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Smith and Repatriation Commission [2003] AATA 979 (8 September 2003)

Last Updated: 1 October 2003

DECISION AND ORAL REASONS FOR DECISION [2003] AATA 979

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No S2002/207

VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION

)

Re

PETER SMITH

Applicant

And

REPATRIATION COMMISSION

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal

Senior Member WJF Purcell

Date 8 September 2003

Place Adelaide

Decision

For the reasons given orally at the Hearing of this matter, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

(Signed)

WJF PURCELL

(Senior Member)

CATCHWORDS

VETERANS' APPEALS - veterans' entitlements - Disability Pension - whether applicant's conditions of depressive disorder and alcohol dependence are war-caused - whether applicant experienced severe stressors during operational service - whether clinical onset of alcohol dependence occurred within 2 years of these stressors - reasonable hypothesis

Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 sections 120, 120A

Statement of Principles Instrument No 58 of 1998

Statement of Principles Instrument No 76 of 1998

ORAL REASONS FOR DECISION

8 September 2003

Senior Member WJF Purcell

1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Repatriation Commission (the Commission) dated 25 September 2001, which refused a claim for the payment of Disability Pension in relation to the applicant's conditions of alcohol dependence and depressive disorder. The Veterans' Review Board (the VRB) affirmed the decision on 5 April 2002.

2. The evidence before the Tribunal comprised the documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T Documents) together with exhibits tendered by the parties. Mr Ower represented the applicant, who gave oral evidence, and called Dr M Ewer, Psychiatrist, and Mr Michael Bradbrook, as witnesses. Mr Crowe represented the Commission, which called Commodore Mulcare, Researcher, as a witness. Commodore Mulcare gave evidence by way of telephone link-up.

3. The applicant, who is 58 years of age, left school at the age of 16 and commenced an apprenticeship to become a spray painter. Some 2 years later he joined the Royal Australian Navy (the Navy) and served from 27 June 1964 until 29 October 1969. He was a steward and clearance diver. Because of his sleep walking habit he was discharged on the grounds that he was physically unsuited to naval service. He has 3 periods of operational service under the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) aboard HMAS Yarra (the Yarra) as follows:

31 March 1965 - 7 May 1965 (38 days)

27 May 1965 - 17 July 1965 (52 days)

29 July 1965 - 1 September 1965 (38 days)

He has also 2 periods of operational service in Vietnam, aboard HMAS Sydney (the Sydney) and the Yarra as follows:

22 April 1966 - 30 April 1966 on the Sydney and

1 May 1966 - 9 May 1966 on the Yarra (18 days - 3 days in Vung Tau Harbour)

26 May 1966 - 9 June 1966 (15 days - 1 day in Vung Tau Harbour)

4. The applicant asserts that his conditions relate to his operational service and the appropriate standard of proof is that of reasonable hypothesis in accordance with section 120 of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act), which, as far as is relevant for the purposes of this review, provides:

"120 Standard of Proof

(1) Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.

Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.

(2) ...

(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:

(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;

(b) that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or

(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;

as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.

Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.

..."

5. Section 120A provides:

"120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles

(1) This section applies to any of the following claims made on or after 1 June 1994:

(a) a claim under Part II that relates to the operational service rendered by a veteran;

(b) a claim under Part IV that relates to:

(i) the peacekeeping service rendered by a member of a Peacekeeping Force; or

(ii) the hazardous service rendered by a member of the Forces.

(iii)

Note 1: Subsections 120 (1), (2) and (3) are relevant to these claims.

Note 2: For peacekeeping service, member of a Peacekeeping Force, hazardous service and member of the Forces see subsection 5Q (1A).

(2) ...

(3) For the purposes of subsection 120 (3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:

(a) a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B (2) or (11); or

(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A (2);

that upholds the hypothesis.

Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.

..."

