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De Simone v Pital Business Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 689 (10 September 2010)
Last Updated: 13 September 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DE SIMONE v PITAL
BUSINESS PTY LTD
|
|
BANKRUPTCY – Review of Registrar's
decision.
|
Re Shaddock; Ex parte Commonwealth Bank of
Australia [1998] FCA 355Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation
[2008] FACFC 185 Re Wilcox: Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996)
141 ALR 727Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA
1537
|
|
Delivered on:
|
10 September 2010
|
REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the
Applicant:
|
In person
|
Counsel for the Respondent:
|
Mr Osborne
|
Solicitors for the Respondent:
|
Schetzer Brott & Appel
|
ORDERS
(1) The application dated 13 May 2010 is dismissed.
(2) Order 5 of the Orders of Registrar Allaway of 6 July 2010 is affirmed.
(3) Order 2 of the Orders of Registrar Allaway of 12 July 2010 is
affirmed.
|
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
MELBOURNE
|
MLG704 of
2010
Applicant
And
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
- This
is an application to review Orders made by Registrar Allaway on 6 and 12 July
2010 in this matter. On 12 July 2010 the Registrar
dismissed an application by
Mr de Simone to set aside, in accordance with section 40(1)(g) of the
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (“the Act”), a Bankruptcy Notice
that he says, in his affidavit of 13 May 2010, was served on him “in
late April 2010”. The Registrar also ordered that the Applicant pay
the Respondent’s costs. On 6 July 2010 the Registrar had adjourned the
hearing
to 12 July 2010 and made certain procedural Orders. He also ordered that
the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs (of that
day) on an indemnity
basis. It is order 5 (the costs order) in particular, of the Orders of 6 July
2010, that the Applicant seeks
to be reviewed.
- The
review of a decision of a Registrar is a hearing de novo. It became apparent
that there was a threshold issue which needed to
be determined before
consideration could properly be given to whether the application ought to be
determined on merit. That issue
concerned whether there was a valid application
to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice before the Court.
- The
affidavit of service of the Bankruptcy Notice stated that the Applicant was
served with the notice on 6 April 2010. If this was
the case, then an
application to have the notice set aside was not made within 21 days after the
service of the notice. While the
Applicant did not accept that such a failure
was “fatal to
jurisdiction”[1]
he also disputed that the Bankruptcy Notice has been served on him on
6 April 2010 and maintained that his application has been lodged
within time.
- Evidence
was called from Mr Preac, the deponent of the affidavit of service and Mr de
Simone gave evidence on his own behalf.
Background
- The
events which led to the matter coming before me can be summarised as follows
- 12 March 2010
– An Order for costs against the Applicant in the sum of $91,980.05 made
by Associate Justice Wood in the Supreme
Court of Victoria.
- 25 March 2010
– Bankruptcy Notice for non payment of debt issued by Respondent.
- Affidavit of
Service (sworn 12 April 2010) deposes that the Applicant was served with notice
on 6 April 2010.
- 13 May 2010
– Application made to set aside Bankruptcy Notice.
- 21 June 2010
– Matter came before Registrar Allaway and further hearing of the
application was adjourned to 6 July 2010 by the
Registrar – time for
compliance with the notice extended to that date and directions made for filing
and serving of affidavits.
Costs were reserved.
- 6 July 2010
– No appearance by Applicant – matter further adjourned until 12
July 2010 – with directions as to affidavits.
Order for costs on an
indemnity basis made.
- 12 July 2010
– No appearance by Applicant – application dismissed with
costs.
- 27 July 2010
– Application to review and affidavit of Mr de Simone
filed.
- Mr
Preac is a licensed process server. He has been licensed since 1991. He gave
evidence that on 29 March 2010 he received instructions
from the
creditor’s solicitors to serve the Bankruptcy Notice on the debtor. He was
aware that all Bankruptcy Notices required
personal service unless there was an
order for substituted service. On 5 April 2010 he attended at the debtor’s
address. The
gates were locked and a sign advised to call a particular number to
obtain entry. He rang the number and spoke to a young child.
He asked for
Giuseppe de Simone. He spoke to a male who admitted that he was Giuseppe de
Simone and who said that he would not come
outside to accept service because it
was a public holiday. The debtor told Mr Preac to return the next day at
8.30 a.m.
