Boron and Repatriation Commission [2002] AATA 789 (11 September 2002)

Last Updated: 11 September 2002

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 789

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No S2000/98 & S2000/474

VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION )

Re EUGENIUS BORON

Applicant

And REPATRIATION COMMISSION

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Senior Member WJF Purcell

Date 11 September 2002

Place Adelaide

Decision The Tribunal affirms the decisions under review.

(Signed)

WJF PURCELL

(Senior Member)

CATCHWORDS

VETERANS' AFFAIRS - veterans' entitlements - Disability Pension - whether alcohol abuse and depressive disorder are war-caused - whether applicant is entitled to more than 90% of the general rate

Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 sections 6A, 120, 120A

Statement of Principles No 58 of 1998

Statement of Principles No 76 of 1998

Statement of Principles No 1 of 2000

REASONS FOR DECISION

11 September 2002 Senior Member WJF Purcell

1. These are applications for review of two decisions of the Repatriation Commission (the Commission). The first, dated 22 May 1998, continued Disability Pension at 90% of the general rate and was affirmed by the Veterans' Review Board (VRB) on 28 January 2000. The second, dated 13 June 2000, accepted a claim for emphysema and increased the rate of pension to 100%, but refused a claim for depressive disorder and alcohol abuse. This decision was affirmed by the VRB on 14 November 2000.

2. The evidence before the Tribunal comprised the documents lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T Documents) together with exhibits tendered by the parties. Ms Hokin appeared for the veteran, who gave oral evidence, and called Dr M Ewer, Psychiatrist, as a witness. Mr Doube represented the Commission.

3. At the commencement of the hearing, I was informed by counsel that it was agreed between the parties that if the two rejected disabilities were accepted, then the veteran would be entitled to receipt of pension at the special rate, with effect from 23 November 1999.

4. The veteran, who is 56 years of age, was 19 years old when he joined the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). He served for 20 years, from 13 February 1965 to 14 February 1985. He was allotted for duty in the Vietnam operational area, aboard HMAS Sydney (the Sydney), from 14 September 1965 to 20 October 1965; and aboard HMAS Brisbane (the Brisbane) as Leading Seaman looking after maintenance of all forward radar, from 16 March 1971 to 11 October 1971. He has eligible war service (which is also operational service) as defined by section 6A of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the Act). The veteran maintains that the conditions arose in the course of his operational service, and the test is that of reasonable hypothesis in accordance with sub-sections 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act.

5. Section 120 of the Act, as far as is relevant for the purposes of this review, provides:

"120 Standard of Proof

(1) Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.

Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.

(2) ...

(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:

(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;

(b) that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or

(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;

as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.

Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.

..."

6. Section 120A of the Act provides:

"120A Reasonableness of hypothesis to be assessed by reference to Statement of Principles

(1) This section applies to any of the following claims made on or after 1 June 1994:

(a) a claim under Part II that relates to the operational service rendered by a veteran;

(b) a claim under Part IV that relates to:

(i) the peacekeeping service rendered by a member of a Peacekeeping Force; or

(ii) the hazardous service rendered by a member of the Forces.

Note 1: Subsections 120 (1), (2) and (3) are relevant to these claims.

Note 2: For peacekeeping service, member of a Peacekeeping Force, hazardous service and member of the Forces see subsection 5Q (1A).

(2) ...

(3) For the purposes of subsection 120 (3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:

(a) a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B (2) or (11); or

(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A (2);

that upholds the hypothesis.

Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this subsection.

..."

7. The applicant puts forward the hypothesis that his conditions of depressive disorder and alcohol abuse relate to his operational service, in that, on the whole of the material, the severe psychosocial stressors he experienced within the 2 years immediately before the clinical onset of the conditions, connect his conditions with his relevant service. In my view, the material before the Tribunal would, if correct, point to a hypothesis that the conditions were war-caused. There are Statements of Principles in force, and in accordance with those Statements of Principles, at least one of the Factors set out in Clause 5 of the respective Statement of Principles must as a minimum exist, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised.

