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Vasta and Anor and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2010] AATA 499 (6 July 2010)

Last Updated: 6 July 2010

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 499

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No 2008/0261, 2385

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
)

Re
WAYNE VASTA
MICHAEL MCKINNON

Applicants
And
CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal
Mr P W Taylor SC, Senior Member

Date 6 July 2010

Place Sydney

Decision
In the Vasta application (2008/0261): I set aside the decision under review. I substitute a decision that the documents listed in the accompanying “Schedule: Exempt Documents Claim – Vasta Request” are not exempt documents.

In the McKinnon application (2008/2385): I vary the decision under review as follows:

(a) the documents listed in the accompanying “Schedule: Exempt Documents Claim – McKinnon Request” are not exempt documents where the words “NOT EXEMPT” appear in the Decision column in the Schedule (subject to deletion of the identifying information referred to in paragraph 127);
(b) the McKinnon application be remitted pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to CASA to identify any additional responsive documents, in the light of the matters contained in paragraphs 132 to 134 of the Reasons for Decision.
I adjourn the proceedings for the purpose of considering any further submissions CASA wishes to make on the question of any recommendation about costs. If CASA does not wish to address any further submission I will, in accordance with FOI Act s 66, recommend to the Attorney General that each Applicant’s costs of the proceedings be paid by the Commonwealth.

..................[sgd]............................
Mr P W Taylor SC
Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – exemptions – documents relating to aircraft maintenance and safety claimed to be exempt under sections 40, 43 and 45 of the FOI Act – whether disclosure could prejudice future supply of information to agency – whether disclosure of documents could reasonably be expected to unreasonably affect an organisation’s lawful business, commercial or financial affairs – distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosure of information to agency – whether certain reports can be characterised as interim reports – scope of requests and adequacy of identification of documents responsive to request – costs – in respect to the first application the decision under review is set aside and in respect to the second application the decision under review is varied and remitted


Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) ss 3, 38, 40, 43, 45, 61, 66


Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v Robertson (1975) 422 US 255

Civil Aviation Authority v Malcolm Kirkaldie [2010] UK ITEA 2009-0033

Cooke v Pacific Hawker Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1238

Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1983] FCA 242; (1983) 5 ALD 545

Jorgensen v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 208 ALR 73; [2004] FCA 143

Ken Rubin v The Minister of Transport 154 DLR (4th) 414; 1997 CanLII 6385

Re Organon (Australia) Pty Ltd and Department of Community Services and Health and Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1987) 13 ALD 588

Re Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Department of Community Services and Health [1991] AATA 188; (1991) 23 ALD 714

Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre [1992] FCA 240; (1992) 36 FCR 111

Washington Post Company v Department Of Health And Human Services 690 F 27d 252


REASONS FOR DECISION


6 July 2010
Mr P W Taylor SC, Senior Member

  1. Mr McKinnon is the freedom of information editor for the Seven Network. Mr Vasta is the assistant federal secretary of the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association (“ALAEA”). In August 2007 they made separate requests to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (“CASA”) to obtain information under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOI Act”) relating to commercial aircraft safety and maintenance standards.

THE VASTA DECISION – 18 OCTOBER 2007

  1. On 24 August 2007 Mr Vasta requested the reports and findings of all audits carried out in 2006 and 2007:
  2. In its 18 October 2007 decision CASA identified audit reports relating to eight different organizations as responsive to Mr Vasta’s request. It claimed they were all exempt documents. CASA said they were exempt under FOI Act s 40(1) (because of the potentially adverse effect of their disclosure on CASA’s compliance audit activities) and also FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(i) (because of the potentially adverse effect of their disclosure on the maintenance and repair organisations to which they related). That decision was confirmed on 13 November 2007. In the course of these proceedings the precise particulars of the contentious reports differed from those identified in the initial decision. Those which ultimately were the subject of the exemption claim are referred to in paragraphs 15(a), 95 and 96 below.

THE MCKINNON DECISION – 31 OCTOBER 2007

  1. On 7 August 2007 Mr McKinnon requested documents relating to repairs and maintenance standards for Qantas aircraft. The particular documents he sought were:
  2. In its initial 31 October 2007 decision CASA identified 24 documents as responsive to Mr McKinnon’s request. It claimed 19 of those documents were exempt - on various identified grounds permitted by FOI Act ss 40, 43 and 45. The decision was affirmed on 23 April 2008. The review officer decided that all of the 19 contentious documents were exempt under FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(i) (because of the potentially adverse effect of their disclosure on Qantas). The review officer also decided that 9 of the documents were also exempt under FOI Act s 40(1)(d) (because of the potentially adverse effect of their disclosure on CASA’s compliance audit activities).
  3. In the course of the proceedings CASA identified, and claimed exemption for a number of additional documents. These were the Service Difficulty Reports referred to in paragraphs 15(b) and 23 to 25 below.

BACKGROUND TO THE INFORMATION REQUESTS

  1. The information requests followed correspondence in the early part of 2007 between CASA and ALAEA about aircraft maintenance standards. A particular ALAEA complaint was that CASA had removed an existing program of Confidential Airworthiness Incident Reports and replaced it with a “self monitoring system” operated by the individual airline operators. ALAEA complained its members were reluctant to use this kind of internal reporting system “for fear of recrimination”.
  2. In March 2007 there were press reports about a Qantas internal audit report, dated 10 August 2006. It was reputed to be critical of the standard of maintenance that had been carried out by SIA Engineering Co. (“SIAEC”) on a Qantas aircraft.
  3. A May 2007 CASA policy announcement related to its classification of aviation activities. The substance of the announcement was CASA’s indication it would accord the highest safety priority, standards and regulatory oversight to aviation passenger transport.
  4. In July 2007 ALAEA expressed its concern to CASA about allegations of unsafe maintenance practices associated with the use of foreign contractors to service Qantas aircraft. The concern was reflected in contemporaneous media reports. They included reference to what was described as “a damning Qantas audit” (presumably the 10 August 2006 document) relating to maintenance carried out by SIA Engineering Co., and an indignant rejection of that claim by SIAEC. SIAEC said, although the details do not seem to be justified by the objective information revealed in the present proceedings, that the Qantas internal audit report had been “proven incorrect by CASA”. The general secretary of the SIAEC Engineers and Executives Union complained that the allegations aired in the Australian press were offensive, totally baseless and had seriously harmed the union’s reputation.
  5. After Mr Vasta and Mr McKinnon lodged their respective review applications (on 18 January 2008 and 28 May 2008) there were other media releases and press articles relating to aviation safety issues. In May 2008 CASA’s chief executive announced a report about future trends in aviation safety. The thrust of this announcement was the need to consider broader issues and not “to rely solely on incident or accident data”. In May and June 2008 there was press coverage of an industrial dispute between Qantas and the ALAEA. Each side presented differing views as to whether safety issues were the central aspect of the dispute. Qantas press statements said that the industrial dispute was affecting its operational performance.
  6. In August 2008 CASA announced its intention to conduct a review of Qantas Airways engineering and maintenance control. The review was prompted by “a spate of reported incidents involving Qantas aircraft”. Some of those incidents were the subject of press reports, or Qantas media releases. In one case they concerned the release of an incident investigation report by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (“ATSB”). These reported incidents included non-closing wheel bay doors, hydraulic fluid leaking from an aircraft wing and a midair explosion that ripped a hole in the fuselage of a Boeing 747 aircraft. The latter incident had caused an emergency landing in the Philippines and was the subject of the ATSB report.
  7. On 31 August 2008 CASA completed its “Systemic Review of Qantas Airways Ltd - Engineering and Maintenance Control”. The report was the subject of a CASA media announcement, and an abbreviated press release, on 1 September 2008. The substance of the matters disclosed was that CASA:
  8. Qantas issued its own press release on 1 September 2008. It emphasised the key CASA review findings that (i) there been no significant change in Qantas’ rate of reported incidents over the past two years and (ii) there was no direct link between the recent reported incidents involving Qantas aircraft. The press release did acknowledge that its key performance indicators had declined, but it attributed a significant impact to the recent industrial dispute.

THE PRINCIPAL “EXEMPTION” DISPUTE – AUDIT REPORTS AND SDRS

  1. Two groups of documents are the principal points of contention in these review proceedings. They are:

AUDIT REPORT – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES

  1. Airline operators, and the aircraft they operate, require various approvals under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988. CASA is the approval authority. Airlines must operate aircraft in accordance with their CASA approval. Both airline and aircraft approvals are typically conditioned on compliance with specified maintenance and repair standards.
  2. Organisations and individuals who perform aircraft maintenance and repair work in Australia must also hold approvals, licences or authorities issued by CASA. Airline operators may, and in cases of exigency sometimes must, have aircraft maintenance checks and repairs carried out overseas by a foreign maintenance and repair organisation. If such an organisation has a relevant approval from their local aviation authority, there is no requirement that it have an additional CASA approval.
  3. Some overseas maintenance and repair organisations do seek, and have been granted, CASA approvals. Part of the CASA approval process, for any aircraft maintenance and repair organisation, involves an audit of the organisation’s facilities. If the audit report, and other required information, demonstrates compliance with the approval criteria, CASA will grant a time limited approval. CASA’s approval for any overseas maintenance and repair organisation will typically be limited to a 12 month period. Any approval renewal is subject to a further CASA audit.
  4. CASA’s general audit program, which covers both domestic and any overseas entities, is determined in advance. CASA assigns qualified inspectors to conduct particular audits. They plan the audit scope and strategy in advance. They determine those matters in the light of the formal regulatory requirements, their own expertise and experience, and their knowledge of the organisation involved. That knowledge will include both information the organisation lodged with its current approval application and any additional material information CASA has acquired. CASA will generally provide an organisation with up to six weeks notice of an impending formal approval or renewal inspection audit. It may carry out some kinds of audit, or surveillance inspections, with very limited prior notice.
  5. When CASA’s inspectors attend an organisation’s facilities to carry out an audit they follow a standard procedure in their formal contact with the organisation’s responsible officers. That procedure commences with an audit entry meeting. At that meeting the CASA inspectors will outline the audit purpose and scope, and their requirements for cooperation in facilitating the audit process. The audit process itself will typically involve physical inspection of the facility, selective inspection of equipment, and sampling of maintenance records. It may, but more typically does not, involve inspection of actual maintenance work that is in progress. It may involve formal interviews with management representatives, and informal discussions with individual employees. Those discussions may provide information that adds particular focus to the audit activities. The audit process itself can take up to 10 days to complete. The duration of any particular audit will depend on the size of the organisation, the complexity of its activities and the apparent sufficiency of its personnel, standards and procedures. The on-site inspection phase of the audit process concludes with a formal exit meeting with the organisation’s representatives. At that meeting the CASA inspectors will at least provide an oral report on the substance of the matters revealed during the inspection. They may provide a draft, or a summary, of their proposed formal audit findings and recommendations.
  6. After carrying out the on-site inspection, the CASA inspectors prepare a formal written audit report. This is usually completed in the week following the inspection. The formal report specifies the material audit findings. These will certainly include any deficiencies and areas of non-compliance with the applicable approvals, or legislative and regulatory requirements. Even if the audit inspection has not revealed specific deficiencies or non-compliance the audit report, whilst noting formal compliance, may indicate areas where the organisation could improve the quality of its performance.
  7. CASA provides the audited organisation with a copy of its formal audit report, but it does not otherwise publish audit reports or their findings. If the audit inspection has identified material deficiencies, CASA will issue a formal Request for Corrective Action to the organisation. The organisation has 28 days to respond to the audit findings, and to any Request for Corrective Action. CASA monitors the organisation’s response with a view to ensuring compliance with the statutory requirements and the organisation’s conditions of approval. If the audit inspection determines that the organisation does not meet the approval criteria, CASA will refuse the application for approval or renewal. It must provide reasons for its decision.

SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS

  1. Service Difficulty Reports (“SDRs”) are documents provided to CASA to report “major defects” in aircraft and aircraft components. Major defects must be reported to CASA because of the mandatory defect notification provisions in the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (“CAR”) - namely CAR regs 51, 51A, 51B, 52 and 52A. Broadly speaking, those provisions oblige aircraft operators, maintenance organisations and maintenance personnel to notify CASA, within 2 working days, of the discovery of major defects in aircraft and aircraft components. (The term “major defect” is defined to mean any defect that may affect the safety of an aircraft or cause it to become a danger to person or property.) If a defect is sufficiently significant that it could cause an aircraft fire, a primary structural failure, engine structural failure or a control system failure, any individual who discovers the defect (even if they are merely an employee of the maintenance provider or of the aircraft owner) must immediately notify CASA of the defect.
  2. All “major defect” reports to CASA must contain the detailed information required by CAR reg 52A. That information includes a description of the defect, the date and circumstances of its discovery, the apprehended cause of the defect and the action taken (or proposed to be taken) to rectify the defect and prevent its recurrence. The required information also includes particulars identifying the aircraft or aircraft component, and material details of their service history. CASA does not publish the defect reports themselves. But it does maintain on its website a publicly accessible log of the SDRs that have been lodged. Each SDR appears to be accorded a numerical identifier. The log includes an indicative, but highly condensed, outline of the nature of the reported defect and the circumstances in which it was detected. The outline account typically includes the aircraft type, but no other details identifying the person or organisation that lodged the report. However, some aircraft types are known to be unique to particular operators. Consequently, the practical reality is that, depending on the type of aircraft, and the nature of the defect, a person informed by appropriate knowledge of the Australian aviation industry could use CASA’s published SDR information to surmise the identity of the operator to which at least some SDRs relate.
  3. CASA did not initially identify any SDRs as falling within the terms of Mr McKinnon’s request. This was substantially because all SDRs are held in CASA’s Canberra office, not the Sydney CASA office that was asked to collate the potentially responsive documents. In any event, CASA ultimately identified some 53 relevant SDRs for which it claimed exemption. (Those SDRs are listed in the accompanying Schedule “Exempt Documents Claim – McKinnon Request”.) Mr McKinnon agreed, for the purpose of the review proceedings, that those were the SDRs relevant to his request.

