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SZNVL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 78 (28 January 2010)
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Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
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SZNVL v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 78 (28 January 2010)
Last Updated: 16 February 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZNVL v MINISTER FOR
IMMIGRATION & ANOR
|
|
MIGRATION – Application to review decision
of Refugee Review Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application
dismissed. |
|
First Respondent:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
|
|
Second Respondent:
|
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
|
REPRESENTATION
Solicitors for the Respondents: |
DLA Phillips Fox
|
ORDERS
(1) The application be dismissed.
(2) The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of
$3,800.
|
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT
SYDNEY
|
SYG 1957 of 2009
Applicant
And
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
|
First Respondent
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)
- This
is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal dated
16 July 2009. The Tribunal affirmed the decision
of a delegate of the
first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
- The
applicant, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, arrived in
Australia in January 2008. She applied for a protection
visa in December 2008.
She attended a Departmental interview. The application was refused and the
applicant sought review by the
Tribunal. She attended a Tribunal hearing.
- The
applicant claimed, in essence, to fear persecution in China on the basis of her
religion. She claimed she was a member of an
unregistered Catholic church in
China, that she had been involved in church activities and had been a driver for
the local priest
during 2007. The applicant claimed that the church was raided,
that she was arrested and detained overnight and thereafter forced
to practise
her faith in secret. She claimed that the police were looking for her and that
they were continually harassing her husband
who had remained in China. At the
Tribunal hearing the applicant elaborated on her claims.
- In
its findings and reasons the Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims as
a claim to fear persecution as a member of an
unregistered Christian (Catholic)
church in China. It set out the details of her claims about past events and her
fears about the
future. However it found the applicant to be “a
witness of variable credibility”, finding that at the hearing, while
she was prepared to speak in some detail about her refugee claims including
claimed incidents
in China and some aspects of Christian teaching, the applicant
had “appeared evasive” and had given what the Tribunal
considered to be “untruthful evidence” about her family, her
passport and other relevant issues.
- The
Tribunal stated that in assessing the applicant’s claims and evidence it
had taken into account that the applicant was initially
a little nervous at the
Tribunal hearing and also her claims to have had little education.
- The
Tribunal accepted, having regard to country information concerning the
widespread practice of Christianity and Catholicism in
the province from which
the applicant came, that the applicant had had “some exposure to and
familiarity with Christians in China”. However it did not accept that
she became a member of any underground Catholic church, that the authorities
detained her
in May 2007 because of her organisational role in that church, or
that the authorities harassed or had any other adverse interest
in her.
- The
Tribunal set out a number of factors which, considered together, caused it to
doubt the applicant’s claimed involvement
in the church, including the
fact that while the applicant displayed some knowledge of Christianity and
Catholicism this was of “limited probative value in assessing whether
she had practiced in China”, given that she claimed she did not start
her involvement with the church until early 2007 and also her evidence of
involvement
in Australian churches since early 2008. The Tribunal found that it
was unable to draw conclusions as to whether the applicant’s
knowledge
stemmed from her activities in China or was of more recent origin.
- The
Tribunal considered it relevant that although the applicant claimed to have
participated in masses and other illegal religious
activities in China, she did
not claim to have been baptised or to have participated in confession or
communion in China. It found
that the applicant’s explanation that the
church “was restricted in what it could do, appeared to be at
odds with her other claims about the congregation’s commitment and
tenacity” and stated that it had “formed the impression that
the applicant was trying to mask her lack of involvement in these, or any
other religious ceremonies, in China”.
- The
Tribunal had regard to the fact that while the applicant claimed that she had
persuaded all the members of her immediate family
to become Christian, she had
“seemed indifferent” when the Tribunal asked whether she had
considered asking her sons (who were in Australia) to give evidence to support
her
application. The Tribunal “did not find convincing the
applicant’s suggestions that [her sons] were too busy, or that she
did not understand the nature of the Tribunal’s invitation to call
witnesses”.