8. The appropriate Statement of Principles for the condition of Depressive Disorder is Instrument No 58 of 1998 (the Depressive Disorder Statement of Principles). The veteran contends that Factors 5(b) and (c) of the Statement of Principles are satisfied:

"...

(b) experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor or stressors within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or

(c) having a clinically significant psychiatric condition within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder; or

..."

"Clinically significant" is defined in the Statement of Principles as:

"... sufficient to warrant ongoing management, which may involve regular visits (for example, at least monthly), to a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist or General Practitioner".

"Psychiatric condition" is defined in the Statement of Principles as:

"... any Axis 1 disorder of mental health that attracts a diagnosis under DSM-IV".

"Severe psychosocial stressor" is defined in the Statement of Principles as:

"... an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual, for example, being shot at, death or serious injury of a close friend or relative, assault (including sexual assault), severe illness or injury, experiencing a loss such as divorce or separation, loss of employment, major financial problems or legal problems".

9. The veteran maintains that in relation to Factor 5(c), the clinically significant psychiatric condition is "generalised anxiety disorder", and that he satisfies Factor 5(a)(ii) of the appropriate Statement of Principles for the condition of Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Instrument No 1 of 2000 (the Anxiety Disorder Statement of Principles). Factor 5(a)(ii) reads:

"experiencing a severe psychosocial stressor within the two years immediately before the clinical onset of anxiety disorder;"

10. "Severe psychosocial stressor" is defined as:

"... an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual, for example, being shot at, death or serious injury of a close friend or relative, assault (including sexual assault), major illness or injury, experiencing a loss such as divorce or separation, loss of employment, major financial problems or legal problems".

11. The appropriate Statement of Principles for the condition of Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse is Instrument No 76 of 1998 (the Alcohol Abuse Statement of Principles). The veteran contends that Factor 5(a) of the Statement of Principles is satisfied:

"suffering from a psychiatric disorder at the time of the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse;"

In relation to Factor 5(a), the psychiatric disorder is "generalised anxiety disorder".

12. The veteran submits that four incidents which occurred during his second period of operational service, aboard the Brisbane, between 16 March 1971 and 11 October 1971, constitute "severe psychosocial stressors" and satisfy Factors 5(b) and (c) of the Depressive Disorder Statement of Principles:

(a) The veteran alleges that he hated his time in Vietnam and the whole concept of the war. He was in the operations room of the Brisbane, which was off the coast of South Vietnam, when the United States spotter planes were giving co-ordinates of targets to the Brisbane. He overheard the United States pilot advise that the missiles had hit the wrong target. The veteran says that he was angry and distressed that civilians could have been killed by these missiles.

(b) On numerous occasions supplies of shells were offloaded from supply ships on pallets, 60 to a pallet, and carried individually by Brisbane personnel down several flights of stairs, and into the appropriate area. The veteran says that on one occasion when he was carrying one of the 5" shells, which weighed about 35 kg, he slipped on the stairway. He thought that the shell might explode, and he would die; he ended up 1 or 2 feet from the edge of the deck railing, and he could have gone over the edge. This incident caused him fear and distress.

(c) On an occasion when the Brisbane was near the Demilitarised Zone, detached from the 7^th Fleet, in a warning position, the veteran says that he was in the operations room when the radar operator identified 2 planes, and by sending an encoded radar signal, asked the planes to identify whether friend or foe. They failed to respond - the Brisbane locked onto the radar signal preparing to fire, but the operator decided they were friendly planes, and they turned away. After 10 minutes, the operator was told subsequently that they were American planes.

(d) The veteran says that on the last occasion the Brisbane was off the South Vietnam coast, it was ½ km off the beach; he was on the deck, and could see figures moving along the beach. The Brisbane was shelling fuel depots. United States planes were bombing the coastline. He saw red flashes, which he thought was exploding fuel, but it was napalm. He did not see anyone fall or be injured. He was distressed and anxious, and pleased to be returning home. His superior officer however, said that it was "a pity that we had to leave, we were having so much fun". The veteran said that he felt like vomiting.