THE EXEMPTION GROUNDS CLAIMED FOR THE ARS AND SDRS

  1. CASA says the ARs and SDRs are exempt documents. It has refused to release them in response to Mr McKinnon and Mr Vasta’s requests.
  2. The FOI Act provides for exemption from production on a number of different grounds. In their application to the ARs and SDRs for which CASA claims exemption, the substance of CASA’s claim is that their disclosure:
  3. These statutory exemption grounds are not precisely congruent. It is necessary to understand their differences, and the practical consequences of those differences in the circumstances of the present applications.
  4. One aspect of CASA’s claim is the apprehended effect of disclosure on its functional capacity. This attracts both FOI Act s 40(1)(d) and 43(1)(c)(ii) – in the latter case, because the information in both the ARs and the SDRs concerns the business and commercial affairs of the organisations to which they relate. The two provisions are similar, in that both require the relevant adverse effect to be established as a consequence that “could reasonably be expected”. They differ in two respects. First, the s 43(1)(c)(ii) exemption ground is made out by a reasonable expectation of information supply “prejudice” – as distinct from a “substantial adverse effect” (the s 40(1)(d) criterion). Second, if information “prejudice” is established under s 43(1)(c)(ii) no “public interest” consideration is available to permit disclosure – compare s 40(2).
  5. In its reliance on the FOI Act s 40(1)(d) CASA contends the public interest does not warrant disclosure because there is a relevant public interest in (i) protecting the business affairs of Qantas (and the other operators to which the particular documents relate) and (ii) ensuring CASA can discharge its function, of proper and efficient surveillance and audit of the aviation industry, by facilitating the free flow of information to CASA about compliance issues and aircraft defects. The second of these contentions is clearly based on CASA’s apprehension about the possible adverse effects of disclosure on the future supply of information to CASA. But that apprehension, in the circumstances of the present matter, substantially duplicates the exemption criterion in FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii). CASA’s contention in relation to FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii) is that disclosure of the SDRs and ARs could inhibit frankness and candour in communications to CASA of information about aircraft defects or maintenance errors. In expressing this contention CASA has three concerns. The first is that operators might only provide the minimum amount of information required to discharge their CAR obligations. The second is that operators might no longer voluntarily participate in the currently existing practice of voluntary disclosure of other defect issues. The third concern is that operators’ employees, and especially aircraft maintenance engineers, might be discouraged from reporting defects (either to their employer or to CASA) if there was a material risk of subsequent public disclosure identifying their personal involvement or responsibility.
  6. The FOI Act s 40(1)(d) criterion of “substantial adverse effect” connotes an effect that is serious or significant. It can be an expectation derived from the contents of the particular document, or from the prospect of disclosure of documents of a particular kind. The relevant adverse effect includes both effects on the internal administration of an agency, or the performance of its functions: Jorgensen v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 208 ALR 73; [2004] FCA 143 at [70] – [73]. The FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii) criterion of “prejudice” to the future supply of information to an agency does not explicitly require a substantial effect. But a quality of detriment or disadvantage is basic to the concept of prejudice. And relevant prejudice to the future supply of information to an agency would not arise unless the reasonably expected affect on the future supply of information was a significant lessening in either the quality or the quantity of future information material to the functions of the agency. Given that both FOI Act ss 40(1) and 43(1)(c) use the same basic criterion of reasonable expectation, it is likely that the differences between their respective references to “substantial adverse effect” and “prejudice” is more a matter of expression than substantive meaning. The different expressions may relate primarily to the fact that FOI Act s 40(1) requires an assessment of the effect of disclosure of identifiable information. On the other hand, FOI Act s 43(1)(c) requires an arguably more speculative assessment about the quality of future, and thus not specifically identifiable, information. I consider that as a matter of practical reality, if CASA can demonstrate the “information prejudice” to which that criterion applies, disclosure of the documents to which it applies is likely also to have a relevant substantial adverse effect for the purposes of FOI Act s 40(1)(d). However, if the “information prejudice” criterion applies, the documents are exempt from disclosure irrespective of any public interest consideration that would otherwise arise under FOI Act s 40(2).
  7. The other aspect of CASA’s claim is the apprehended impact of the disclosure on the affairs of the organisation to which the information relates. CASA’s contention in relation to FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(i) is that disclosure of the documents could lead to adverse publicity concerning defects and maintenance practices. That publicity could affect the level of business generated by the operators concerned. The risk of misuse of aircraft safety related information is, as CASA’s position indicates, a matter of genuine concern. It operates at several levels. The first is the potential for disclosure to promote further publicity by direct competitors, or other participants in the airline and tourist industries, anxious to publicise issues for the purpose of commercial advantage. That purpose is not precisely congruent with fair and reasonable discussion and, despite the potential sanctions that would apply to misleading and deceptive conduct (for example, under ss 52, 82 and 87 of the Trade Practices Act) it does have some potential for misuse of information contained in ARs and SDRs. The second level of concern is the risk of malicious misuse, perhaps by disgruntled customers, suppliers or participants in airline dependent businesses. The third is the risk of unintended misuse because of inability to evaluate, in a way that is accurate fair and reasonable, the real significance of potentially complex and interrelated safety and maintenance information.
  8. In the case of the SDRs involved in the present case, Qantas is the entity principally involved. According to CASA, publication of the information contained in the SDRs might give the impression that Qantas has numerous serious deficiencies in aircraft; that those defects were attributable to inadequate maintenance standards or maintenance errors, and that those deficiencies could imminently impact on the safety of Qantas aircraft. CASA contends that such an impression would be unfounded. It says it would be unreasonable, by disclosure of the ARs and SDRs, to expose Qantas to the risk of misleading publicity.
  9. This aspect is a true alternative to both the “information prejudice” and “agency operations” exemption criteria. It is a true alternative because it is concerned with the effect of disclosure by, rather than the extent of future disclosure to, CASA. But, despite its status as an alternative criterion, it also does not require evaluation of the “public interest” as such. All it requires is satisfaction that the disclosure “could reasonably be expected” to “unreasonably affect ... adversely” the organisation’s business affairs. If that disclosure criterion is met, the relevant document is exempt, despite any separate evaluation of the public interest in disclosure.
  10. However, the question of public interest is relevant to the application of the FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(i) criterion. This is so for the reasons explained in Searle Australia Pty Ltd v Public Interest Advocacy Centre [1992] FCA 240; (1992) 36 FCR 111 at 125:
If it be in the public interest that certain information be disclosed, that would be a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether a person would be unreasonably affected by the disclosure; the effect, though great, may be reasonable under the circumstances. To give two examples: if the relevant information showed that a business practice or product posed a threat to public safety or involved serious criminality, a judgment might be made that it was not unreasonable to inflict that result though the effect on the person concerned would be serious. Of course, the extent and nature of the effect will always be relevant, often decisive. Whether the effect of the disclosure is unreasonable cannot be assessed without taking into account all relevant factors: see Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corp [1991] FCA 152; (1991) 29 FCR 429 at 438, 441.

CASA’S BASIC AR AND SDR EXEMPTION CONTENTION – “INFORMATION PREJUDICE”

  1. The expectation of future information prejudice is CASA’s basic exemption contention in relation to both the ARs and the SDRs. In elaborating that contention CASA acknowledges the extent of its compulsory powers under the Civil Aviation Regulations. Those powers permit it to gain access to facilities and records in connection with its audit and operational surveillance activities. But CASA says the current disclosure practices in the civil aviation industry have both a mandatory and voluntary aspect. It contends the voluntary aspect of the current disclosure practices are particularly useful in identifying safety related trends and risk factors relating to the safety of aircraft. It is apprehensive that the presently sought disclosure of ARs and SDRs could significantly reduce the extent of future voluntary cooperation by airline operators. It is also concerned that any marked lessening of the current culture of voluntary disclosure could result in it having to adopt an inflexible procedure of relying exclusively on its formal powers under the Civil Aviation Regulations. It apprehends that formality of this kind would be likely to limit the scope of its activities, and make them less effective in detecting safety related deficiencies.

CASA’S EVIDENCE FOR THE SDR AND AR EXEMPTION CLAIM

  1. CASA proffered evidence from Mr Laws to provide the factual and impressionistic basis for the application of these various statutory grounds for exclusion. Mr Laws is a qualified licensed aircraft maintenance engineer and an airworthiness team leader at CASA’s Sydney Air Transport Field Office. He is primarily responsible, as lead auditor, for CASA’s compliance activities relating to Qantas Airways and Qantas Engineering.
  2. In his 15 July 2008 witness statement Mr Laws opined that the audit report documents in the Vasta proceedings were exempt for a number of reasons. His opinion was that disclosure of the documents (i) would tend to reveal the CASA audit methodology, and might undermine the effectiveness of the audit process, (ii) might prompt organisations to require CASA to rely on its formal CAR inquiry powers, and might consequentially increase the duration, and limit the effectiveness, of CASA’s future audit activities, and (iii) would inhibit frankness and candour in future audit activities.
  3. Notwithstanding the opinions Mr Laws expressed in his 15 July 2008 witness statement, CASA subsequently consented to the release of some of the contentious audit reports in response to Mr Vasta’s request. On 12 August 2009 the Tribunal made a consent decision that six of the audit report documents were not exempt. The effect of that decision was that the only identified audit reports relating to two organizations (Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co. and ST Aerospace Engineering) and one of the multiple audit reports relating to each of four other organizations, were released to Mr Vasta.
  4. In his oral evidence Mr Laws outlined CASA’s audit practices. (It is his evidence I have relied on in providing a summary description of the audit process set out earlier in these reasons.) He stressed the cooperative atmosphere in which CASA endeavoured to conduct its audit activities. He said there was a practical benefit, and in a sense the necessity, of such an approach. It lay in (i) the extraordinary complexity of the task of safe aircraft maintenance and repair, (ii) the practical impossibility of CASA’s audit activities having any more than an emphasis on the apparent adequacy of procedures and practices, and (iii) a practical necessity for CASA’s audit scope to be targeted to areas of either inherent materiality or where it had a specific reason to investigate. In the latter context CASA was particularly assisted by the willingness of audited organisations and their employees to volunteer areas of potential concern.
  5. Mr Laws was apprehensive about the difficulties CASA might encounter if it was forced to rely upon its compulsory powers under the Civil Aviation Regulations in conducting its audit activities. His apprehensions were principally based upon the proposition that it would be “extraordinarily time consuming and exacting” to use the regulations “simply to gain access to facilities and records” each time a scheduled audit or operational surveillance exercise was carried out.
  6. Mr Laws also addressed CASA’s exemption claim in relation to the SDRs. He did this in his 16 December 2009 witness statement. He said the purpose of the SDR system was to provide information to improve and enhance the level of flight safety in the aviation industry. He characterised the SDR reporting system as “an essential part of the continuous task of monitoring the safety performance of the aviation industry and identifying safety related trends and risk factors.” He expressed the view that the value of the system was “directly related to industry participation in the program, the effective monitoring of the development of effective corrective actions and feed back to the industry by, for example, providing timely aviation safety advice.”
  7. In support of these opinions Mr Laws described CASA’s functions in relation to SDRs it received. These were:
  8. Mr Laws elaborated on the extent of Qantas’ participation in the SDR reporting procedures. He said that although the CAR only imposed a requirement to report “major defects” Qantas’ practice was to report all defects and maintenance related events to CASA. He explained that CASA did not discourage any operator from reporting matters to it, irrespective of however minor they were. He said CASA’s view in relation to these matters was that unrestricted disclosure by operators provided intangible safety benefits by (i) allowing CASA to have detailed knowledge of how operators dealt with even apparently minor matters and (ii) tending to foster a culture of “openness” by operators in their dealings with CASA.
  9. Mr Laws opined that disclosure of the Qantas SDRs (i) would inhibit frankness and candour in future disclosure of defects by operators (and their personnel) to CASA, (ii) discourage disclosure or anything other than the bare minimum amount of required information, and (iii) discourage personnel from reporting maintenance errors to their own employers.
  10. Mr McKinnon impugned Mr Laws’ evidence on several grounds. Mr McKinnon said Mr Laws’ opinions constituted nothing more than either hypothesis or, where they predicted or purported to include the response of airline operators and maintenance organisations, they were merely second hand opinions about the potential effects of disclosure. He particularly complained that Mr Laws’ evidence did not really reflect his own, deliberately considered, opinion. It was asserted rather than concluded and it was neither based on knowledge of the actual content of the particular documents, nor expressed as the result of a reasoned process of considered evaluation. It was, Mr McKinnon contended, no more than supposition about the possible effect of disclosure of the generality of the widely different kinds of information that might conceivably be contained in a range of SDR reports.
  11. I do not intend to convey any criticism of Mr Laws in accepting that Mr McKinnon’s complaints about Mr Laws’ proffered opinions are, to a significant degree, well placed. As is evidenced by the circumstances that saw the belated identification of the potentially relevant SDRs, Mr Laws had no direct responsibility for, nor involvement in, CASA’s monitoring of SDRs. (That activity was principally carried out in CASA’s Canberra office.) Furthermore, it emerged during the course of his evidence that he had seen only some of the contentious SDRs. His opinion was really nothing more than an apprehension that releasing any SDRs would set some form of precedent that might create future difficulties. It also emerged that much of the substance of Mr Laws’ witness statement in relation to the exemption claim for the SDRs had been prepared for him as a draft by CASA’s legal section. In my assessment, it reflected a view with which he ultimately agreed, as distinct from representing his own independently considered opinion. In particular, and despite what might have otherwise been surmised from his witness statement, Mr Laws had no reliable information about the extent to which, if at all, the Qantas SDRs in fact included voluntarily disclosed defects. He conceded that the mandatory disclosure obligation would, in view of both the potential sanctions and the imprecise judgment involved, likely influence organisations to disclose defects that might only arguably merit categorisation as “major”. But his own experience of disclosure by operators was substantially confined to the audit and approval activities that he undertook or supervised. Those activities did not attach any particular significance to the SDR reporting system, or information that it provided.
  12. Another part of the reason for my assessment is the evidence Mr Laws gave when he was asked specific questions about the audit process and the potential impact that any lack of cooperation would have. He said he had not given any specific consideration to the particular “formal” powers on which CASA inspectors might have to rely. He had a good understanding of the breadth of CASA’s CAR enquiry powers, and was fully aware that they overwhelmingly involved no particular formal requirements. He could not identify any realistic respect in which the apparently peremptory available powers of enquiry, for example, under CAR reg 30(4), might be inadequate for audit purposes.
  13. Despite what he had included in his 15 July 2008 witness statement, by way of apprehensions that any future lack of candour that might have on CASA audit activities, Mr Laws did not articulate a factual hypothesis that tended to substantiate his apprehensions. On the contrary, Mr Laws indicated that he, in fact, had no real apprehension that the audit process was likely to be hindered by the need to rely on any supposedly “formal” powers. He anticipated that if he or his audit inspectors perceived any lack of cooperation, withholding of information, or restricting access to employees, they would only be likely to intensify the audit scope and depth of enquiry. Consequently, any defensive disclosure attitude adopted by an entity being audited would, in Mr Laws’ opinion, be a quite counter productive strategy for it to adopt in its audit related dealings with CASA.

