Ciemcioch v Echuca-Moama RSL & Citizen Club [1994] HREOCA 2 (8 February 1994)

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

Sex Discrimination Act 1984

No. H93/029

Between:

Victoria Ciemcioch

Complainant

and

Echuca-Moama RSL Citizens Club Ltd

Respondent

Reasons for Decision

of Mr Kevin O'Connor

Inquiry Commissioner

Hearing: Echuca, Victoria

Date: 7 & 8 February 1994

The complainant, Vicki Ciemcioch, applied for membership of the Echuca-Moama RSL Citizens Club Ltd. late in 1991. At its meeting of 18 December 1991 the committee of the club considered, and rejected, her application. In the context of a rescission motion, the committee on 29 May 1992 confirmed its decision. Mrs Ciemcioch's complaint is that, in rejecting her application, the club unlawfully discriminated against her on the ground of her marital status. She says, in essence, that a factor - if not the main factor - in her being denied membership was that she was married to a person who had been involved in litigation against the club, Mr Ciemcioch.

Complainant's View

The Club was a new one, founded in 1989. The complainant's husband was a foundation committee member. He and the complainant were joint debenture-holders in the club. Their support for the formation of the club derived to a significant degree from the fact that they both had been members of the armed forces. Mr Ciemcioch had nine years service in the Royal Australian Navy and two years in the Department of Defence. Mrs Ciemcioch, the complainant had two years service in the WRANS.

The club was essentially a registered club of a type common in New South Wales which contained areas where liquor is sold and a large area devoted to gaming. Material before this inquiry indicated that the club had several thousand members and in its history only 3 membership applications had been rejected, one being that in issue in this case.

Unlike her husband, the complainant had not sought to become a member of the club at the time of its formation as she was living away from home during the work-week. That situation ended in November 1991 when she resumed living full-time in Echuca; and she then applied for membership of the club. But by this time the relationship between her husband and key members of the club had soured. In 1990 he took legal action against the club over concerns he had as to the propriety of its actions, in particular those of the chairman - Mr Bill Lynn - in relation to the purchase of the land at Moama on which the club premises were to be erected. The land was purchased from interests associated with a member of the committee without, in Mr Ciemcioch's opinion, the protection of an independent written valuation. Mr Ciemcioch had, in September 1990 been suspended from the committee; and commenced legal action; on 14 November 1991, Mr Ciemcioch and the club had settled the proceedings.

The complainant says that her application, considered a month later, was rejected because of continued hostility towards her husband on the part, in particular, of those who controlled the committee - especially Mr Lynn and the secretary/manager of the club, Mrs Angliss. She said they viewed her as the wife of a trouble-maker and not someone they wanted as a member.

Respondent's View

The respondent, the club, disputed the complainant's version of the reasons for the committee's decision. The club said that the committee rejected her application because of its dissatisfaction over comments and views which had been attributed to her. In this regard, the key factor was a report given to the committee a few months earlier by Mr Jackson, a committee member, after he had visited the Ciemcioch's farm with a view to persuading Mr Ciemcioch to abandon his legal action against the club. The respondent said that he reported back to the committee that he spent about two hours at the farm and, for most of that time, was solely engaged in conversation with the complainant. During that conversation the respondent said that he reported that she made a number of remarks that he regarded as offensive in relation to the operation of the club and in relation to the values and ideals of the RSL. Mr Jackson himself did not give evidence; and the complainant disputed the accuracy of the report.

The respondent said that the fairness or accuracy of Mr Jackson's report was not of significance, the issue was simply what was the thinking of the committee when it made its decision. The respondent said that the complainant was, because of the comments attributed to her, viewed negatively and not wanted as a member. Though the context in which she had her conversation with Mr Jackson arose from her husband's litigation against the club, she was not rejected because she was married to him but because of the remarks that were attributed to her and because of the negative recommendation made to the committee meeting by the membership committee which Mr Jackson chaired.