13. The veteran maintains, that on his evidence, and that of Dr Ewer, each of these incidents satisfies the test necessary to establish that he suffered a severe psychosocial stressor within the 2 years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder, and thus Factor 5(b) of the Depressive Disorder Statement of Principles is satisfied; and/or the severe psychosocial stressor suffered by the veteran during his operational service satisfies Factor 5(a)(ii) of the Anxiety Disorder Statement of Principles, "having a clinically significant psychiatric condition within 2 years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder". These factors thus raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the veteran's depressive disorder with the circumstances of his relevant service.

14. The Commission submits that none of these four events satisfies the definition of "severe psychosocial stressor" in either the Depressive Disorder or Anxiety Disorder Statement of Principles. None of them are objectively of such a nature as to be an event of such severity, similar to the examples quoted in the definition, as to cause ongoing psychiatric scarring. It submits further, that Factor 5(c) of the Depressive Disorder Statement of Principles is not satisfied, in that the veteran did not have a "clinically significant" psychiatric condition, requiring ongoing, continuing treatment within the 2 years immediately before the clinical onset of depressive disorder. It was not until 1979 that there was any psychiatric condition requiring treatment from a medical practitioner.

15. On the veteran's evidence, he did not suffer any anxiety or depressive symptoms before his service in Vietnam in 1971. He became angry then, and anxious, flooded with emotion; his sleep patterns changed, and he found difficulty sleeping. When he returned to Australia, his sleep pattern became worse. He had bad dreams, and felt that he was being persecuted. He had recurring dreams of "people out to get me". He said that he never complained of these symptoms because he would be regarded as "a wimp". He kept everything to himself.

16. The veteran said in evidence that in relation to the "anxiety state" noted in his service records of 3 October 1979 [T4/89], when he was prescribed Mogadon for 5 nights; this event was different from anything he had experienced previously, and he has not had a similar episode since 1979. He said that he just broke down, he was trembling, light headed, something he had never experienced before. He did not know what was wrong with him. The doctors diagnosed anxiety.

17. The veteran's service records do not disclose any further attendances over the next 6 years for any symptoms. In his discharge medical statement of 25 October 1984, he stated in relation to his disabilities, that he "repeatedly suffer from anxiety states" [T4/118]. He said in evidence that he has never sought psychiatric treatment for his condition. At the request of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, he was examined by Dr Blakemore, Psychiatrist, on 25 November 1996, and by Dr Truman, Psychiatrist, on 19 April 1999. Dr Ewer, Psychiatrist, interviewed the veteran on 18 May 2001, at the request of his solicitors, but has not treated the veteran.

18. As to the veteran's condition of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse, he maintains that although he consumed alcohol to excess from time to time before his operational service in 1971, the pattern of his alcohol intake changed frequency level, and motivation, because of his operational service. He was suffering subsequently from a psychiatric disorder, "generalised anxiety disorder", an Axis 1 disorder, attracting a diagnosis under DSM-IV, and the same four stressors were relevant to the development of the condition and satisfaction of the Anxiety Disorder Statement of Principles.

19. Dr Ewer reported on 22 May 2001 [Exhibit A1] that the veteran outlined to him the four stressors referred to above, and Dr Ewer reported, in part, as follows:

"...

14. DIAGNOSIS

Mr Boron fulfils the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for a Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Mr Boron reported excessive anxiety and worry which has lasted for many years. He has difficulty controlling the worry. The anxiety and worry are associated with a range of additional symptoms including fatigue, difficulty concentrating, irritability, muscle tension and insomnia. The anxiety leads to clinically significant distress and impairment of his social and occupational functioning.

Mr Boron also fulfils the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for the axis-1 psychiatric diagnosis of Alcohol Abuse. I note occasional episodes of alcohol excess prior to his trip to Vietnam in 1971 but prior to that time he did not fulfil the DSM-IV criteria to diagnose Alcohol Abuse. I believe Mr Boron has suffered from Alcohol Abuse since [1971] in the sense that he has consistently consumed an excessive amount of alcohol which has adversely affected his physical health, psychological health and many elements of his day to day functioning.