CASA’S “FORMAL” POWERS - CONTRAST BETWEEN MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE

  1. CASA’s basic claim is that the risk of FOI disclosure of information relating to particular organisations, would or could require it to adopt a formal, and potentially less effective role, in the exercise of its audit functions. This claim is unpersuasive when seen against the amplitude of the powers conferred on CASA by the Civil Aviation Regulations. That amplitude can be readily described:
  2. A striking feature of almost all of these various powers is the lack of formality with which they can be exercised. Predominantly CASA’s powers can be exercised without any requirement for notice, either written or oral. Only the power to require production in connection with an investigation explicitly requires formal written notice.

MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE TO CASA

  1. CASA’s significant investigatory powers, and the mandatory reporting obligations, under the Civil Aviation Regulations are complemented by the legal and practical necessity for people and organisations engaged in aircraft operations, and maintenance and repair activities, to hold the requisite licenses and authorities stipulated in the Civil Aviation Regulations. In practical reality, deliberate or repeated non-compliance with the CAR reporting obligations in relation to major defects would be likely to result, ultimately, in the removal of any relevant licence or authority. The statutory framework, and the mandatory reporting obligations, therefore provide a powerful incentive for regulated organisations to continue to provide CASA with the information it requires to discharge its administrative functions fully and effectively. They provide persuasive reasons to conclude that the future supply of information to CASA is highly unlikely to be materially prejudiced by disclosure, for example, of either the ARs or the mandatorily required SDRs in the present case: see Re Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Department of Community Services and Health [1991] AATA 188; (1991) 23 ALD 714 at 727.
  2. Nevertheless, it is likely to be simplistic to postulate that the effectiveness and efficiency of CASA’s role depends exclusively on the adequacy of its compulsory powers. In that regard it is proper to consider that Mr Laws referred to voluntary disclosure and cooperation by approved organisations. He also alluded to CASA’s partly consultative relationship with them. Consequently, despite the considerable legal obligations and sanctions evident in the CAR provisions relating to defect reporting, it is appropriate to assess the reality of CASA’s claim that there is a current climate of voluntary disclosure, and that it plays a significant functional role in ensuring the safety of aircraft operations.
  3. The suggestion that some material, additional element of voluntary cooperation, and expectation of confidentiality, attached to CASA’s audit and investigation roles was espoused by others.
  4. For example, in a letter dated 16 June 2008 Lufthansa Technik Philippines (“LTP”) wrote emphasising what it regarded as “the confidential nature of the information obtained by CASA” during any audit of its operations. LTP went on to state its opinion that:
... confidentiality is critical in order that the maintenance organization being audited would be fully transparent to the regulatory agency without fear of self-incrimination. Without this strict compliance to the confidential relationship between a regulatory agency and a maintenance organization, there can also be no full transparency of the maintenance organization through no fault of the latter. Without full transparency, a regulatory agency would have insufficient basis not only to determine whether or not a maintenance organization observes mandatory safety standards, but also to make proper recommendations based on its findings.
  1. LTP’s expressed concerns relate to a somewhat different point to that espoused by Mr Laws on behalf of CASA. The most obvious point of LTP’s concerns is that it should be able to deal with CASA free of apprehension that voluntary disclosures would expose it to the risk of punitive enforcement sanctions under the relevant legislation. This apprehension, possibly not without practical substance, bears only indirectly on the presently relevant question. That question concerns the desirability of FOI required disclosure by CASA, rather than CASA’s own decision about the appropriate regulatory response to potentially incriminating information voluntarily provided to it by operators and licence holders.
  2. LTP’s letter did address the question of disclosure more directly. It pointed out that, while the overall conclusion of any particular audit report may be very favourable “neither CASA nor LTP can control how third parties (including but not limited to competitors)” will use a CASA report. LTP’s apprehension was the contingency that the contents of a publicly disclosed report could be selectively and maliciously published for the purpose of building a negative perception of the audited organisation. LTP was apprehensive that publicity of this kind could generate a negative public perception, greatly damage an organisation’s reputation and have a severe adverse effect on its financial operations.
  3. LTP’s apprehensions about the potential impact of unfair publicity and the possibility of its occurrence, were broadly consistent with Mr Laws’ views. They were also expressed by other organisations in response to CASA’s letter informing them of the documents to which Mr Vasta and Mr McKinnon’s requests related.
  4. SIA Engineering Co. wrote to CASA on 20 May 2008 expressing the following views:
SIAEC permits CASA unrestricted access to its facilities and relevant documents in excess of what it is required by legislation. SIAEC has no hesitation with voluntary disclosure to CASA relating to any quality and safety issues during CASA audits. It freely discusses these issues with CASA with a clear understanding that information exchanged ... will be kept confidential and used solely by CASA and SIAEC for improvement of quality and safety.
If SIAEC’s current understanding on confidentiality of information with CASA is no longer valid, then SIAEC would have to reluctantly review its open and voluntary disclosure policy in future dealings with CASA to ensure that SIAEC’s confidential information is not placed at risk of being disclosed and becoming open to public scrutiny. This may include a policy that SIAEC only provides CASA with access and information as is required by a strict interpretation of the legislation.

QANTAS’ POSITION IN RELATION TO THE SDRS

  1. On 15 December 2009 Qantas responded to CASA’s notification that some of the SDR documents related to Mr McKinnon’s request. Qantas made the following points in its letter:
  2. Notwithstanding the elaborately stated claims made in the 15 December 2009 letter, the proposition that Qantas does in fact routinely submit SDRs to CASA for all defects is contradicted by earlier correspondence. In February and March 2009 the executive general manager of Qantas Engineering responded to ALAEA’s complaint that Qantas had failed to submit an SDR to CASA in relation to a serious defect reported by one of its LAME (licensed aircraft maintenance engineer) members. Qantas obviously took a different view of the significance of the alleged defect. It explained the reason why no SDR had been submitted to CASA in relation to it. According to the explanation (i) a judgment was involved in the determination of whether any defect was reportable under CAR reg 51, (ii) Qantas had an internal procedure for reviewing all employee notified defects for the purpose of distinguishing between those which were “low risk”, and could sufficiently be dealt with internally, and those which were reportable in accordance with CAR reg 51, (iii) Qantas held regular SDR review meetings with CASA where “every SDR and potential SDR” was reviewed and discussed, (iv) all Qantas personnel involved in the internal review procedure received extensive risk assessment training, and (v) all SDR reporting decisions are a joint undertaking between Qantas quality services and risk management sections and its engineering services division.
  3. In the light of Qantas March 2009 letter to ALAEA I do not accept the claim that Qantas “over reports” to CASA defects it is not required to disclose under CAR reg 51. However, as I explain in paragraphs 103 to 108 below, there is an aspect of Qantas’ SDR related reporting practices that involve it in providing CASA with information beyond that mandatorily required by CAR regs 51 and 52A.

DISCLOSURE ISSUES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

  1. Air travel and air safety issues are, by their nature, not jurisdictionally unique. Furthermore it is plain, from the material I have just described, that those directly involved in conducting and regulating air transport activities place great emphasis on the inherent desirability of facilitating the voluntary (albeit non public) disclosure of safety related information. Against that background it is instructive to review the approach taken in other jurisdictions to the question of FOI disclosure of air safety related information.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  1. The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) is CASA’s counterpart organisation in the USA. It has responsibilities for air safety under the US Federal Aviation Act.
  2. In Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v Robertson (1975) 422 US 255 a public interest law group sought access to FAA reports on the “operation and maintenance performance of commercial airlines”. It is not possible to tell from the reported decision whether these reports were relevantly analogous to the ARs and SDRs in the present matter. But the formal title of the reports involved in Robertson was “Systems Worthiness Analysis Program Reports”. The title tends to suggest the reports may have been similar to the ARs, and significantly more comprehensive than SDRs.
  3. The FAA resisted disclosure of the reports under the US Freedom of Information Act. The judgments in Robertson indicate that a substantial factor in the FAA’s resistance to disclosure was a view that the effectiveness of its operations required ongoing airline cooperation and candour, and an apprehension that the latter would be compromised if its reports were amenable to disclosure under the FOI legislation. This contention raised a point of fundamental principle, not directly related to the content of the particular documents, and very similar to part of CASA’s arguments in the present case.
  4. In Robertson the FAA contended the reports were excluded from FOI disclosure by an exemption (Exemption 3) that applied to documents “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”. The FAA said the operative statutory exemption was provided by s 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act. That provision permitted the Administrator to withhold information he considered “would adversely affect the interests of the objecting party and is not required to be disclosed in the interest of the public”. The US Supreme Court held that this provision, even though it operated only by reference to the contingency that the Administrator had formed the requisite opinion, nevertheless constituted an exemption for the purposes of “Exemption 3” in the FOI Act.
  5. The US Supreme Court noted in Robertson that the Congressional intention, in providing for the various FOI exemptions (of which Exemption 3 was one) had apparently been to “preserve, for air transport regulation, a broad degree of discretion on what information is to be protected in the public interest in order to insure continuing access to the sources of sensitive information necessary to the regulation of air transport”. The Court concluded that vesting the exercise of the discretion conclusively with the Administrator reflected the Congressional conclusion “that the public interest was better served by guaranteeing confidentiality”. The Court rejected the proposition that it was appropriate to interpret the FOI legislation as if its enactment conveyed a legislative indication that “all information in all agencies and in all circumstances is to be open to public inspection”.
  6. It remains the case that FOI exemption claims in the United States fall to be considered under Exemption 3. But there is an additional specific disclosure limitation that applies to voluntarily provided airline safety information. It is found at 49 USC 40123 and reads:
40123 Protection of voluntarily submitted information
(a) In General. - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, nor any agency receiving information from the Administrator, shall disclose voluntarily-provided safety or security related information if the Administrator finds that:
(1) the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information and that the receipt of that type of information aids in fulfilling the Administrator’s safety and security responsibilities; and
(2) withholding such information from disclosure would be consistent with the Administrator’s safety and security responsibilities.
  1. The reference to voluntarily provided information, in the USA context, is probably best understood by reference to two formal programs the FAA has established. These, the Aviation Safety Action Program (“ASAP”) and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance program (“FOQA”) provide a measure of both conditional and comparative immunity from enforcement sanctions and immunity from employer imposed sanctions, where defects are promptly reported and do not involve deliberate misconduct. They appear to have a broad, but far from precise, parallel in the voluntary reporting scheme under Part 13 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998.
  2. In Working Paper A35-WP/92 to the 35th session of the International Civil Aviation Organisation Assembly Technical Commission the United States said this:
These supplementary programs share a common goal of establishing a proactive approach to accident prevention by individual air operators. In sum, operators accept responsibility for identifying adverse safety trends and making appropriate interventions before they lead to accidents, and further, can do so by utilizing tools provided by the FAA. The incentives provided by the FAA for sharing information in the context of these programs with the FAA are (1) protection from release of information to the public, and (2) protection from legal enforcement action by the FAA.
  1. Australia has a more restricted voluntary reporting scheme established by ss 30DL to 30DR of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. That scheme operates to conditionally exempt the holders of civil aviation authorisations from administrative enforcement action in respect of a contravention voluntarily reported and to make any such voluntary report inadmissible in criminal proceedings against the holder of the civil aviation authorisation. More importantly, the Australian exemption provision, in FOI Act s 38, is significantly more restricted than the US “Exemption 3”. Under FOI Act s 38, non-disclosure provisions in other legislation do not establish the “exempt” status of a document unless the provision either expressly applies FOI Act s 38 or is specified in FOI Act Schedule 3.