In any case, the respondent argued that if this inquiry was not disposed to accept its account of the committee's reasons, but instead accepted the complainant's contention that a factor in the decision was that her application should be rejected because she was married to Mr Ciemcioch, that this still did not bring her complaint within the ambit of unlawful discrimination on the ground of marital status. If this alternative view of the facts, favourable to the complainant's case, was adopted it should simply be seen as an instance of a club refusing membership to someone who had a relationship with a person who had caused trouble to the club. The refusal, on this argument, was not founded on a characteristic that appertains generally to the relationship of marriage; a similar stand might have been taken towards a brother or sister of Mr Ciemcioch, or towards a close friend or business partner. The respondent submitted that for the complainant's case to succeed, it was necessary for the complainant to show that the Board had based its decision to exclude Mrs Ciemcioch on a stereotyping assumption about married women. The respondent contended that this argument had support both in law (referring in particular to the relevant New South Wales Court of Appeal case of Boehringer Ingelheim P/L -v- Reddrop (1984) 2NSWLR 13) and in policy (the legislature's concern is to prevent discrimination against people where that is based simply on the fact of marriage or on a stereotyping assumption about married women, but not to regulate the decision-making processes of private clubs). Under s.6(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act, 1984 (Cth) discrimination on the grounds of marital status may occur by reason of a characteristic that "appertains generally" (para.(b)) or "is generally imputed" (para (c)) to persons of the marital status of the complainant.

Evidence

The inquiry had before it a referral report from the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, various statements from members of the committee at the time and an edited transcript of a tape-recording of committee meetings early in 1992, where consideration was given to the possibility of rescinding the decision of 18 December to refuse the complainant's application for membership. Oral evidence at the inquiry was given, on the complainant's side, by the complainant, her husband and five men who had served on the committee at different times between 1990 and 1992 (Messrs. Tyler, Dempsey, Avis, Watson and Gledhill); and on the respondent's side, by the chairman of the committee at all relevant times, Mr Bill Lynn, by the secretary/manager at all relevant times, Mrs Margot Angliss and by another committee member at the time, Mr Davidson.

Seven of those who gave evidence (the complainant, her husband and Mr Tyler being the exceptions) were present at the committee meeting of 18 December 1991. While there were variations in the evidence as to the detail of what transpired at the meeting, the following would appear to be agreed

- that there was a membership committee report on new applications for membership given to the meeting by Mr Jackson

- that the names of those under consideration were in the committee papers provided to members

- that Mr Jackson's recommendation was that all but the first-named person on the list be accepted

- the first-named person was the complainant

- that a decision was made, at least by a majority of members, in accordance with the recommendation.

The differences in the evidence relate to the extent of discussion, the influence of Mr Lynn as chairman and Mrs Angliss as secretary/manager in procuring the decision and the actual thinking of committee members in reaching a decision.

In the case of some members who had only joined the committee in September 1991 (e.g. Mr Avis and Mr Dempsey) their only knowledge of the applicant was her name and an assumption in one instance (Mr Dempsey) that she was Mr Ciemcioch's wife. Other members who had served on the previous year's committee had been present at a meeting in July 1991 when Mr Jackson had given his account of the conversation at the Ciemcioch farm with the complainant. In their minds they linked the reason for the negative recommendation to her behaviour on that occasion as reported by Mr Jackson.

Several of the committee members also referred to the influence in club affairs of Mr Lynn. They were of the view that he was a dominating personality who saw that his opinion prevailed in regard to matters he considered important, and that he had the support of Mrs Angliss in that regard. A number of members had left the committee because of dissatisfaction with his management style. Some of those who gave evidence said that while Mr Lynn said little, or nothing, in the discussion of the membership committee's report, that his non-verbal behaviour was in agreement with the recommendation and they were not prepared to vote against him. In evidence, Mr Lynn (in my view disingenuously) disavowed the extent of influence attributed to him by other committee members. He presented as a forceful, opinionated man with a single-minded approach to club issues.

He said that the fact that the complainant was married to Mr Ciemcioch played no part in his attitude. I find that assertion difficult to accept as it was clear that the legal proceedings brought by Mr Ciemcioch had been of great concern to Mr Lynn and the committee members. In Mr Lynn's case questions of personal integrity and judgement were raised. In addition, he and other committee members were concerned about the cost of the litigation to the club and their possible exposure to personal liability for any damages award. The settlement was one that favoured Mrs Ciemcioch to a significant degree, and would, I consider, have been unwelcome to Mr Lynn.

All witnesses who were present at the meeting of 18 December 1991, except for Mr Lynn who said there was no discussion, recalled there being some discussion of the recommendation to reject the complainant's application. I am satisfied that there was a discussion.

