law which his Honour identified was in concluding that persecution for a reason unconnected with religion is not persecution for reasons of religion even if the act of persecution interfered with a religious belief of the applicant. Mr Christie relied upon that finding as the basis for a submission that:

. it was the appellants' political beliefs that caused them to depart illegally from China; and

. that illegal departure would, on their return to China, result in the effect of persecution through the imposition of excessive punishment.

Mr Christie submitted that in those circumstances the risk of excessive punishment arose as a direct result of Mr Wu's dislike and fear of the authorities i.e. his political opinion. Mr Christie acknowledged that a similar argument had been advanced before and rejected by French J in Mai Xin Lu v. The Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, 19 July 1996, No. 1163 of 1996). In that case French J said:

"The question of law then narrows down to whether it is sufficient that the apprehended persecution flow from an act which was motivated by political opinion. To put it another way, is it necessary that the persecuting authority inflicts the feared persecution because it knows of and wishes to punish or suppress the relevant political opinion?"

His Honour then referred to Ram v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs [1995] FCA 1333; (1995) 130 ALR 314. In Ram the Full Court held that where the apprehended persecution was for reasons of membership of a "particular social group" the fact of that membership must be an element of the motivation for the persecution. In Ram Burchett J (Nicholson and O'Loughlin JJ agreeing) said (at p.317):

"Persecution involves the infliction of harm, but it implies something more: an element of an attitude on the part of those who persecute which leads to the infliction of harm, or an element of motivation (however twisted) for the infliction of harm. People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors. Not every isolated act or harm to a person is an act of persecution. Consistently with the use of the word "persecuted", the motivation envisaged by the definition (apart from race, religion, nationality and political opinion) is "membership of a particular social group"."

There is no suggestion in Ram that the Full Court by referring in parenthesis to race, religion, nationality and political opinion, was regarding those alternative reasons as being in any different category.

In my view, the learned trial judge did not err in law in reaching his decision.

It is clear from his Honour's reasons for judgment that his Honour considered the political content of illegal departure from China in two contexts. The first was the act of leaving the country of origin on its own. His Honour held that leaving in an illegal manner on its own, and even being the organiser of the illegal departure, is not in itself necessarily relevant to the holding of political opinion. Nevertheless, his Honour expressly recognised that the history of the matter (for example expressing political opinion against the controlling regime or alignment with particular political groups) could well colour the act of departure so as to make it, in effect, part of the manifestation of political opinion in opposition to the government. His Honour concluded his reasons for judgment in the following terms:

"In the instant case the Tribunal has found, as a fact, that the treatment faced by the applicants does not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.

Given the findings of fact made by the Tribunal and the material before it in the present case, I do not consider that the act of illegal departure even when considered against the background that Mr Wu made the arrangements; organised the departure; and assumed the role of captain of the vessel can be said to amount to an expression of political opinion notwithstanding that the illegal departure may expose him to fines, imprisonment or both. What is sought to be punished here is breach of migration controls and not expression of political opinion or views orally, in writing or by conduct. Sanctions imposed on a person by a government for breach of its migration laws does not make the person a "refugee" for Convention purposes."

The findings to which his Honour referred, made by the Tribunal, were preceded by a careful review of the two sets of Chinese regulations governing illegal departures, information gathered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and set out in certain cables and other sources of information. The Tribunal referred extensively to the DFAT cables in particular. Its conclusion in respect of Mrs Wu (referred to by the Tribunal as "Ms Jian") was expressed in the following terms:

"In the case of Ms Jian, there is nothing to suggest that she would be regarded as anything more than an ordinary passenger on the boat."

In respect of Mr Wu, the Tribunal said:

"If the Chinese authority decide, as he claims, that Mr Wu was involved in the organising and piloting of the "Cockatoo", he may well receive more serious punishment, including imprisonment in accordance with Article 1 and 4 of the regulations. However, that does not in itself bring that punishment within the scope of the Convention no matter how serious unless it can be said to be imposed for reasons of a Convention ground."

