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Facton Ltd & Ors v Dash Industries Pty Ltd & Anor [2010] FMCA 709 (23 September 2010)
Last Updated: 27 September 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FACTON LTD & ORS v
DASH INDUSTRIES PTY LTD & ANOR
|
|
COPYRIGHT – Infringement – default
judgment – assessment of damages.
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|
Second Applicant:
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G-STAR INTERNATIONAL B.V
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|
Third Applicant:
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G-STAR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 096 765 123)
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|
First Respondent:
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DASH INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (ACN 133 864 267)
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|
Second Respondent:
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HAI YIM CHEN
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|
Hearing date:
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25 August 2010
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Date of Last Submission:
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25 August 2010
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Delivered on:
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23 September 2010
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REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the
Applicants:
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Mr Feder
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Solicitors for the Applicants:
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Middletons
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Counsel for the Respondents:
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No appearance
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Solicitors for the Respondents:
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No appearance
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ORDERS
PENAL NOTICE TO THE RESPONDENTS:
IF YOU
- REFUSE
OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING
OF THE ACT; OR
- DISOBEY
THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU TO ABSTAIN FROM DOING,
YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR
OTHER PUNISHMENT.
ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR
PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY
PUNISHED.
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
(1) The respondents have:
- (a) infringed
the G-Star Trade Marks (as defined in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Claim) in
breach of section 120 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth);
- (b) infringed
or authorised the infringement of the Copyright Works (as defined in paragraph 7
of the Statement of Claim);
- (c) contravened
sections 42 and 44 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW); and
- (d) engaged in
conduct which constitutes the tort of passing off.
(2) The first respondent has contravened sections 52 and 53 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
(3) The second respondent has contravened sections 52 and 53 of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (by virtue of the operation of section 75B of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)).
AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
(1) The respondents, whether by themselves, their
servants, employees, agents or otherwise howsoever be restrained, in trade or
commerce
from:
- (a) importing,
manufacturing, promoting, advertising, distributing, offering for sale, selling
or exhibiting in public, the Dash Garments
(as defined in paragraph 11 of the
Statement of Claim) or any other clothing or clothing accessories to which the
G-Star Trade Marks
and Copyright Works have been affixed or applied without the
knowledge, authority or licence of the applicants or any of them (Counterfeit
G-Star Products);
- (b) disposing
or dealing with the Dash Garments or Counterfeit
G-Star Products in any other
way than in accordance with order 2 below;
- (c) authorising,
causing, procuring or inducing any person to do any act which would be an
infringement of the injunction referred
to in order (1)(a) above;
- (d) representing
that the Dash Garments, or Counterfeit G-Star Products are imported,
manufactured, advertised, promoted, offered
for sale or sold with the
sponsorship or approval of the applicants or any of them;
- (e) representing
that the Dash Garments or Counterfeit G-Star Products are the G-Star Products
(as defined in paragraph 3 of the Statement
of Claim);
- (f) representing
that the Dash Garments or Counterfeit G-Star Products emanate from the same
trade source as the G-Star Products;
- (g) representing
that the Dash Products or Counterfeit G-Star Clothing are made by the applicants
or any of them;
- (h) passing
themselves off as the applicants or any of them; and
- (i) passing off
the Dash Garments or Counterfeit G-Star Products:
- as
and for the G-Star Products (as defined in paragraph 3 of the Statement of
Claim); and
- as
having the sponsorship, approval or a connection or affiliation in the course of
trade with the Applicants or any of them and the
G-Star
Products.
(2) The respondents, whether by themselves, their
servants, employees, agents or otherwise howsoever, deliver up to the
applicants:
- (a) all the
Dash Garments and Counterfeit G-Star Products in their possession, custody or
control;
- (b) any and all
brochures, pamphlets, advertising, labels, swing tags, promotional or marketing
material and the like in their power,
possession, custody or control which bear
the G-Star Trade Marks or the Copyright Works; and
- (c) any
materials, products or things in the respondents’ power, possession or
control, the exploitation of which by the respondents
would be an infringement
of the foregoing injunctions.
(3) The respondents pay the applicants’ damages of $50,000.
(4) The respondents pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding fixed in
the sum of $3,815 together with disbursements fixed
in the sum of $2,205.62.