As to how extensive the discussion was and what its contents were, the evidence varied. The most detailed account was given by Ms. Angliss, the secretary/manager. She said the discussion canvassed: whether members had been rejected before; what were the criteria; and her advising that two other applications had been rejected because the applicants had made remarks which were seen as defamatory or disloyal to the club. Two witnesses (Mr Watson and Mr Dempsey) recalled a brief negative report about the complainant given by Mr Jackson who said "they didn't want her" and a comment from Mr Davidson that there is "no way we'll have her as a member of this club". In his evidence, Mr Davidson said that there was a "round-table discussion" and that he had said that he "didn't know the lady". Mr Davidson confirmed that he was opposed and remained opposed to the application. It would appear that Mr Lynn, in the chair, remained silent but one witness, Mr Dempsey, who had, during his working career, significant experience in servicing official meetings, said he regarded Mr Lynn as being opposed. He formed that view from the manner in which Mr Lynn dealt with the item. Another witness, Mr Avis, gave evidence of Mr Lynn's aggressive attitude towards the Ciemciochs. He said that he had heard Mr Lynn express anger in relation to the litigation and threaten to take the farm off them, if it failed.

As I have noted, several of the witnesses, all of whom had occupied senior roles in the management of the Club referred to the dominating influence of Mr Lynn. As I have also noted, in giving evidence himself, Mr Lynn displayed an aggressive, opinionated and single-minded approach. The explanation given by several witnesses for their not continuing to serve as directors was that they felt that their point of view was disregarded by Mr Lynn or that they were not consulted.

It was clear, in my view, that effective control of the affairs of the club lay with Mr Lynn and the full-time secretary/manager Mrs Angliss.

For the purpose of ascertaining what were the factors which gave rise to the committee's initial decision to refuse membership and its subsequent continued refusal, I do not consider that I should confine my analysis simply to examining the understandings of the majority of the committee members. It is, I consider, reasonably clear from the evidence that most of the committee members did not have any independent view of Mrs Ciemcioch, but relied entirely on the assessment of her character presented by Mr Jackson and approved (largely tacitly) by Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss. Their approval was, in my view, crucial to the decision, a view reflected by a number of the committee members in their evidence.

It is reasonably clear from the evidence of the witnesses present at that meeting that Mr Lynn either said nothing or very little in the course of discussion of the recommendation to reject Mrs Ciemcioch's application. Mr Lynn, in his evidence, suggested that his silence demonstrated a lack of any strong view on the matter and that like most other members of the committee did not question the negative recommendation of Mr Jackson. Some of the witnesses present at the meeting as directors gave, in my view, a more credible view of the situation. They took Mr Lynn's silence to amount to endorsement of the recommendation and were guided by that in voting. Only two directors actively questioned the rationale of the reason given for excluding Mrs Ciemcioch her disloyalty to the objectives of the RSL Club.

(None of the directors were recorded as voting against the motion though one asserted in evidence that he did (an assertion I accept) while another asserted that he abstained (an assertion I also accept).)

I am satisfied that the guiding influence in the decision of the committee was the approval given by Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss to the recommendation and the reasons-in-support.

In these circumstances it becomes critical, in my view, to examine the reasonableness or otherwise of the reasons-in-support. While this inquiry was hampered by the unavailability of Mr Jackson to give evidence (due to ill-health), I consider that the reasons given were unfair and ill-conceived. Mrs Ciemcioch gave a detailed account of her conversation with Mr Jackson when he visited to try to have her husband drop his case against the club. She also referred to notes that she kept. Mrs Ciemcioch's account was a credible one. She acknowledged that she had criticised aspects of the operation of the club, and (not surprisingly) defended her husband's concerns and his right to pursue them. Her strong-minded and spirited views did not warrant the highly potent characterisation, in the context of a club connected with the name of the RSL, of "disloyalty".

Mr Lynn would appear not to have questioned this characterisation. His omission to do so is, in my view, significant.

I do not consider that this is a case where Mrs Ciemcioch's personality was the sole factor influencing the committee's decision to refuse her membership. The unreasonableness of the assessment of her conversation with Mr Jackson, the acquiescence of Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss in that assessment and the subsequent conduct of Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss in dealing with attempts to rescind the exclusion, point to the presence of an additional and more significant factor - her marital relationship with Mr Ciemcioch.

