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Jia v Wollgramm-Tan [2011] FMCA 38 (1 February 2011)
Last Updated: 11 March 2011
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BANKRUPTCY – Application opposing a
Creditor’s Petition – whether the Court should look behind the
judgment debt
– principles considered – debt did not exist at the
time judgment was entered – Creditor’s Petition dismissed.
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|
Hearing date:
|
19 October 2010
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|
Delivered on:
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1 February 2011
|
REPRESENTATION
Advocate for the
Applicant:
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Mr I Mitchell
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Solicitors for the Applicant:
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Websters Solicitors
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Advocate for the Respondent:
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Ms A Lam
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Solicitors for the Respondent:
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Margaret Tan & Associates
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ORDERS
(1) The Creditor’s Petition, filed on 7 September
2010, is dismissed.
(2) A copy of this order to be provided to the Official Receiver in Sydney
within 2 days.
(3) The Applicant creditor to pay the Respondent debtor’s costs as agreed
or taxed.
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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY
|
SYG1954 of
2010
Applicant
And
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceedings
- By
an Amended Notice Stating Grounds of Opposition to the Creditor’s Petition
filed on 8 October 2010, the Respondent debtor
Gabriele Wollgram-Tan claims that
she does not owe the Applicant creditor, Ye Jia, the amount of $23,689.84
awarded against her in
proceedings number 10153 of 2009 in the Local Court,
Downing Centre Sydney. Ms Wollgram-Tan states the following.
- The
Applicant has never paid the bank guarantee which is the basis of the judgment
debt in 2009 as alleged.
- The
Applicant cannot provide evidence of the discharge of the bank guarantee by
National Australia Bank (“NAB”). The
Applicant is relying solely on
a credit entry and a bank statement of Port Homemakers Pty Ltd, dated 9
September 2008.
- There
is a claim by the NAB in the Supreme Court in relation to the alleged debt of
$46,723.00 against the Respondent and the Applicant
jointly. The debt amount
referred to above which was claimed by the Applicant is half the amount of
$46,723.00 claimed by the NAB.
- The
Respondent is one of the defendants in proceedings number 00119013 of 2010 in
the Supreme Court.
- The
application to set aside the judgment entered on 2 December 2009 in the Local
Court was refused on the basis that the Respondent
could cross claim against the
Applicant in the Supreme Court.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan states that the Applicant relies on a judgment debt based on an
alleged indemnity from her. The indemnity was between
the Applicant and Ms
Wollgramm-Tan to the NAB. Ms Wollgramm-Tan claims she has never provided any
indemnity to the Applicant. Ms
Wollgramm-Tan relies on s.52(1)(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”) and asks the Court to
look behind the judgment relied on by the Applicant as there are substantial
reasons
for doubting whether there really was a debt due to the petitioning
creditor at the time of the judgment. Ms Wollgramm-Tan relies
on s.52(2)(b) of
the Act and asks the Court to dismiss the petition on the basis of insufficient
cause.
Background
- I
initially rely upon the affidavit of Gabriele Wollgramm-Tan sworn
15 October
2010, and the affidavit of Ye Jia sworn 18 October 2010 which sets out
background material to the proceedings. The creditor,
Ms Ye Jia and the debtor,
Ms Wollgramm-Tan were directors of the business Port Homemakers Pty Ltd, ACN 126
821 172 (“Homemakers”).
On 3 December 2007, there was a bank
guarantee granted by the NAB in the amount of $46,723 in which Ms Ye Jia and Ms
Wollgramm-Tan
were guarantors to secure Homemakers’ obligation in the
lease. On 13 June 2008, the bank guarantee was called by the lessor
as a result
of a default in payment of rent. The NAB, paid the bank guarantee to the
lessor, the Trustee of Roman Catholic Diocese
of Lismore. A copy of the bank
statement of Homemakers account number 082184858870461 (Number 1) shows the
debit entry for $46,731
with the description of “Bank Guarantee Paid to
Roman Catholic Church” on 23 June 2008.
- Ms
Ye Jia filed a Statement of Claim on 7 October 2009 in the Local Court at the
Downing Centre against Ms Wollgramm-Tan alleging
that she had paid the NAB the
full amount of the bank guarantee and was therefore seeking that Ms
Wollgramm-Tan pay for half of the
amount of the bank guarantee being $23,689.84.
Ms Wollgramm-Tan acknowledges that she and Ms Ye Jia provided a joint indemnity
to
the NAB for the bank guarantee but denies that she provided an indemnity for
the bank guarantee to Ye Jia.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan states that she and her husband had a furniture business in Port
Macquarie where they had planned to retire and rely
on that small business. She
states that they had been operating a furniture business in Sydney successfully
for over 15 years.
Ms Ye Jia operated a company, Hong Da (Aust) Pty Ltd (ACN
083 082 428) which was a supplier to their furniture business. Ms Wollgramm-Tan
states that on a number of occasions, Ms Ye Jia asked her to go into business.