CANADA

  1. In Ken Rubin v The Minister of Transport 154 DLR (4th) 414; 1997 CanLII 6385 the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal ordered disclosure of a safety review report relating to an aircraft crash in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The crash was the worst airline disaster in Canadian history. The report was a comprehensive review of the organisation, operations, maintenance and management of the airline operator.
  2. The Canadian Minister of Transport had resisted the request for disclosure under the Canadian Access to Information Act. That resistance initially relied on the alleged confidentiality of information contained in the report. Subsequently, the Minister resisted disclosure on the ground that it would be “injurious to ... the conduct of lawful investigations” - that being a specifically permissible non-disclosure ground under s 16(1)(c) of the Access to Information Act. The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal construed the permissive exclusion as applying to information that could prejudice “something specific about the development or progress of a particular investigation” and did not “refer to the general investigative process”. The Court of Appeal accepted that the restriction might justify the nondisclosure of information relevant to an imminent future investigation. But the Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the view that the exclusion could refer to future investigations generally. In particular, it did not permit a refusal to disclose information merely on the basis of an apprehension that the disclosure would have a “chilling effect” on future investigations.
  3. The actual decision in Rubin turned on the particular wording of the Canadian legislation. It was significantly different from the ground of exemption provided for in FOI Act s 43(c)(ii) - which does permit nondisclosure of information that “could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information” for the purpose of Commonwealth administration. However, the Canadian legislation did impose an onus on the entity resisting disclosure (similar to FOI Act s 61). It also contained a declaration of purpose similar to that contained in FOI Act s 3. A further similarity was the absence of any more specific legislative provision evidencing either a policy or a requirement inhibiting the disclosure of air safety related information. Against this background it is informative to recognise the way in which the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with the Minister of Transport’s argument about the possibility that disclosure would have an adverse impact on Transport Canada’s capacity to undertake effective future air safety investigations. McDonald JA (in whose judgment the other members of the court agreed) said the following:
... I am not unaware of the important role safety review reports play in the overall framework of ensuring safety for the public in the aeronautics industry. However, if, and as [the Minister] suggests, there is a negative impact on the willingness of individuals to participate in these reviews due to public disclosure, then there is nothing to preclude Parliament from changing the Aeronautics Act to provide for wide-scale confidentiality protection, or, from adding these reviews to the section 24 category of broad exemptions in the Access to Information Act. It is also open to the Minister to protect certain aspects of the report under other exemptions ...
Having stated the important role that post-accident safety reviews play in the overall safety of the aeronautics industry, I think it is also important not to underestimate the public’s interest in disclosure and the positive impact disclosure may have on the regulation of the aeronautics industry...
The main ground advanced by those asserting that a privilege should be attached to all statements obtained by the investigators in the course of their investigations is that witnesses would refuse to provide information to accident investigators if these statements could become admissible in legal proceedings. Those who advanced this position opined that this would happen. These opinions were equally matched with the opinions of others that no such result would follow. It has not been the experience of the National Transportation Safety Board in the United States, where witnesses’ statements enjoy no privilege that their sources of information have dried up. Conversely, there is a danger that witnesses who are assured that their information will not be challenged, nor come under public scrutiny may take liberties with the facts. This may impair public confidence in the reliability of accident reports.
  1. Despite the broad parallels, to which I have referred, between the Canadian legislation and the Australian Freedom of Information Act, it is important to acknowledge material differences between the two jurisdictions relating to the regulation of air safety and the disclosure of air safety information. For example, the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 contains specific provisions limiting the disclosure of “restricted information” (which includes information obtained for the purposes of an investigation under the Act irrespective of whether it has been compulsorily acquired, obtained as a result of an inspection permitted by the Act, or has been voluntarily provided) and “on board recording information”. Information within these two categories is prohibited from disclosure except (i) for the purposes of the Act, (ii) certain types of criminal proceedings, and (iii) in civil proceedings where the court determines that “any adverse domestic and international impact that the disclosure of the information might have on any current or future investigations is outweighed by the public interest in the administration of justice”: see ss 53 and 60. (Each of these provisions is prescribed as a secrecy provision for the purposes of s 38 of the Australian FOI Act.) The conditional disclosure limitations contained in the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 involve a statutory recognition of Australia’s obligations as a signatory to the 1944 Convention on Civil Aviation (the “Chicago Convention”): see Cooke v Pacific Hawker Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1238 at [11].

UNITED KINGDOM

  1. In the United Kingdom decision Civil Aviation Authority v Malcolm Kirkaldie [2010] UK ITEA 2009-0033 the UK Information Tribunal considered a request for FOI disclosure of an airline safety audit report by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (“the CAA”). The CAA initially opposed disclosure relying on the United Kingdom equivalent of FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii) (apprehension that it would adversely affect the administration of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 (UK)). The authority emphasised, as did CASA in the present case, the significance it attached to maintaining trust and openness with the organisations regulated and their apprehensions about the potential impact disclosure would have on their future dealings with the CAA. The CAA contended that any assessment of the likelihood of prejudice had to take into account both the arguably low degree of probability of any adverse effect and the potential seriousness of the consequences of any such prejudice. The CAA contended that the statutory exemption ground was sufficiently made out if there was a real, as distinct from a wholly speculative, risk of prejudice to its ability to discharge its functions under the legislation.
  2. In elaborating its apprehensions about the risk of prejudice the CAA emphasised that its functions were not limited merely to establishing compliance with regulatory requirements. In a pithily forceful submission the CAA said that “[e]vidence of compliance might not in itself be evidence of competence”. Consequently in all of its activities, particularly in its audit investigations the CAA was concerned to obtain the maximum possible amount of information potentially relevant to assessing the actual competence and safety of particular organisations. Its ability to make an assessment was enhanced by the willingness of organisations to share information with it voluntarily, rather than to provide only what was specifically requested. The CAA cited the Rumsfeldian expression “unknown unknowns” to express its concern about the risk of material information being withheld by organisations because of anxiety about the risk of their subsequent unrestricted disclosure.
  3. Despite its initial reliance on these general arguments, the CAA subsequently successfully contended that disclosure of the audit report was statutorily prohibited, and that prohibition gave it the status of an exempt document under s 44 of the UK FOI legislation (a provision broadly equivalent to s 38 of the FOI Act in the present case). The CAA relied on the disclosure prohibition contained in s 23 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. That section was broadly similar in its effect to the provisions he US Supreme Court had considered in Robertson. It prohibited disclosure unless certain conditions applied. One of those conditions was the CAA’s own determination that the information “may be disclosed”. (I note, however, that the prohibition only applied to information provided “in pursuance of any provision of this Act ... or of an Air Navigation Order”. It does not seem specifically to refer to voluntarily provided information.)
  4. The Information Tribunal determined that the statutory prohibition applied, as a consequence of the CAA’s determination not to disclose information, unless that determination was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. No such argument had been advanced to challenge the CAA’s decision.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “OTHER JURISDICTIONS” APPROACHES

  1. This limited discussion of the approach taken to the disclosure of air safety related information in other jurisdictions is significant in three ways. First, it demonstrates the ubiquity of the concern expressed by air safety regulators to ensure the adequacy of their access to information. Second, it reveals dissatisfaction that a clear line of distinction can be drawn between the adequacy of the information air safety regulators can obtain compulsorily and what they may usefully obtain by the voluntary cooperation by others. Thirdly, it reveals a diversity of approach in the way in which the critically relevant disclosure issues have been framed in other freedom of information regimes.
  2. The latter observation suffices to highlight the importance of paying particular regard to the terms of the exemption grounds on which CASA relies in the present case, and the statutory provisions they invoke.

REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PREJUDICE

  1. I summarised earlier (in paragraph 27) the grounds on which CASA relied to support its general exemption claim in relation to the ARs and SDRs. I concluded (in paragraph 31) that the likely determinative consideration, in relation to CASA’s contention that disclosure of those documents would impede its proper and efficient functioning, was the “information prejudice” criterion in FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii).
  2. In applying that criterion it is not sufficient to highlight the extent of CASA’s compulsory powers to acquire information. It is conceivable that both the quality and quantity of information provided to CASA might be influenced by the degree of cooperation voluntarily provided by regulated persons or organisation: see Re Organon (Australia) Pty Ltd and Department of Community Services and Health and Public Interest Advocacy Centre (1987) 13 ALD 588 at [36] - [38] - citing Washington Post Company v Department Of Health And Human Services 690 F 27d 252 at 268. There is, in the nature of things, some inherent risk of disparity between, on the one hand, information likely to be volunteered where there is a belief in its substantial immunity from subsequent disclosure and, on the other hand, information produced in response to a compulsive requirement where there is reason to apprehend the possibility of its subsequent disclosure or adverse use.
  3. The magnitude of the risk in any particular case, and the significance that should reasonably be attached to it, will depend on the particular circumstances. One of the most important considerations is likely to be the nature of the compulsive power and the practicalities of its exercise. For example, if the power either requires or permits the desired information to be identified by its degree of relationship (direct or indirect) to a particular subject matter (a tangible object or an intangible concept) the practical content of the obligation, and thus the conduct sufficient to discharge it, may be open to honestly held, though self-interestedly distorted, differences of opinion. Sometimes the judgments that underlie such differences of opinion may be difficult to discern, and some information may, consequently, go unelicited. But that risk is likely to be minimal if the interrogator is purposeful, informed and skilled. CASA, with the staff and resources available to it, can justifiably be accorded all of those qualities. Its compulsory powers, if they were needed to be invoked against an evasive organisation, are likely to be ample to secure any relevant information it considers material to the proper discharge of its functions.
  4. However, the risk of information prejudice must be assessed on the basis of the reasonableness of the expectation, rather than an estimate of the probability of its occurrence. This point was explained by the Full Federal Court in Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft (1986) 10 FCR 180. At first instance the Tribunal had rejected the exemption claim, in the light of positive evidence that no information had been withheld, or was likely to be withheld in the future. The Full Federal Court held that this was an irrelevant inquiry. Bowen CJ and Beaumount J said (at 190):
In our opinion, in the present context, the words “could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information” were intended to receive their ordinary meaning ... they require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like. To construe s 43(1)(c)(ii) as depending in its application upon the occurrence of certain events in terms of any specific degree of likelihood or probability is, in our view, to place an unwarranted gloss upon the relatively plain words of the Act. It is preferable to confine the inquiry to whether the expectation claimed was reasonably based: see Kioa v West (1985) 62 ALJR 113 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J.
... It is ... unnecessary to consider whether an “even chance” or something of that kind is needed. It is preferable to confine oneself to the language of the provision itself and to attempt to form an opinion, on the evidence, as to what can reasonably be expected to happen if disclosure occurs.
  1. However, Sheppard J went on to express the view that the concept of expectation required more than a mere risk, and that the combined expression “could reasonably be expected” was intended to convey some element of qualification. His Honour said
I do not myself feel able to derive from the presence of the word “reasonably” in the relevant expression a great deal of assistance. The difficulty is to give full weight to the meaning of the word “expected”. It is only then that one can turn one’s mind to the question of the significance of the qualification of it by the word “reasonably”. The words are expressed in the passive voice — “could reasonably be expected”. What is required is that the decision-maker act reasonably. For the document to be exempt his conduct must be taken to be that of the reasonable man. But then comes the difficulty. So acting, the decision-maker must expect that disclosure of the document could prejudice the future supply of information. In my opinion he will not be justified in claiming exemption unless, at the time the decision is made, he has real and substantial grounds for thinking that the production of the document could prejudice that supply. But, stringent though that test may be, it does not go so far as to require the decision-maker to be satisfied upon a balance of probabilities that the production of the document will in fact prejudice the future supply of information.
  1. It would be easy for the uninitiated not to grasp adequately the complexity of the undertaking involved in safe air transport operations. It would be similarly easy to fail to appreciate all of the ramifications of the heightened risk awareness and risk aversion that characterises aviation regulation and the safety standards professed by airline operators and aircraft manufacturers. Those possibilities combine to require recognition of two further considerations. The first is that apprehensions expressed by those privy to the realities of the aviation industry, particularly those involved in commercial air transport operations, deserve to be evaluated not only with a determination to understand fully the reasons advanced, but also with an awareness that they may not always be readily amenable to empirical verification. The second is that CASA’s general regulatory role is particularly dependent, in a real practical sense, on the quality of the cooperation it receives from industry participants. Even in its audit activities, which perhaps provide CASA with its best opportunity to assess the real safety competence of airline operators and repair and maintenance organisations, CASA does not, nor could it reasonably be expected to, act in the role of a continuously on site quality assurer. Rather CASA’s audit role involves elements of informed judgment and selection, in determining the priority, range and scope of the enquiries it makes and the inspections it carries out in conducting any particular audit. This is so irrespective of whether the audit is one of the more formally planned and notified exercises I outlined earlier, or whether it involves a comparatively spontaneous exercise of operational surveillance.

THE CONTENTIOUS AUDIT REPORTS

  1. It is not difficult to conceive that the extent of CASA’s audit activities may be informed by information disclosed to it – either compulsorily or voluntarily. But the more particular question required to be answered in applying the FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(ii) exemption criterion is whether disclosure of the contentious audit reports in the present case, could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply of information to CASA. Furthermore, the question has to be answered against the background of both the onus provisions in FOI Act s 61 and the more general declaration of the object of the legislation in FOI Act s 3.
  2. There are good reasons to doubt that the disclosure of the contentious ARs in the present case justifies invoking the exemption (or the related exemptions in FOI Act ss 40(1)(d) and 43(1)(c)(i)).
  3. At a level of generality, the reality is that every audited organisation depends on being able to satisfy CASA’s requirements. In that regard, the organisations’ commercial self interest dictates compliance and disclosure of any information about which CASA enquires. That compliance can be enforced either directly by the punitive provisions in the legislation and regulations, or indirectly by the sanction of being deprived of any requisite approval, licence or authority. Furthermore, there is a standing mandatory obligation requiring the disclosure of every “major defect” in an aircraft or aircraft component.
  4. If information about which CASA enquires is particularly material it is likely to be something the entity was obliged to disclose in any event. If it is a less material matter, its significance may be limited merely to suggesting possible risks or alternative/additional lines of audit enquiry. But in either case it is most unlikely that the disclosed information would merely be restated, or even alluded to in the formal audit report. It is much more likely that the audit report would be confined to an account, and the result, of any enquiry that was prompted by the disclosure.
  5. At least in the case of aircraft maintenance and repair organisations there is likely already to be a degree of disclosure, albeit not public disclosure, that occurs in any event. Aircraft maintenance and repair organisations, at least those of the kind to which the presently contentious audit reports relate, have major airlines as their customers. It is scarcely conceivable that they could secure work from any major airline without welcoming pre contract “due diligence” enquiries and investigations. It also scarcely conceivable that those kinds of enquiries would not involve disclosure and examination of any current audit reports received from CASA (and other regulatory authorities). It is not suggested that the prospect of this kind of disclosure, adversely influences the quality or the quantity of the information that is provided to CASA, or the business affairs of the organisations.
  6. I would infer, therefore, that the real basis for any application of the “future supply of information” exemption depends on the particular content of the contentious ARs themselves.
  7. In its response to Mr Vasta’s request CASA ultimately identified 13 ARs as exempt documents. On 2 August 2009 the Tribunal made a consent order in these proceedings relating to 7 of those reports. Those reports concerned Hawker Pacific (March 2006), Jet Aviation (March 2007), Fieldair Engineering (July 2006), Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co. (June 2006). SIA Engineering Co. (August 2007) and ST Aerospace Engineering (October 2006 and July 2007). CASA abandoned the exemption claim for these documents because they contained either nothing negative about the maintenance organisations, or raised only minor issues.
  8. CASA now claims that audit reports relating to six overseas maintenance and repair organisations are exempt documents, despite being otherwise within the scope of Mr Vasta’s request. CASA wrote to all of the organisations involved, informing them of the request and inviting them to indicate their response to it. Some organisations did not respond to CASA’s invitation. Two of the organisations that did not respond (Jet Aviation and Fieldair Engineering) were the subject of disclosed audit reports to which the 2 August 2009 consent order relates. Four organisations objected to their audit reports being disclosed to Mr Vasta. Two of these (Hawker Pacific and SIA Engineering Co.) were also the subject of audit reports that were disclosed under the 2 August 2009 order.
  9. Hawker Pacific’s disclosure objection was pitched at the same level of generality that characterised CASA’s principal exemption claims. Its apprehensions were about the potential misuse, or unfair use, of particular documents. And, in that respect its concerns paralleled part of the objections made by Lufthansa Technik Philippines “LTP” - to which I referred in paragraph 57 above. The other objecting organisations were SIAEC and Air New Zealand. Both relied on the contention that disclosure of the audit reports would be likely to restrict their willingness to cooperate voluntarily in disclosing information to CASA. Air New Zealand raised the additional objection that the audit report in question related to an aircraft it had ceased to operate. It was concerned disclosure of the report might give rise to a misleading view of its current operations.
  10. I do not accept the exemption claim argument in relation to the contentious audit reports, whether it is primarily expressed as relying on the “information prejudice” contention, or on the “unreasonable adverse effect” contention, when it is started at this level of generality. Whatever force the argument has, in relation to the willingness of organisations to cooperate voluntarily with CASA’s audit activities, must be assessed in the light of a proper understanding of the audit process, the nature of the audit report and, in particular, the content of the particular reports in question. In relation to the nature of the audit process, I have set out my views earlier in these reasons. By its nature the process is one in which CASA participates as a skilled and authoritative enquirer. Conversely, the audited organisations have both a legislative compliance obligation and a self interest (in relation to avoiding statutory sanctions and maintaining CASA’s confidence and approval) in full cooperation with CASA. As well, just from the point of view of their own commitment to safety and risk management, organisations would be highly likely to wish to cooperate fully with CASA and to welcome the contribution of its inspectors to the maintenance of required safety standards.
  11. In relation to the content of the reports there is always some possibility, as an abstract generality, for information to be taken out of context. But that possibility, and the more direct concern that the information contained in a particular report might itself be of a kind that attracts one or other of the exemption grounds claimed by CASA, must ultimately be assessed by reference to the contents of the contentious documents themselves.
  12. The contentious audit reports are listed in the Schedule - “Exempt Documents Claim – Vasta Request” - accompanying these reasons. I have examined their contents. For the reasons set out in the “Decision” column in the attached Schedule, none of the audit reports in question attracts either the “information prejudice” or the “unreasonable adverse effect”/“unreasonably affect ... adversely” exemption grounds.

