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Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Christou [2011] FMCA 489 (24 August 2011)

Last Updated: 31 August 2011

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEMANDEM HOLDINGS PTY LTD & ANOR v CHRISTOU
[2011] FMCA 489

BANKRUPTCY – Contested creditor’s petition – whether the debtor is solvent and whether the debtor has an off-setting claim that provides a reason for the Court to refrain from making a sequestration order considered.


Christou v Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 36
Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard [2009] WASCA 158
Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd & Anor v Christou [2010] FMCA 494
Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (No.3) [2010] FCAFC 158
Fromont v Coupland [1824] EngR 650; (1824) 2 Bing 170; 130 ER 271
J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1982] FCA 78; (1982) 41 ALR 539
Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl [1988] HCA 34; (1988) 165 CLR 71
Leman v Gordan (1838) 8 Car & P392; [1838] EngR 163; 173 ER 546
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 226; (1997) 74 FCR 19; 143 ALR 396
Norman v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 21; (1963) 109 CLR 9
Re Rule’s Settlement [1915] VicLawRp 101; [1915] VLR 670
Re Schmidt; ex parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 111
Smith, Fleming & Co’s Case (1866) LR 1 Ch App 538
Totev v Sfar & Anor [2008] FCAFC 35; (2008) 247 ALR 180

First Applicant:
DEMANDEM HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Second Applicant:
GLENLEA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
ACN 065 274 544

Respondent:
NICK CHRISTOU

File Number:
PEG 59 of 2011

Judgment of:
Driver FM

Hearing date:
1 June 2011

Date of last submission:
1 July 2011

Delivered at:
Sydney, via telephone link to Perth

Delivered on:
24 August 2011

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:
Mr M Bennett
Bennett + Co Solicitors

Solicitors for the Respondent:
Mr A Rumsley
Commercial Disputes Lawyer

ORDERS

(1) The estate of Nick Christou be sequestrated.
(2) The petitioning creditor’s costs, including reserved costs, be taxed and paid in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
(3) The Court notes that the date of the act of bankruptcy is 9 February 2011.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 59 of 2011

DEMANDEM HOLDINGS PTY LTD

First Applicant


GLENLEA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
ACN 065 274 544

Second Applicant


And


NICK CHRISTOU

Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. The applicant (Demandem) proceeds on a creditor’s petition presented on 16 March 2011. The petition states that the respondent (Nick Christou) owes Demandem $27,600.62 based upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dated 28 March 2008[1] plus interest of $13,302.20 as set out in bankruptcy notice WA 136/2010. Demandem is an unsecured creditor. The petition is supported by the affidavits contained within Part 2 of it verifying its contents.
  2. The petition is further supported by the affidavits of Maria Eva Worthington made on 14 March 2011 and two made on 31 May 2011, the affidavit of service of Cheryl Lorraine Harrison made on 31 March 2011, the affidavit of Keith Graeme Lingard made on 11 April 2011, the affidavits Neil Kevin Joyce made on 15 April 2011 and 6 May 2011 and the affidavit of Darren Kurt Zusman made on 2 March 2011.
  3. The petition is opposed by Mr Christou, who relies upon an amended Notice Stating Grounds of Opposition to the Petition filed on 27 April 2011 as follows:
  4. Mr Christou relies upon his own affidavits made on 12 and 27 April 2011.
  5. None of the deponents were required for cross-examination.