(5) The applicants serve a copy of these orders on the respondents as soon as
practicable.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATESCOURT OF AUSTRALIA
ATMELBOURNE
|
MLG 20 of 2010
First Applicant
Second Applicant
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G-STAR AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 096 765 123)
|
Third Applicant
And
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DASH INDUSTRIES PTY LTD (ACN 133 864 267)
|
First Respondent
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
- This
is an application for default judgment in relation to, among other things, an
alleged breach of copyright. The applicants filed
a notice of motion on 31 May
2010 in which they sought orders substantially in terms of their application
filed on 12 January 2010.
- Subrule
13.03A(2) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 relevantly provides
that:
- (2) For
rule 13.03B, a respondent is in default if the respondent:
- (a) has not
satisfied the applicant’s claim; and
- (b) fails
to:
(i) give an address for service
before the time for the respondent to give an address has expired; or
(ii) file a response before the time for the respondent to file a response
has expired; or
(iii) comply with an order of the Court in the proceeding; or
(iv) file and serve a document required under these Rules; or
...
(vi) do any act required to be done by these Rules; or
(vii) defend the proceeding with due diligence.
- Subrule
13.03B(2) of the rules relevantly provides that:
- (2) If a
respondent is in default, the Court may:
(c) if
the proceeding was commenced by an application supported by a statement of claim
or the Court has ordered that the proceeding
continue on pleadings – give
judgment against the respondent for the relief that:
(i) the applicant appears entitled to on the statement of claim;
and
(ii) the Court is satisfied it has power to grant;
or
(d) give judgment or make any other order against the
respondent; ...
- In
Arthur and Ors v Vaupotic Investments Pty Ltd and Ors [2005] FCA 433 at
[3], Heerey J discussed the equivalent rule in the Federal Court Rules
and said:
- The rule
does not require proof by way of evidence of the applicant’s claim; rather
that on the face of the statement of claim
there is a claim for the relief
sought and, of course, that the court has jurisdiction to grant that
relief.
- The
same point has been made in a number of other cases in the Federal Court and in
this court. I proceed on the basis that Arthur v Vaupotic accurately
sets out the relevant test.
Procedural history
- The
evidence indicates that the application and statement of claim were served on
the first respondent by post at its registered office
on 13 January
2010[1] and on the
second respondent personally on 12 February
2010.[2]
- The
application stated that 17 February 2010 was the first directions hearing. The
respondents did not appear on that day. Orders
were made in the
respondents’ absence for them to, among other things, file and serve a
defence by 17 March 2010. They did
not do so. In fact, the respondents have
not appeared at any of the various hearings in this matter and have not filed
any documents.
- Pursuant
to orders made on 26 May 2010, the notice of motion filed on 31 May 2010 and
various other relevant documents were served
on the first respondent by post and
email on 4 June 2010[3]
and on the second respondent personally on 8 June
2010.[4] The notice of
motion was returnable on 16 June 2010. The respondents did not appear on that
day, and the matter was adjourned.
The notice of motion eventually came on for
hearing on 25 August 2010.
Default
- Clearly,
the respondents’ failure to file a defence constitutes a default as
defined in the rules.
Declarations and injunctions
- On
the face of the statement of claim and the application, there is a claim for the
relief sought, save that the amounts claimed for
damages and costs were not
specified. With the exception of a claim under the Trade Marks Act 1995,
all of the relief sought is clearly within the jurisdiction of the court. In
relation to the trade marks claim, ss.125 and 190 of the Trade Marks Act
1995 provide as follows:
- 125 What
courts may hear action for infringement of registered
- trade
mark
- (1) An
action for an infringement of a registered trade mark may be brought in a
prescribed court.
- Note: For
prescribed court see section 190.
- (2) Subsection
(1) does not prevent an action for infringement of a registered trade mark from
being brought in any other court that
has jurisdiction to hear the
action.
- 190
Prescribed courts
- Each of
the following courts is a prescribed court for the purposes of this
Act:
- (a) the
Federal Court;
- (b) the
Supreme Court of a State;
- (c) the
Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory;
- (d) the
Supreme Court of the Northern Territory;
- (e) the
Supreme Court of Norfolk Island.
- Although
this court is not a prescribed court, I proceed on the basis that, pursuant to
s.125(2), the court has accrued jurisdiction in relation to the infringement of
trade marks, where the court has clear jurisdiction in relation
to the copyright
and other aspects of the claim.