Ms Ye Jia had indicated that she had substantial financial
resources and would
provide all the money to finance the venture whilst Ms Wollgramm-Tan would work
in the business. The business
was to be owned equally between them.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan claims that in September 2007, she finally agreed to enter the
venture with Ms Ye Jia and they formed the company
Homemakers. However disputes
about how to run the business occurred within three months. Ms Wollgramm-Tan
states that she offered
to buy Ms Ye Jia out or alternatively offered Ms Ye Jia
to purchase her share. They entered into negotiations but were unable to
reach
an agreement. Ms Wollgramm-Tan claims she tendered her resignation as a
director on 15 May 2008 but Ms Ye Jia refused to accept
it. Consequently, Ms
Wollgramm-Tan sought to have administrators appointed to liquidate the
company.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan acknowledges that she surrendered the financial management of the
company to Ms Ye Jia in October 2007, because there
was constant disagreement
concerning the trading figures. Ms Ye Jia kept all the cheque books, deposit
books and bank statements.
In January 2008, Ms Wollgramm-Tan went to Germany to
visit her sick mother. When she returned in February 2008, Ms Ye Jia had
changed
the internet password so that Ms Wollgramm-Tan was unable to access
their bank statements and she was unaware of what was happening
with the company
finances.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan claims that Ms Ye Jia incurred debts with the lessor and other
suppliers. Ms Wollgramm-Tan also claims that Ms Ye
Jia only paid herself until
the company was forced into liquidation. In the administration report, they
identified 17 payments to
the value of $94,378, which may be regarded as unfair
preferences.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan states that the global financial crisis severely affected her
business and she had already lost her house. She states
that she had made
enquiries about issuing proceedings against Ms Ye Jia and could not afford to
pursue that litigation. Ms Wollgramm-Tan
states that she could not afford legal
fees and therefore was not legally represented in the Local Court proceedings on
7 October
2010, seeking to set aside that judgment, and in the Federal
Magistrates Court proceedings on 13 October 2010. At the same time,
she states
that she was struggling to re establish her business in Sydney and that she and
her husband were budgeting weekly depending
on sales revenue from that
business.
- Ms
Wollgramm-Tan claims that in an attempt to avoid legal costs, she acknowledged
the debt. The judgment was entered against her
in the Local Court on 2 December
2009. Ms Wollgramm-Tan states that she had made serious attempts to settle the
debt with Ms Jia.
She states that she offered instalment payments but that
application was refused. In an attempt to settle this matter, she also
offered
stock to Ms Ye Jia but did not receive any response. Ms Wollgramm-Tan then
failed to appear before the Local Court when
the Notice of Motion was heard for
the payment by instalments. This failure to appear resulted in the application
being dismissed.
Supreme Court proceedings
- In
June 2010, the NAB filed a claim in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, case
number 00119013 of 2010 against Ms Ye Jia and Ms
Wollgramm-Tan for the whole of
the amount of the bank guarantee plus interest.
- The
clauses of the Amended Statement of Claim that are directly relevant to these
proceedings are as follows:
- 15. On or
about 29 August 2007, the plaintiff provided a Bank Guarantee Facility to Port
Homemakers Pty Ltd ACN 126 821 172 (Company)
in the amount of $46,723 (Bank
Guarantee).
- 16. The
following are, inter alia, the terms of the Bank Guarantee:
- (a) The
plaintiff is to immediately pay any amount demanded at any time under the Bank
Guarantee to a beneficiary;
- (b) Any
amount the Company must pay to the plaintiff becomes due and payable upon the
earlier of:
- (i) the
plaintiff making a payment under the Bank Guarantee;
- (ii) the
plaintiff incurring an obligation to make payment under the Bank Guarantee;
or
- (iii) the
Company’s default under the Bank Guarantee.
- (c) The
Company will indemnify the plaintiff in respect of any amount the plaintiff pays
to a beneficiary under the Bank Guarantee;
- (d) The
plaintiff may debit the Company’s nominated account with any amounts
payable by the Company in relation to the Bank
Guarantee including any amounts
paid by us under the Bank Guarantee, interest, fees and charges, taxes,
enforcement expenses, economic
costs and accounts payable by the Company under
an indemnity.
- Particulars
- The
Facility Details, the Specific Conditions and clauses 1,4,5,6,12,13,14 and 26 of
the General Conditions of the Bank Guarantee.
The plaintiff will refer to the
terms of the First Bank Guarantee when produced at the hearing, as if the same
were fully set out
herein.
- 17. The
plaintiff made payments to various beneficiaries totalling $46,723 and debited
the account number 082 184 611 3095 in accordance
with the terms of the Bank
Guarantee.
- 18. Prior
to entering into the Bank Guarantee the Company provided the plaintiff with a
written declaration pursuant to section 11
of the Consumer Credit Code, to the
effect that the monies advanced under the Bank Guarantee were to be applied
wholly or predominantly
for business or investment purposes and that the said
Code does not apply to the Bank Guarantee.