6. The hypothesis propounded by the applicant is that his conditions of alcohol dependence and depressive disorder relate to his operational service, in that on the whole of the material, the traumatic events which he experienced connect his alcohol dependence with his relevant service, and in turn his alcohol dependence is the major illness he suffered prior to the onset of his depressive disorder. In my view, the material before the Tribunal would, if correct, point to a hypothesis that the conditions were war-caused. There are Statements of Principles in force, and in accordance with those Statements of Principles, at least one of the Factors set out in clause 5 of the respective Statement of Principles, must as a minimum exist, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting the conditions with the circumstances of the applicant's relevant service.

7. The current Statement of Principles for alcohol dependence, is Instrument No 76 of 1998 (the Alcohol Dependence SoP). It was in force also, at the time of the primary Commission decision. The applicant contends that Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Dependence SoP is satisfied:

"experiencing a severe stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse;"

"Experiencing a severe stressor" is defined in the Statement of Principles as:

"... the person experienced, witnessed or was confronted with, an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to the person's or other people's physical integrity, which event or events might evoke intense fear, helplessness or horror.

In the setting of service in the Defence Forces, or other service where the Veterans' Entitlements Act applies, events that qualify as severe stressors include:

(i) threat of serious injury or death; or

(ii) engagement with the enemy; or

(iii) witnessing casualties or participation in or observation of casualty clearance, atrocities or abusive violence;"

8. The appropriate Statement of Principles for the condition of Depressive Disorder is Instrument No 58 of 1998 (the Depressive Disorder SoP). The applicant contends that Factor 5(c) of the Depressive Disorder SoP is satisfied:

"having a clinically significant psychiatric condition within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder;"

The "clinically significant psychiatric condition" the applicant asserts he suffered is alcohol dependence.

9. In relation to his alcohol dependence, the applicant maintains that he only started drinking heavily and regularly after his experiences on his first trip to Borneo in June/July 1965, and soon afterwards he was abusing alcohol and had become dependent on alcohol. This abuse, and then dependence on alcohol, in turn, led to him being withdrawn and depressed. By 1996 he was suffering from a depressive disorder.

10. The Commission contends that at no time during his operational service did the applicant experience a "severe stressor", as defined in the Alcohol Dependence SoP. Even if he had experienced a severe stressor, there is no evidence that within 2 years immediately after he experienced such a stressor he satisfied the definition of dependence in accordance with the Alcohol Dependence SoP. The Commission concedes that, although the applicant was suffering from alcohol dependence within the 2 years immediately before the clinical onset of his depressive disorder, the alcohol dependence was not war-caused, and thus the applicant's depressive disorder is not war-caused.

11. I have outlined only briefly in these oral Reasons for Decision the parties' lengthy and carefully prepared submissions. I do not intend to set out in detail those submissions which, in the light of my findings of fact in this matter, I consider I do not need to address.

12. The applicant submits that during his operational service he experienced a number of severe stressors which satisfy the definition, and which can be summarised as follows:

1. Enemy Diver Incident

13. The applicant, having trained as a diver, was aboard the Yarra when it was docked at HMS Terror, naval dockyards near Singapore. There was a report of a suspected enemy diver or divers in the water. The applicant was sent in to search alone, armed only with a knife. The water was very murky and visibility was extremely poor, as a tug had recently passed by, stirring up the water. He was unable to locate the diver. Scare charges were subsequently thrown in as a deterrent. The applicant says that he was very frightened of being attacked.

2. Boarding Party Incident

14. The applicant, as part of his duties on the Yarra, was involved in boarding suspected enemy sampans, and he recalls having to board 10 to 15 sampans on the same day. He was armed with a Thomson machine gun, and said they had to remove people from the boat and search thoroughly. He felt vulnerable and very frightened when performing this work as armed enemy infiltrators could have been aboard.

3. Diving in Vung Tau Harbour Incident

15. While the Yarra was in Vung Tau Harbour the applicant, by now trained as a clearance diver, led a team of 6 divers, and was required to search the bottom of the hull for limpet mines. He found this very stressful, as the visibility was so poor.

4. Saving the Sailor Incident

16. On another occasion, when he was on the Yarra whilst it was being refuelled by another ship, the sea was very rough and a large wave knocked a fellow sailor off his feet. The applicant thought the sailor was going to washed overboard. He dived to save him and was almost washed over himself. If he had gone over the side he is certain that he would have drowned and not been found.