- The
Tribunal also had regard to the fact that while the applicant claimed that the
authorities continued to harass her husband because
of their adverse interest in
her (and not because of his Catholicism), he nonetheless continued to operate
his own business. It
found the applicant had appeared
“uncertain” when asked to explain this, and that her evidence
about the details was “changeable”. It set out her evidence
in that respect.
- The
Tribunal also found that “the applicant had difficulty giving
context to other aspects of her claims” which it set out in detail,
including evidence relevant to whether the church operated openly or
clandestinely and the fact
that while she had claimed that the local priest
continued to preach she “struggled” to explain why the
authorities had failed to take action against him. It found overall that the
applicant’s evidence
was “weak in the peripheral and
circumstantial details that would have lent credibility”.
- The
Tribunal found it significant that while the applicant stressed that the
authorities were interested in her “not only because of her involvement
in the church, but because of her contribution to its logistics and organization
by providing
transport... and her knowledge of the members and
locations”, she was “equivocal” as to how it was
that she was selected to perform this task. The Tribunal stated that, in any
event, it had difficulty believing
that “the authorities had any
sustained interest in such a driver” if their intention was to gather
intelligence on a relatively small Christian congregation and its meeting
places.
- The
Tribunal also found that the applicant’s conduct in China and her delay in
lodgement of her protection visa application
in Australia were
“inconsistent with her claimed experiences in China”. It
referred to the fact that “despite the applicant’s claim of
detention and mistreatment in May 2007, it was not until later that year that
she took the
opportunity of her son’s study in Australia to obtain a
passport and leave China”. It found that her “ability to
obtain a PRC passport in her own name in October 2007, and to use it to depart
the country strongly suggest[ed] that she did not have a subjective fear
of persecution and that the authorities did not ... have any adverse
interest in her”. It considered her explanation in that respect and
referred to country information, but concluded that it found the
applicant’s
references to assistance provided through “bribes and
connections” were “somewhat glib and unconvincing”.
- The
Tribunal also had regard to the delay in the applicant departing China after
obtaining an Australian visa. It addressed her response
when this was put to
her at the hearing. While it accepted that “flight or other
administrative arrangements may reasonably explain some delay in the
applicant’s departure”, it did not accept that she was in
hiding, “particularly taking into account the continued presence at her
home of other family members”.
- The
Tribunal placed weight on the applicant’s delayed lodgement of a
protection visa application in Australia “as evidence that she did not
flee China for any refugee-related reasons”. It rejected her
explanation “that she was ill-equipped to make enquiries ...
because of her limited English, her limited education or any misapprehensions
about the risk that she or her sons might be deported”. It observed
that the applicant had told the Tribunal that she lived with two sons, both of
whom studied English in Australia
and who could have assisted her if she needed
to enquire about protection.
- The
Tribunal also found that the applicant’s “evidence about the
extent to which she [had] discussed her refugee concerns with others
during 2008, and what transpired, was changeable and unreliable”. It
observed that initially the applicant had said that she had not disclosed her
fear of persecution to anyone at church,
but that she had then said she had told
a particular church-goer. She later spoke in very general terms about having
called on a
migration agent who had advised that she could not make “an
application”. The Tribunal considered that “the applicant
may have discussed some migration-related matters during 2008”, such
as obtaining permission to work, but did not believe that she spoke to the named
fellow church-goer or to anyone else
about a fear of persecution or that she
made any enquiries about refugee protection.
- The
Tribunal also considered “whether the applicant’s attendance at
church in Australia, within months of her arrival, support[ed] her claim
to have been a Catholic in China”. It accepted that she started going
to church in Australia from early 2008, based on her oral evidence, the evidence
of a
witness at the hearing and statements from a priest and another person
supporting her claims about church attendance although it
considered that the
photographs she provided were “mostly undated or relatively
recent” and did not indicate the timing of church attendance.
Relevantly, however, the Tribunal found that the supporting statements
provided
by the applicant were “silent as to whether she had any previous
knowledge of or commitment to, Catholicism”.