THE DISPUTED SDR DOCUMENTS

  1. I outlined in paragraph 27 the substance of CASA’s exemption claim in relation to the SDRs. I explained (in paragraphs 28 to 31) why I considered CASA’s principal claim fell for determinative consideration under the “information prejudice” criterion.
  2. The other aspect of significance to the exemption claim for the SDRs is the reasonable expectation that disclosure could unreasonably and adversely affect Qantas. Here the principal concerns are (i) the general potential for misrepresentation and misuse of the SDR information and (ii) the particular risk of disadvantage that might occur if Qantas was perceived to have a disproportionate level of defect notifications. I outlined the basis of that concern in paragraphs 32 to 34. I summarised Qantas’ position on the disclosure of the SDRs in paragraphs 60 to 61.
  3. Earlier in these reasons (in paragraph 32) I addressed CASA’s apprehensions about the risk of misunderstanding and misrepresenting airline safety information. Those risks need to be assessed against the content of the particular information in the contentious documents.
  4. At this point it is necessary to clarify the imprecision of the description “Service Difficulty Reports” when it is applied to the actual documents for which CASA claims exemption. A report of a “major defect” must be submitted within two days of its discovery, and it must contain the information I summarised in paragraph 24 above. The evidence proceeded upon the basis that Qantas sought to discharge this reporting obligation by providing information to CASA in a document entitled “Service Difficulty Report”.
  5. The actual “SDR” documents for which CASA claims exemption are listed in the accompanying Schedule “Exempt Documents Claim - McKinnon Request” (items 7 - 65). All of these documents are indeed entitled “Service Difficulty Report”. They have a very structured content. That structured content substantially complies with all of the CAR reg 52A reporting requirements. It details the identifiers relating to the aircraft registration, type, manufacturer and engine. The actual SDRs list the aircraft departure and arrival port, and describe the circumstances in which the defect was found. The person, and the investigating department, responsible for submitting the SDR are named. Typically, but not always, a report was apparently submitted to CASA within the required two business days from discovery of the defect.
  6. In some cases the items identified in the Schedule relate to a single document. But the contents of the actual document often significantly post date the discovery of the defect to which it relates. In many cases the items identified in the Schedule relating to a particular numbered SDR include several documents. Typically the date range for the different documents relating to the same SDR number item spans a period of weeks, and sometimes many months, after the discovery of the reported defect. Closer examination of the documents for particular items in the Schedule reveals a common pattern of events. In that pattern the individual documents appear to evidence (i) an initial report to CASA of the discovery of the defect, (ii) a later interim report, and (iii) a final closing report. Sometimes the closing report contains a great deal of information detailing the Qantas investigation into the cause of the defect, and the action taken as a consequence of that investigation.
  7. The interim and closing report information in the “SDR” documents for which exemption is claimed is usually included under the heading “Closing and Preventive Action”, with a subheading indicating whether it is an interim or closing report. Typically these reports follow an apparently predetermined structure. They describe the circumstances in appropriate detail, including the effect of the defect and any systems warnings that accompanied its discovery. Often the description will include a report on, or a postulation about, the factors that operated to cause the defect. The report structure requires a statement of opinion as to whether those causal factors are systemic, organisational or circumstantial. The reports will often consider, according to the nature of the defect, whether it has operational implications, whether other aircraft should be inspected for similar defects, and whether the aircraft manufacturer/approval holder should be notified. Most typically the “closing” reports detail the action that has been taken to rectify the defect. In some instances these closing reports disclose the events involved in detailed follow up investigations.
  8. The immediately preceding description of the documents for which exemption is claimed suffices to suggest that, despite their title as “Service Difficulty Reports”, they are more than documents created merely for the purpose of discharging the mandatory reporting obligation created by CAR reg 52. Typically, the documents that contain interim and closing reports set out information obtained more than, and sometimes much more than, two days after the discovery of the defect to which they relate. I would infer that these documents were follow up reports, and related to defects Qantas had previously notified timeously in accordance with CAR reg 52. I would also infer that the style and content of these “SDR” documents, at least where they contain “interim” and “closing” reports, is attributable principally to Qantas’ own internal safety management and review practices. In particular the sections of these reports that deal with assessment of operational implications, and the desirability of fleet inspection, are typically considerations for Qantas as the airline operator. They are not considerations that CAR reg 52A explicitly requires to be addressed in a “major defect” report to CASA.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “MAJOR DEFECT REPORTS” AND “THE QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS”

  1. The actual contents of the particular “SDR” documents for which exemption is claimed requires a distinction to be made between (i) those documents that merely provide the information required by CAR reg 52A and (ii) those documents that provide additional information (such as the “interim” and “closing” reports). In order to reflect that distinction, I will refer to the second category of documents as “the Qantas SDR documents”. I will refer hereafter to the first category of documents as “major defect reports”. In using that description I intend to refer to those documents in the Schedule that report defects timeously (or apparently timeously) in accordance with CAR reg 52A, and which do not contain additional information in the nature of “interim” or “closing” reports.
  2. Although I will use the two different descriptions I have provided in the preceding paragraph, I would also infer that the actual distinction between the “major defect reports” and “the Qantas SDR documents” is not quite so clearly demarcated. The appearance of the Qantas SDR documents suggests that the first part of the document is merely an iteration of the originally submitted “major defect report”.

DISCLOSURE OF “MAJOR DEFECT REPORTS”

  1. There are situations where the nature of the information contained in a document is not sufficiently clear or complete to justify its disclosure. This is the point that was addressed in Harris v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1983] FCA 242; (1983) 5 ALD 545 in relation to the contentious disclosure of an interim report. The “major defect reports” are often not of this kind. They report an occurrence that has been observed, corrected and assessed as having no systemic implications. In many other instances the “major defect reports” do self evidently provide merely an abbreviated account of a preliminary state of affairs. In that sense they can be regarded as “interim” types of reports. But I do not consider that this possible characterisation leads to the result that disclosure of “major defect reports” would have, or could reasonably be expected to have, effects that would attract the grounds of exemption that CASA claims.
  2. The substance of the “major defect” report information is already disclosed by CASA on its website – as I indicated in paragraph 24 above. CASA’s practice of providing that information neither has any substantial adverse effect on its operations nor prejudices the supply of information to it. Publication of the basic defect notification information that an airline operator is legislatively obliged to provide could not reasonably be expected to have an unreasonable adverse effect on the reporting airline. The appearance of the typical major defect report is that of an objectively succinct account. This appearance is what one would expect from the account of Qantas’s SDR reporting procedures that I set out in paragraph 61 above, particularly against the background of CASA’s publication practice. In my opinion, having regard to their brevity and objective content, the major defect reports do not readily lend themselves to misrepresentation, misuse or misunderstanding.
  3. In dealing with “major defect reports” I take into account Qantas’ particular concern about SDR disclosure in general. That concern related to Qantas claim that it voluntarily “over reports” to CASA, defect related information that it is not actually obliged to disclose under the CAR “major” defect notification obligations. I addressed this claim in paragraph 61 above. I do not accept it, in relation to the reporting of “major defects” as such. The “major defect” criterion is obviously one that eludes precise definition. It requires an impressionistic assessment. That assessment is informed by the demanding standards of air safety. It is also no doubt informed by an acute awareness of the potentially catastrophic consequences of defects that appear minor to the uninitiated and might reasonably justify a less significant characterisation in other endeavours. But the “major defect” notification requirement is not new. It is, as the consultation process between CASA and Qantas referred to in paragraph 61 suggests, a matter of attention, discussion and apparent understanding. Given what is now an evidently substantial history in the application of the criterion, I do not accept that disclosure of the major defect reports would, or could reasonably be expected to, influence adversely the ongoing application of that criterion, or the content of the disclosures that it requires.
  4. Neither do I accept the contention that major defect report disclosure would, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to CASA. The major defect reporting obligation, with its structured content and significant sanction, together with the espoused conscientious commitment of airline operators to high safety standards, and industry recognition of the utility of sharing significant safety related information, strongly suggests the contrary conclusion. Furthermore, whilst the consultation process between CASA and Qantas (described in paragraph 61) continues, whatever degree of interpretative flexibility exists in the application of the “major defect” disclosure criterion by Qantas will be patent to CASA in any event. This is because that consultation process involves, according to Qantas’ own description, disclosure of any potential SDR defects.
  5. I referred in paragraph 60(n) to Qantas’ particular claim that it would (or could) be prejudiced (that is, unreasonably adversely affected) by major defect report disclosure because of the variability of reporting practices. This claim was linked principally to the contention, which I have rejected, that Qantas voluntarily “over reports” defects to CASA. Despite rejecting that particular claim, and despite my expectation that the “major defect” criterion is likely to be generally well understood by those concerned with its practical application, I accept that some disclosure variation may, and perhaps does, occur. But I do not accept that this either warrants or permits a conclusion that disclosure of the contentious major defect report in the present case would or could reasonably be expected to adversely affect Qantas. There are several reasons for that conclusion. First, Qantas supported its contention with an illustration of an apparent difference between its SDR disclosure rate and that of another airline. It attributed that difference to its voluntary “over reporting” practice. The attribution is itself problematic. But, and more significantly to my mind, the example seems to evidence a comparison that Qantas was already able to make in relation to the other operators’ reported disclosures. This is consistent with the practical reality (to which I referred in paragraph 24 above) that a motivated and moderately informed enquirer could likely surmise the identity of the airline operator involved in the SDR information that is already published by CASA.
  6. The second reason why I reject Qantas’ contention is that neither it, nor CASA, attempted to link its postulated example (of apparent disparity in SDR reporting practices) to any of the contentious SDRs. Thus the example was left as a generality, from which the conclusion was sought to be drawn that none of the SDRs, virtually irrespective of their content, could be disclosed. This is too large a step to take.
  7. Perhaps the major argument relied on to substantiate the “unreasonable adverse impact” exemption ground was the apprehension that disclosure of major defect reports would, or could, just because they record episodic irregularities, generate an adverse impact. This argument is partly related to the risk of misrepresentation or misuse. But it is also more fundamental. It operates at an almost visceral level of concern. It is an apprehension that the gargantuan efforts directed by airlines and regulators to ensuring air safety do not lend themselves to ready comprehension and fair and reasonable public assessment. Those efforts are made precisely because, as in any human endeavour, defects occur and mistakes are made. The comprehensive and extraordinarily elaborate safety measures applied in airline and aircraft maintenance operations are designed partly to eliminate error occurrences and partly to ensure their prompt detection and rectification when they do occur. The practice of reporting defects is, on this understanding of the concern about the potentially adverse effects of disclosure, more a confirmation of the adequacy of safety management practices than a basis for either criticism of, or apprehension about, the operations of the particular reporting airline organisation.
  8. This understanding, or variations of it, may partly account for the deference accorded in some FOI jurisdictions to the confidentiality of airline safety information. But in the Australian FOI regime, where FOI Act s 38 limits general exemptions to specifically identifiable statutory provisions and FOI Act s 61 imposes an onus of persuasion on the agency resisting disclosure, the argument, and the apprehensions that underlie it, have to be evaluated against the information contained in the particular contentious documents.
  9. Furthermore, they also have to be evaluated against the background of significant public interest in airline safety. In alluding to this aspect of the matter I appreciate that “public interest” is explicitly relevant to the FOI Act s 40 exemption criterion, but not FOI Act s 43. Nevertheless, the question of unreasonable adverse affect of disclosure on the business of an airline operator cannot be answered without taking into account the reality of its safety practices and reputation. The disclosures and media reports to which I referred in paragraphs 7 to 14 suffice to illustrate the fact that Qantas’ safety reputation and performance is already (or at least was at the time of those events) a matter of public interest and discussion. Moreover, it was a public discussion, or perhaps it could be described as a public controversy, to which Qantas contributed. That does not mean that by properly participating in public debate Qantas must be taken to have removed the basis for any “adverse affect” exemption under FOI Act s 43(1)(c). But it does mean that the potential application of the exemption depends on the contents of the particular documents, rather than on the asserted reasonableness of apprehensions expressed at a high level of generality.
  10. CASA’s and Qantas’ contentions in relation to SDR disclosure included specific apprehension about the potential effect where disclosed information identified the reporting individuals. An apprehension was that individuals could reasonably be expected to either refrain from reporting, or modify their reporting practices, if their defect reports were made publicly available. Mr McKinnon accepts that this is a legitimate concern and that personal information of this kind can properly be edited from any documents disclosed.