I regard the subsequent conduct of Mr Lynn as significant in forming my view. I refer, in particular, to the fact that Mr Lynn, in a separate capacity as President of the sub-branch of the local RSL, had not opposed Mrs Ciemcioch's application to the sub-branch. Membership of the sub-branch had been granted while the question of rescinding the club decision to refuse her was under consideration. (The sub-branch is the official unit of the RSL restricted to persons who have performed military service.) He said that he only objected to Mrs Ciemcioch in the club context. (Clubs are not, as I understand it, as strictly connected to the RSL other than in respect of their need to have official approval to use the name of the RSL.) He regarded her as "disloyal" to the club. But I am satisfied that the report given by Mr Jackson to Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss after he returned from the farm and subsequently to meetings in September and December 1991 depicted her as disloyal to the ideals of the "RSL" not just the "Club". Mr Lynn by his silence in December was content, in my view, to let the worst-possible view of Mrs Ciemcioch's attitude go forward to the committee, a committee made up of returned soldiers, that she was "disloyal" not just to the club but to the RSL.

This view is, I consider, borne out by the edited transcript of the committee meetings of early 1992 where Mr Lynn makes a number of negative references to Mrs Ciemcioch personally and in respect of her relationship to her husband.

The key influence of Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss is also reflected in the selected transcripts of committee discussions during early 1992. At those meetings the question of rescinding the exclusion of Mrs Ciemcioch was raised, and eventually debated. Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss were vigorous in opposing reversal of the exclusion:

1. Excerpt from Echuca-Moama RSL and Citizens Club Board of Directors Meeting - 28 May 1992.

Mr Bill Lynn:....."Now I will just say this in passing because it is not making a big hassle of it. Don't get yourself into a hassle with that bloke [J Ciemcioch] because you know he is trying it all the time and there is one aim in life to try it here and to do the same across the river. It will be suitably dealt with across the river at the next one. We don't want to suitably deal with it here because it it going to cause kafufles so don't get yourself into the area with him".

2. Excerpt from Echuca-Moama RSL and Citizens Club Board of Directors Meeting - 29 June 1992

.....

Bill Lynn:....."I'd be very careful on that one fellas because you can get into a hot water situation because if they're [the Ciemcioch's] intent as you can see with John's conversation that went to John Avis. They're intent on stirring up all sorts of trouble if they can. I can assure you Margot's been on to the solicitor as regards the phone call. It's absolutely rubbish."....

Margot Angliss:...."Another point is that around the town too now they're [the Ciemciochs] starting to really bring themselves undone because I had it come back to me from various people that know various members that Mr Ciemcioch canvassed from door to door with his petition. He struggled to get those 32 and if you look at that petition, 75% of that are relatives of various directors, they only got a few other names and I have another letter concerning that here at the moment, ex directors, and the thing is that I've heard back from people where he's walked into people's kitchen and been told very clearly where to go and what to do. He has gone to peoples front doors who don't even know who he is and what's this all about, no thank you, goodbye. He has been canvassing all over, now because he's been canvassing all over and a lot of these people that don't know much about it but think he's an idiot, just say to other people who's that fellow, what's he on about, I told him to get lost. Now he's starting to bring himself undone with members in general that didn't know much about it, didn't care because he's knocking on their door and they say we don't want to know him and this is coming, this feedback is coming in this last week or two, this feedback has come to me of all the different people he's knocked on doors of that just said get lost.

Bill Lynn:...."There's possibly a bit of psychology in it, I mean if you make enough noise when the fun fire does start, you'll always hear a certain amount of ducking their heads.".....

......

Margot Angliss: Well I've heard things, people have said things to me and you know what people have said to me, in here since I've been back "Oh I had a call from Mr Ciemcioch, he's a bit of an idiot fellow isn't he?" That's a couple of comments I've had and I've just said "yeah" and just gone on my way.

......

Margot Angliss: ..."She [Mrs Ciemcioch] can talk about it till she's blue in the face but nothings going to happen and I, personally, as Secretary of this club feel that if Mrs Ciemcioch becomes a member, you're asking for trouble to begin with because she's trouble not being a member, she has said various things about this club that I don't like and I personally would, I wont, I don't care if its a direction of the Board and I don't care if I'm out of order, I will not sign any letter and somebody else will have to do it to say if you decide that Mrs Ciemcioch will be a member of this club because I don't feel anybody should back down after what Mrs Ciemcioch has said. I mean we are not a social club with thirty members, we are a ten million dollar a year turnover, we are a business with four thousand eight hundred members and you've got one silly little woman running around wanting to swear out writs and what does the Board do turn round and say like we are a social club with thirty members well we had better let her in. I can't believe it. That's just my opinion I'm sorry."