Mr Boron also fulfils the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for the axis-1 psychiatric diagnosis of a Major Depressive Disorder. He has a range of emotional, cognitive and physical symptoms in keeping with this diagnosis.

Mr Boron continues to suffer from Nicotine Abuse.

15. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HIS PSYCHIATRIC CONDITIONS TO HIS WAR SERVICE

I believe there is a clear and direct link between Mr Boron's Generalized Anxiety Disorder and his war service. Firstly, Mr Boron did not suffer from anxiety prior to his 1971 trip to Vietnam. Secondly, there is a temporal link between the abovementioned stressors and the development of his Generalized Anxiety Disorder in the sense that the latter came on directly after the former. Furthermore, Mr Boron's Anxiety Disorder can be well understood in the context of the stressors I have described. What is more, the particular incidents cited by Mr Boron meet the Statement of Principles definition of a "severe psychosocial stressor". In particular I note such a stressor is considered to be an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual. Various examples are given including serious injury of a close friend, experiencing a loss such as divorce, loss of employment or major legal problems. Comparing Mr Boron's stressors with these and in particular understanding the meaning of the stressors to Mr Boron, they evoked feelings of substantial distress in him similar to those experiences described in the Statement of Principles, in particular feeling threatened by approaching, unidentified planes, and seeing human beings running away from exploding fuel tanks being hit by shells.

I also believe Mr Boron's Alcohol Abuse is directly related to his war service. Firstly, he reports beginning to regularly abuse alcohol during his 1971 trip to Vietnam. Secondly, alcohol was cheap and readily available to sailors during the Vietnam War. Thirdly, Mr Boron gives a clear history of increasing his alcohol intake and abusing alcohol, to cope with the distress he was experiencing during this 1971 trip. He continued this pattern of abuse over the years. Finally, psychological studies indicate that individuals suffering from a Generalized Anxiety Disorder have a high rate of substance abuse.

I believe Mr Boron's Major Depression is a secondary disorder to his Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Alcohol Abuse. Depression is a well recognized complication of long term, alcohol abuse. Furthermore, Mr Boron's alcohol abuse and his Generalized Anxiety Disorder resulted in a number of losses and these were pivotal in precipitating Mr Boron's Major Depression.

...

18. ASSUMPTIONS

In order to form an expert opinion regarding Mr Boron, I have made a number of assumptions. The assumptions are:

* That Mr Boron has truthfully relayed his history to me.

* That the ancillary information provided to me is accurate and valid.

* That my observations of Mr Boron's mental state are accurate and can be used to form an opinion regarding Mr Boron's psychiatric state.

I have made all enquiries which I believe are desirable and appropriate to fully assess Mr Boron within the realm of my specialty. I do not believe there is any aspect of my report which is incomplete or inaccurate. I am unaware of any matters of significance which are being withheld from the Court.

..."

20. In the course of his oral evidence, Dr Ewer said that he relied for his opinions on the veracity of the veteran's account of events, and that he had not been provided by the veteran's solicitors with a copy of the veteran's service records [T4/14-118]. I have taken this aspect into account in my assessment of the weight to be given to Dr Ewer's opinions and testimony.

21. The veteran gave lengthy oral evidence in relation to the four incidents. It must have been difficult for him to recall the detail of events which occurred more than 30 years ago; but I gained the impression that there was an element of deliberate reconstruction of events and exaggeration of their importance and the level of distress they engendered at the time.

(a) Incident of American advice that targets missed

The veteran says that this incident upset him greatly. I note however, that he did not mention this incident when interviewed by Dr Blakemore on 25 November 1996, or Dr Truman on 19 April 1999, nor did he mention it at the VRB Hearing on 14 November 2000. The first mention of this incident is to Dr Ewer on 18 May 2001. I do not consider that such a recently remembered event, satisfies the definition of a "severe psychosocial stressor" in the relevant Statement of Principles. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that this incident does not satisfy the definition.