DISCLOSURE OF “THE QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS”

  1. I explained in paragraph 109 above the particular meaning I have assigned to the expression “the Qantas SDR documents”. I described in paragraphs 106 to 108 the typical contents of those documents. That description demonstrates that they include information that goes beyond the required content of “major defect” reports as set out in CAR reg 52A. Indeed the layout, style, and contents of many of these documents suggests that they are in reality documents principally prepared for Qantas’ own investigative and safety management purposes, but which it discloses to CASA. It may be that the reason for this disclosure can be found in the consultation procedure to which I referred in paragraph 61 and proper understanding of the actual reality underlying Qantas’ “over reporting” claims.
  2. Given the actual content of many of the Qantas SDR documents, and the extent to which that content exceeds any mandatory disclosure obligation, it is necessary to assess the exemption claim with informed regard to CASA’s views about the importance of encouraging voluntary disclosure to it. It is also necessary to take into account Qantas’ apprehensions about the effect of unrestricted disclosure of the “SDR” information it provides Qantas. (I particularly referred to those apprehensions in paragraph 60(m) above.) In taking those matters into account I remain of the view that CASA’s ample powers of investigation and enquiry are likely to provide considerable practical incentive for Qantas to continue to report to CASA in much the same way as it has in the past. It would not be in Qantas’ own interests (in relation to minimising the cost, complexity and effectiveness of its dealings with CASA, as well as its ability to promote itself as having an effective working relationship with CASA) to be seen to adopt too much of a “close guarded” approach. As well there are no doubt good commercial reasons why Qantas’ investigation and closing report practices, as evidenced in the Qantas SDR documents, have been adopted and are provided, apparently as a matter of course, to CASA.
  3. Nevertheless the relevant criterion, under FOI Act ss 40 and 43, is the reasonableness of expectation, rather than the actual probability, of the relevant adverse effect or prejudice. And in assessing the reasonableness of that expectation it is necessary to give full effect to the fact that hitherto the Qantas SDR documents have been prepared and provided in an environment where Qantas likely had no expectation they could or would be subject to FOI disclosure. Even if there was a recognition of the possibility, the fact that the reports disclosed to CASA seem to be copies of Qantas’ own internal investigation and assessment documents suggests that any such expectation had little impact on the disclosure practice. I would infer that Qantas’ disclosure practices in relation to the Qantas SDR documents proceeded on the basis that there was unlikely to be any disclosure of the information, other than in accordance with the practice evident from the CASA web site – namely, publication of merely abbreviated SDR information.
  4. Qantas’ attitude to its current practices, in relation to providing CASA “interim” and “closing” reports following up “major defect reports”, is likely to be at least reviewed if there is a materially increased chance that those reports could be publicly released. Qantas’ current practice of providing CASA with those kinds of reports is useful to CASA, and substantially aids the proper and efficient conduct of its operations. Without that disclosure CASA might have to rely on the investigative powers to which I referred in paragraph 50(c) above. For these reasons disclosure of the Qantas SDR documents could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to CASA, and could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on CASA’s operations.
  5. The views that I have just expressed apply generally to any Qantas SDR document. This is because any decision that involves disclosure of such a document could reasonably be expected to influence Qantas to adopt a more discriminating and limited form of disclosure, potentially prejudicing the quality of the information supplied to CASA.
  6. The contentious Qantas SDRs are all listed in the accompanying Schedule “Exempt Documents Claim – McKinnon Request”. I have examined their contents. My decision in relation to the individual “SDR” items, together with an indication of my particular reasons, is set out in the “Decision” column in the attached Schedule. Sometimes the documents within a numbered SDR item include both a “major defect report” and a “Qantas SDR document”. Typically I have decided that the “major defect reports” are not exempt. Sometimes the documents within an item include only “Qantas SDR documents”. But it is obvious from the general pattern of the SDR documents as a whole that, where this is the case, the “Qantas SDR documents” actually contain (they begin with) an iteration of the “major defect report” to which they relate. Consequently my decision that a “major defect report” is not exempt includes (unless the particular items for that document in fact include a separate “major defect report” document) that part of any Qantas SDR document which precedes the section beginning with the heading “Closing and Preventive Action”.
  7. Where any individual document is not exempt, the document should be edited to remove all identifiers of (i) the reporter, (ii) the author of any accompanying or proposed investigation report, and (iii) any personnel named (or described other than by a generic title or description) in the document.

DISPUTED EXCLUSION OF IDENTIFIED DOCUMENTS - MCKINNON REQUEST

  1. There are 10 groups of documents (comprising about 65 documents in total) that Mr McKinnon contends fall within the scope of his request but have not been produced. CASA says they fall outside the scope of the request.
  2. The very broadest and briefest description of these categories of documents is as follows:
  3. Mr McKinnon’s contention about these documents is that CASA’s bland description of them is less informative than that given by Qantas. CASA’s description is in Ms Ng’s witness statement in these proceedings. (Ms Ng is the CASA FOI Co-ordinator. She was the person most immediately responsible for the content of CASA’s response to Mr McKinnon’s request.) The Qantas description is set out in its 24 September 2007 letter to CASA. Mr McKinnon invites the Tribunal to conclude from the Qantas description that the documents are within the scope of his request, and that CASA has failed to discharge its onus of proof to establish the contrary.
  4. The Qantas description and the parties’ respective contentions in relation to the contentious documents are set out in the accompanying Schedule “Identified Documents”. The dates, subject matter, and some of the descriptive comments for the various documents, give rise to strong impression that they are likely to relate to the media reports and controversy to which I referred in paragraph 10. In particular, the impression is fostered by the reference to the surveillance report at Avalon Airport. I would infer that the subject matter of many of these documents corresponds with the documents in item 2 of the “Exempt Documents Claim - McKinnon Request”. Approaching the matter with that understanding I have concluded that, in many instances Ms Ng’s characterisation is likely based on untenably narrow views as to whether the documents either “relate” to Qantas or “detail” maintenance related concerns, problems or potential flaws (the language of Mr McKinnon’s request). My decision on each of these documents is recorded in the Decision column in the accompanying Schedule “Identified Documents”.

THE UNIDENTIFIED DOCUMENTS ISSUE

  1. On 7 September 2007 Ms Ng wrote to Qantas and provided copies of all of the documents CASA’s Sydney Air Transport Office had provided to her as potentially within the scope of Mr McKinnon’s request. There were, Mr McKinnon contends, some 1,600 pages of documents.
  2. Qantas responded to Ms Ng in its 24 September 2007 letter. The letter included a schedule. The schedule identified 155 pages of documents as within the scope of the McKinnon request. This is much less than the 1,600 pages CASA apparently sent to Qantas on 7 September 2007. Mr McKinnon says the discrepancy between the number of pages originally identified, and the number ultimately produced is remarkable. He says the discrepancy is so great that the Tribunal could not be satisfied all the required documents have been produced.
  3. I accept Mr McKinnon’s submissions on this point. The very considerable process of discrimination suggested by the discrepancy referred to in the preceding paragraph appears to have been undertaken principally by Ms Ng. Without inferring any criticism of her endeavours in that process of discrimination, I am of the view it is likely to have been educated by the same artificiality evident in the characterisation she accorded to the “Identified Documents” - to which I have referred in paragraph 131. Accordingly, this aspect of the decision should be remitted pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to CASA so that it can further respond to Mr McKinnon’s request.

RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED TO THE AAT

  1. Mr Vasta contends that there are two categories of documents that are also responsive to his request. These comprise the documents listed on the attached Schedule “Allegedly responsive s 37 documents - Entry Control Assessments & Standard Form Recommendations”. They can be summarised as involving:
  2. The evidence established that the approval assessment documents are identified differently within CASA, on the one hand, and by other industry participants, on the other. In CASA’s usage the term “audit” was confined to activities carried out pursuant to what I have identified as “CASA’s general audit program”. Those activities I have described in paragraphs 19 to 22 above. In the wider usage, the term “audit” can also be used to describe the inspection typically carried out by CASA in connection with an approval application. I adopted that usage when referring to this topic in paragraph 18 above.
  3. Mr Vasta’s submission on this point is that his request should be interpreted in a common sense way, and should recognise the more general usage of the term “audit”. He contends, therefore, that his request for the reports and findings of all audits of Civil Aviation Regulation 30, aircraft maintenance facilities should extend to include the approval inspections/“audits” that preceded the grant of any CASA approval that gave the facilities their “”Regulation 30” status. I reject this contention. The substance of Mr Vasta’s request turns on its total context. I accept that the term “audit” should not itself be narrowly construed. It could include examination and assessment reports, whatever their precise title. However, the key aspect of the context of Mr Vasta’s request was that it was concerned with audits of organisations that had been approved by CASA and granted a certificate of approval under CAR reg 30. I do not consider that the request was apt to include reports which CASA prepared in relation to examinations conducted prior to the grant of the relevant approval. Mr Vasta, having regard to his position, would have well understood that CASA would be unlikely to grant approval to a maintenance and repair organisation unless the organisation was able to satisfy CASA of its prospective ability to provide complying services of the requisite quality. He would also have understood the difference between an approval based on an expectation of future compliance, and a subsequent audit examination conducted for the purpose of verifying the fact of compliance. Mr Vasta’s request, worded as it was, would most naturally and reasonably be construed as directed towards obtaining “audit” reports of “post approval” CASA audit examinations. The most likely practical purpose that his enquiry was apt to serve, was to obtain the reports of those examinations in order to establish whether CASA had determined that the approved organisations had in fact complied with the terms of their relevant approval. For these reasons the CASA approval assessment documents were not within the scope of Mr Vasta’s request.
  4. In relation to the reissue and renewal recommendations, Mr Vasta’s submission is that these documents contain audit findings. The basis of that submission is that the recommendations typically, at least, allude to the fact that audits have been carried out and been found satisfactory. Mr Vasta contends that these typical statements constitute audit findings. Consequently, he says that these documents all fall within the scope of his request for “all audit reports and findings”. I reject this submission. The typical statements in the recommendation documents are not audit findings. They are a reference to the fact that audits have been carried out, and to the fact particular findings have been made as a result of the audit process. Such a reference does not constitute an audit finding. Documents which contain such a reference do not fall within the scope of Mr Vasta’s request.

MCKINNON REQUEST – REMAINING DOCUMENTS

  1. The accompanying Schedule “Exempt Documents Claim - McKinnon Request” contains three additional categories of documents for which separate exemption claims are made. These three categories are:
  2. Items 1 and 4: documents relating to the Singapore maintenance work: The general subject matter of the controversy relating to the quality of the maintenance and repair work carried out in Singapore in 2006 has already been a matter of public discussion. I have referred to that matter in paragraphs 8 and 10 above. The contents of the documents in these two items partly contribute to a better understanding of the circumstances underlying that controversy, the competing views about it, and CASA’s assessment of the significance of the real underlying events. Having read the documents I do not consider that they could reasonably be expected to have effects that would justify their exemption under either FOI Act ss 40 or 43.
  3. Items 2 and 3: documents relating to inspection of the Avalon facility: The first of these documents is in the nature of an “audit” type report by Qantas following its inspection of the Avalon facility in response to particular reports of irregularities. The Item 2 documents themselves have a close parallel to the audit reports that I considered earlier in these reasons in dealing with Mr Vasta’s request. Having regard to the format, content and purpose of these reports I do not consider that their disclosure could reasonably be expected to have effects that would justify their exemption under either FOI Act ss 40(1)(d) or 43(1)(c)(ii). That view is reinforced by the contents of the documents in Item 3, which appears to be Qantas’ specific response following up matters raised in the documents in Item 2. The response information in the Item 3 documents is an apparently formal, deliberative response to CASA’s particular requirements. When the two sets of documents in Items 2 and 3 are read together, it could not reasonably be expected that their disclosure justifies exemption from disclosure under FOI Act s 43(1)(c)(i).
  4. Items 5 and 6: the documents relating to non-compliance with Airworthiness Directives: It is evident from the description of the documents in Item 6 that they contain explanatory information Qantas provided to CASA in relation to its non-compliance with the Airworthiness Directives, including those referred to in the Item 5 documents. Mr Laws said that the material in Item 5 was information Qantas effectively volunteered to CASA in order to satisfy its concern that the non-compliance had been rectified, was an episodic aberration, and did not raise any wider, ongoing concerns about Qantas’ maintenance program and practices. CASA’s submission about these documents was, in essence, that they contained information Qantas voluntarily provided. Thus their disclosure raised substantially the same exemption justification as that on which it had relied generally in relation to all of the documents for which it had claimed exemption.
  5. Mr McKinnon submitted that it was unrealistic to regard these documents as relevantly providing “voluntary” information. Mr McKinnon emphasised that non-compliance with Airworthiness Directives was a potentially serious matter and, indeed, a strict liability offence under the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998. It was a matter of Qantas’ own protective self interest to disclose to CASA, and to endeavour to satisfy it that, despite the conceded default, the matter had been appropriately addressed and did not raise any ongoing safety related concerns. Mr McKinnon contended that it was completely artificial to regard the information in these documents as “voluntarily” provided.
  6. I accept Mr McKinnon’s contentions in relation to these documents. The contents of the Item 5 document particularly reinforces the artificiality of regarding the Item 6 document as having been provided voluntarily by Qantas. It is apparent from the contents of the Item 6 document that it reflects an apparently thorough attempt by Qantas to satisfy CASA of the steps it had taken in response to the irregularity in compliance with the Airworthiness Directives. The information contained in the documents seems to be no more than the kind of information about which CASA could reasonably be expected to have enquired, and indeed did enquire, in relation to the compliance issue. Conversely, the Item 6 document appears to be a thorough, comprehensive and objective explanatory account by Qantas. I am not satisfied that the disclosure of these documents could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the administration of CASA’s functions, or to prejudice the supply of information to it. Similarly, having regard to the contents of the documents (the comprehensive explanation of the particular circumstances, and the corrective action that had been taken) I do not consider that disclosure could reasonably be expected to have an unreasonably adverse effect on Qantas.
  7. I have set out my decision on each of the relevant categories of documents in the accompanying Schedule “Exempt Documents Claim - McKinnon Request”.