- Mr
Preac attended the same address on 6 April 2010 at 8.30 a.m. On this occasion
the gates were open. The front door was opened by
a middle aged woman and he
asked for Giuseppe de Simone. The woman stated that he (the debtor) was in bed
as he had been up all night
with a sick child. She asked if she could accept the
notice. Mr Preac advised her that he could not leave the document with her
as
it required personal service and that an arrangement had been made for him to
attend at 8.30 a.m. The woman went back inside and
returned to say, “He
will be out in a minute”.
- After
a few minutes a man, who Mr Preac identified as the debtor, came to the door
wearing a robe. Mr Preac asked him if his name
was Giuseppe de Simone and if he
was the person referred to in the document (which Mr Preach showed him) as the
debtor? The man answered
“Yes” to both questions.
- Mr
Preac produced a copy of his telephone bill which identified the call made on 5
April 2010; an affidavit of attempted service,
sworn on 7 April 2010; the
work sheet containing notes he took at the time; and an email sent to the
creditor’s solicitors
on 2 July 2010 after he was first requested to be
available to give evidence in these proceedings. The affidavit of service
attaching
the copy of the Bankruptcy Notice was sworn on 12 April 2010.
- In
cross-examination, Mr Preac stated that he might serve between two and five
Bankruptcy Notices per week. He did not always prepare
an affidavit of attempted
service. This one was done for billing purposes. He recalled certain aspects of
this matter because anything
unusual you tend to remember, particularly with
property that is locked. Mr Preac agreed that there had been a dispute about
service
in a previous matter involving the debtor where service was not effected
on the debtor but on his brother. Mr Preac was also able
to describe the woman
who answered the door and his recollection that the debtor was wearing a
dark-coloured robe.
- Mr
Preac stated that the gate was open. He believed the woman was getting ready to
leave and she may have left while he was there.
Mr Preac denied that he
only recognised the debtor because he had seen him in Court. He agreed that he
had previously served a document
on the debtor’s brother and that he looks
similar to the debtor. He stated that he had put all the details of the service
in
an affidavit on that previous occasion. Mr Preac agreed that when he was told
that there was a dispute about service of the notice,
he went back to his
original notes and emailed to the solicitors what he could recall at the time.
He also gave them his worksheets.
- It
was Mr de Simone’s evidence that he had no recollection of the
conversation about which Mr Preac gave evidence on 5 April
2010 or of attending
at his front door in a bathrobe on 6 April 2010. He only became aware that there
was an issue about service
in late June when it was raised in the proceedings
before Registrar Allaway. According to his on-line calendar, he was in Ocean
Grove
on 6 April 2010. He has a business at Ocean Grove and when he goes there
he usually leaves at about 7.00 a.m. in the morning. The
manager of the business
could not remember if he was there on 6 April 2010 but could recall that he was
there that week. As he left
to go interstate on 9 April 2010 and was at a
conference on the Wednesday, it could only have been on Tuesday 6 April
2010 or Thursday
8 April 2010. He was interstate until the night of
20 April 2010.
- Mr
de Simone stated that he has young children and they do get sick but he could
not recall if one of them was sick on 5 April 2010.
The description given by Mr
Preac was his wife but she had no recollection of speaking to Mr Preac.
Documents get dropped off at
the house all the time. She normally accepts them
on his behalf. She worked on 6 April 2010. She normally works Tuesday,
Wednesday
and Thursday. She normally leaves between 7.30 a.m. and 8.00 a.m.
although that is not invariable. The gate is usually kept locked
but his wife
could have left it open.
- Mr
de Simone stated that he lived in the house with his wife and two children. As
it was school holidays there could have been someone
else there to look after
the children. It could have been his father who is 80 and who could not recall
if he was there that day.
- Mr
de Simone stated that his recollection was that he first saw the Bankruptcy
Notice on Thursday 22 April 2010. There was a big pile
of documents when he got
home late on 20 April 2010. He did not look at them then or on the Wednesday
when he was at a conference.
It was probably on the Thursday that he saw
it.
- In
cross-examination, Mr de Simone stated that there were 30 or 40 envelopes and
loose documents in the pile when he got home on 20
April 2010. He could not
unequivocally state that he was in Ocean Grove on 6 April 2010. He was aware
that he had to file an application
with respect to the Bankruptcy Notice within
21 days. He agreed that when he filed the application he could not pinpoint the
date
on which he received the notice. He agreed that he lived at the address
given with his wife and two children and that the phone number
given was his
number. He was not sure who was in his house on 6 April 2010. He could not
recall speaking to Mr Preac on 5 April 2010
but it was possible that he did.