(b) Falling down stairs whilst offloading 5" shells

The historical documentary evidence [Exhibit R1/p227] discloses that the replenishment of supplies at sea was a frequent occurrence aboard the Brisbane. Over the period of the 4 deployments in which the veteran was involved, the Brisbane was replenished on 48 occasions, and fired 7,760 rounds. There is no record of any occasion upon which enemy fire was received. That the veteran slipped on stairs whilst carrying a shell is supported by the letter from former seaman, Mr Lawless [Exhibit A5]. The veteran said in evidence that this was the most frightening of the four incidents; but he agreed in cross-examination that he knew it was not possible for the shell to explode when dropped. He did not mention the incident to either of Drs Blakemore or Truman. It was referred to at the VRB Hearing, but more in relation to physical injury, its attribution by the veteran to the psychosocial and alcohol conditions is clearly of more recent origin. In any event, I do not consider that this incident, if it did occur, satisfies the definition of a "severe psychosocial stressor" in the relevant Statement of Principles. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that this incident was not a "severe psychosocial stressor".

(c) The identification of friend or foe aircraft

The veteran made no mention of this incident to either of Drs Blakemore or Truman. He raised the incident at the VRB Hearing, when, through his advocate Mr Coxon, he referred to 3 aircraft approaching the ship, not 2, and Mr Coxon said they would not identify and the officer-in-charge correctly said "well they would be friendly anyway, but that was one incident that happened there" [Exhibit R3/p4]. On the veteran's evidence, the whole incident took 10 minutes. In his letter [Exhibit A4], Mr Giles, a former seaman, recalled that the planes were enemy MIGS, which turned away when they realised the Brisbane's guns were locked on them. If this were the situation, it would have been an enemy attack on the Brisbane, and recorded in the official history. There is no such recording. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, in all the circumstances, that this incident does not satisfy the definition of "severe psychosocial stressor" in the relevant Statement of Principles.

(d) The Napalm on the beach incident

The veteran says that this incident occurred on the last day of Brisbane's deployment, and that the Brisbane was ½ km offshore. The official history, "Royal Australian Navy in Vietnam" [Exhibit R1] records at p101, that from 15 August 1971 until 5 September 1971, the Brisbane was assigned to the Demilitarised Zone. The history reads, in part:

"DMZ

A marked increase in enemy activity in the DMZ and the northern provinces of Military Region 1 in early August was considered to be an attempt to influence the elections for the South Vietnam House of Representatives at the end of the month. To counter the heavy mortar and rocket attacks on spotting positions and artillery bases, two NGFS ships were assigned to the DMZ. Brisbane joined USS Berkeley (DDG 15) and the ships alternated day by day as the active NGFS ship until August 21 when USS Shelton (DD 790) relieved Berkeley. That day, Brisbane and Shelton combined to fire on a large enemy concentration and rocket and mortar positions. During this very active period of operations, Brisbane was informed by signal (on the 18^th) that she was not to be replaced.

The cruiser USS Oklahoma City (CLG 5), flagship of the Seventh Fleet, joined the NGFS unit on August 27 supplementing Brisbane for long-range fire.

Such was the tempo of operations in Brisbane's last period on the gunline that almost half of the 7231 rounds used up to her 79^th day on the gunline were fired during the latter half of August.

This increased activity almost became an embarrassment to Brisbane as her gun barrels were rapidly reaching the end of their life. During the last ten days of the deployment, Brisbane kept out of the firing line whenever other ships were available, but took up her station again as soon as they were detached for replenishment or other reasons. Using this method of conserving ammunition, Brisbane was kept busy until September 5, the day of her departure from the gunline. Her final rounds completed the maximum number allowed to be fired from each barrel.

After anti-submarine exercises and maintenance at Subic Bay, Brisbane left for Australia on September 30. Her return to Sydney on October 15, after steaming 27,011 miles and firing 7760 rounds in her second deployment, marked the end of the RAN's combat role in the Vietnam War.

..."

Page 98 reads, in part:

"...