17. The applicant gave lengthy evidence. It must have been difficult for him to remember the details of incidents which occurred nearly 30 years ago. He is a poor historian who, in Dr Ewer's opinion, suffers memory problems because of his long-term consumption of large quantities of alcohol. This may well explain some of his problems in recalling precise details of past events, but the inconsistencies in the history he provided to the Commission, to Dr Ewer, and in his oral evidence, are such as to render much of his evidence unreliable in the extreme. This does not mean that I disregard the whole of his testimony but that I prefer other more reliable evidence in areas of dispute in the evidence.

18. Dr Ewer relied upon the applicant's version of events being credible when reaching his opinions, and I take that into account when deciding upon the weight to be given to his evidence and opinions. The applicant's fellow seaman, Mr Bradbrook, gave evidence which I accept. I consider Commodore Mulcare a witness for truth, and prefer his evidence to that of the applicant in any area of dispute in the evidence.

19. Turning to the alleged stressors:

1. Enemy Diver Incident

20. A perusal of the Record of Proceedings of the Yarra for the month of June 1965 discloses that the incident which forms the basis of the applicant's contention occurred on 4/5 June 1965, when the Yarra was undergoing a self maintenance period in Singapore Naval Base. The Record of Proceedings reads in part as follows:

"...

4. On the evening of Friday 4th, there occurred the extraordinary affair of the missing diver which was reported in detail in my letter 0028/2/29 of 6th June. At 2100 on the 4th, a sentry sighted bubbles aft. After several officers, including the Engineer Officer and two others with diving experience had observed them, it was decided they originated from a diver. Later that night a trial was carried out with a ship's diver and exactly the same effect produced. Grenades and scare charges were dropped and the bubbles ceased. A search of the ship's bottom produced no result.

5. Next morning, after a check bottom search, two young divers commenced a search of the sea bottom and claim they sighted a man dressed as a diver sitting on the bottom motionless and seemingly dead. They both came to the surface to report this find and unfortunately could not go back as they had insufficient air. An interval of some 20 minutes elapsed before a diver again entered the water. The body could not be located, and in spite of several thorough searches, has not been seen since. Nothing was seen in the vicinity which could have been mistaken for a body.

6. Factors pointing to the existence of a diver are the activities of the previous night and the sighting and examination at a distance of 3 to 4 feet, by two men who, in spite of very severe interrogation have not changed their original story. Factors against its existence are that it hasn't been seen since and the improbability of the event.

..." [Exhibit R1]

The ship's log contains the following entries:

"4 June

2055 After sentry sighted bubbles stbd side aft.

2107 Assumed NBCD State IZ, Awkward State 2 modified.

2123-18 4 charges dropped.

2122 Divers carried out bottom search.

2145 Bottom clear, Divers clear of the water.

2147 NBCD State 3Y. Awkward State 3 modified.

5 June

0705 Divers carried out bottom search.

0720 Body located, but not marked, under the ship.

0746 Assumed NBCD State 1 Awkward State 2 modified.

0800 Hands employed preparing to shift ship.

0820 Disconnected shore (power) supply. Singled up (berthing lines).

0825 Ships divers clear of the water, body not located.

0835 Fleet Clearance Diving Team commenced bottom search.

0900 Hands employed embarking naval and canteen stores.

0901 Awkward State 1 modified.

0915 NBCD State 2Y. Doubled up, Reconnected shore power. (This indicates a decision that it was not necessary to move the ship).

0930 Object (indecipherable) on bottom presumed mine.

NBCD State 1Z. Came to immediate notice for steam.