- The
Tribunal stated that, as discussed at the hearing, it was also
“troubled by the applicant’s account of why she was not baptised
into the Catholic faith until April 2009”. In those circumstances,
considering also its concerns about the applicant’s credibility and past
experiences, the
Tribunal placed “very little weight on the
applicant’s attendance at church in Australia from early 2008 as evidence
of any prior religious interests”.
- Based
on these factors and the Tribunal’s concerns about the applicant’s
conduct, despite her attendance in Australia
at church, the Tribunal found she
had “not given a truthful account of her experiences in China and the
circumstances that led her to come to Australia”. It did not accept
her claims that she became involved in any Catholic congregation in China,
whether authorised or unauthorised,
that she provided transport or any other
support to such a group, or that she had any other association with Catholics.
Nor did
it accept her claims that she “engaged in any religious
activities in a secretive or discreet way, to avoid persecution; that she
experienced any associated fear;
that PRC authorities detained and mistreated
her”; that she went into hiding thereafter and decided to leave China
to flee persecution; or about harassment of her husband,
harm to his business or
inquiries by the authorities.
- The
Tribunal did accept that the applicant had attended a Catholic church in
Australia and that she had been baptised and participated
in a range of
religious and social activities. It was “satisfied that she did so
otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening her claim to be a
refugee” and that that conduct was therefore outside s.91R(3) of the
Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It was satisfied that it was plausible that
the applicant “may have acquired some genuine interest in the
faith”, although it found that this was quite limited.
- The
Tribunal concluded however that there was no real chance of the applicant
experiencing Convention-related persecution if she returned
to China for reasons
that it gave. First, given its finding that “the applicant did not
practice Catholicism in China and did not suffer any relevant harm”,
the Tribunal found that it followed that the authorities would have “no
adverse interest in her” on that basis. The Tribunal accepted (with
some reservations given its credibility concerns) that “the applicant
may wish to establish contacts with Catholics and learn more about the faith in
China”, but did not accept her claim that she was committed to worship
in an unauthorised Catholic church because she had done so
in the past, as this
claim was rejected, or because she objected to the Communist Party’s
involvement in the church, finding
this claim to have been “contrived
for the purpose of this application”. The Tribunal found on the
evidence before it that the applicant had “no past connection or
affinity with unauthorised churches” and that she “would
decide what Catholic church or group to contact on unrelated grounds, such as
location and where she [felt] welcome”.
- The
Tribunal found on the evidence as a whole that there was “no real
chance of the applicant experiencing persecution” if she made contact
with Catholics, whether in a registered or an unregistered church, having regard
to country information
about Fujian’s growing Christian community and the
generally tolerant environment, including in relation to Christian groups
outside the official state churches.
- The
Tribunal acknowledged that there were “individual reported incidents of
... officials harassing and detaining unregistered Catholics”,
but found that the predominant picture in Fujian province was of “a
thriving Christian population, including Catholics outside the State church, who
experience no serious problems”. “[I]n light of this
information and the applicant’s very limited religious
involvement”, the Tribunal found that “she face[d] no
real chance of persecution if she [chose] to develop her interest in
Catholicism, and that there [was] also no real chance of her needing to
modify her conduct to avoid persecution”.
- While
the applicant did not claim to fear harm on the basis of her conduct in
Australia, the Tribunal found in any event that the
available material did not
suggest that “her conduct in Australia [would] attract the
adverse attention of the authorities or anyone else in China”.
- The
Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of
Convention-related persecution now or in the reasonably
foreseeable future if
she returned to China.
- The
applicant filed an application for review of the Tribunal decision on
14 August 2009. There are three generally expressed and
unparticularised
grounds in the application. In addition, the applicant filed written
submissions on 15 January 2010 which she addressed
in oral submissions.
- Dealing
first with the grounds in the written application, the first ground is that the
Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations
under s.424A(1) of the Migration
Act.
- As
indicated, this ground is not particularised but in any event the only
information relied on by the Tribunal or that could be seen
as information that
the Tribunal considered would be the reason or a part of the reason for
affirming the decision under review within
s.424A(1) of the Act, consisted of
information given by the applicant for the purposes of the application or during
the process that led to
the decision under review, and independent country
information. Such categories of information are excluded from the operation of
s.424A(1) by virtue of s.424A(3) of the Act. This ground is not made out.