Someone would have had to have been in the house with the children on
6 April 2010 because it was
school holidays unless they had gone to the
school holiday programme. He had no specific recollection of the day. He owned a
white
terry towelling bath robe and a red night gown. He did not challenge Mr
Preac’s evidence about the robe. He could not say how
Mr Preac would know
that he had a dark robe.
- Mr
de Simone stated that if he had been served on 6 April 2010 he would have had
until 27 April 2010 to file his application which
would have given him a week
after he got back from interstate to do it. There is no reason why he would not
have done it in that
time frame. It is highly unlikely that he would not
remember being served.
Contentions – service of the Bankruptcy Notice
- The
Respondent submitted that the Court does not have the jurisdiction pursuant to
s.33(1)(c) to extend the time provided in s.41(5)
for giving notice after an act
of bankruptcy has been committed by failure to comply with the notice. The
Respondent referred to
paragraph [41.5.13] of Australian Bankruptcy Law and
Practice[2] to
submit that the application to extend time must be given within the time allowed
for payment. Paragraph [41.6A.10] confirms that
failure to make the application
before the expiry of the time fixed for compliance is fatal to
jurisdiction.[3] If Mr
Preac’s evidence that he served Mr de Simone on 6 April 2010 is
accepted, then 21 days expired on 27 April 2010 and there
is no jurisdiction for
the Court to extend the time for compliance with the notice.
- The
Respondent submits that Mr Preac’s evidence was credible and provided
detail such as the dressing gown worn by the debtor
and the appearance of the
wife. He was right about the gates and the phone number. There is
contemporaneous documentary evidence
which is probative. Mr Osborne referred to
the contents of the worksheet, the phone records and the affidavit of attempted
service.
The affidavit of service is consistent with usual practice. The email
is a prior consistent statement. The affidavits were sworn
at a time when there
could have been no issue about the timing.
- The
Respondent submits that the debtor’s affidavit is vague about the date of
service. He has not been able to adduce any form
of probative corroborative
evidence. The highest his evidence gets is a notation in his calendar which
suggests that he would have
gone to Ocean Grove on 6 April. He has not given any
explanation of anyone else who was present or who could have received the
documents.
He is unable to say who looked after his children that day. It is
inherently likely that there was someone with the children and
the
debtor’s evidence is consistent with Mr Preac’s that the wife
appeared to be on her way out, going to work.
- The
Applicant contends that the wording of s.33(1)(c) is somewhat confused. Mr de
Simone submitted that as a matter of construction,
the prohibition on extending
time only relates to time fixed by the Court or the Registrar under this Act.
The Bankruptcy Notice
is issued under the Bankruptcy Regulations
1996 (“the Regulations”) and the time is not fixed in the
actual regulation itself. It is fixed in a notation to the form
in Schedule 1.
The time is therefore not fixed under the Act. The Notice itself is issued by
the official receiver. An official receiver
may issue a Bankruptcy
Notice. It does not say shall or must so, theoretically, the official receiver
has a discretion subject to judicial
oversight. Subsection (2) of s.41 says the
notice must be in accordance with the form prescribed by the Regulations. The
only place
the 21 days appears is in a note to the form. A form is not a legal
mandate. The Act properly construed allows the Court to extend
the time for
issue of an application to set aside a Bankruptcy Notice.
- Mr
de Simone submitted that in the past Mr Preac had effected service of documents,
which were supposed to be served on him personally,
on someone else. He has also
given evidence that he fills out a lot of affidavits of service. While he did
not know that there was
going to be a dispute about service, he knew that last
time no problem arose from the substituted service. There is no mention in
the
affidavit of service of bathrobes or other people seeking to take the documents.
It could have been prepared straight off a template.
- The
Applicant submitted that he had no recollection of having the document and what
the Court was being asked to accept was that he
got it on 6 April 2010 and then
did not do anything for 40-odd days. Mr Preac’s recognition of him in
Court does not really
account for anything. Anything could have happened. Mr
Preac could have left the document in the letter box. He could have left it
with
the Applicant’s wife or his father or the nanny or someone else. There are
no detailed notes of what happened on 6 April
2010 except that service was
effected. Last time, Mr Preac left a document requiring personal service with
the Applicant’s
brother. Therefore he does not take personal service as
seriously as his job would require.
Contentions in relation to costs
- Mr
de Simone submitted that there should not have been an Order for costs made
against him by Registrar Allaway and, in particular,
no Order for indemnity
costs should have been made with respect to 6 July 2010. The Applicant
stated that his reason for failing
to appear on 6 July 2010 was that he was
involved in a committal hearing in the Melbourne Magistrates Court and bailed to
appear.
