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Sethi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 27 (27 January 2011)

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Sethi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 27 (27 January 2011)

Last Updated: 2 February 2011

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SETHI v MINISTER FOR & ANOR

MIGRATION – Review of Tribunal’s decision to affirm cancellation of student visa under s.109 – application for visa supported by “bogus” documentation – invitation to respond said not to have been received by applicant – invitation sent in accord with legislative requirements – applicant said to be a victim of Indian Bank Manager and Indian education agent – no evidence of fraud committed on Tribunal – vague suggestion that Minister estopped from cancelling after issue of visa in circumstances where the application on proper examination was manifestly not acceptable – application for review dismissed.


Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko–Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lu [2010] FCAFC 147
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185
CLR 259

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
(No 2) (2004)144 FCR 1
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZFNX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1980
SZLHP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1675

Applicant:
ISHDEEP KAUR SETHI

First Respondent:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:
MLG 400 of 2010

Judgment of:
O'Dwyer FM

Hearing date:
31 August 2010

Date of Last Submission:
31 August 2010

Delivered at:
Melbourne

Delivered on:
27 January 2011

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:
In person, assisted by a McKenzie Friend, Mr Ibrahim

Counsel for the First Respondent:
Ms Latif

Solicitors for the First Respondent:
Clayton Utz

ORDERS

(1) The application for review filed on 19 March 2010, as amended on
4 June 2010, is dismissed.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 400 of 2010

ISHDEEP KAUR SETHI

Applicant


And


MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This matter came before the Court as a review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 4 December 2010. The Tribunal affirmed an earlier decision of the First Respondent’s delegate to cancel the Applicant’s student visa (Subclass 572 Vocational Education and Training Sector visa) (the visa).
  2. I have had the benefit of contentions of fact and law filed by both the Applicant and the First Respondent, together with submissions made at the hearing before me. At the hearing the Applicant acted in person, but had the assistance of a McKenzie Friend, Mr Ibrahim. Mr Ibrahim is a migration agent. I was given an understanding that he assisted the Applicant in the compilation of her contentions of fact and law.

Background

  1. The Applicant is a citizen of India who, after completing secondary schooling there, also undertook tertiary studies, the exact nature of which is uncertain, but was said to be, as set out in her application for the visa, a certificate of computer studies and at the hearing before the Tribunal, to be a Bachelor of Arts degree from the Punjab University. She sought the visa to undertake further studies in Australia. To that end after being granted the visa, she arrived in Australia on 25 May 2008 and commenced a Diploma of Hospitality Management at the Austech Institute in Sydney the following day. She stopped this course after approximately five weeks and moved to Melbourne in mid-July 2008. She proposed to undertake further studies in Melbourne at an education provider named Ozford College. She never commenced the course there, but she informed the Tribunal that her intention was to live in Shepparton and travel to Melbourne, as required, to attend the course.
  2. To obtain the visa she submitted with her application documentation purportedly from the Punjab National Bank (PNB) confirming a loan had been provided to her and that the first instalment of the loan was issued to Austech Institute and disbursed. This was a necessary requirement for her to meet the financial capacity criterion under the visa. It is to be noted that an earlier application had been refused on the basis that she did not meet the financial capacity criterion. However, the second application, which was supported by letters from the PNB (the PNB letters), was successful.
  3. An officer from the First Respondent wrote to the PNB providing a copy of the PNB letters and asked whether the first instalment of the loan had been disbursed. By a letter dated 16 June 2008 the Chief Manager of the PNB informed, in effect, that the documents purportedly from the PNB and submitted in support of the second application were “fake”.
  4. Thereafter followed correspondence by the First Respondent to the Applicant, pursuant to s.109 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act), informing the Applicant of her failure to comply with ss.101, 103 or 105 of the Act. The letter gave particulars of the non-compliance; including reference to the PNB letters and the PNB response advising of the bogus nature of the supportive letters from the PNB that purportedly confirmed the loan to the Applicant.
  5. Sections 101, 103 and 105 variously refer to the need for all questions on an application to be answered and no incorrect answers given; that no bogus documents are to be provided, given or presented in support of an application and, finally, that once an Applicant is informed, or becomes aware, of an incorrect answer, the obligation falls to the Applicant to inform of the incorrect answer and to provide the correct one. In that correspondence dated 12 November 2008, sent by registered mail to the Applicant’s last known address, the Applicant was invited to provide a written response to the allegation about the bogus nature of the letters and to the answers alleged to have been incorrect. She was to give reasons by 5 December 2008 as to why her student visa should not be cancelled (the s.109 letter). No response was received.
  6. By a letter dated 16 December 2008 the First Respondent’s delegate sent the Applicant a copy of the decision to cancel her visa under s.109 of the Act (the cancellation notice). That letter was also sent by registered post to the last residential address of the Applicant – being the same address as the s.109 letter was sent. The cancellation notice was not returned. The Applicant admits having received the s.109 letter and the cancellation notification, but at a significantly late time due to, she maintains, a third party not passing them onto her.