- The
second ground is that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s
claims “properly and fairly”. However, contrary to this
generally expressed claim, it is apparent from the Tribunal reasons for decision
that the Tribunal
considered each of the applicant’s claims, albeit that
it did not accept all of her claims and arrived at an adverse decision.
- The
third ground is that the Tribunal’s decision gave rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. Such a generally expressed
claim is not made out. It is
only in rare and extreme circumstances that bias on the part of the Tribunal
would be established simply
by reference to the Tribunal’s reasons for
decision (see SZHVL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA
356). As discussed further below, neither apprehended bias in the sense
considered in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982;
[2001] HCA 28, or actual bias in the sense considered in the Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507;
[2001] HCA 17, is made out on the material before the court. In particular, no
partiality or perception of bias or a closed mind is established
on the part of
the Tribunal member on the basis of the decision record from the perspective of
the appropriately informed reasonable
lay observer. Rather it appears from the
Tribunal’s reasons for decision that the Tribunal embarked on a thorough
examination
of the applicant’s claims, which properly involved testing
those claims at the hearing.
- The
claim of bias was also addressed in the applicant’s written submissions
and in oral submissions today. Particulars in relation
to the claim of a
reasonable apprehension of bias were provided in the written submissions as
follows:
There is no evidence to support that only those, who
have been baptized in the underground Roman Catholic church, would be subjected
to persecution by the PRC authorities. In other words, a person like me, who
have (sic) played an active role in the underground church, must also
have a real chance of persecution by the Chinese government even if I
have not
been baptized at that time.
- To
some extent such particulars seek impermissible merits review. This claim also
misunderstands the Tribunal reasons for decision.
As set out above, the
Tribunal found for a number of reasons that it doubted the applicant’s
claimed involvement in an underground
Catholic church in China and, in that
respect, considered it relevant, among other things, that although the applicant
claimed to
have participated in masses and other illegal religious activities in
China she did not claim to have been baptised or to have participated
in
confession or communion in China.
- It
found her explanation that the church was restricted in what it could do
appeared to be at odds with her other claims about the
Chinese
congregation’s commitment and tenacity and in those circumstances formed
the impression that the applicant was trying
to mask her lack of involvement in
these or other religious ceremonies in China. The Tribunal did not simply
reject the applicant’s
claims based on the fact that her evidence was that
she was not baptised until she came to Australia (and then not until April
2009).
- I
also note that the Tribunal account of what occurred in the hearing (which is
the only evidence before the court of the conduct
of the Tribunal hearing)
indicates that the Tribunal raised with the applicant the issue of why she had
not been baptised in China.
The Tribunal recorded the applicant’s
response that the government did not allow baptisms in the underground church
and also
that when the Tribunal expressed scepticism about that response (given
that the applicant claimed all underground activities were
prohibited) the
applicant stated that she did not know much about Christianity there and that
she had not had the opportunity to
be baptised.
- Having
regard to the evidence of the Tribunal review as a whole and the
Tribunal’s reasons for decision set out above, the fact
that the Tribunal
raised this issue with the applicant in the course of the hearing is not such as
to give rise to any reasonable
apprehension of bias. The fact that a Tribunal
raises issues of concern with an applicant during the course of the hearing is
not
such as to be indicative of bias (see Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship v MZXPA and Another (2008) 100 ALD 312; [2008] FCA 185). Indeed
the expression of a preliminary view on the part of the Tribunal by having
invited an applicant to a hearing does not, of
itself, establish apprehended
bias.
- Similarly,
to the extent that the Tribunal expressed scepticism about a particular aspect
of the applicant’s claims it is not,
in the circumstances of this case,
apparent that this was done in a manner which evinced a determination only to
prove the falsity
of the applicant’s claims (see SZLUD v Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 549).