- Particulars
- Business
Purpose Declaration form dated 29 August 2007.
- 35. On or
about 24 July 2009, the plaintiff made demand on the first defendant and third
defendant to immediately pay to it the sum
of $54,474.06, being the total amount
then owing under the Third Guarantee.
- Particulars
- Demand
dated 14 July 2009.
- 36. The
first defendant and third defendant failed to pay the plaintiff the monies so
demanded.
- 39.
Interest continues to accrue on the amount owing by the first defendant to the
plaintiff at the following rates, such interest
being calculated daily and
compounding monthly.
- (a) The
Combination Loan at the rate set out in the Combination Loan from time to time
(currently 8.13% per annum)
- (b) The
Third Guarantee at the rate set out in the Third Guarantee from time to time,
(currently 18.58% per annum).
- Particulars
- The
plaintiff repeats the particulars to paragraphs 12 to 19
above.
- 42. As at 8
June 2010, the third defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of
$66,070.93 under the terms of the Third Guarantee.
- 43 Interest
continues to accrue on the amount owing the Third Guarantee at the rate set out
in the Third Guarantee from time to time,
(currently 18.58% per annum), such
interest being calculated daily and compounding monthly.
- After
receiving the Statement of claim, Ms Wollgramm-Tan contacted the NAB to enquire
as to why they were seeking to recover the debt.
Ms Wollgramm-Tan indicates
that her initial response to the NAB was that the bank guarantee had been paid
as Ms Ye Jia had commenced
recovery proceedings against her for her
contribution. Ms Wollgramm-Tan claims that the bank’s response was that
the debt
had not been paid.
Evidence
- Ms
Lam, appearing for the Respondent debtor, relied on the following
evidence:
- affidavit
of Gabriele Wollgramm-Tan sworn 8 October 2010; and
- second
affidavit of Gabriele Wollgramm-Tan sworn 15 October 2010.
- Mr
Mitchell, appearing for the Applicant creditor, relied on the following
material:
- affidavit
of Ye Jia, sworn 18 October 2010; and
- exhibit
A1 – NAB – Homemakers business cheque
account.
Submissions for the Applicant debtor
- Ms
Lam submits that the Local Court judgment case number 10153/09, issued on 2
December 2009, was obtained without an adjudication
on the merits. The judgment
was entered based on an acknowledgment of the debt by Ms Wollgramm-Tan. Ms Lam
contends that there is
doubt as to whether there is a debt and the burden of
proof shifts to the petitioning creditor: Corney v Brien [1951] HCA 31; (1951) 84 CLR
343.
- The
Court was also referred to Udovenko v Mitchell (1997) 79 FCR 418 per
Davies J (with Foster and Carr JJ agreeing) where His Honour made the following
observation:
- The
circumstances in which a court will go behind a judgment cannot be stated in a
definitive manner: however there are two guiding
principles. First, as Fullager
J said in Corney v Brien at 356-7:
- If the
judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial on which both
parties appeared, the court will not reopen the
matter unless a prima-facie case
of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out.
- Secondly,
in the same case, Dixon, Williams, Webb & Kitto JJ at 348 cited the remarks
of Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond (1942)
13 ABC at 49 that “...the court
looks with suspicion on consent judgments and default judgments”.
Fullagar J puts this
point more forcefully when he said at
357-8:
- But,
wherever the judgment in question is a judgment by default, it appears that the
court will always ‘go behind’ the
judgment if there is what it
regards as a bona-fide allegation that no real debt ‘lay behind’ the
judgment.
- In the
present case, it was not necessary to go behind the judgment of the Local Court
in the sense of making any investigation.
- Ms
Lam submits that the judgment obtained by acknowledgment or in other words by
consent is not likely to be accepted by this Court
but should be reviewed and
the liability of the debtor considered. Ms Lam seeks that this Court exercise
its discretion to go behind
the judgment and relies on Wren v Mahoney
[1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126 CLR 212 per Barwick CJ where His Honour states:
- But it has
been made quite clear by the decisions of the past that where reason is shown
for questioning whether behind the judgment
or as it is said, as the
consideration for it, there was in truth and reality a debt due to the
petitioning creditor, the Court of
Bankruptcy can no longer accept the judgment
as such satisfactory proof.
- Ms
Lam submits that the Creditor’s Petition should be dismissed on the basis
that the debt did not exist at the time of judgment
and the creditor failed to
prove it has standing due to the following reasons:
- at
the time of the judgment debt was obtained the creditor had not paid the debt
due under the bank guarantee;
- the
creditor has not been able to provide any evidence to show that the debt under
the bank guarantee has been discharged;
- the
creditor and the debtor were in a business together as equal shareholders in the
company, Homemakers;
- on 20
August 2007 the NAB issued a debt bank guarantee to secure Homemaker’s
obligations under the lease for the shop premises;
- the
bank guarantee was called upon under the lease by the lessor –
Trustee’s for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lismore,
the National
Australia Bank paid the money to the lessor; and
- the
creditor insists that she paid the bank guarantee in 2008 but she cannot provide
proof or evidence that she made such a payment
and there is no record of
discharge of the bank guarantee by the National Australia Bank.