- There
is authority that a court should not make a declaration unless it is satisfied
on the basis of evidence that it is proper to
make the declaration, because of
the impact of declarations on the world at large. However, in the present case,
the declarations
that are sought only concern the conduct of the respondents.
Accordingly, I consider that it is appropriate to make the declarations
and
injunctions that are sought in this proceeding.
Damages
- Among
other things, the application sought general damages (consisting of compensatory
damages and damages for loss of reputation)
under s.115(2) of the Copyright
Act 1968 and additional damages under s.115(4) of the Copyright Act
1968. The application also sought damages under the Trade Marks Act
1995, the Trade Practices Act 1974, the Fair Trading Act 1987
(NSW), and for passing off.
- However,
at the hearing of the notice of motion, the applicants acknowledged that they
could not “double dip”. Consequently,
the applicants indicated
that, provided they were successful in relation to their copyright claims, they
would not press their claims
for damages under the other heads.
- Additionally,
the applicants noted that, under s.115(2) of the Copyright Act 1968, they
were able to seek either damages or an account of profits. The applicants
elected to seek damages.
a. compensatory damages
- The
applicants sought compensatory damages of $6,987.60. That amount was calculated
on the basis of the profit that the applicants
would have received if they had
sold genuine items in place of the counterfeit items sold by the respondents.
The respondents did
not provide discovery, contrary to court orders.
Consequently, the evidence available to the court concerning lost sales
consisted
solely of the affidavit of Mr Fahd sworn on 3 June 2010. Mr Fahd said
that he attended the Druitt Dash Store and the Sussex Dash
Store, which are the
respondents’ stores, and noted counterfeit G-Star branded goods on display
as follows:
- about
40 pairs of jeans for $80 each;
- about
20 T-shirts for $25 each;
- about
15 singlets for $10 each;
- about
15 jumpers for $45 each;
- about
8 polo shirts for $15 each; and
- about
10 T-shirts for $30 each.
- I
understand that the respondents have not delivered up any goods to the
applicants. The applicants invite the court therefore to
proceed on the basis
that the respondents have sold all of the garments that were seen on display by
Mr Fahd. In the absence of
any evidence or submissions to the contrary from the
respondents, that seems a reasonable assumption to make.
- Christian
de Bil swore an affidavit on 25 May 2010 in which he said that the first
applicant licenses the use of the G-Star trade
marks, the second applicant is
the corporate headquarters and designer, distributer and seller of G-Star
branded clothing and accessories
and the third applicant is the exclusive
wholesaler and distributer of G-Star products in Australia.
- Mr
de Bil said that the third applicant sold its jeans wholesale for $112.84 and
its T-shirts wholesale for
$16.56.[5] Forty pairs
of jeans at that price would amount to lost sales of $4,513.60. Thirty T-shirts
at that price would amount to lost
sales of $496.80. There was no evidence
about the amounts at which the third applicant sold singlets, jumpers and polo
shirts wholesale.
However, I am prepared to assume that the price would average
out to about the same as the price of
T-shirts. Thirty-eight singlets,
jumpers and polo shirts at that price would amount to lost sales of $629.28. On
that basis, the
total lost sales would amount to $5,639.68.
- I
also assume that the applicants would have had some costs associated with their
sales. In the absence of any clear evidence or
explanation from the applicants
about the loss of profit arising from the respondents’ actions, I consider
that compensatory
damages of $5,000 would be reasonable.
b. damages for loss of reputation
- The
applicants also sought damages on the basis that the availability in the
marketplace of the counterfeit garments sold by the respondents
damaged the
G-Star brand and the applicants’ reputations.
- I
am satisfied on the basis of Mr de Bil’s affidavit that the third
applicant has spent a good deal of money on advertising
the G-Star brand, it has
a large wholesale customer base in Australia and it has significantly increased
its sales in Australia since
2006. I am satisfied that the applicants have a
substantial reputation in Australia and overseas as “an innovative brand
[of
clothing] with a cutting edge style” and a level of
“exclusivity”.