0937 Object identified as cathodic protection anode. NBCD State 1Y.

1140 Fleet Clearance diving team completed search. Nil result.

1200 Hands to make and mend clothes." [Exhibit R1]

21. The applicant said in evidence that he does not recall whether he was aboard the Yarra on the evening of 4 June 1965, when the bubbles were sighted, but that he was in his wet suit and stand-by diver when 2 or 3 divers went in search of the enemy diver on the morning of 5 June 1965. He recalls seeing the divers return to the surface, and that one of the divers, with his eyes "popping", said that they had seen a diver lying or crouching on the bottom. Joe Golanski, the Yarra's Leading Seaman Clearance Diver, ordered the applicant, the only man left "kitted up", to go over the side on his own, and armed with a blunt knife, to search for the enemy diver. He said that a tug had approached the Yarra, stirring up the water. Those on board the Yarra beckoned to the tug to go away, and when the applicant entered the water it was so stirred up that he could only see the ship's bottom, and as he attempted to go lower, the visibility was "zilch". He says that he returned then to the surface. He said in evidence that he was "as scared as hell". This was his first dive outside Australia, and he had not been trained for such a difficult undertaking during the 3-week diving course he had completed recently.

22. Dr Ewer said in evidence that the applicant told him that he was sent into the water alone because he was a more experienced diver; that he feared for his life and was very frightened of being attacked and possibly killed. Dr Ewer was of the opinion that this incident satisfied both the subjective and objective elements of the definition of "severe stressor" in the Alcohol Dependence SoP.

23. Mr Bradbrook gave evidence that he saw the applicant on the morning of 5 June 1965; and that he was in his diving gear. Mr Bradbrook did not see the applicant enter the water. He said also that a group of divers joined the Yarra's divers in the search whilst the balance of the crew stood on the wharf. I accept Mr Bradbrook's evidence.

24. Commodore Mulcare said in evidence that there was no record of the names of the divers who entered the water on that occasion, and that the applicant could well have been one of them. He said however, that as the applicant had completed his diving training course on 17 March 1965; he was not an experienced diver, and it was unlikely that an ordinary seaman with only limited diving experience, would be sent into the water alone, to search for a body reported by 2 other divers. In addition, ship's divers would almost certainly have operated in pairs.

25. It is clear on the evidence that the applicant at this time was an inexperienced diver, and I accept Commodore Mulcare's evidence and opinion that in all the circumstances it was unlikely that he would be sent into the water alone. I consider that the applicant exaggerated to Dr Ewer, and in his oral evidence, the level of his personal involvement in the search for the diver. I am satisfied on the evidence, and find as a fact, that the enemy diver incident did not occur in the manner described by the applicant.

2. Boarding Party Incident

26. The applicant said in evidence that he took part in a boarding party, on one day only; and that they boarded some 12 to 15 junks during the daylight hours on that day. He was armed with a helmet and a Thomson sub-machine gun. There were 5 or 6 in the group. The applicant was aboard the junk, just below deck, on guard, whilst others searched for weapons and explosives. He said that he felt pretty fearful. This was something he had never done before, to be on guard when the crew could attack his fellow sailors. He feared for his life, anyone could have come out and attacked him. He said that all the boardings took place without incident; there were no signs of hostility from the crews, nor were any weapons found on that day.

27. Dr Ewer said in evidence that on the basis of the applicant armed with an automatic weapon, and being part of a group where the others were armed with automatic weapons, with the threat of being shot or killed, the applicant felt very frightened and vulnerable to being attacked. It was Dr Ewer's opinion that this incident satisfied both the subjective and objective elements of the definition of "severe stressor" in the Alcohol Dependence SoP.

28. Commodore Mulcare provided a report in relation to this incident in the following terms:

"...

9. The veteran made only one trip to Borneo and that was from 19 June 1965 to 15 July 1965 when YARRA was the guardship at Tawau on the north east coast of Borneo. During 21 nights on patrol in the Tawau area, YARRA searched a total of eleven boats, all of them either fishing boats or barter traders who plied between Malaysia and Indonesia. Most boarding operations took place at night and the usual routine was for the kumpit to be called alongside YARRA's starboard side, which was illuminated by lights rigged on the Seacat deck above. Two members of the boarding party, armed with Thomson sub-machine guns, covered the kumpit from the Seacat deck, while the Boarding Officer and a Petty Officer went on board via a scrambling net which was in place over the ship's side. The Boarding Officer went below and searched the kumpit while the Petty Officer remained on deck and covered the crew. The remainder of the boarding party remained on deck in YARRA in the charge of another officer, usually the Executive Officer or the Gunnery Officer. Commander Fitzgerald recalls that both he and the Petty Officer were armed with pistols as larger weapons may have tangled in the scrambling net as they climbed down t he ship's side.