He submitted that the hearing on 6 July 2010 was caused by the
unreasonable refusal by the creditor to grant an adjournment. He wrote
to the
Registry and to the creditor and the creditor’s sole director was aware of
the fact that the Applicant was required
to attend the Melbourne Magistrates
Court that day because he was involved in the proceedings. The matter in front
of Registrar Allaway
could not proceed without him.
- Mr
de Simone submitted that he could not instruct someone else to act on his behalf
as it required that he give evidence. What he
was seeking was that the matter be
set down for a date when he was not required in Court. The Registrar could have
adjourned the
issue of costs to the resumed hearing to give him an opportunity
to present reasons why a costs order should not be made. The hearing
was only
occasioned by the unreasonableness of the creditor.
- The
Applicant submitted that he could not comply with the timeline in relation to
filing an affidavit because it takes a lot of time
to check with people. Other
commitments also obviated and prevented compliance. He was not in Court when the
Orders were made in
relation to indemnity costs and the new time line. He was
not asked if those dates were suitable. He was unable to attend. He was
a few
minutes late on 12 July 2010 and was told he was “too
late”.
- The
Applicant submitted that orders should be complied with if people are able to do
so. If they are unable to do so for a good reason
there should be proper
indulgence given. There is no way he could have attended on 6 July 2010. There
was no prejudice to the creditor
in an adjournment. The Registrar ordered
indemnity costs and then required a justification for not being present. You
should ask
for the justification before you make a decision on costs.
- Mr
Osbourne, in response, pointed to the email sent to the Applicant by the
creditor’s solicitors on 2 July 2010 in relation
to the failure by the
Applicant to file and serve an affidavit on 30 June 2010. The email called for
some evidence in relation to
his unavailability on 6 July 2010 and indicated
that an Order dismissing his application and for indemnity costs would be
sought.
On Tuesday 6 July 2010, the Applicant failed to appear. The Registrar
declined to dismiss the application but adjourned it to 2.15
p.m. on 12
July 2010 and gave the Applicant until noon on 12 July 2010 to file his
affidavit. Come 2.15 p.m. on 12 July 2010 there
was no appearance so
Registrar Allaway made the Orders dismissing the
application.
Conclusions
- On
13 May 2010, the Applicant filed an application under s.40 (1)(g) to set aside
the Bankruptcy Notice issued on 25 March 2010. The
application was set down for
hearing before a Registrar on 21 June 2010. At the hearing the
Respondent raised the issue that, according
to the affidavit of Mr Preac, the
Applicant had been served with the Bankruptcy Notice on 6 April 2010. The Notice
was in the form
prescribed by the Regulations and required that the debtor take
action “within twenty-one (21) days after service of the notice on him
to comply with the notice”.
- While
Mr de Simone argued that the provisions of s.33(1)(c) did not prevent the Court
from extending the period, as the time limit
set was not “fixed by the
Court or the Registrar under this Act”, I was unable to find any
decision which supported this contention.
- The
Respondent referred the Court to paragraph [41.5.13] of Australian Bankruptcy
Law and Practice and the cases cited
therein.[4] It is only
necessary to refer to the decision of Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of
Taxation.[5]
- The
Full Bench of the Federal Court in that case considered the relationship between
s.41 and s.33(1)(c). In paragraph [25] the Bench
states :
- Section
33(1)(c) relevantly provides that the Court may extend any time limited by the
Act for doing an act or thing, other than the time fixed for compliance with
the requirements of a bankruptcy notice. That power must be considered in
the context of s 41 and the scheme provided for in that
section.
- After
describing the scheme of s.40 and s.41 the Bench goes on to say:
- Section
41(6A) provides that where, before the expiration of the time fixed for
compliance with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice, proceedings to set
aside the judgment or order in respect of which the bankruptcy notice was issued
have been instituted by the
debtor, or an application has been made to the Court
to set aside the bankruptcy notice, the Court may, subject to s 41(6C) extend
the time for compliance with the bankruptcy notice. Section 41(6C) is concerned
with the bona fides of, and diligence with which,
an application to set aside
the judgment or order is made.
- Thus, s 41
lays down a strict regime for dealing with a bankruptcy notice. That is
essential, having regard to the consequences of
failing to comply with a
bankruptcy notice. That is to say, failure to comply constitutes an act of
bankruptcy. It is critical, having
regard to those consequences, to know that,
when the time for compliance with a bankruptcy notice has expired, there can be
no doubt
that an act of bankruptcy has been committed. Even if a sequestration
order is not made on the basis of non-compliance, relation
back period for a
bankruptcy is determined by the date of the earliest act of bankruptcy within
six months prior to the making of
the sequestration order.