Ships firing on targets in the Demilitarised Zone were restricted to remaining south of latitude 16º57'N and were required to be more than 5000 yards from the coast.

..."

22. I prefer to rely on the recorded history, and do not accept the veteran's evidence that the Brisbane was ½ km offshore; and in any event, I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the incident is not of such a nature as to satisfy the definition of "severe psychosocial stressor".

23. As to the question of the veteran's condition of alcohol abuse, an examination of his service records discloses that within 4 months of enlistment, on Tuesday 1 June 1965, at age 19, the veteran was diagnosed with "acute alcoholic gastritis. Heavy alcoholic intake last night - vomiting this am" [T4/22]. The veteran travelled to Canada aboard HMAS Melbourne in October 1967 (4 years before his service in South Vietnam). On 13 October 1967 at 3.00 am, he was admitted to a Canadian Military Hospital with multiple lacerations to his face, and slight concussion, having fallen down stairs at a beach in Vancouver. The notes read, in part:

"...

21-year-old man, sailor on board an Australian ship, was drinking moderately - had 20 beers and 8 ozs. of Scotch. Can't remember anything after 2 a.m. when he was getting into a taxi. At 3:10 a.m. he arrived unconscious at Emergency, Shaughnessy Hospital, with a friend who said he fell on some stairs. He is generally a heavy drinker and has lost his memory on quite a few occasions after heavy drinking.

..." [T4/35]

24. The service notes disclose also [T4/45] that on 25 February 1970, the veteran was evaluated by a specialist physician in relation to hypertension, with a BP reading, over a period of several hours, of 170/110. The notes read, in part:

"...

Today his blood pressure is unaltered at 170/110 but his heart appears normal. With proper management as regards weight reduction and stopping his alcoholic intake his BP should be lowered.

At the present time and with his BP reading I do not consider him fit for overseas service. He should report to his Sick Bay every couple of weeks re his BP, therapy may be needed other than diet, but probably not.

..."

25. It is apparent that the veteran adhered to the diet, and was approved for overseas duty. There is no reference after 1970, in the service documents, to alcohol intake, or any problems associated with alcoholic intake. As with the question of psychiatric condition, Dr Ewer relied on the veteran's statement as to the onset of symptoms subsequent to his Vietnam service.

26. There is clear evidence that the veteran was a heavy drinker from early in his Navy career, and before his operational service in 1971, and there is only his own assertions that his pattern of drinking changed as a result of his operational service. Dr Ewer accepted the veteran's assertions without question, and without seeing his service records. I have had the opportunity to hear the veteran's evidence and to peruse the documentary evidence, and I am not satisfied that the path of alcohol consumption, which was well in place before 1971, was altered by his operational service, and I am not satisfied therefore that the onset of either his generalised anxiety disorder or alcohol abuse or dependency occurred shortly after his return from South Vietnam.

27. I have examined the whole of the evidence carefully and in detail, and I have taken into account the parties' submissions. I am satisfied on the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the alleged incidents did not occur in the manner described by the veteran. I am satisfied on the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that none of the incidents outlined by the veteran satisfy the definitions of "severe psychosocial stressor" in either the Anxiety Disorder or the Depressive Disorder Statements of Principles. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that Factors 5(b) and (c) of the Depressive Disorder Statement of Principles are not satisfied; nor is Factor 5(a)(ii) of the Anxiety Disorder Statement of Principles; nor is Factor 5(a) of the Alcohol Abuse Statement of Principles.

28. I am satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is not sufficient ground for determining that the veteran's conditions of depressive disorder and alcohol abuse were war-caused. The material before the Tribunal does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting these conditions with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the veteran.

29. For these reasons, the Tribunal affirms the decisions under review.

I certify that the 29 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member WJF Purcell

Signed: .....................................................................................

Associate

Date/s of Hearing 18/19 February 2002

Date of Decision 11 September 2002

Counsel for the Applicant Ms C Hokin

Solicitor for the Applicant Lempriere Abbott McLeod

Counsel for the Respondent Mr G Doube

Solicitor for the Respondent DVA