The Tribunal’s hearing and findings

  1. At the hearing the Applicant gave evidence to the effect that she had a Bachelor of Arts degree. This was the first time the Applicant had made that claim whereas earlier, in her application, she claimed to be a “computer diploma holder”. She also informed the Tribunal that she was unaware that two student visa applications had been made but she confirmed her signature on both the applications. She denied, however, completing the forms and denied the handwriting was hers. She also agreed she had received the s.109 letter. She maintained that the PNB letters were genuine, but when presented with the response from the PNB alleging they were fake she asserted she had not seen the PNB response before and was unable to provide any explanation, or give any further evidence on the matter.
  2. It is to be noted, also, that the Tribunal invited the Applicant to comment pursuant to s.359A of the Act, to which the Applicant provided two responses.
  3. The Tribunal found after examining the PNB letters and the PNB response, and after considering the evidence given by the Applicant at the hearing, including evidence about a loan from another bank which proved to be for a another person, that the Applicant had not complied with s.103 of the Act because she caused a bogus document to be given in support of her application. In my view, these findings were open to the Tribunal based on the evidence before it.
  4. The Tribunal, having found the PNB letters to be bogus, also found the Applicant provided, or caused to be provided, incorrect answers in her visa application in breach of s.101(b) of the Act. Again, in my view, this finding was open to the Tribunal.
  5. Significantly, the Tribunal expressed its concerns about the credibility of the Applicant’s evidence and concluded that she was not a witness of truth. On the evidence before the Tribunal there would appear to be good grounds for that finding.