- It is clear
that s 33(1)(c) does not authorise the extension of time to comply with a
bankruptcy
notice.[6]
- The
question is therefore whether the Applicant was served with the Bankruptcy
Notice on 6 April 2010 as sworn by Mr Preac or did
not receive it until some
time later and probably on 22 April 2010. I am satisfied that the evidence of Mr
Preac should be accepted.
He provided details of the circumstances under which
the document was served which were supported by reference to contemporaneous
notes. He clearly understood the necessity for the Notice to be personally
served on the Applicant. While Mr de Simone attempted
to suggest that as Mr
Preac had failed to effect personal service on him in the past, when he served
documents on the Applicant’s
brother he was likely to have done something
similar on this occasion, it is equally possible that because of that prior
experience
Mr Preac was keen not to make the same mistake again.
- In
any event, there was no suggestion that there was or could have been someone at
the house on 6 April 2010 who might have been mistaken
for the Applicant.
- On
the other hand, Mr de Simone was unable to provide any concrete evidence to
establish that he was not at home at 8.30 a.m. on the
day in question. He argued
that had he received the documents on that day he would have lodged his
application within the time specified.
Equally, if the circumstances were as
described by Mr Preac, he may have been tired at the time of service, distracted
by the needs
of a sick child or concentrating on the things he needed to get
done before he left to go to Perth. On his return he may well have
forgotten
which day it was that he had been served.
- The
Applicant’s initial affidavit of 13 May 2010 did not specify a date. The
latter affidavit specifies a date, some two days
after his return from Perth but
precisely 21 days before his application was made.
- As
the application was not made before the expiration of the time fixed for
compliance with the requirements of the Bankruptcy Notice,
the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the application.
- I
turn now to deal with the question of costs. The Registrar made two costs Orders
against the Applicant on 6 July 2010 and 12 July
2010. The Order of 6 July
2010 is for indemnity costs. Those Orders were made in the following
circumstances:
- On 21 June 2010,
the Applicant being present, the hearing was adjourned to 6 July 2010. Orders
were made that the Applicant file and
serve an affidavit deposing to the full
circumstances in which he received the Bankruptcy Notice by 30 June 2010 and
that he and
Mr Preac make themselves available for cross-examination on
6 July 2010. Costs were reserved.
- On Friday 2 July
2010, the Respondent’s solicitors emailed the Applicant pointing out that
they had not received the Applicant’s
affidavit and requiring it by 4.00
p.m. that day.
- The Applicant
responded that, as the Respondent was aware, he had “been in Court each
day since the hearing”.
- The
Respondent’s solicitors reiterated the request for the sworn affidavit
“by 4.00 p.m. today”.
- The Applicant
sent a further email at 2.17 p.m. the same day stating that he was unable to
attend the hearing on 6 July 2010, “as His Honour Magistrate Mealy has
refused me bail”, and requested an adjournment to the conclusion of
the committal which was expected to be on or about 22 July 2010.
- The Respondent
replied that either the Applicant, or someone on his behalf, would have to
appear to make application for an adjournment
as Registrar Allaway had directed
him to attend. The application would need to be supported by proper evidence and
the application
did not effect the requirement to file and serve an affidavit.
The letter went on to state that should certain conditions not be
met, the
Respondent would move to have the application dismissed and seek an order for
indemnity costs.
- At 1.27 p.m. on
6 July 2010 the Applicant sent an email to the Respondent stating that he had
attended the Federal Court Registry
during the lunch adjournment of the
committal hearing. He could not attend at 2.15 p.m. and could not instruct
anyone to attend on
his behalf. He indicated that he would copy the email to the
Registry.
- There was no
appearance by the Applicant on 6 July 2010 and further Orders were made by the
Registrar adjourning the proceedings to
12 July 2010 at 2.15 p.m. Further Orders
were made that the Applicant file and serve an affidavit deposing to the
circumstances under
which he received the Bankruptcy Notice and why he did not
attend the Court on 6 July 2010 by 12.00 noon on 12 July 2010. He was
again ordered to make himself available for cross-examination on that day and an
Order for “costs of today on an indemnity basis” made against
him.
- No affidavit was
filed and served by 12.00 noon on 12 July 2010.