- It
is submitted that the debtor acknowledged the claim to avoid further legal costs
and because the creditor had claimed that she
had paid the full amount of the
bank guarantee to the NAB and discharged the bank guarantee. Ms Wollgramm-Tan
states that at the
time she was in financial distress and that her husband had
suffered a stroke at the time the creditor filed the Statement of Claim.
It is
submitted that she sought legal advice and was advised of the funds that she
would require in order to defend the matter but
she did not have those resources
at that time.
- In
June 2010, the NAB filed a Statement of Claim against the creditor and the
debtor jointly for the amount of $46,723 which is the
full amount of the bank
guarantee.
- The
Court was referred to the Local Court Statement of Claim matter number 10153 of
2009 between Ms Ye Jia (plaintiff) and Ms Gabriele
Wollgramm-Tan (defendant)
which contains the following pleadings and particulars:
- 1. On 29
August 2007 the plaintiff and the defendant executed a deed of joint and several
guarantee and indemnity in favour of National
Australia Bank (“the
Bank”) guaranteeing the indebtedness of Port Homemakers Pty Ltd to the
Bank (“the deed of
guarantee”) in the sum of $46,723 (“the
sum”).
- 2. The bank
has made a demand upon the plaintiff and the defendant the payment of the
sum.
- 3. The
defendant has not paid the sum or any part of it to the bank.
- 4. The
plaintiff has paid the sum of $46,723 to the bank pursuant to the deed of
guarantee.
- 5. The
plaintiff claims monies due to for contribution and indemnity from the defendant
in the sum of $23,361.50 being one half share
of the sum paid by the plaintiff
to the bank for and on behalf of both parties pursuant to the deed of
guarantee.
- Ms
Lam submits that paragraph 4 above is a false statement because the NAB would
not have filed the Amended Statement of Claim in
the Supreme Court of New South
Wales against both Ms Ye Jia and Ms Wollgramm-Tan jointly for the amount of
$46,723.
- Ms
Lam informed the Court that Ms Wollgramm-Tan’s application to set aside
the Local Court judgment number 10153 of 2009 was
dismissed on 7 October 2010,
as the Magistrate presiding over the hearing of the Notice of Motion, refused
the application on the
basis that Ms Wollgramm-Tan could file a cross claim in
the proceedings in the Supreme Court in matter number 00119013 of 2010.
Ms Lam
argues that this was unrealistic due to the expense of litigation. Prior to
that hearing of the Notice of Motion, Ms Wollgramm-Tan
did not have the benefit
of any legal representation and this resulted in her premature acknowledgment of
the debt which in fact
had not been paid.
- Ms
Lam contends that the circumstances of the matter before this Court were
analogous to those in Wren v Mahoney (supra) where His Honour Barwick CJ
considered the indemnity between the creditor and the debtor which was expressed
in a deed. The
deed relied on by the creditor contained no express promise by
the debtor to pay the amount of any tax which had become or might
become due by
the creditor to the Commissioner of Taxation.
- Ms
Lam referred the Court to the following passage from the Chief Justice judgment
at 225:
- It is now
necessary to consider what ought to have been decided by the Bankruptcy Court as
to the existence of the petitioning creditor’s
debt. The deed set out in
the petition contained no express promise by the Applicant in terms to pay the
amount of any tax which
had become or might become due by the Respondent to the
Commission of Taxation. Without such a promise, a cause of action could
only
arise against the Applicant in my opinion when the Respondent had paid an amount
of tax. The position of a person with no more
than a promise of indemnity is
set out by Griffith CJ in
- 1: Ranken v
Palmer [(1912) [1912] HCA 95; 16 CLR 285 at pp.289-290]
- It is
clear, however, that the plaintiff’s only right is to indemnity, and the
Court is bound to see that it does not prejudice
the defendant by giving the
plaintiff anything more. If the judgment stood in its present form, and the
defendant paid the whole
sum to the plaintiff, the plaintiff might not pay to
the creditor, in which event the defendant’s principle might have to pay
the money over again. Such a result would be manifestly unfair. An undertaking
by the plaintiff would not alleviate this difficulty.
- The
principle governing such cases was fully discussed in the Court of Appeal in the
recent case In Re Richardson; ex parte Governor’s
of St Thomas Hospital.
- 2:In that
case Fletcher Molton LJ after pointing out that at common law a person entitled
to an indemnity could not avail himself
of his right until he had actually paid
the money, said
- 1 The rule
in chancery was somewhat different, and yet, to my mind, it emphasises the
fundamental principle that you must have paid
before you have the right to
indemnity that you must have paid before you have the right to indemnity,
because the remedy which equity
gave was a declaration of a right. You could
file a bill against a principle debtor to make him pay the debt so that you
would not
be called upon to pay it, and then you could obtain a declaration that
you were entitled to an indemnity. You could in certain cases
have a fund set
aside in order that you might be indemnified, to avoid the necessity of you
having to pay and then to sue for the
money you had paid, which perhaps would
not repair your loss and credit even if it discharged the debt. But I do not
think that
equity ever compelled a surety to pay money to a person to whom he
was surety before the latter had actually paid. He might be ordered
to set
funds aside, but I do not think that he could be ordered to
pay.