It is clear, in my view, that their attitudes which were negative to Mrs Ciemcioch were critical to the outcome of those discussions.

I regard this material as relevant in forming a view as to the conduct of the original meeting of 18 December 1991. In contrast to usual practice at the time, it would seem that no tape of this meeting was made.

So far as Mr Lynn is concerned, I am satisfied that his hostility was based on two factors:

(a) Mrs Ciemcioch's spirited and independent personality, and the possibility that she might become active in the affairs of the club; and

(a) Mrs Ciemcioch's relationship with Joe Ciemcioch. She was seen, as the complainant alleges, as being married to a so-called "trouble-maker", who had recently had vindication in legal proceedings against the club.

I am satisfied that Mrs Ciemcioch's comments to Mr Jackson at the farm reflected a strong commitment to the ideals and objectives of the RSL movement. Her concerns as to the current issues relating to the management of the club (which had given rise to her husband's litigation) could not, in my view, be reasonably construed as involving hostility or disloyalty to those ideals or objectives. Denials of membership were highly unusual in the history of this club.

The usual practice of this club was to accept all membership applications routinely and without question. There were two other instances of rejection, and it was said by Mr Lynn and Ms Angliss that the rejections were on the basis of alleged derogatory remarks made by those persons about the club and its directors. When referring to these instances in evidence Mr Lynn reiterated his commitment to that decision in strong and passionate terms.

In giving evidence, it was clear that Mr Lynn held strong views on many matters, in particular with respect to the acceptability of potential members who had known, negative views as to the club or its administration. Mrs Angliss shared a similar outlook.

As noted earlier, evidence of that characteristic is to be found in many of the comments of Mr Lynn and Mrs Angliss in the edited transcript of committee meetings in early to mid 1992 where the possibility of rescinding the decision to exclude Mrs Ciemcioch was in issue.

I do not regard Mr Lynn's construction of Mrs Ciemcioch's attitude as reasonable. Mr Lynn placed a construction on the report of Mrs Ciemcioch's conversation with Mr Jackson which was likely to be the one most detrimental to her application, i.e. that she was disloyal to the club and (at least by inference ) to the ideals of the RSL.

I have little doubt that several of the committee members reached their conclusion with no other view of the matter other than Mrs Ciemcioch had engaged in disloyal conduct. In the case of some members of the committee, the only thing they knew independently on Mr Jackson's report about Mrs Ciemcioch was that she was married to Mr Ciemcioch.

But it is not sufficient, simply to have regard to the reasoning of the committee at the relevant meeting in circumstances where the wider committee was given a view of the applicant which was unreasonable.

In reaching these conclusions as to the views of Mr Lynn and Mr Jackson, I have also had regard to the additional evidence as to the likely thinking of the committee found in the transcripts of the tapes of meetings where the possibility was discussed of rescinding the exclusion of Mrs Ciemcioch.

The Law

It was put to me by counsel for the club that the view formed of Mrs Ciemcioch, even if unfair or erroneous, was one founded on her own characteristics, i.e. that of a strong-willed person, who had expressed criticism of the club. As the opinion related to her own characteristics, it was not a case that fell within the purview of the Sex Discrimination Act. It simply represented an example of a case where a contentious decision was made by the committee of a club, something it was free to do provided anti-discrimination legislation was not infringed.

If counsel's original premise as to the facts in this case is accepted, then I would agree with the conclusion he draws. Anti-discrimination laws represent a limited and narrow intervention into the affairs of clubs, which otherwise should be left to conduct themselves subject to their own rules and constitution.

But, as I indicated, I am satisfied that an additional factor, involving Mrs Ciemcioch's marital relationship to Joe Ciemcioch, was present. Counsel for the club submitted that nonetheless this finding did not give rise to the conclusion that the Sex Discrimination Act was infringed. It was submitted that the mere existence of a close relationship of support and loyalty to each other's views, as often occurs between married people, is not sufficient.