- The Applicant
states:
- On 12 July
during the luncheon break in the VCAT proceeding, I rushed to prepare the
affidavit ordered on 6 July 2010 by the Registrar
but did not complete it until
2.15 p.m. I attended at the hearing at 2.23 p.m. to be advised that the
Registrar had made the orders
in my absence as I had not
attended.
- On 12 July 2010,
Registrar Allaway dismissed the application and ordered that the Applicant pay
the Respondent’s costs.
- Section
32 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 provides that the Court may make such
orders as to costs as it thinks fit. In Re Wilcox: Ex parte Venture
Industries Pty
Ltd,[7] Black
CJ (with whom Cooper and Merkel JJ concurred) said of the powers of the
Federal Court:
- The
circumstances under which indemnity costs will be ordered have been discussed in
many cases in this Court and it is well established
that the starting point for
any consideration of an application for indemnity costs is that in the ordinary
case costs will follow
the event and the Court will order the unsuccessful party
to pay the costs of the successful party, on a party and party basis, a
basis
which will fall short of complete indemnity. Nevertheless the court has an
absolute and unfettered jurisdiction in awarding
costs, although that discretion
must be exercised judicially. So, indemnity costs may properly be awarded where
there is some special
or unusual feature in the case justifying the Court
exercising its discretion in that
way”.[8]
- In
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No
8),[9] Kenny J
considered whether indemnity costs should be awarded against an unrepresented
party. The litigant, in that case, had been
put on notice that such an
application would be made in circumstances where the conduct of the hearing by
the litigant prolonged
the hearing and wasted time. Her Honour noted at
paragraph 20:
- On the one
hand, litigants in person, even if partially assisted by lawyers, often produce
significant difficulties and unnecessary
expense for the parties against whom
they proceed: see Bhagat v Royal & Sun Alliance Life Assurance Australia Ltd
[2000] NSWSC 159 at [13] per Hodgson CJ in Eq. These difficulties arise from
their lack of knowledge of the law, unfamiliarity with court practice and,
sometimes,
lack of objectivity and want of lawyerly skills in reading and
writing. Mr Spalla suffers, to some degree, from the disabilities
of most
self-represented litigants. There may be other factors too that compound a
self-represented litigant’s inability to
utilise court procedures
appropriately. On the other hand, a person’s capacity to gain redress for
legal wrongs in the courts
should not depend on his or her ability to pay for
legal representation. In seeking to balance these considerations, the courts
have
been generally more reluctant to make orders for indemnity costs against
self-represented litigants than against legally represented
litigants.[10]
- Mr
de Simone is no stranger to litigation. He was present in Court when the Orders
of 21 June 2010 were made by Registrar Allaway
yet he failed to comply with
those Orders. He made no attempt to file and lodge the affidavit he was supposed
to file by 30 June
2010. It was only after contact was made with him by the
Respondent’s solicitors that he sought their agreement to an adjournment
and notified the Registry less than one hour before the hearing that he was
unable to appear.
- I
accept that Mr de Simone was required to attend, as a condition of his bail,
proceedings in the Melbourne Magistrates Court. He,
however, made no attempt to
comply with any of the Orders of 21 June 2010 or to seek an adjournment from the
Registrar in the usual
way.
- Further,
Mr de Simone then made no attempt to comply with the Orders of 6 July 2010 in
relation to the filing and serving of his affidavit
until after the time
specified in the Order and again failed to appear at the time set down for the
hearing.
- It
is perhaps understandable that the Applicant was paying greater attention at the
time to other proceedings. That does not however,
in my view, excuse him from
complying with the Orders of the Registrar or taking appropriate steps to have
the proceedings adjourned.
He did neither. As a result the Respondent was
subjected to the expenditure of costs.
- I
am not satisfied that either the costs Orders of 6 July 2010 or of 12 July
2010 should be vacated.
I certify that the preceding
46Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error,
!Error! Style not defined.Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error,
!forty-sixforty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for
judgment of Whelan FM
Associate:
Date: 10 September 2010
[1] As per Goldberg J
Re Shaddock; Ex parte: Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] FCA
355.
[2] Thomson
Reuters, Australian Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Volume 1 (at 1 –
2680).
[3] Ibid (at
1- 2681).
[4] Ibid
(at 1- 2680).
[5]
Cumins v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FACFC
185.
[6] Ibid at
paras. 27-29.
[7]
Re Wilcox: Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR
727.
[8]Ibid.
[9]
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 8) [2006] FCA 1537
[10]Ibid.
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