- Ms
Lam submits that a similar situation could manifestly occur in this case where
Ms Wollgramm-Tan may pay her half share of the debt
to Ms Ye Jia but would still
be liable to the NAB under the Statement of Claim, for the whole amount of the
debt due. In this matter,
there is no indemnity between Ms Ye Jia and Ms
Wollgramm-Tan. Ms Lam argues that even if it was found that there was indemnity
between
the parties, Ms Ye Jia would not have an action at law until the debt
under the bank guarantee had been paid by her and the bank
guarantee discharged.
Ms Lam contends that the bank guarantee has not been discharged.
- Ms
Lam advances the argument that Ms Wollgramm-Tan’s acknowledgment of the
debt is analogous to a consent judgment and seeks
the Court to look upon the
debt with suspicion. In support of this argument, Ms Lam relies upon the
decision in Ex parte Lennox; Re Lennox (1885) 10 Ch App 317 (cited in
Wren v Mahoney by His Honour Barwick CJ), where the debtor had consented
to judgment in debt at law. He had failed to comply with a Bankruptcy
Notice
founded on a judgment but when the matter proceeded to a hearing of the
Creditor’s Petition, he disputed the existence
of the debt. A Registrar
had held that, the debtor was not entitled to go behind the consent orders. An
appeal was successful and
the matter was remitted back to the Registrar.
- Ms
Lam also refers to In re Frazer; ex parte Central Bank of London (cited
in Wren v Mahoney by His Honour Barwick CJ). In this case, an
application to set aside the judgment had failed as had an appeal against a
refusal of
the application. Lord Esher MR referred to Ex parte Lennox; in re
Lennox His Lordship said:
- The
decision is based upon the highest ground – VIZ., that in making a
receiving order, the Court is not dealing simply between
the petitioning
creditor and the debtor, but it is interfering with the rights of other
creditors, who, if the order is made, will
not be able to sue the debtor for
their debts, and the Court would not to exercise this extraordinary power unless
it is satisfied
that there is a good debt due to the petitioning creditor. The
existence of the judgment is no doubt prima facie evidence of a debt:
but still
the Court of bankruptcy is entitled to enquire whether there really is a debt
due to the petitioning creditor.
- Ms
Lam submits that Ms Wollgramm-Tan had acknowledged the debt. She subsequently
had filed a Notice of Motion to set aside judgment
but failed. Despite her
unsuccessful application, in line with the precedents, the Court of Bankruptcy
is entitled to go behind
the judgment of a debt and can enquire whether,
notwithstanding the judgment, there was a good debt.
Creditor’s submissions
- Mr
Mitchell, appearing on behalf of Ye Jia, indicated that he relied upon her
affidavit sworn 18 October 2010 and Exhibit A1 which
was filed in Court at the
commencement of the hearing. Mr Mitchell submits that no attempt was made by Ms
Wollgramm-Tan to set aside
the judgment obtained by Ms Ye Jia until after the
act of bankruptcy had been committed. The grounds on which it was sought to set
aside that judgment are substantially the same as are being argued before this
Court. That application failed and one of the principle
reasons has failed
according to the learned Magistrate in the Local Court was that it was
appropriate if these issues were to be
ventilated in the Supreme Court
proceedings.
- Mr
Mitchell contends that the Supreme Court proceedings are only peripherally
irrelevant to the claim of Ms Wollgramm-Tan in the proceedings
in this Court
as:
- they
involve at least one other party; and
- they
involve a range of other issues of which the matter before this Court is only
one.
However, although the parties have been in possession
of the Supreme Court proceedings since June there has been no defence,
cross-claim
or any other material filed on behalf of Ms Wollgramm-Tan.
- Mr
Mitchell concedes that he cannot show that the guarantee has been paid however
what is being sought is a contribution of 50% of
the amount of the guarantee.
As the Bankruptcy Notice and a subsequent Creditors Petition result from a
judgment by acknowledgment,
evidence has not yet been assembled by Ms Ye Jia.
Only recently Ms Ye Jia has become aware of the initiation of these proceedings
and that the payment of the debt is in question.
- Mr
Mitchell referred to the material in Ms Ye Jia’s affidavit which he claims
leads to the conclusion that the full amount of
the guarantee has been paid.
- Annexure
A to the affidavit sets out the guarantee and indemnity which at p.3 identifies
the guarantors as Ms Ye Jia and Ms Wollgramm-Tan
as the guarantors jointly and
severally. On p.4 the amount of $46,723 is the amount of the guarantee to the
NAB. That guarantee
was used to found a lease of the premises on which Ms Ye
Jia and Ms Wollgramm-Tan conducted their business of Homemakers.