- There
may be specific and, indeed, arguably onerous questioning at a hearing which
nonetheless does not sustain a conclusion of a
reasonable apprehension of bias
(see SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2009)
179 FCR 109; [2009] FCAFC 106). As Buchanan J pointed out in SZJBD bias
or the reasonable apprehension of bias is not demonstrated by the selection and
administration of a series of highly specific
questions, even if they take on
the appearance of an examination. The critical issue is what use is made of the
responses. In this
instance the Tribunal’s approach to the fact that the
applicant was not baptised in China is not such as to give rise to a
reasonable
apprehension of bias from the perspective of the appropriately informed
reasonable lay observer. Neither actual nor apprehended
bias is made out on the
material before the court.
- In
addition to the grounds in the application, in written and oral submissions, the
applicant claimed that the Tribunal failed to
comply with s.425 of the Migration
Act, which obliges the Tribunal to invite the applicant to appear before it to
give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues
arising in relation
to the decision under review.
- The
applicant contended that at the hearing she had the right not only to provide
oral evidence but also to rebut the points the Tribunal
had doubts about, and
that the Tribunal had failed to give her this opportunity. As stated by the
High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [2006] HCA 63, the Tribunal’s
obligation under s.425(1) of the Act extends to the identification of
dispositive or determinative issues arising in relation to the decision under
review.
However the Tribunal’s obligation does not extend to putting its
preliminary reasoning to the applicant, in the sense of giving
advance notice of
proposed adverse findings (see SZIUD v Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1555 at [15]).
- The
applicant took issue with three specific aspects of the Tribunal’s
decision in this respect, suggesting first that while
the Tribunal had stated
that it was unable to draw conclusions as to whether the applicant’s
knowledge of Christianity stemmed
from her activities in China or was of more
recent origin, the Tribunal had never raised this issue clearly, either at the
hearing
or thereafter, so that the applicant was not given a fair chance to
present her arguments against it.
- Insofar
as this contention addresses the issue of the applicant’s knowledge of
Christianity, it is apparent from the Tribunal
reasons for decision that the
applicant’s knowledge of Christianity was discussed at the Tribunal
hearing, as well as her claims
about activities in the church in China. In any
event, while the applicant’s knowledge of Catholicism and its practices
was
of significance and dispositive relevance to the delegate’s decision,
that was not the case in relation to the Tribunal’s
decision. As the
Tribunal stated, the applicant’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of
Christianity was not treated as dispositive,
given that the Tribunal could not
conclude whether such knowledge stemmed from activities in China or was of more
recent origin.
- Further,
it was not necessary for the Tribunal to put its conclusions in that respect to
the applicant for comment at the hearing,
given that the issue of her knowledge
of Christianity was clearly raised. On the material before the court it has not
been established
that the Tribunal failed to comply with s.425 of the Act in
relation to this issue.
- The
applicant also took issue with the Tribunal’s conclusion that it had
difficulty believing that the authorities had any sustained
interest in a driver
if, as claimed, their intention was to gather intelligence on a relatively small
Christian congregation and
its meeting place. The applicant’s claims in
this respect were discussed in the course of the Tribunal hearing according to
the reasons for decision. The Tribunal was not obliged to put its preliminary
reasoning in that respect to the applicant.
- Further,
the applicant took issue with the Tribunal’s conclusion that it was
troubled by the applicant’s account of why
she was not baptised into the
Catholic faith until April 2009 and claimed that the Tribunal never raised this
issue with her. Contrary
to this contention it is apparent from the Tribunal
reasons for decision that at the hearing the Tribunal not only raised the fact
that the applicant was baptised only in April 2009 but also asked why she had
not been baptised in China and expressed some scepticism
about her response.
- The
applicant’s claims about the Tribunal failure to comply with s.425 of the
Act are not made out on the material before the court.
- The
second contention in written and oral submissions was that the Tribunal failed
to consider the applicant’s “particular difficulties”
while it considered her claims and that it had “ignored important
evidence before it”.