10. Commander Fitzgerald recalls that only trained and experienced personnel were stationed on YARRA to give [sic] provide covering fire if required. This is illustrated by the fact that the then Leading Seaman Golanski was one of the hands stationed on the Seacat deck. Both Commander Fitzgerald and the Petty Officer had a very keen personal interest in this aspect, as they would have been in the firing line if personnel on YARRA had occasion to open fire on a kumpit.

11. There are no records that would confirm the veteran was a member of YARRA's boarding party. If he was a member, he may have been armed but he is likely to have been held in reserve, under the direction of the Executive Officer. Commander Fitzgerald recalls that before YARRA went to Tawau, the Captain determined that there would be only one Boarding Officer used in Tawau. He was selected for the task and usually slept in an alcove off the upper deck so that he was readily available each night. He does not recall any junior sailors boarding any of the intercepted vessels off Tawau and believes this did not occur.

..." [Exhibit R1]

29. In the course of his oral evidence Commodore Mulcare, who was on board the Yarra for 2 years from the end of 1964 to the end of 1966, said that only 2 people boarded a junk, the Boarding Officer and the Petty Officer. Two people were on guard on the Seacat deck of the Yarra, alongside with sub-machine guns, 4 to 6 other seamen would be in the area on the Yarra, but not involved. The applicant was at that time a very inexperienced, untrained, ordinary seaman, and would not have been allowed by the Boarding Officer to carry a Thomson sub-machine gun whilst the others were aboard the junk.

30. I accept Commodore Mulcare's evidence, and I am satisfied on the whole of the evidence that the boarding party incident did not occur in the manner described by the applicant.

3. Diving in Vung Tau Harbour Incident

31. Immediately after the applicant's return from his first 3 periods of operational service between 31 March 1965 and 1 September 1965, he undertook the Navy's 6-month training course as a clearance diver. He said in evidence that he travelled to Vietnam aboard the Sydney in late April 1966, and was transferred by helicopter to the Yarra on 1 May 1966. He said that he undertook a half-necklace formation search of the hull of the Yarra, and together with Leading Seaman Clearance Diver Golanski and another diver called Nicholls, they went ashore and searched the hull of a merchant vessel.

32. The applicant said in evidence that the half-necklace dive was the only dive he undertook in Vung Tau Harbour. He was the only trained "clearance diver", the other 5 were "ship's divers", ie those who had undertaken the 3-week course. He said that the tide was so strong that one could only dive in Vung Tau Harbour during slack tide, and he was concerned as to what he would do if he came across a limpet mine, which he understood would explode if he touched it. Although he had undertaken a 6-month course, he said that he had no idea how to differentiate a limpet mine from a cathodic protection anode (an oval shaped object attached at strategic points to the hull of a ship) nor what to do if he found a mine. The diving conditions were not good, the visibility was very poor, and he was very fearful of finding a mine as he did not know what to do with it.

33. Dr Ewer said in evidence that from an objective point of view, the applicant was in a war zone with mines possibly attached to the hull, and feeling along the hull of the ship for anodes and mines. The applicant told him that he experienced considerable fear, but Dr Ewer was of the opinion that this incident did not satisfy the subjective elements of the definition of "severe stressor" in the Alcohol Dependence SoP. It was in the "grey area".

34. Commodore Mulcare said in evidence that the applicant had at that time completed the clearance diver's course, during which all the divers practised diving, and were trained for this particular business, to search the anchor cable and the hull of a ship and to locate limpet mines. During the 6-month diving course, the participants would have been instructed to inform immediately the senior clearance diver on board the Yarra if a mine was detected. It would explode if the diver attempted to remove it. It was the senior clearance diver's responsibility to defuse a limpet mine.