The grounds for review

  1. The grounds for review expressed in the application were expanded by the contentions filed on behalf of the Applicant. In saying that, however, the formulation of them was vague and it was necessary, in order to do justice to the Applicant, to attempt to formulate grounds that may apply on the basis of the submissions made. Not unusually when an applicant does not have, or have available, the requisite legal skills, the stated grounds for review lack the focus and precision demanded in these types of cases where it is incumbent on the review applicant to persuade the Court that a jurisdictional error was made by the Tribunal. This is perhaps less understandable, in this case, where the Applicant appeared to have the assistance of a migration agent in the preparation of her case. Be that as it may, the First Respondent did not take issue with this and sought to address all of the potential grounds for review as articulated in the application, the supporting affidavit and the contentions of fact and law filed by the Applicant.
  2. From the Applicant’s filed material, it was possible to discern potential grounds for review which were extracted and addressed in the First Respondent’s contentions of fact and law. For the sake of convenience, I will address those potential grounds in the same order.
  3. The application appears to raise two grounds; namely, errors in notification by the Minister, and a failure to consider relevant considerations.
  4. In respect of the alleged failure of notification, the Applicant relied on an assertion that her previous migration agent failed to forward on to her Departmental correspondence on time. She alleges that the visa was cancelled without her knowledge and that the registered letters (that is the s.109 letter and cancellation notice) were received by another person without her authorisation, and that she did not know she had been contacted by the Department. I note that these claims are inconsistent with the evidence before the Tribunal and, I further note, the conclusions reached on the question of the Applicant’s credit. I am satisfied the Minister complied with regulation 2.55 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in posting the s.109 letter and cancellation notice by registered mail to the Applicant’s last known address and that the Applicant is deemed to have received them. In any event, the Applicant was unable to advise as to what she may have been able to do, once notified, that could have affected the outcome. In my view, the Applicant’s claims in regard to a failure to properly notify do not reveal any jurisdictional error.
  5. In respect of the allegation that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant considerations, no particulars were provided. A reading of the Tribunal’s decision and also the Applicant’s material submitted, does not indicate that a claim existed, or an integer of a claim, that was not considered by the Tribunal which the Tribunal was bound to take into account in making its determination and which, had it been considered, may have been dispositive of a review (see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko–Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40 per Mason J, and NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1). I am satisfied that the Tribunal had regard to all relevant considerations in its reasons for decision and in this regard no jurisdictional error is disclosed.
  6. The next potential ground is the quality of translation provided by the interpreter used at the hearing. The First Respondent submits that this is mere assertion, not supported by evidence. With this contention, I must agree. The Applicant has provided no instance of where a mistranslation may have led to the Applicant either not having a proper hearing, as required by s.360 of the Act, or to the Tribunal being misled in a way that a proper translation may have resulted in a decision favourable to the Applicant. Clearly, the Applicant must provide evidence that demonstrates specific examples of the interpreter’s performance having unfairly affected the presentation of her claims and evidence (see Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6 per Kenny J). No jurisdictional error is demonstrated in this regard.
  7. The next contention raised by the Applicant centres on her allegations concerning the conduct of her former migration agent and a bank manager in India. By these allegations, the Applicant seems to be attempting to bring her case within that considered in SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; (2007) 232 CLR 189. It is accepted that a fraud practiced on the Tribunal by a person, other than the visa Applicant, may disable the Tribunal from the due discharge of its statutory functions with respect to the conduct of the review. However, strong evidence in required to establish that fraud. Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362 per Dixon J requires that fraud must be proved “clearly”, “unequivocally”, “strictly” or “certainly”. Further, the fraud must be shown to affect the process proscribed by the Act; in particular, whether the Applicant had the opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments (see SZFNX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1980 at [34] per Besanko J; SZLHP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1675 at [16] per Scarlett FM. For a more recent discussion of the issued raised and considered in respect of an alleged fraud on the Tribunal see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Lu [2010] FCAFC 147).
  8. The First Respondent contends, with which contention I agree, that the Applicant has not discharged her burden of establishing fraud in regard to this ground and, indeed, has not gone into evidence on the issue. It is to be noted that the agent, against whom the Applicant now makes allegations, was called as a witness before the Tribunal by the Applicant. The irregularities concerning the PNB letters and the PNB response were already known to the Applicant at this time, yet the opportunity to agitate this contention was not availed. The Applicant, in my view, has not demonstrated how any of the matters raised now in this regard impacted on the Tribunal so as to deny the Tribunal the opportunity of fulfilling its imperative function to review.
  9. Again, to the extent the Applicant relies upon failures by her former immigration agent to act in a timely fashion, or a failure in administrative arrangements entered into between her and third parties, they do not reveal jurisdictional error.
  10. The Applicant contends that the First Respondent was in error in processing the second application and granting a visa in response to it. This is a strange ground with perhaps a number of interpretations.
  11. The impression created was that the Applicant contended that the second application for the visa should not have been granted in the first instance because, manifestly, when regard is had to the date of the application (4 April 2006) and the date of the bogus document from the PNB (6 March 2008), it is apparent that the PNB document post dates the application. I took this assertion by the Applicant to be an argument that, having in those circumstances granted the visa, the Minister was estopped from then cancelling, the Applicant having acted to her detriment by coming to Australia.
  12. Should this have been the thrust of the Applicant’s contention, I am satisfied that the First Respondent was not in error in processing the second application. No issue of estoppel arises. In any event, on the face of it, the second application appeared valid and under s.47 of the Act the First Respondent is to consider it.
  13. Another aspect of the Applicant’s contention, in a similar fashion, was that the First Respondent’s discovery of bogus documents and incorrect information after the visa was granted and thereafter cancelling the visa is indicative of jurisdictional error. None of these contentions were fully developed by the Applicant, but I took it to be a bald contention that the First Respondent should not have cancelled the visa after its issue.
  14. In my view, the First Respondent is entitled to rely on the evidence presented in an application and if, on the face of it, it appears to satisfy necessary criteria to issue a visa but, thereafter, on discovering that the application was supported by bogus information, he was entitled to cancel the visa pursuant to s.109. There was nothing in the process adopted by the First Respondent’s delegate in this regard that would reveal jurisdictional error and nothing at the Tribunal level to further reveal such error.
  15. In the final contention the Applicant makes general statements about the use by the Tribunal of the PNB letters with the implicit suggestion that the Tribunal came to conclusions and used the PNB letters in a way where, as I understand how the submission is put, the Tribunal needed further evidence before concluding that they were bogus; namely, some need to find who produced them and where they were produced. In my view, the Tribunal was more than entitled to give the PNB response the probative value that it did and to draw the conclusion and make the finding that the PNB letters submitted by the Applicant as part of her visa application were bogus. It is also to be noted that the PNB letters were put to the Applicant for comment during the hearing and she was given every opportunity to give evidence and make argument about the issue. As noted earlier, when this was done, she made no further comment. The Tribunal’s approach to the evaluation of the evidence and the weight to be given was open to it and does not reveal any jurisdictional error.
  16. In conclusion, to a significant degree the Applicant’s case invited the Court to review the facts of the case, which invitation amounts to an impermissible merits review and does not form a basis for a finding of jurisdictional error (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259).

Conclusion

  1. The Tribunal’s findings, in relation to the breaches by the Applicant, as set out in its decision, and the affirmation of the delegate’s determination to cancel the visa are, in my view, supported by the evidence and certainly open to the Tribunal to so find.
  2. For the above reasons, the Applicant has failed to disclose any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal and, accordingly, the application filed 19 March 2010, as amended, is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding 31Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !Error! Style not defined.Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !thirty-onethirty-one (31) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of O'Dwyer FM


Associate:


Date: 27 January 2011


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