THE BREACH OF CONFIDENCE ISSUE

  1. CASA contended that email document in Item 1 of the McKinnon Schedule was also exempt under FOI Act s 45. There is no substance in this contention. The contents of the email suggests that it was a summary response to CASA in relation to particular defects or irregularities that had been (i) previously discussed with CASA and (ii) also discussed with other parties, including ALAEA. Typically the information in the email consists of a factual account of action that Qantas had taken, and comments about the apparent significance (in reality, the asserted insignificance) of the matters discussed, having regard to the aircraft manufacturer’s maintenance requirements.

COSTS

  1. FOI Act s 66 permits the Tribunal to make a recommendation to the Attorney-General that the applicant’s costs of proceedings of the present kind be paid by the Commonwealth. The Applicants asked the Tribunal to make such a recommendation. CASA sought an opportunity to address on further submissions to the Tribunal, after the substantive decision. I will give CASA that opportunity. However, it may be of assistance if I express a preliminary view, having regard to my current understanding. That view is intended merely to assist CASA, and the Applicants by indicating a tentative view.
  2. The only threshold restriction on making such a recommendation is that the review application is successful, or substantially successful. Messrs Vasta and McKinnon have been substantially successful in their applications. In that regard they relied on the consent decision that was made by the Tribunal on 12 August 2009, as well as foreshadowing the content of these reasons.
  3. In deciding whether to make such a recommendation the Tribunal is required to have regard to (i) any financial hardship the applicant might suffer by being required to bear the costs; (ii) the public benefit from the decision in the proceedings; (iii) any commercial benefit to the applicant arising from the decision and (iv) the reasonableness of the decision under review. Those mandatory considerations are not exhaustive. The Applicants also invited the Tribunal to take into account earlier interlocutory applications in these proceedings, on which they were substantially successful. They also complained about the inadequacy of CASA’s initial responses to each of their requests, and about the arbitrariness of the decisions that were made in determining the documents that fell within the proper scope of the requests.
  4. The Applicants contended, in relation to the mandatory considerations, there was no evidence either of them will benefit personally from the decision. They also contended, particularly in Mr McKinnon’s case, there was no evidence his employer would benefit commercially from the decision. I would not presently regard either of these considerations as persuasively material matters. The costs of the proceedings are likely to be substantial. On the other hand, the question of the individual capacity of the Applicants to bear those costs, and whether or not they will actually be required to meet them personally, appears to me to be somewhat problematic. This is because, in a practical sense each of the two applicants is a representative of an organisation which obviously has a genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings and is no doubt encouraging their pursuit in fulfilment of its wider interests.
  5. However, the subject matter of the proceedings does raise a matter of significant public interest. The fundamental way in which CASA has conducted itself in these proceedings has been, as I presently understand the position, to seek to defend a fundamental point of principle about the appropriate level of disclosure of air safety related information. CASA has taken the view, in effect, that very wide scope should be given to the exemption grounds on which it has relied in relation to FOI disclosure applications. I am in no sense critical of CASA’s approach in that regard. However, it has raised a point of principle, and one that was, I have no doubt, taken in the public interest. On that point, which was in reality the principle point of contention in these proceedings, CASA failed. In my opinion would be appropriate, subject to any submissions CASA wishes to provide, to make the recommendation sought by the Applicants.

DECISION

  1. In the Vasta application: I set aside the decision under review. I substitute a decision that the documents listed in the accompanying “Schedule: Exempt Documents Claim - Vasta Request” are not exempt documents.
  2. In the McKinnon application: I vary the decision under review as follows:
  3. I adjourn the proceedings for the purpose of considering any further submissions CASA wishes to make on the question of any recommendation about costs. If CASA does not wish to address any further submission I will, in accordance with FOI Act s 66, recommend to the Attorney General that each Applicant’s costs of the proceedings be paid by the Commonwealth.

I certify that the 154 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr P W Taylor SC, Senior Member


Signed: ...............[sgd].................................................................

Associate


Dates of Hearing 19-22 April 2010

Date of Decision 6 July 2010

Counsel for the Applicants Mr T Brennan

Solicitor for the Applicants Ms R Eagles, Sparke Helmore

Solicitor for the Respondent Mr A Anastasi, CASA


Schedule

Identified Documents

Document Identifier
Qantas’ description of document in its letter of 24 September 2007 at T5-8 to 18
Ms Ng’s Witness Statement paragraph 5
Applicants’ Contention
Decision
A 9
22-Mar-07 Email from Murray to Laws and Neal capable of being presented in a manner reflecting adversely upon Qantas and as a reason for passengers to travel with other airlines
Discusses Qantas question time brief not maintenance concerns or defects.
Qantas’ description difficult to reconcile with Ms Ng’s description.
Latter description is insufficient to take the document outside the scope of Mr McKinnon’s request.
Unacceptably narrow characterisation.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
A45 – 49
Emails between Perez and Parker 17 and 18–Apr-07 relating to a “maintenance Lufthansa Technik Philippines” issue
Emails between CASA and maintenance organisation asking for information – does not detail maintenance concerns or deficiencies
The documents concern the requirement for Lufthansa Technik Philippines to have reported the defect of lock wiring the oxygen bottle shut and possibly concern issues as to how that question fell between the cracks of Qantas, Jetstar and Lufthansa Technik Philippines. See McKinnon T Documents page 27.
The document details potential flaws with maintenance standards for Qantas aircraft.
Unlikely to be confined to a mere request for information.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
A50 – 53
Emails between CASA and Lufthansa Technik Philippines officers dated 17-Apr-07
Airbus maintenance manual pages
Qantas’ description directly conflicts with Ms Ng’s description and the former should be preferred.
Description accepted
DOCUMENT NOT WITHIN REQUEST
C10
Email from David Klein to Barry Laws dated 16-Apr-07 being one of:
  • The surveillance report for audit 05-7322 at Avalon;
  • Three requests for corrective action; or
  • A draft document used in preparation of the audit report.
Internal CASA email – does not detail maintenance concerns or deficiencies.
The internal email was a draft used in the preparation of the audit report. Therefore it is responsive to Mr McKinnon’s request.
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
C12, C13
Request for corrective action dated 26-Apr-07
Blank page and blank form.
Ms Ng’s description is inconsistent with Qantas’ description and the former should be preferred.
Description accepted.
DOCUMENT NOT WITHIN REQUEST
D3 and 4
Email from Jim Marcolin to Alan Murray dated 21-Mar-07 and email from Alan Murray to Jim Marcolin of the same date.
Emails relate to SIA Engineering Company Limited.
SIAEC was authorised to conduct maintenance on Qantas aircraft CASA cannot discharge its onus.
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
D5 and D6
Email from Alan Murray to Jim Marcolin and others dated 21-Mar-07 and from Julie Fox to Alan Murray dated 21-Mar-07 relating to SIA Engineering Company Limited.
CASA emails – discussing Qantas question time brief – do not detail or discuss maintenance concerns or defects.
SIAEC was authorized to conduct maintenance on Qantas aircraft – see pages 343 to 380 of exhibit SR1 to the affidavit of Stephen Re dated 17 September 2009.
CASA cannot discharge its onus.
Ms Ng’s evidence is insufficient to establish the documents fall outside the scope of Mr McKinnon’s request. The emails very likely concern a question time brief about maintenance standards of SIAEC. Maintenance standards of SIAEC of concern to CASA could only be those applying to Qantas aircraft. They are the only Australian registered aircraft for which SIAEC was authorized to provide maintenance.
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
D7, D8
Email from Patrick Murray to Jim Marcolin dated 21-Mar-07 relating to SIAEC.
Herald Sun news article.
The discrepancy between Qantas’ description and Ms Ng’s description is such that CASA cannot discharge its onus on that state of evidence and the former should be preferred.
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
D9, D10
Email from David Skeoch to Kerrie Westen dated 12-Apr-07 relating to SIAEC.
CASA emails – do not relate to Qantas.
See comments with respect to documents D3 to D6
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST
D11 to D54
Requests for corrective action, operational surveillance records, surveillance reports and sundry correspondence relating to SIAEC.
Requests for corrective action, surveillance results reports and emails/letter to SIAEC – not refer to or relate to Qantas.
See comments with respect to documents D3 to D6.
Apparently related to Qantas surveillance audit following reports of defects in four aircraft.
DOCUMENT WITHIN REQUEST

Schedule
Allegedly responsive s 37 documents
Entry Control Assessments & Standard Form Recommendations


Page No.
Description
Decision
438 - 441
Standard form recommendation for reissue of CASA CAR30 Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
449 – 451
Standard form recommendation for renewal to Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
456 – 459
Standard form recommendation – Certificate of Approval reissue with variations for SR Techniks Switzerland.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
463 – 466
Standard form recommendation for renewal of CAR 30 Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
467 – 470
Standard form recommendation for renewal of CAR 30 Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
474 – 482
Certificate of Approval inspection.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
486 – 488
Standard form recommendation for reissue of Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
489 – 490
Standard form recommendation for renewal of CAR 30 Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
494 – 513
Initial issue of Certificate of Approval assessment control document.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
514 – 518
Standard form recommendation for Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
522 – 524
Standard form recommendation for renewal and variation to Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
528 – 530
Standard form recommendation for variation of Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
534 – 536
Standard form recommendation for renewal of Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
547 – 554
Manufacture and maintenance of aircraft COA500.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
563 – 566
Standard form recommendation to reissue with additional locations.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
567 – 570
Letter to Malaysian Airline System.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
571 – 575
Assessments of quality systems.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
576 – 577
Recommendation to issue CAR30 approval to Malaysian Airline Systems.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
578 – 585
Assessment of Malaysian Airline Systems quality systems.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
586 – 589
Standard form recommendation initial issue of CAR30 to Malaysian Airline Systems.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
593 – 596
Standard form recommendation for CAR30 renewal.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
597 – 617
Assessments of quality systems.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
622 – 629
Assessment of manufacture and maintenance of aircraft.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
630 – 636
Standard form recommendation for CAR30 renewal with amendment.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
637 – 651
Initial issue of a change to particulars of a Certificate of Approval assessment control document.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
652 – 655
Standard form recommendation for Certificate of Approval variation.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
659 – 672
Change to particulars of Certificate of Approval assessment control document.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
673 – 675
Standard form recommendation for renewal of Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST
679 – 680
Standard form recommendation for renewal of existing Certificate of Approval.
NOT WITHIN REQUEST

SCHEDULE: EXEMPT DOCUMENTS CLAIM - VASTA REQUEST
Date of document
Document
CASA Description of document
Decision
1.
June 2007
CASA audit report of Hawker Pacific
- audit observations
- requests for corrective action
16-17 May 2007 audit. Minor deficiencies detected relating to maintenance data, accessing intranet, discrepancy in company approval held by an engineer, checking of revision status of data, stores issues.
NOT EXEMPT
This report was an Organisation Surveillance Inspection Summary. It indicated some minor deficiencies but was overwhelmingly supportive of the quality and confidence of the organisation and its staff.
Nothing in the audit report suggests it was materially influenced by information voluntarily provided in the course of the audit.
The contents of the report convey the impression they were exclusively the result of the inspectors’ independent inquiries and examination.
2.
June 2007
CASA audit report - Jet Aviation (Asia Pacific)
- requests for corrective action
21-22 May 2007 audit. Minor deficiencies detected - possible contamination of equipment, issue concerning tool calibration policy, whether process in place to check currency of maintenance data. Audit noted operator conducted little maintenance in previous 12 months. No systemic issues identified.
NOT EXEMPT
This was a formal audit report, as distinct from an Organisation Surveillance Inspection Summary.
The report identified a small number of deficiencies, but its overall conclusion was that the facilities were well-organised and adequate, and that the organisation’s procedures were effective in ensuring compliance with legislative requirements. The specific audit conclusion was that the organisation demonstrated a commitment to safety and compliance.
The contents of the report convey the overwhelming impression they are the product of the inspectors independent inquiries. Nothing indicates the conduct of the audit was materially influenced by any voluntarily provided information.
The audit report makes a particular comment in relation to a possible inadequacy of one employee’s understanding of their task. But this deficiency could not (having regard to its subject matter) reasonably be expected to have any significant adverse impact.
3.
December
2006
CASA audit report of Fieldair Engineering
- audit observations
- requests for corrective action
6-17 November 2006 audit. Minor deficiencies were detected - relating to marking of tooling, number of systems used to track tool calibration (CASA recommend 1 instead of 2).
NOT EXEMPT
The audit report concluded that the organisation was acceptable and only three small anomalies had been detected. These resulted in Requests for Corrective Action related to the control of lifting equipment, and amendments to the Quality Assurance Manual. The report suggested some improvements in the control of calibrated tooling and the installation of a flameproof, self-closing “flammables” cupboard. The report appears to reflect findings made by the inspector as a result of examinations and inquiries conducted on their own initiative although, as recorded in the report, on some occasions with assistance from Fieldair staff. The audit report includes a record of the fact of discussions with staff. But nothing in the report indicates it was materially influenced by information voluntarily provided during the course of the audit.
4.
August 2007
CASA audit report of Lufthansa Technik Philippines Inc
- requests for corrective action
6-24 August 2007 audit. Minor deficiencies detected - whether variance between practice and procedure, joint procedures manual requiring approval of CASA, clarification required as to use of stamps on task cards and use of Qantas task cards.
NOT EXEMPT
This is another formal audit report. The report positively commended the organisation for the professional attitude of its staff. The facilities inspected were described as adequate. There was a full complement of tooling equipment and a random sampling of the tooling indicated they were all correctly labeled.
The report indicated a number of deficiencies, principally relating to a lack of correlation between procedures actually carried out and the contents of the organisation’s Quality Control Manual. Three requests for corrective action were raised as a result of the audit. The report indicates a number of inquiries were made during the course of the audit for additional information. However, all these related to either the production of additional documents or explanation of the documents that had been produced.
Nothing in the report indicates it was materially influenced by voluntarily provided information.
Nothing in the report could reasonably be expected to attract exemption.
5.
March 2007
CASA operational surveillance records and surveillance results report of SIA Engineering Co.
21-22 May 2007 audit. Deficiencies were detected - comment on quarantine store facilities, comment on lack of hand/over procedures (although being done in practice), availability of CASA information to staff, issues concerning tagging of a small number of calibrated tools.
NOT EXEMPT
The documents relate to Operational Surveillance carried out by CASA between 14 & 20 March 2007 (the CASA Description does not match the actual documents). The documents record that this was carried out following public allegations of inadequate supervision. CASA recorded an overall satisfaction with SIAEC’s level of supervision and expertise. CASA concluded that SIAEC was carrying out its maintenance activities in accordance with its current procedures and CASA Regulations. Although some Requests for Corrective Action were made, they are immaterial in comparison to the overall audit conclusion. Nothing in the report indicates it was dependent on, or influenced by, voluntary disclosures. Disclosure of the contents of the documents could not reasonably be expected to have an effect that would justify exemption.
6.
October 2006
CASA audit report of Air New Zealand & covering letter
- requests for corrective action
26 September - 11 October 2006 audit. Deficiencies were detected - comment on nature of one certification in a maintenance log, issues concerning traceability of two components, whether had documented procedure for rejecting components, comment on whether procedures when work done in temporary location outside NZ, whether some procedures meet intention of Australian legislation, issues concerning maintenance on routing of left hand elevator cable (RCA06/6112-7), whether duplicate installation of cable grommet performed, whether scheduled inspection of cockpit voice recorder performed, whether certifications made for some defect rectification, whether battery should be reported to CASA, whether engineers trained on EGPWS system, whether stores record recorded wheel rotation carried out.
NOT EXEMPT
This audit report noted that occurrence defect reporting, maintenance error and investigation, were carried out to an acceptable standard. It also reported that the quality audit system was functional. The report did refer to systemic deficiencies relating to certification in the monitoring of subcontracted personnel. It was also critical of the quality of the quality assurance oversight and audit schedule.
The report resulted in 12 formal Requests for Corrective Action. Seven of these appear to relate to deficiencies in documented procedures. Three related to specific maintenance deficiencies, either of inspection or, in one case, a misunderstanding that resulted in an aircraft failing to comply with a particular Airworthiness Directive.
Nothing in the report indicates it was to any significant extent influenced by voluntarily provided information.
Although the report contains the criticisms noted above, they could not reasonably be expected to unreasonably affect the organization. Their disclosure could not reasonably be expected to give rise to “information prejudice”.