- Annexure
B is a letter from Donovan Oats Haniford Lawyers which represent the trustees of
the Roman Catholic Church Diocese of Lismore.
That letter indicates that a
failure to pay rent will result in a default in the lease. The letter also
indicates that one of
the terms upon which the lessor was prepared to settle
the amount of the debt was a forfeiture of the bank guarantee held by the
trustee from the NAB. It is that guarantee that is referred to in these
proceedings.
- Annexure
C is a NAB business cheque account for Homemakers which indicates that the
guarantee was called and paid by the NAB to the
lessor in the sum of $46,731 as
a debt in the Homemakers account.
- Annexure
D is a NAB business cheque account for Homemakers which shows the amount has
been credited by the NAB as a book entry against
the account of
Homemakers.
These payments came from other accounts of Ms
Ye Jia, a company known as Hong Da (Aust) Pty Ltd which is a company that Ms Jia
was
a sole director and shareholder of.
- Exhibit
A1, which is a further NAB business cheque account shows there are two further
credits for $18,000 and $15,000 respectively.
Mr Mitchell submits that these
four amounts total $49,000 and they are the amount referred to in Annexure
F.
- Annexure
F which is a letter from NAB business addressed to Mr Mitchell of Webster
Solicitors and Barristers states:
- We can
confirm that our mutual client Ye Jia has deposited $49,000 from her business
entity “Hong Da Aust Pty Ltd” into
Port Homemakers Account over the
period of October 2008 to February 2009.
- Mr
Mitchell submits that the sum of $49,000 is the amount of the guarantee
including interest and costs. His client has not sought
to sue Ms Wollgramm-Tan
for any of the interest and costs, because, it may be argued, that Ms Ye Jia
should have taken appropriate
steps to mitigate by paying the debt earlier.
- The
last of the payments made on 6 February 2009, seeks to recover 50% of it from Ms
Wollgramm-Tan. Mr Mitchell argues that significantly
there no response to the
material that has been in evidence for some time. In response to the argument
that Ms Ye Jia has not made
this payment, cogent evidence as to what these
payments are must exist. Mr Mitchell argues that Ms Ye Jia is the only party
that
had the funds that could be relied upon to secure the debts of Homemakers.
- Mr
Mitchell contends that the above material demonstrates that the amount of the
guarantee has been wholly paid by Ms Ye Jia including
costs and interest on the
guarantee, and there is no reason to to prevent the Creditor’s Petition
from proceeding because this
litigation simply repeats the failed litigation in
the Local Court.
Consideration
- Under
s.52(1) of the Act, the petitioning creditor is obliged to prove that the
debt or debts on which it relies is or are still owing. The Court has
discretion
to accept a judgment as proof of debt relied upon to found the
Creditor’s Petition. The Court in Bankruptcy has the power
to go behind
judgment and enquire whether, notwithstanding the judgment, there is a debt due
to the petitioning creditor. In the
context of s.52(1) the Court’s
discretion was described in Wren v Mahoney (supra) per Barwick CJ with
whom Windeyer and Owen JJ agreed at 224-225. This passage is reproduced above
in the submissions advanced
by Ms Lam.
- The
Court will not go behind judgment as a matter of course, but only if appropriate
circumstances are shown to exist: Re Flatau; ex parte Scotch Whiskey
Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83 per Lord Esher at 85-86 and Joosse v
Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245 at [3].
- In
Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343 His Honour Fullagar J at 355
stated:
- No precise
rule exists as to what circumstances call for an exercise of the
power.
His Honour then referred to the reluctance of
the Court to reopen a matter in the absence of a prima facie case of fraud,
collusion
or miscarriage of justice when the judgment in question had followed a
trial of which both parties appeared. However, His Honour
pointed out (at
357-358):
But, wherever the judgment in question is a judgment by default, it appears
that the Court will always go behind the judgment if
there is what is regarded
as the bona fide allegation that no real debt lay behind the judgment.
- The
majority in Corney v Brien their Honours Dixon, Williams, Webb and
Kitto JJ referred to the Court’s undoubted jurisdiction at
347:
- To go
behind the judgment obtained by default or compromise or where fraud or
collusion is alleged and enquire whether the judgment
is founded on a real debt.
Their Honours noted with approval the statement by Latham CJ in Petrie v Redmond
(1942) 13 ABC 48 where His Honour stated at 49:
- The Court
looks with suspicion on consent judgments or default
judgments.
- In
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Jeans [2005] FCA 569 His Honour Hely J
at [13] stated:
- [13] In
Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1971-1972) 126 CLR 212 the High Court held that the bankruptcy
court not only may go behind a judgment, but must do so if there appear to be
substantial
reasons for doubting whether there really was a debt due to the
petitioning creditor. However, a judgment after the trial of an action
will not
usually be re-opened unless a prima facie case of fraud, collusion, or
miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney v Brien
(above) at
356–357.
Then His Honour identified the classic
cases in which the Court may go behind the judgment.