- Mr
de Bil said in his affidavit, and I accept, that the applicants’
reputations were damaged by the respondents selling counterfeit
G-Star products
because:
- the
exclusivity of the G-Star brand was undermined by cheaper counterfeits being
available;
- the
cheaper counterfeits were being sold in shops in close proximity to shops
selling genuine G-Star products; and
- the
cheaper counterfeits were not subject to the strict quality controls to which
the genuine products are subject.
- The
applicants submitted that the evidence of Mr Fahd showed that the respondents
had offered for sale at least 120 counterfeit G-Star
products. The applicants
submitted that damages of $50,000 for loss of reputation would be appropriate in
this case.
- In
Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton on Clothing Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 378;
[2009] FCA 633, Gordon J awarded $10,000 for damage to reputation in
circumstances where 28,139 infringing garments had been sold. However, her
Honour addressed the paucity of evidence of the impact of the infringing
products on the reputation of the plaintiff, and the difficulties
with assessing
the damage to reputation in the following terms:
- [33]
In the present case, I find that it was reasonably foreseeable that
infringement of the applicant’s copyright would cause a
loss of reputation
to the applicant in terms of brand-name recognition. However, the applicant
adduced no evidence of the damage
it allegedly suffered to its reputation by
reason of the infringement of its copyright. In previous cases where damage to
reputation
has been quantified, evidence was usually led to establish (a) the
importance of singularity, distinctiveness, quality or some other
commercially
valuable aspect of reputation to the victim and (b) how, and to what extent, the
infringing product or conduct damaged
that aspect of the victim’s
reputation: see Paramount Pictures Corporation v Hasluck [2006] FCA 1431; (2006) 70 IPR 293 ; [2006] FCA 1431 at [55]; New
Cover[[6]] at [44]–[46] and
Innovative[[7]]
at [29]–[31].
- [34]
What then is the commercially valuable aspect of the
applicant’s reputation, and how, and to what extent, was this commercially
valuable aspect damaged by the conduct of the respondent? At its highest, it was
submitted by the applicant that the “iconic”
and
“exclusive” nature of the Elwood brand was “cheapened”
by the production of the infringing products of
the respondent. For the
moment, I am prepared to accept that the exclusivity of the applicant’s
reputation was, on balance,
adversely affected by the availability of the
infringing products – as the availability of a product increases and its
cost
decreases, it will be viewed as less exclusive. The problem that I am left
with is how to quantify this “drop” in exclusivity,
being the extent
of harm to the applicant’s reputation. The substance of the
applicant’s submission was that, after undertaking
a cursory evaluation of
the case law, a sort of broad formula could be adopted: X many infringing
products = $Y in damages to reputation.
In other words, if a court granted
$50,000 in damages to reputation based upon 1000 infringing products in one
case, it was sufficient
in another to grant $25,000 in damages to reputation
where 500 infringing products were created. That proposition has no
justification
in authority or logic. Any quantifiable figure for damage to
reputation, by necessity, will depend upon the particular circumstances
of the
case. The starting point must be the reputation, and the harm it has suffered.
Using the number of infringing products to
determine the quantum of damage to
reputation reverses the process. Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, on the
balance it is likely
that some damage to reputation was suffered. After all, as
they say, success breeds success: see
Prior v Sheldon (2000) 48 IPR 301 ; [2000] FCA 438 at [87]. While the precise quantification of the
applicant’s lost goodwill is necessarily speculative for the reasons
identified above,
I would award it an additional sum of $10,000 in this regard.
That amount represents the best assessment I can make in the circumstances:
New Cover at [46].
- Gordon
J made it clear in that passage that there is no ready formula for assessing
damage to reputation, especially not a formula
based on the number of infringing
garments.
- In
Review Australia Pty Ltd v Innovative Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd and
Anor (2008) 166 FCR 358; [2008] FCA 74, Jessup J awarded $7,500 for damage
to reputation under the Designs Act 2003. His Honour said at [30] and
[31]:
- [30]
I think there is sense in the applicant's position in this regard, particularly
with respect to so much of the respondents' infringement
as concerns offering to
sell, and selling, their own dress. I accept the applicant's evidence that it
put considerable value by the
perceived originality of its garments. It was an
important aspect of the applicant's image in the market. I can well understand
that,
if the applicant had a reputation, however diffuse, for originality of
design, a consumer might well show a particular interest in
the applicant's
range of products, and be alert to the appearance of new designs from time to
time. And if she took that approach,
she would have to enter one of the
applicant's stores or outlets to satisfy her curiosity. If garments bearing a
substantial similarity
to those of the applicant started to appear in other
outlets and under other brands, the consumer's perception of the originality
of
the applicant's designs would necessarily be weakened. In an extreme case, the
consumer's perception may be that the applicant's
garments were nothing very
special at all, and that she might as well spend her discretionary dollar at any
outlet where she noticed
something to her taste. I could not, of course, find
that the present was anything like an extreme case, but I am prepared to find,
on the probabilities, that the market presence of the respondents' dress did
bring about some minor dilution of the applicant's reputation
for
originality.