35. On the evidence the applicant had undertaken a 6-month full-time training course, as a clearance diver, but said in evidence that at no time was he trained as to what he should do if he located a limpet mine attached to the hull. He said that he thought a limpet mine would detonate if he touched it, but he said he never asked those who had trained him, nor Mr Golanski, what he should do in such circumstances. I do not accept the applicant's evidence on this topic, nor do I accept his evidence that despite his 6 months of training, he was so fearful of finding a mine, because he did not know what to do with it. I did not consider on the whole of the evidence that the diving in Vung Tau Harbour incident was an event which might have evoked intense fear, helplessness or horror. I am satisfied on the evidence, and find as a fact, that the diving in Vung Tau Harbour incident does not satisfy the definition of a "severe stressor" in the Alcohol Dependence SoP.

4. Saving the Sailor Incident

36. The applicant said in evidence that during the re-fuelling operation, the date of which he cannot remember, it was his role as a diver to be on the deck in his wet suit with flippers under his arm, and a lifebuoy nearby to help a crewman if he fell overboard. The other sailor was carried along the deck by the wash between the two ships. He was in a wall of water, his torso under the edge of the deck, under the strand of wire, and the applicant grabbed his ankles and brought him back. He said that he was elated, he felt good as he had saved another sailor's life. Soon thereafter he was called over the loudspeaker and summoned to the bridge. He was delighted, because he thought he would receive a commendation. When he arrived, the coxswain said that it was the most stupid thing he had ever seen, as both of them could have been killed. The applicant said that he felt dreadful; he had reacted instinctively and saved the man's life, and when he was chastised he thought then that he could have been sucked under the water and lost at sea.

37. Doctor Ewer said in evidence that this incident was also in the grey area. Another person could have lost his life, but the subject aspect of the stressor might not be satisfied, as the applicant only recognised after the event that he could have been killed. Mr Ower indicated in his closing submissions that there was no evidence that this incident occurred during the applicant's operational service, and in the light of Dr Ewer's evidence, he would not be addressing this alleged stressor.

38. I am satisfied on the evidence therefore, and find as a fact, that the applicant did not suffer a "severe stressor" during his operational service and Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Dependence SoP is not satisfied. It follows also that Factor 5(c) of the Depressive Disorder SoP is not satisfied.

39. In the light of my findings of fact, it is not necessary for me to make a finding in this matter as to the date of the clinical onset of the applicant's alcohol dependency. I consider it appropriate, however, in view of the considerable volume of evidence devoted to this topic in the course of the Hearing, that I state the following. Had I been satisfied that the applicant had experienced a "severe stressor" during his operational service, I would not have accepted Dr Ewer's opinion that the applicant's alcohol dependence had arisen within 6 months of his first voyage in June 1965.

40. On the applicant's own evidence, he had commenced drinking in 1963. He had an established pattern of drinking in 1964. He said in evidence that the first time he realised he had an alcohol problem was in about 1981, when he was convicted of driving under the influence. He said that he suffered a seizure in about 1983, which the consulting neurologist told him was due to the brain's chemical reaction to alcohol, and that he would have to give up coffee, tea, cigarettes and alcohol. He said that he was only able to give up beer for 3 months, but that in recent years he has confined his drinking to light beer. He drinks 10 to 15 stubbies per day, more at weekends.

41. I would not have been satisfied on the whole of the evidence that the clinical onset of the applicant's alcohol dependence occurred within 2 years of the occurrence of any of the alleged severe stressors. Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Dependence SoP would not have been satisfied in any event.

42. I am of the opinion that the material before the Tribunal does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the conditions with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the applicant. I am satisfied, on the whole of the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is not sufficient ground for determining that the applicant's conditions of alcohol dependence and depressive disorder were war-caused.

43. For these reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decision under review.

I certify that the 43 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member WJF Purcell

Signed: .......................................................................................

Associate

Date/s of Hearing 1, 2 & 8 September 2003

Date of Decision 8 September 2003

Counsel for the Applicant Mr S Ower

Solicitor for the Applicant Tindall Gask Bentley

Counsel for the Respondent Mr A Crowe

Solicitor for the Respondent DVA


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