- Insofar
as the applicant’s contentions take issue with the conduct of the Tribunal
hearing, I note again that the only evidence
before the court of what occurred
in the Tribunal hearing is the Tribunal reasons for decision. The applicant
conceded in submissions
that she may have to accept that her oral evidence at
the hearing might not have been very clear but claimed that the Tribunal had
failed to consider any particular difficulties she suffered, including that she
had been under huge pressure, mentally and psychologically.
- However
this claim is not made out. The Tribunal specifically took into account that
the applicant was initially a little nervous
at the hearing. On the evidence
before the court it has not been established that the applicant’s
condition was such that
she was unable to give evidence or avail herself of the
opportunity to participate in the hearing in the sense considered in decisions
such as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v
SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553; [2003] FCAFC 126.
- The
applicant also claimed that she had sometimes been unable to understand the
Tribunal’s questions, even if they had been
interpreted by an interpreter.
There is no evidence before the court of any interpretational difficulties such
as to indicate that
the hearing invitation was not a real and meaningful
invitation or that there was a jurisdictional error in the sense considered
in
Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230. To some extent the applicant’s
claims in this respect are speculative. She indicated that it may have been
that when an interpreter
interrupted her explanation to translate, she lost her
place. There is no evidence before the court, such as a transcript of the
Tribunal hearing, to indicate any disjunction between Tribunal questioning and
answers or that is such as to support any claims that
the interpretation was
inadequate or was such that the applicant was prevented from availing herself of
the requisite hearing opportunity.
- The
fact that the Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an
interpreter is not of itself such as to establish any jurisdictional
error,
insofar as this is contended. There is nothing in the Tribunal’s account
of the hearing to indicate any difficulties
in interpretation or comprehension,
bearing in mind that the Tribunal took into account the applicant’s
nervousness and her
claims to have had little education.
- The
applicant also claimed that the Tribunal ignored what she described as
“particular difficulties” she had suffered since she came to
Australia in relation to her delay in lodging of a protection visa application.
She sought
to explain to the court, both in written and oral submissions, why
her sons could not provide adequate assistance.
- However,
as I endeavoured to explain to the applicant, it is not for the court to decide
whether or not she is a refugee or to determine
factual matters, those being
matters for the Tribunal. The fact that she may now be able to provide a more
comprehensive explanation
for her delay in applying for a protection visa does
not establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal which had regard
to this issue, raised it with the applicant, and considered the explanation that
she provided for the delay.
- The
fact that the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s explanation for the
delay is not such as to establish that the Tribunal
ignored important evidence
or failed to consider the applicant’s difficulties in a manner
constituting jurisdictional error.
- The
applicant also claimed that the Tribunal completely ignored evidence about the
difference between the official Catholic church
in China and the underground
Roman Catholic church and that it assessed her claims based on country
information in relation to the
official Catholic church.
- The
Tribunal clearly understood that the applicant’s claim was that she was a
member of an underground church in China. This
is apparent from its description
of her claims and the account of what occurred in the Tribunal hearing. The
Tribunal recorded that
it discussed with the applicant independent country
information about Christianity in Fujian Province in China, in relation to both
State-approved and unregistered churches. It specifically considered but did
not accept her claim that she became a member of an
underground Catholic church
for the reasons set out above. Moreover, in considering whether the applicant
faced a real chance of
persecution in the future, the Tribunal had regard to the
possibility that she may practice Christianity in a registered or in an
unregistered church in China.
- It
has not been established that the Tribunal completely ignored evidence about the
difference between the official Catholic church
and the underground Roman
Catholic church or that it assessed the applicant’s claims based only on
country information in relation
to the official Catholic church.
- None
of the claims raised by the applicant, either in her application or in written
or oral submissions, establish jurisdictional
error on the part of the Tribunal.
Accordingly the application must be dismissed.
- The
applicant has been unsuccessful and the Minister seeks costs in the sum of
$3,800. There is nothing in the circumstances of this
case to warrant a
departure from the normal principle that an unsuccessful applicant should meet
the costs of the first respondent.
The amount sought is appropriate in light of
the nature of this and other similar matters.
I certify that
the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment of Barnes FM
Associate:
Date: 11 February 2010
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