- [31]
Although different from Autodesk 94 ALR
472[[8]] with respect to
the matter of actual lost sales, I consider that the present case is one in
which the approach of Wilcox J may be
taken with respect to the reputational
damage which the applicant alleges. Because of the uncertainties involved, and
because the
applicant has made an apparently conscious choice not to put
satisfactory sales figures before the court, I must be very cautious
in my
assessment. By conducting its case in the way that it has, the applicant has
made the task of assessment entirely a matter
of impression. Doing the best I
can, I am prepared to place a capital value of $7,500 upon the probable
diminution of the applicant's
reputation for originality brought about by the
respondents' infringement.
- In
G-Star Raw Denim KFT and Ors v Urban Culture Pty Ltd and Anor [2009] FMCA
1317, O’Dwyer FM awarded $35,000 for damage to reputation in circumstances
where 100 counterfeit products were displayed for sale
and two had been sold.
However, as Gordon J explained in Elwood, the number of infringing
products is not in itself a useful guide to an assessment of damages for loss of
reputation.
- In
Facton Ltd & Anor v Chung Lim Sports Cap Pty Ltd and Ors [2010] FMCA
584, Burchardt FM awarded $15,000 for damage to reputation. In Facton Ltd
& Anor v Yao [2010] FMCA 433, Riethmuller FM awarded $10,000 for damage
to reputation.
- The
case put by the applicants in relation to damage to their reputation was
somewhat speculative. There was no evidence about the
actual damage to their
reputations, much less what the monetary value of that damage might be.
Nevertheless, I accept that there
would have been some damage to the
applicants’ reputations. Doing my best, in all of the circumstances of
this case, I consider
that damages of $15,000 would be appropriate for loss of
reputation.
c. additional damages
- The
applicants claimed additional damages under s.115(4) of the Copyright Act
1968. That subsection provides that the matters that the court may take
into account in assessing a claim for additional damages include:
- the
flagrancy of the infringement;
- the
need to deter similar infringements;
- the
conduct of the infringer after the infringement or, if relevant, after being
informed of the infringement; and
- the
benefit to the infringer from the infringing conduct.
- The
applicants submitted that this was an appropriate case for an award of $100,000
in additional damages for the following reasons.
- Firstly,
the respondents had taken no part in the proceedings. Clearly, the respondents
could have ameliorated their infringement
by making appropriate admissions,
providing discovery, and reaching and honouring a reasonable settlement. They
have not done so.
- Secondly,
it was submitted that the counterfeit products were extremely good copies and
are therefore flagrant infringements. There
was no expert evidence about the
quality of the copies. Although two garments were made available for the
court’s
inspection[9], I do not
consider that the court is able to assess the quality of the copies without the
benefit of expert evidence. In any event,
examples of all of the relevant types
of garment were not provided to the court.
- Thirdly,
the applicants submitted that the respondents had gained a considerable
commercial advantage by selling products with the
G-Star brand, as they were
able to charge a premium for their products.
Mr de Bil said in his affidavit
that genuine G-Star jeans were sold in Australia at an average recommended
retail price of $280 and
genuine G-Star t-shirts were sold in Australia at an
average recommended retail price of $40. Mr Fahd said in his affidavit that
the
respondents’ counterfeit jeans were offered for sale $80 and their
counterfeit t-shirts were offered for sale at $25 or
$30.
- This
does not strike me as selling the counterfeits at a premium. Again, there was
no expert evidence about these matters. However,
ordinary experience suggests
that not many jeans and t-shirts are sold in shops, as opposed, perhaps, to
markets, for much less than
$80 and $30 respectively.