- In
Richardson v Leonard Cohen & Co [2008] FCA 308 at
[13]- [14]:
- [13] The
Court will not go behind a judgment as a matter of course, but where a judgment
is obtained by default the Court in bankruptcy
will more readily look behind the
judgment than it would if the judgment were obtained following a hearing on the
merits: Wolff v
Donovan [1991] FCA 222; (1991) 29 FCR 480 at 486 per Lee and Hill JJ. At 487
their Honours said:
- [T]he true
position is that there is a shifting onus. Once the judgment is proved, and it
is prima facie evidence of the existence
of the underlying debt, there is a
tactical onus on the debtor to show that there are circumstances which make it
appropriate to
go behind the debt to see whether the judgment was in truth and
reality a true debt. The overall onus of proof of the existence of
a real debt
underlying a judgment, however, remains always with the petitioning
creditor.
- [14] It is
not necessary for a Respondent debtor to prove that they are not, in truth and
reality, indebted to the petitioning creditor.
All that is required of a
Respondent debtor was to show that there was “substantial reason for
questioning whether there is
... a debt”: Joosse v Deputy Commissioner of
Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245; (2004) 137 FCR 576 at 579 [6] per North and Finkelstein
JJ.
- In
Boglari v Coadys [2009] FCA 1398 His Honour Gray J cites the relevant
authorities in relation to the ‘discretion’ held by a bankruptcy
court to go behind
a judgment, particularly a default judgment and to
investigate the actual state of indebtedness or lack thereof between the
creditor
and the debtor. His Honour sets these out at [11]-[13] as
follows:
- Going
behind the judgment
- [11] The
power of a court on an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice to “go
behind the judgment” on which the
bankruptcy notice is based is a
discretionary power. In an appeal from a judgment involving the exercise of
discretion, the question
for the appeal court is not whether it would have
exercised the discretion differently from the court below. The basis on which an
appeal court is required to act is set out in the well-known passage in the
joint judgment of Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ in House
v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
at 504–555:
- The manner
in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is
governed by established principles. It is
not enough that the judges composing
the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the
primary judge, they
would have taken a different course. It must appear that
some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts
upon a
wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or
affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does
not take into account some
material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the
appellate court may exercise
its own discretion in substitution for his if it
has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has
reached
the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is
unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that
in some way
there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law
reposes in the court of first instance. In
such a case, although the nature of
the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on
the ground that
a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.
- [12] The
nature of the discretion the exercise of which is sought when a recipient of a
bankruptcy notice seeks to set aside that
notice by going behind the judgment on
which it is based is set out in the joint judgment of North and Finkelstein JJ
in Joossé
v Cmr of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245; (2004) 137 FCR 576 at
[3]:
- The court
can go behind a judgment to determine whether it is founded on a real debt
because a sequestration order should not be
made on the petition of a person who
is not a real creditor. The court has a discretion whether or not to go behind
the judgment.
The discretion is of a limited kind. In Wren v Mahony [1972] HCA 5; (1972) 126
CLR 212, Barwick CJ, with whom Windeyer and Owen JJ agreed, said (at
224–225) that:
- [t]he
Court’s discretion ... is a discretion to accept the judgment as
satisfactory proof of [the petitioning creditor’s]
debt. That discretion
is not well exercised where substantial reasons are given for questioning
whether behind that judgment there
was in truth and reality a debt due to the
petitioner.
- [13] There
is also authority to the effect that a court will be more ready to find that
there is a substantial reason for questioning
whether a judgment is based on an
actual debt when that judgment has been given by default. See Corney v Brien
(1951) 84 CLR 343 at 348 per Dixon, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ and
357–358 per Fullagar J and Wolff v Donovan [1991] FCA 222; (1991) 29 FCR 480 at 486 per
Lee and Hill JJ.
- In
the affidavit of Gabriele Wollgramm-Tan, sworn 15 October 2010, the following
evidence appears:
- 23. In June
2010 the National Australia Bank (NAB) filed a claim against the Applicant and
me for the whole amount of the bank guarantee
plus interest.
- 24. I
initially responded by telling NAB that the bank guarantee had been paid because
I had a judgment debt against me from the
Applicant on the basis that she had
paid the debt. They responded by stating that the debt had not been
paid.
- 25. It was
at this point that I asked the Applicant to provide me with evidence that she
had discharged the bank guarantee. To date
she had not been able to do so.
- 26.
Annexed hereto a copy of the Amended Statement of Claim in the Supreme Court of
New South Wales case number 00119013 of 2010
and marked “D”.
- 27. The
Applicant was relying on a credit entry in account number 1 to prove she has
paid the bank guarantee.
- 28.
Annexed hereto is a copy of a bank statement number 1 showing a credit entry on
9 September 2008 and marked “E”.
- 29. In
fact the credit entry was an internal transfer from account 082184826113095 (No
2 to the Administrator’s Account) for
the exact amount and description.
This account number 2 had a new balance at the time of debit.
- 30.