Consideration

  1. There is no challenge to the validity of either the bankruptcy notice or the creditor’s petition. Prima facie, Demandem is entitled to the relief sought in the petition. The dispute between the parties arises from the grounds of opposition to the petition which involve claims of solvency and set-off. Mr Christou deposes to assets in excess of $4.5 million in his affidavits. Mr Christou further submits that the judgment supporting the petition establishes a liability in his favour of $122,399.38 net of interest which this Court has previously found could be set-off against the judgment debt in favour of Demandem[2]. However, in subsequent proceedings concerning an additional set-off claim by Mr Christou[3] Federal Magistrate Raphael found that Mr Christou’s right to be paid by Demandem did not come into existence until he paid the debt due to Demandem, so that there was no further right of set-off.
  2. Nevertheless, Mr Christou submits that the discretion provided by s.52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“Bankruptcy Act”) is a broad one sufficient to recognise that substantial justice is best done by reducing the indebtedness of Mr Christou to reflect the net effect of the orders of the Supreme Court. He submits that as Demandem is required to pay Mr Christou $50,000 on receipt of $150,000 from him, the established set-off of $122,399.38 more than accounts for the debt due to Demandem. Put simply, Mr Christou asserts that there is more money owing to him by Demandem than he owes to Demandem.
  3. As to solvency, Mr Christou claims an interest in a residential property at City Beach in Perth jointly with his wife and he gives a valuation for that property of $2.4 million. However, Mr Christou’s interest is as a beneficiary of a trust and the legal title to the property is in Mrs Christou’s name. While I have evidence of the trust it is not sufficient to persuade me that Mr Christou will be able to access his equitable interest in the property within a reasonable time.
  4. Mr Christou is one of three partners in an accounting partnership. The other two partners are Keith Graeme Lingard and Neil Kevin Joyce. Mr Joyce is the director of Demandem. Mr Christou has been in dispute with Mr Lingard and Mr Joyce since 2001 and in litigation with them since 2003 in this Court, the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The partnership was valued in 2002 at $8 million. It has not been wound up. Mr Christou asserts that his share of the partnership as valued in 2002 is $2,666,666. On 28 March 2008 Beech J made declarations in the Supreme Court of Western Australia in relation to Mr Christou’s entitlement to distributions of income under trusts controlled by companies in respect of which Mr Lingard and Mr Joyce and he are directors in the amount of $747,954.19. Mr Christou has not received the distributions of income. However, in the same orders Beech J ordered the winding up of the partnership (which has not occurred) which would seem to be a necessary step in dealing with the distributions from the partnership required by the Supreme Court. The orders made by the Court also included costs orders against Mr Christou and the orders for principal and interest supporting the creditor’s petition. Those orders do not, on their face, establish an asset available to Mr Christou now or within a reasonable time in order to discharge his debts. Mr Christou asserts other assets of approximately $35,000 (including shares) but his evidence as to his assets does not persuade me that he is solvent.
  5. At the trial of this matter on 1 June 2011 I invited Mr Christou to support his claim of solvency by payment into court of the amount due to Demandem. He gave an undertaking to pay into court the amount of $40,902.82 within 28 days. Mr Christou paid that sum into court on 27 June 2011. I also gave the parties the opportunity to file further evidence and submissions after the trial of the matter. A further affidavit by Ms Worthington made on 28 June 2011 was filed on the same day. That establishes an additional costs liability owed by Mr Christou of $165,660.71[4]. There are, in addition, other liabilities which Mr Christou shares with the company Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd (CSP) arising out of other litigation.
  6. Having regard to the now crystallised further debts that have been identified, I find that, notwithstanding the payment into court, Mr Christou has failed to demonstrate solvency.
  7. In relation to the second ground of opposition to the petition, it is necessary to review the circumstances surrounding the Supreme Court judgment supporting the petition and the consequences of that judgment. In the 2010 proceedings in this Court Federal Magistrate Raphael found that the bankruptcy notice then in issue overstated the debt due to Demandem and dismissed the creditor’s petition before him. Relevantly, at [3]-[9] his Honour said:
  8. Demandem issued a fresh (and the current) bankruptcy notice which Mr Christou applied to set aside. That application was the subject of the 2011 proceedings before Raphael FM. In his judgment in that proceeding Raphael FM examined the issue of set-off raised by Mr Christou in more detail. His Honour said at [2]-[17]:
The bankruptcy notice issued on 17 September 2010 effectively does this but it does not take into account certain other monies which Mr Christou says the assignor to Demandem and Glenlea owed him or a company from whom he had received an assignment. He says that these monies also constituted equities that would enable a set off under s.40(1)(g) and s.41(6A) of the Act to be invoked.
The first “set off”
There has been considerable litigation between these parties in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. On 21 April 2008, after a lengthy trial, Beech J gave judgment and made declarations and orders; Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard (No.4) [2008] WASC 21. Order 10 of his Honour’s orders was:
The fifth and sixth defendants are the respondents to this application and it is common ground that their right, title and interest in the $150,000.00 arose out of a deed of assignment dated 13 June 2005. The assignment is in writing, expressed to be a deed and I understand that notice thereof was given to Mr Christou. It has all the hallmarks of a legal assignment in respect of which s.20 of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA) applies. The operative provisions of the deed state as follows:
It is common ground that “the debt” is the $150,000.00 that Beech J ordered Mr Christou to pay to the assignors. It is defined in the deed as:
It is also agreed that Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd (ACN 009 412 622) (“CSP”) has assigned its rights in the one third of the net proceeds to Mr Christou. After the hearing, I noticed a discrepancy between the company named in clause 2.2 of the assignment deed and the company named in the decision of Beech J. In response to my request for clarification on the identity of this company, the parties agreed that clause 2.2 of the assignment erroneously adds a 3 onto the end of the ACN number and omits the word “Publishing”. I accept there is no issue in this regard and that the named companies are, in fact, the same.
The respondents accept that the SPA assignment is one of a chose in action and is subject to s.20 of the Property Law Act 1969 (WA). The respondents argue that the obligation in clause 2.2 of the deed does not constitute an equity in favour of Mr Christou because it only attaches to the net proceeds of the debt after deduction of legal costs and that means it only attaches to the amount that Mr Christou pays to the respondents after it has been calculated and he has paid it. I have not been addressed as to what the phrase “all legal costs associated with the enforcement thereof” means in the context of this deed. It is accepted that it has a very strong connection to the costs of the counter-claim in the proceedings before Beech J and I am aware that a bill in the sum of $20,084.20 has been prepared for taxation. But it has not yet been taxed and I do not know whether it is considered that “all legal costs” mean just those taxed or the actual sum paid by the creditors to their solicitor and counsel. The creditors argue that, because they have already taken into account the other set-off against the sum of $150,000.00 plus interest, one third of the balance in respect of which they stand as trustees for Mr Christou must be less than the total amount of his debt. He must, therefore, be indebted to them. That is as may be, but it is for the creditors to accurately state the figure they claim the debtor owes them. If what I would call the “trust monies” are capable of constituting a set-off then it is clear to me that the amount claimed under the bankruptcy notice is inaccurate, probably because of an overstatement in respect of which a proper notice has been served or because the applicant would be confused as to the amount which he owes his creditors; Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl [1988] HCA 34; (1988) 165 CLR 71.
This “inaccuracy”, which would invalidate the notice if found, is separate from the claim that the set-off may equal or exceed the amount claimed. Because it is said to arise from equities that existed at the time of the assignment the notice should only claim the net amount owing. This is what the current notice does, in contra-distinction to the first notice that I found invalid. But the calculation of the net may prove to be wrong thus involving the overstatement or confusion grounds. It is for the applicant to make this out and he seeks to do so by the arguments considered below.
The applicant submits that clause 2.2 of the deed of assignment is merely a reflection of the debtor’s pre-existing entitlement to one third of any judgment in SPA’s favour;