- The
applicants also submitted in its third point that the fact that the respondents
sold their counterfeit products in shops, as opposed
to markets, would have
indicated to consumers that the products were genuine. I accept that argument
in relation to the t-shirts,
where the price differential was only about 25 or
30 per cent. However, the argument is less compelling in relation to the jeans.
The respondents were selling counterfeit jeans at less than a third of the
recommended retail price of the genuine product. That
is an extraordinary price
reduction for an exclusive product. I consider that many consumers would have
been alerted by the very
large price reduction to the respondents’
products not being genuine.
- Fourthly,
the applicants reiterated that the respondents had not participated in these
proceedings.
- Fifthly,
the applicants submitted that the respondents, as sellers of a substantial
quantity of merchandise, ought to be good corporate
citizens, and, consequently,
the principles of specific and general deterrence required an award of
additional damages. There was
no particular evidence about the size of the
respondents’ retailing venture, except that they have two shops. However,
I accept
that it is appropriate that there be some level of deterrence for
conduct of the type engaged in by the respondents.
- Sixthly,
the applicants submitted that the respondents, despite being put on notice that
they were infringing the applicants’
copyright, continued to sell
counterfeit copies of the applicants’ products: Fahd affidavit at [8]. I
accept that evidence
and accept that it warrants an award of additional damages:
see Review Australia Pty Ltd v Innovative Style Investments Pty Ltd
(2008) 166 FCR 358; [2008] FCA 74.
- In
the Elwood case, $150,000 was awarded in additional damages, partly
because the respondents had continued to sell infringing garments after
being
put on notice.
- In
Urban Culture, O’Dwyer FM awarded $50,000 in additional damages.
The same amount was awarded in Review Australia Pty Ltd v New Cover Group Pty
Ltd (2008) 79 IPR 236; [2008] FCA 1589 and in Facton Ltd & Anor v Yao
[2010] FMCA 433. However, in Facton Ltd & Anor v Chung Lim Sports
Cap Pty Ltd and Ors [2010] FMCA 584, Burchardt FM awarded only $15,000 for
additional damages.
- Taking
into account all of the circumstances of this case, I consider that an
appropriate award of additional damages is $30,000.
- As
the applicants are to be given an award of damages for breach of copyright, it
is unnecessary for me to consider whether there
should be an award of damages in
relation to the other claims made by the applicants.
Costs
- The
applicants seek party-party costs on scale. More particularly, they seek $2,350
for initiating the proceeding and $1,465 for
the final hearing. Actually, the
sum of $1,465 is the amount allowed for an interim or summary hearing, which is
the correct description
of the hearing of the notice of motion. I consider that
both amounts should be allowed.
- Additionally,
the applicants sought disbursements of:
- $420
for an agent’s fee for investigation;
- $543.72
for an agent’s fee for personal service;
- $150
for an agent’s fee for an affidavit;
- $745
for the filing fee for the initial application;
- $447
for the filing fee for the notice of motion;
- $297
for the fee for mediation; and
- $22.90
for ASIC and personal name searches.
- There
was no evidence that these fees had actually been incurred. However, the court
fees are obvious, and the other amounts all
seem to me to be proper and
reasonable, except for the agent’s fee for investigation. It seems likely
that the investigation
preceded the institution of proceedings and, as such, it
is not recoverable. Otherwise, there will be an order for costs in the
amount
claimed.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) paragraphs
are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Riley FM
Date: 23 September 2010
[1] Affidavit
affirmed by Shalini Jayaweera on 16 February 2010 and company search dated 25
August 2010 and marked exhibit
A.
[2] Affidavit
sworn by Andrew Ng-Saad on 15 February
2010.
[3] Affidavit
sworn by Jessilyn Chen on 10 June
2010.
[4] Affidavit
sworn by Morrie Michael Fahd on 16 June
2010.
[5] The
applicants initially said that these figures were commercial in confidence but
withdrew that claim to enable these reasons for
decision to set out a rational
basis for the calculation of compensatory damages.
[6] Review
Australia Pty Ltd v New Cover Group Pty Ltd (2008) 79 IPR 236; [2008] FCA
1589.
[7] Review
Australia Pty Ltd v Innovative Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd and Anor (2008)
166 FCR 358; [2008] FCA
74.
[8] Autodesk
Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR
472
[9] Exhibits
MMF-1 and MMF-2 to the affidavit sworn by Morrie Michael Fahd on 3 June 2010
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