SCHEDULE: EXEMPT DOCUMENTS CLAIM – MCKINNON REQUEST
Date
Document
CASA’s Description
Decision
1.
30-Jul-07
Email - Qantas to CASA
Discusses issues concerning escape path lighting systems, rudder functional checks, control cable inspections.
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 4 and the matters referred to in paragraphs 8 and 10 above
2.
26-Apr-07
Letter - (CASA) to (Qantas), attaching:
■ Surveillance Results Report - 27 April 2007
■ Requests for Corrective Action No 05/7322-39, 40,41 - 27 April 2007
■ Observation Report March 2007
■ Request for Corrective
Action - 26 April 2007
These documents relate to an audit conducted between 23-26 March 2007 on Qantas’ Avalon maintenance facility. The audit report makes it clear that no significant findings were discovered by CASA during the audit.
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 3 and in the nature of an audit report
3.
1-Aug-07
Maintenance Error Investigation - Interim Progress Report dated 1 August 2007. Author: Qantas – directed to CASA
The report summarises ten deficiencies detected by CASA at an audit and records the action agreed to be taken by Qantas, and in fact taken by Qantas to correct the deficiencies.
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 2 and in the nature of a considered response to an audit report
4.
21-Mar-07
Email from Barry Laws to Jim Marcolin (both CASA officers).
The email describes maintenance performed on four Boeing 747 aircraft by Singapore International Airlines Engineering. It summarises some deficiencies (but not any detail or specific descriptions of them) that were identified by Qantas but rectified prior to aircraft going to service. The documents discuss voluntary disclosures to CASA from Qantas about the maintenance.
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 1 and the matters referred to in paragraphs 8 and 10 above
5.
1,3-Jun-07
Email (a) from Adrian Verkerk (Qantas) to Barry Laws (CASA), and (b) reply from Barry Laws, both dated, discussing airworthiness directives.
The email reports to CASA there may have been potential non compliances with two Airworthiness Directives (ADs).
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 6 and in the nature of a request for information from Qantas in response to a disclosed irregularity
6.
27-Jun-07
Qantas Powerpoint Presentation entitled “AD Compliance Issues & Qantas Engineering Systems Replacement Program Update” directed to CASA
This document describes non compliance with ADs (it is unrelated to the previous document discussion) in that an inspection of an aircraft component was not performed at the required time. The document describes no deficiencies in the aircraft were detected when the inspections were performed. The document also describes how recurrence of this event will not occur.
NOT EXEMPT DOCUMENT
- related to Item 5 and in the nature of a considered response to a formal requirement for additional information

Service Difficulty Reports – lodged by Qantas with CASA
7.
30-Aug-06
14-Feb-07
13-Jul-07
O8457-06
Boeing 767 had an APU shutdown in transit. The MEL for the aircraft was applied. (Each aircraft has a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) which permits an aircraft to be operated with a defect, usually for a set period of time. The correct amount of adhesive had not been applied to a part on assembly of the APU. The Qantas SDR, assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
8.
5, 18-Jan-07
O13434-06
Boeing 767 had an incorrect bolt installed in the PCA Actuator Rod to the elevator attachment fitting. The report states “from a purely functional point of view the substitution will not have any detrimental effect on the system.” The reason why the incorrect bolt was used could not be identified, but was assumed to be maintenance error. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
Same as item 46 below.
9.
5-Jan-07
4-Apr-07
SDR 510003840
Boeing 747 Engine 2 thrust reverse blocker door #12 was detached and corona fairing damaged. The report identified maintenance error in the installation of the blocker door. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
Same as item 47 below
10.
8-Feb-07
12-Apr-07
SDR 510004082
Boeing 747 was found to have metal contamination in the number 2 engine master and main gearbox mag plugs during a routine inspection. The High Speed gearbox was changed but the Step Aside Gearbox was not. An issue arose as to whether this was done in accordance with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) for the aircraft. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
11.
6 February
22 May 2007
SDR 510004024
Boeing 767 on take off the right engine fan indicated 5 units of vibration. The vibration was caused by incorrect fan blades being fitted to the engine. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
Same as item 49 below.
12.
9 February 2007
22 March 2007
SDR 510004277
Boeing 747 experienced leakage of hot air from a pneumatic duct seal which caused APU fire bottles to discharge due to overpressure - duct inspection in accordance with the Fault Isolation Manual may not have been performed. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
Same as item 51 below.
13.
14-Feb-07
11-Apr-07
18-Jun-07
SDR 510004086
Boeing 747 trailing edge inboard flap alternate extension continued to run past 26.5 units. Alternate extend motor limit switch was not installed/ adjusted correctly. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
14.
20-Feb-07
21-Nov-07
SDR 510004124
Boeing 747 had a fuel leak. 1 missing bolt, 2 loose bolts and 17 under torque bolts caused a panel to be unrestrained causing fuel to flow into the dry bay until it exited the dry bay vent and drain holes. This was described as a one off maintenance error at the Sydney maintenance base. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
15.
9-Mar-07
24-Apr-07
SDR 510004233
Boeing 747 had fuel leaking from the number 3 engine strut drain tube caused by wiggins couplings being over-torqued. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
Same as item 55 below.
16.
19-Mar-07
14-Jun-07
SDR 510004260
Boeing 747 had panel 193U missing (between body landing gear doors). Forward flange attach screws may not have been installed. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
17.
23-Mar-07
8 & 26-Apr-07
SDR 510004288
Boeing 747 had high vibration in the number 4 engine after take off. Right lower wing surface leading edge blow out panels both inboard and outboard of number 3 engine had detached from aircraft. Leading edge pneumatic supply duct had ruptured- caused by unauthorised repair - could not determine when carried out. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
18.
30-Jul-07
SDR 510004899
Boeing 747 had feeder cable stapled (aft of upper deck to feed the emergency path lighting to stairway) - no cover on feeder, other areas had incorrect cover. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
19.
1-Aug-07
SDR 510004901
Boeing 747 had T pieces missing at cross over feeders and incorrect covers fitted to feeders. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as low.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
20.
10-Jul-07
SDR 510004790
Boeing 747 entry door number 5 RH medium lower bustle fitted incorrectly. Also, the lanyard attaching sea survival kit to emergency escape slide was not attached. In the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
21.
3-Aug-07
SDR 510004918
Boeing 747 had damaged wiring below the aft/centre blow out panel- possibly caused by maintenance personnel stepping through the panel. By the SDR, Qantas assessed any risk associated with the defect as medium.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
22.
17-Aug-06
SDR 510003273
Aircraft unable to retract landing gear – nose gear ground lock pin not removed.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
23.
24-Aug-06
SDR 510003286
Masking tape found around RH static port but not obstructing port.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
24.
5-Sep-06
SDR 510003351
Fuel found leaking from No 4 engine strut on engine pen nib fairing – ring seal in front spar wiggins coupling damaged.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
25.
8-Sep-06
SDR 510003356
APU auto shutdown. Incorrect connection of PU oil quantity transmitter connector.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
26.
18-Sep-06
SDR 510003390
Tool bag dropped from main landing gear on take off at Sydney.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
27.
21-Sep-06
SDR 510003408
Trailing edge fairing inboard and outboard forward pivot bolts loose and not secured by lockwire.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
28.
11-Oct-06
SDR 510003477
Rag left on top of PU combustion chamber – rag caught fire.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
29.
7-Nov-06
SDR 510003615
Engine driven hydraulic pump and electric hydraulic pump case filters contaminated – caused by suspected incorrect installation of engine driven hydraulic pump impeller screw to the drive shaft.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
30.
16-Nov-06
SDR 510003708
Main wheel tie bolts loose. Suspect bolts not torque correctly at wheel assembly.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
31.
16-Dec-06
SDR 510003834
Rudder Power Control Unit misrigged – unit may have been supplied this way by the manufacturer (not
Qantas).
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
32.
26-Jun-07
SDR 510004809
Emergency escape path lighting inoperative – feeder cables had been cut and incorrectly repaired using staples.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT


SDR 510004790
See item 20 above (but includes additional documents)
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
33.
2-Aug-07
SDR 510004931
Door 2L centre sill plate incorrectly installed preventing correct seal contact causing loud whine/noise during flight.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
Further revised schedule 22/4/10
34.
7-Aug-06
SDR 510003288
RH wing gear aft four bolts attaching bearing retaining plate to support housing loose.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
35.
10-Oct-06
SDR 510003470
RH nose wheel tyre burst during taxi – FOD hole missed during retread process.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
36.
1-Nov-06
SDR 510003563
Landing gear not retract – manual extension limit switch out of adjustment.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
37.
1-Nov-06
SDR 510003573
Seat row 18DEF forward fitting pulled from seat due to stripped threads.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
38.
7-Nov-06
SDR 510003584
No 1 engine driven hydraulic pump leaking.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
39.
8-Dec-06
SDR 510003747
No 2 main landing gear wheel assembly tie bolts loose.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
40.
29-Nov-06
SDR 510003692
LH main landing gear outboard brake assembly damaged.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
41.
30-Nov-06
SDR 510003699
Life rafts at door 2 left and 5 right not have survival raft kit lanyards attached.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
42.
1-Nov-2006
SDR 510003782
Yellow hydraulic system ground service manifold lower bleeding fitting O ring damaged.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
43.
14-Dec-06
SDR 510003805
LH engine oil chip detector suspect contaminated.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
44.
18-Dec-06
SDR 510003811
Flight deck DME torches not flashing.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
45.
28-Dec-06
SDR 510003841
Slow response to VGIC due to undersize bearings.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
46.
28-Dec-06
SDR 510003844
Incorrect bolt fitted to PCA actuator rod to elevator attachment fitting.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
47.
28-Dec-06
SDR 510003840
No 2 engine thrust reverser No 12 blocker door missing.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
48.
12-Jan-07
SDR 510003932
No 3 engine fuel tube cracked at tube end fitting welded joint.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
49.
2-Feb-07
SDR 510004024
Moment weight of fan blade out of limits with original blade.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
50.
5-Feb-07
SDR 510004087
Lockwire pigtail in MEC throttle control box jam engine throttle.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
51.
6-Feb-07
SDR 510004277
Pneumatic dust seal adjacent to APU fire bottles leaking.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
52.
26-Feb-07
SDR 510004184
4 metal pieces found in aft sump of engine.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
53.
3-Mar-07
SDR 510004296
Dimmer transformer to overhead light dimmer broken.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
54.
5-Mar-07
SDR 510004215
Engine thrust reverser ball screw actuators damaged.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
55.
9-Mar-07
SDR 510004233
Damage located in wiggins coupling.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
56.
14-Mar-07
SDR 510004252
Nose wheel steering out of adjustment.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
57.
9-Apr-07
SDR 510004372
Excessive wheel bearing grease suspected of causing no.13 brake assembly fire.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
58.
30-Apr-07
SDR 510004466
RH nose landing gears door out of adjustment.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
59.
1-May-07
SDR 510004489
Oil leaking from blanked internal gearbox chip detector plate.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
60.
4-Jun-07
SDR 510004668
Captains seat loose – seat track attachment bolt loose.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
61.
16-Jun-07
SDR 510004710
Slide assembly had 2 packing straps.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
62.
10-Jul-07
SDR 510004841
Slide assembly had 2 packing straps.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
63.
11-Jul-07
SDR 510004829
RH engine filter bypass switch – four screw mounts damaged threads, mounting screws missing.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
64.
22-Jul-07
SDR 510004909
Galley trash compactor not secured.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT
65.
23-Jul-07
SDR 510004877
Steering metering valve input rod attachment bolt loose and installed incorrectly.
MAJOR DEFECT REPORT (as defined in reasons) NOT EXEMPT
QANTAS SDR DOCUMENTS EXEMPT

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