Annexed herewith a copy of bank statement No.2 showing a debit entry on 10
September 2008 and marked “F”.
- In
the Amended Statement of Claim issued in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
(second affidavit of Wollgramm-Tan, Annexure D) at
para.15 it
states:
- On or about
29 August 2007, the plaintiff provided a bank guarantee facility to Port
Homemakers Pty Ltd ACN 126 821 172 (company)
in the amount of $46,723 (bank
guarantee).
In a Statement of Claim issued in the
Local Court between Ye Jia and Gabriele Wollgramm-Tan (second affidavit of
Wollgramm-Tan, Annexure
C) in the Pleadings and Particulars para. 1 states:
On 29 August 2007 the plaintiff and the defendant executed the deed of joint
and several guarantee and indemnity in favour of the
National Australia Bank
(“the bank”) guaranteed the indebtedness of Port Homemakers Pty Ltd
to the bank (“the deed
of guarantee”) in the sum of $46,723
(“the sum”).
- In
the Amended Statement of Claim (second affidavit of Wollgramm-Tan, Annexure D)
at para. 17 it states:
- The
plaintiff [NAB] made payment to various beneficiaries totalling $46,723 and
debited to the account number 082-184 82-611-3095
in accordance with the terms
of the bank guarantee.
- The
NAB business cheque account (account number 082 184 85-887-0641) for Homemakers
contains the entries for $12,000 and $4,000 and
Exhibit A1 contain the amounts
for $18,000 and $15,000 respectively are credited to that same account. The
amounts of $12,000 and
$4,000 were initiated by the NAB and were not paid by Ms
Ye Jia as claimed.
- The
NAB letter addressed to Mr Ian Mitchell of Websters Solicitors and Barristers
dated 15 December 2008 (affidavit of Ye Jia Annexure
E) contains the following
statement:
- NAB
acknowledges receipt of a payment in the amount of $12,000 on or about 20
October 2008 and a further $4,000 on or about 31 October
2008 in reduction of
the amount owing under the first guarantee securing the overdraft
facility.
- The
Amended Statement of Claim (second affidavit of Ms Wollgramm-Tan, Annexure D) at
paras. six to ten clearly indicate that the NAB
had provided a business
overdraft facility to Hong Da (Aust) Pty Ltd which was guaranteed by Ms Ye Jia.
The overdraft facility is
a separate issue from the bank guarantee for the lease
of the premises.
- The
NAB business letter (which is undated) addressed to Websters Solicitors and
Barristers (affidavit of Ye Jia, Annexure F) states:
- We can
confirm that our mutual client Ye Jia has deposited $49,000 from her entity
“Hong Da Aust Ltd” into Port Makers
account over the period of
October 2008 to February 2009.
- Significantly
this letter does not indicate that this payment discharged the bank guarantee.
Nor does it indicate which account the
payments were going into. I agree with
the submissions made by Ms Lam. The evidence is vague and unclear in terms of
discharge of
the bank guarantee, which is the essence of the judgment debt on
which the Bankruptcy Notice and the petition rely. I accept that
the amount of
$49,000 has been paid but there is insufficient evidence to support the claim
that this payment discharged the bank
guarantee in the amount of $46,723.
- On
the material before the Court, it is appropriate to go behind the Local Court
judgment that is the basis of the Bankruptcy Notice
and the Petition
because:
- the
judgment was the result of an acknowledgment of the debt of Ms Wollgramm-Tann so
the judgment was entered without a contested
hearing;
- the
acknowledgment by Mr Mitchell that by Mr Mitchell that he was unable to produce
any statement that the NAB had been paid the full
amount of the
guarantee;
- despite
submissions made to the effect that the guarantee had been paid during the
period of 20 October 2008 and February 2009, the
NAB’s Amended Statement
of Claim issued in June 2010 states that the guarantee remained
unpaid;
- the
individual payment of $12,000 made on 20 October 2008 and the payment of $4,000
made on 31 October 2008 which are submitted as
being part payments in the total
of $49,000 to the finalisation of the guarantee were in fact acknowledged by the
NAB as being payments
due under the business overdraft facility which is a
separate issue from the guarantee; and
- the
payment of $12,000 and $4,000 were initiated by members of the NAB staff and not
by either of the directors of Homemakers.
- In
these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Creditor’s Petition should be
dismissed on the basis that the debt did not exist
at the time the judgment was
entered. The principle that a cause of action against Ms Wollgramm-Tan does not
arise until Ms Ye Jia
had paid the debt owed to the NAB and then the issue of
contribution arises. Despite the claims made by Ms Ye Jia that she paid
the
bank guarantee in 2008, she is unable to provide proof as evidence that she made
such a payment. Further, there is no record
of discharge of the bank guarantee
by the NAB. Payments that have been put forward as part payment of the
guarantee have been identified
by the NAB as payment being made to settle a
separate obligation under the business overdraft facility.
I
certify that the preceding fifty-four (54) paragraphs are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM
Associate:
Date: 1 February 2011
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