The applicant’s submissions in relation to the first set-off are based on the assumption that, prior to the assignment of the chose in action, CSP was entitled to one third of the judgment debt. The applicant does not provide a reason for this though it is implicit that he is referring to the way in which SPA distributed income to the three partners. Although described by Beech J as a partner of SPA, Mr Christou was in fact a director and shareholder of that company. The income generated by SPA was distributed by the Stanton Partners Trust, a unit trust of which SPA was trustee. Under this trust CSP was entitled to one third of the income generated by SPA. At [11] of the decision on appeal from Beech J; Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard [2009] WASCA 158, Owen JA, with whom McClure and Buss JA agreed, explains that the partners received payments in two ways:
It seems to me that the applicant has confused his entitlement to a third of the drawings and distributions of income of SPA with an entitlement to a third of the judgment debt. There is no direct relationship between the two. The company is entitled to decide how to use the $150,000.00. It may wish to distribute this sum as income but, equally, it may wish to reinvest this money. I am satisfied that Mr Christou did not have an entitlement to one third of the judgment debt prior to the assignment.
The next question to consider is the nature of the entitlement which was created by clause 2.2 of the deed of assignment and whether it can form the basis for a set off. The Respondent submits that the debtor’s entitlement to one third of the net proceeds of the debt cannot form the basis of a legal or equitable set off because the subject matter of the trust did not exist at the date of the deed. It is well established that a mere expectancy or “future property” cannot be the subject matter of a trust and a trust which purports to have property of this nature as its subject will be void for uncertainty; Re Rule’s Settlement [1915] VicLawRp 101; [1915] VLR 670; cf Dal Pont and Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia (2007). The respondents rely on Norman v FCT [1963] HCA 21; (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 26 per Windeyer J:
In that case the High Court held by majority that yet to be declared dividends from shares could not be the subject of a voluntary equitable assignment as the sum of money did not exist at the time of the assignment and was dependant upon the affairs of the companies in question. I am of the view that the subject matter of the trust in the instant case falls into this same category of “future property”. The subject of the trust is not a third share in the debt but rather a third share in the net proceeds of the debt. This is a sum which could not be ascertained with any certainty at the time of the assignment.
The next issue raised by the respondents concerns the potential enforceability of clause 2.2 of the assignment as a contract to create a trust. As there was no present right to enforce the trust, it would fail unless it was supported by valuable consideration in the eyes of equity. The assignment deed which creates the “trust” in clause 2.2 nowhere mentions consideration, not even “in consideration of these presents”. I am satisfied that no consideration was expressed to pass for the “trust” purportedly created.
Even if the assignment did give rise to an obligation to create a trust in favour of CSP and hence Mr Christou, I am of the view that this would not form the basis of a legal or equitable set off:
Both at common law and in equity, the right of set-off depends upon proof of an actionable debt; J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd [1982] FCA 78; (1982) 41 ALR 539 at 554. In this case, Mr Christou has no legal or equitable right to enforce the contract until the net proceeds of the debt come into existence. The only way he could come into possession of this right is by first paying the outstanding judgment debt.
After the hearing, Mr Christou referred the Court to the decision in Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (No 3) [2010] FCAFC 158 in which the applicant sought the imposition of a costs order of $8,039.90. In that case the Court was also aware of the respondent’s entitlement to $16,415.95 from the applicant for costs in another Federal Court matter:
I do not agree that the same exercise of discretion is appropriate in the instant case. After having regard to the equities between the parties, I am of the view that there would be no unfairness in allowing the respondents to recover the outstanding debt without regard to Mr Christou’s claim for one third of the net proceeds. As already noted, it is not clear what is meant by the phrase “all legal costs associated with the enforcement thereof” and whether it includes the costs of the present proceedings. As such, there is no way for me to determine the sum of the net proceeds to which Mr Christou may be entitled.
For the above reasons, I am satisfied that there is no right of set off in regard to the “trust monies”.
The second “set off”
Another of Beech J’s orders of relevance in these proceedings was order 5:
It is noteworthy that his Honour made a declaration about these sums and did not give Mr Christou or his trustee company (the first plaintiff) a judgment for them. Any rights that the first plaintiff, CSP, had in respect of this declaration were assigned to Mr Christou. Mr Christou argues that these monies constitute a set off against SPA and SAA that existed, so far as the years 2003 to 2005 are concerned, at the time of the assignment to the current creditors and are thus an equity in respect of which they are burdened. The respondents argue that the orders of Beech J constitute no obligation of that type, that they are no more than a declaration by his Honour of amounts which will be taken into the partnership accounts for the relevant years and against which deductions may be made before a final distribution amount is known. They argue that the figures do not constitute an obligation of the creditor companies’ assignor to Mr Christou and that, before there can be said to be such an obligation, further proceedings must be taken. Against this, the applicant cites the views of Owen JA with whom McClure and Buss JA agreed in the appeal against the decision of Beech J; Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard [2009] WASCA 158 at [176-177]:
It seems to me that the appeal judgment establishes the respondent’s case. Beech J deliberately did not make orders entitling CSP to any sums certain and the appeal court recognised that further litigation was necessary for all years after 2002. I am of the view that their Honours were only referring to the 2002 year in the paragraph commencing with the word “secondly”. This view is supported by the supplementary reasons for decision of Beech J at [32]:
Besides the declarations in Order 5 of Beech J’s judgment, the applicant has not advanced any other evidence to enable the Court to determine his cash entitlements from the income of SPA and SAA. I am, therefore, unable to find that there is a set off available on account of these sums which is equal to or exceeds the amount claimed in the bankruptcy notice.
The findings made above mean that the applicant has not satisfied me that there was an overstatement of the debt, that the amount claimed in the notice was liable to cause confusion or that he had a cross-claim, cross-demand or set-off equal to or exceeding the amount of the claim. The set-offs he now contends for are not actionable at this time although it may well be that he is entitled to some further monies from the accounting practice. The application must be dismissed and the applicant shall pay the respondents’ costs to be taxed, if not agreed, pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2006.
  1. I am not persuaded that his Honour’s analysis in the 2011 judgment was wrong. On the contrary, in my view that judgment is an effective answer to ground 2 in the Notice of Grounds of Opposition. Federal Magistrate Raphael gave close attention to the deed of assignment entered into on 13 June 2005 between Stanton Partners Australia Pty Ltd (SPA) (the assignor) and Demandem Investments Pty Ltd and Glenlea Enterprises Pty Ltd (the assignees). The deed purports to assign a debt to the assignees, pursuant to clause 2.1.
  2. Pursuant to clause 1.1, the deed defines the debt as being:
  3. The Debt is the amount of $150,000 required to be paid by Mr Christou to the applicants pursuant to order 10 of the orders made by Beech J on 28 March 2008 in proceedings CIV 1788 of 2003.
  4. Pursuant to clause 2.2, the assignees agreed that they would hold one third of the net proceeds of the Debt after deduction of all legal costs associated with the enforcement thereof in trust for Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd (CSP).
  5. CSP assigned its right to one third of the net proceeds of the Debt to Mr Christou.
  6. Clause 2.2 of the deed makes clear that Mr Christou’s entitlement under the deed is limited to one third of the net proceeds of the debt after deduction of all legal costs associated with the enforcement thereof.
  7. In the 2011 proceedings Raphael FM found that in the absence of a proof of an actionable debt, Mr Christou had no right to set-off at common law or in equity in respect of the net proceeds of the debt: J & S Holdings Pty Ltd v NRMA Insurance Ltd at 554. In other words, Mr Christou has no legal or equitable right to enforce the purported obligation in clause 2.2 of the Deed until the net proceeds of the debt come into existence. The only way Mr Christou could come into possession of this right would be through first paying the outstanding debt.
  8. Therefore, Mr Christou’s failure to pay the amount of $150,000 precludes him from being able to claim a legal or equitable set-off in respect of one third of the net proceeds of the debt after the deduction of all legal costs associated with its enforcement.
  9. The present bankruptcy notice and the creditor’s petition take account of the set-off identified in the 2010 proceedings. I am not persuaded that Mr Christou has established that he has a further set-off or other entitlement to monies from Demandem in circumstances where it would be unjust for this Court to make a sequestration order.
  10. Neither am I persuaded that there is any other reason for the Court to refrain from making a sequestration order. Mr Christou relies on the authority of Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (No.3) in support of its proposition that the discretion provided by s.52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act is broad enough to recognise that substantial justice is best done by reducing the indebtedness of the respondent.