It does not, in my view, follow that because the characteristics of loyalty and support are to be found in a wide variety of interpersonal relationships that the existence of these characteristics in the relationship of marriage should be treated as not protected by the Sex Discrimination Act. The view was pressed on me by counsel that the 'marital status' provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act only gave protection in relation to characteristics attaching to marital status where they were only found in marriage. I have had some difficulty in identifying what characteristics could be said to be absolutely unique to marital relationships, and not to be ones capable of arising in other forms of interpersonal relationships.

A preferable approach, I consider, is to recognise that an object of the Sex Discrimination Act is to alleviate forms of discrimination commonly affecting women (exclusively in the case of pregnancy). A woman's ability to pursue an independent career or to participate in community life, by joining clubs, should not be hampered unreasonably because of the fact of being married, or of being married to a particular person or because of the possession of characteristics found in marriages. In this regard as Priestley JA, referring to the NSW Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, said in Boehringer Ingelheim P/L - v - Reddrop, at p.21:

"Experience suggests.....that discrimination against individuals because of characteristics of, or imputed to, a group in general often occurs and is difficult to deal with. It is proper that, insofar as a policy of this kind is embodied in this Act, full effect be given to it."

It is my view that the beneficial objects of legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act should be given weight in interpreting the scope of its provisions. I favour a liberal construction of s.6 rather than the narrow one put by counsel for the respondent.

In any event, in my view there is an important difference between the circumstances of this case and two leading cases referred to in argument: Reddrop (supra); and Waterhouse-v-Bell (1991) 25 NSWLR 99. In both of the cited cases the concern of the organisation arose from understandable considerations. In Boehringer Ingelheim P/L-v-Reddrop (op.cit.) it was the company's proper concern with ensuring that its confidential commercial information was protected, one it saw as being placed at risk by employing the complainant, who was married to a senior executive of a rival company. In Waterhouse-v-Bell (op.cit.) it was a principal racing club's proper concern with the integrity of the operation of the racing industry which it saw as being placed at risk by granting a trainer's licence to the wife of a warned-off man.

While I have doubts as to the current authority of the decision of New South Wales Court of Appeal in Boehringer Ingelheim P/L-v-Reddrop (op.cit.), as I have already noted, that case dealt with a difficult situation where the organisation's underlying concern was an understandable one. Nonetheless, the social policy considerations that have given rise to the prohibition of marital status discrimination perhaps do not warrant the caution reflected in that decision. It is difficult to see why a woman (or a man) should be impeded in obtaining suitable employment simply because a possible risk (ie that commercially-confidential information might be disclosed) is seen as arising from the conversation and communication inherent in marriage.

In contrast, this case involves an underlying organisational concern which was, in my view, not properly held. In this instance the organisation was seeking to prevent the entry into the club of a woman married to a man who had, through proper legal channels, exercised his right to question the administration of the club. What occurred here was that an inappropriate consideration (discontent over a male member exercising his lawful right to sue) was coupled in the thinking of the committee with a characteristic generally imputed to married women (loyalty to and support for a husband's lawful activities).

I am satisfied that the club in rejecting the complainant's application, both at the meeting of 18 December 1991 and subsequently, infringed the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) by having regard to an unlawful consideration, namely the characteristic of loyalty towards and support of a husband's lawful activities, a characteristic generally imputed to the relationship of marriage. I am also satisfied that in similar circumstances the club would not have treated a person of a different marital status in the same way.

Determination

I find the complaint substantiated.

Accordingly, I find that the club infringed s.6 and s.25 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).

I make the following declarations:

(i) That the respondent has engaged in conduct rendered unlawful by the Act and that the complainant's application to join the club should be reconsidered; and

(ii) That the respondent should pay to the complainant damages by way of compensation in the sum of $3000.

Signed in Sydney this 13 July 1994

Kevin O'Connor

Hearing Commissioner

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission

Sex Discrimination Act 1984

No. H93/029

Between:

Victoria Ciemcioch

Complainant

and

Echuca-Moama RSL Citizens Club Ltd

Respondent

Determination

The Commission finds as follows:

1. The complaint has been substantiated; and

2. The respondent club infringed s.6 and s.25 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).

Accordingly the Commission makes the following declarations under s.81 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth):

(i) That the respondent has engaged in conduct rendered unlawful by the Act and that the complainant's application to join the club should be reconsidered; and

(ii) That the respondent should pay to the complainant damages by way of compensation in the sum of $3000.

Signed on behalf of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in Sydney this

13 July 1994

Kevin O'Connor

Hearing Commissioner