In that regard the Tribunal made the following findings of fact:

"It is apparent from the information quoted above that the Chinese Government does not regard illegal movements of people by boat to Australia as having a political motivation and it does not ascribe any political views to such people. This is particularly the case with persons from the Applicants' province of Guingxi. Moreover, nothing in the evidence before me suggests that the imposition of any punishment would serve an underlying political purpose. Taking that evidence into account, and in the circumstances of this case, in which no element of political opinion is associated with the Applicants' departure from China or the punishment they may face, I find that any punishment by reason of their illegal departure is not a matter within the ambit of the Convention."

Conclusion

Even if such punishment as might be inflicted on Mr Wu for his involvement in the illegal departure could be said to amount to persecution, that punishment would not be by reason of his membership of a particular social group. Accordingly, for that reason alone, I do not consider that he is entitled to a protection visa as a refugee. Furthermore, on the facts as found by the Tribunal he would not, upon return to China, be punished on the basis of having held or expressed a political opinion. In other words, he would not be persecuted for reasons of political opinion, but for contravening one or other of the two applicable regulations.

In my opinion, the Tribunal, having found the facts, correctly applied the applicable law to those facts. Neither it nor the learned trial judge erred in law as contended on behalf of the appellants.

For the foregoing reasons I would dismiss the appeal.

I certify that this and the preceding eleven

(11) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for

Judgment of Justice Carr.

Associate:

Date: 19 February 1997

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )

GENERAL DIVISION ) NO WAG 92 OF 1995

On appeal from a judge of the Federal Court of Australia

B E T W E E N: WU GUO XIONG

First Appellant

and

JIAN XIU FENG

Second Appellant

and

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: R D NICHOLSON J

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1997

PLACE: PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons of Carr J with which I agree. I add only the following.

In relation to the issues raised by the first ground of appeal, there may be occasions where the evidence can properly support an inference that a non-citizen applicant suffers a variety of detriments at the hands of his or her country of nationality because of non-acceptance of a policy based on state control of reproduction by the family. There was evidence before the Tribunal in the present case that the applicants' son would suffer persecution on return to China because the applicants had been unable to obtain household registration for him. It was claimed on their behalf that without such registration the son would be denied access to a range of benefits including the costs of his education, state medical care and state-subsidised food or allocation of housing or land.

The first ground not being argued other than formally before the primary judge, it is the reasons of the Tribunal which deal with this claim. Those reasons state the applicants' claim that after the second applicant returned to her home in June 1994 family planning officials demanded payment of a fine of 3000 yuan in respect of the birth of her second child without a permit. She paid 500 yuan and was tole she had until February 1995 to pay a further 2000 at which time consideration would be given to providing household registration for her son. She made no further payments.

At the time of the second applicant's forced sterilisation in July 1994 she asked the head family planning official to ensure household registration for her son and was told to discuss it after her return home. In her evidence she also claimed she also asked the Public Security Bureau ("PSB") officers about household registration for her son and was told the permission of the family planning officials was needed first. She testified she later discussed the registration again with a family planning official and was told that as she had no permit, no household registration would be granted. The Tribunal found this to be in contrast to her statement to the Department and written submission to the Tribunal in which she had stated she had been told the matter would be considered further after February 1995, that is it had not finally been determined. The Tribunal rejected a contention for the second applicant that she had told the Department household registration had been refused. The Tribunal found that it did not appear from her evidence that the matter was discussed with the official after July 1994.

The Tribunal concluded that the forcible sterilisation of the second applicant constituted persecution but that none of the other matters relied on by the applicants, including the refusal of household registration for their son, did so. The Tribunal went further and did not accept that household registration had in fact been denied to their son. It rejected their claim they had used their utmost endeavours to obtain household registration. These findings of fact are such as to preclude it being open to argument in this case that there had been any on-going persecution of the applicants as a consequence of their non-compliance with the one-child policy.

I state this because the concession by counsel for the applicants was not in absolute terms in that he said "there was not evidence produced to the Refugee Review Tribunal, there was no relevant evidence produced apart from that recorded by the Tribunal in its decision." In my view, the relevant evidence and the findings made on it cannot assist the applicants case on this point.

I certify that this and the preceding 2 pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice R D Nicholson.

Associate:

Date: 19 February 1997

APPEARANCES

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Christie

Solicitors for the Applicant: Legal Aid of Western Australia

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P R Macliver

Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing: 14 October 1996

Date of Judgment: 19 February 1997