  11. In that case Food Channel Network (FCN) sought an order for the repayment of $8,039.90 paid by it to Television Food Network GP (TFN) in discharge of an order for costs, which was later set aside on appeal, in circumstances where TFN was entitled to payment by FCN of $16,415.95 pursuant to a certificate of taxation.
  12. The Court considered that in those circumstances, whether or not TFN was strictly entitled to set off the sum of $8,039.90 against FCN’s debt of $16,415.95, the Court’s discretion was broad enough to recognise that substantial justice was best done by leaving FCN indebted to TFN in the sum of $8,736.05, rather than to compel TFN to pursue FCN for the recovery amount of $16,415.95.
  13. Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP can be distinguished from the present case on the basis that it concerned two actionable debts, both of which were due and payable at the date of the action. I do not accept that the principle laid down in Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP extends to cases such as this where in the first instance there is no actionable debt due to Mr Christou but merely a contingent future debt.
  14. Even if the Court’s discretion does extend to taking account of non-actionable contingent debts, it does not follow that such a contingent debt provides “other sufficient cause” under s.52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act so that a sequestration order should not be made.
  15. Mr Christou relies on the authority of Totev v Sfar & Anor [2008] FCAFC 35; (2008) 247 ALR 180 in submitting that the Court’s discretion under s.52(2)(b) is a broad one. In that case the Full Federal Court did not consider what range of circumstances might constitute “other sufficient cause” under the Bankruptcy Act, but instead concentrated on answering one specific question as to whether a counterclaim by a respondent debtor in other proceedings against an applicant creditor might enliven the Court’s discretion under s.52(2)(b).
  16. The Court recognised that while the discretion is enlivened in such circumstances, the existence of a counterclaim by a respondent debtor against a petitioning creditor has been held not to constitute sufficient reason for the Court to decline to make a sequestration order, even though it has been accepted that, in an appropriate case, such a claim might constitute “other sufficient cause”: Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 226; (1997) 74 FCR 19 at [25]- [26]; ALR 400-2 and Re Schmidt; ex parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1967) 13 FLR 111 at 115-117. The Court identified that the determination of such a question would depend upon an assessment of the particular facts in each case, considered in conjunction with the interests of the petitioning creditor.
  17. Mr Christou relies on Totev v Sfar only to the extent that it supports his proposition that the discretion afforded to the Court is a broad one under s.52(2)(b). However, to the extent that that authority may have application in respect of Mr Christou’s claim against the petitioning creditors in Federal Court proceedings WAD182 of 2010, the petitioning creditors note the most recent orders of McKerracher J made on 9 June 2011 strike out Mr Christou’s statement of claim for a third time.
  18. Whilst Totev v Sfar is authority for the proposition that the Court’s discretion under s.52(2)(b) is a broad one, like Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP, it provides no authority for Mr Christou’s contention that a non-actionable debt should be accepted as constituting “other sufficient cause” under the Bankruptcy Act so that a sequestration order ought not to be made.
  19. In my view, in circumstances where a debtor has substantial debts in addition to the debt identified in a creditor’s petition, and the contingent debt relied upon to resist a sequestration order is not actionable until such time as the debt due to the petitioning creditor is paid, and there is little likelihood of that debt being paid (even in bankruptcy) the Court should not accept the contingent debt as a reason not to make a sequestration order. That is the circumstance here.
  20. I am satisfied that Mr Christou committed the act of bankruptcy alleged in the petition. I am satisfied with the other matters of which s.52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act requires proof.
  21. I am not satisfied that Mr Christou has established that he is able to pay his debts or that there is another reason for the Court to refrain from making a sequestration order. I will grant the relief sought in the petition.

I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Driver FM


Date: 24 August 2011

[1] Proceeding number CIV 1788/2003
[2] See Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd v Christou [2010] FMCA 494 (the 2010 proceedings)
[3] Christou v Demandem Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] FMCA 36 (the 2011 proceedings)
[4] A further $13,357.37 is owed to him.

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