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Workplace Ombudsman v Ella Enterprises Pty Limited & Anor [2010] FMCA 54 (3 February 2010)
Last Updated: 18 February 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WORKPLACE OMBUDSMAN v
ELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED & ANOR
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INDUSTRIAL LAW – Awards – breach of
Award – underpayments – recovery of outstanding wages –
penalty
– Workplace Relations Act – calculation of penalties.
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First Respondent:
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ELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED
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Second Respondent:
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LUCAS WALLER
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File Number:
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BRG 851 of 2008
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Hearing dates:
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11 and 12 May 2009; 10 and 11 June 2009
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Date of Last Submission:
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2 September 2009
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Delivered on:
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3 February 2010
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REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the
Applicant:
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Mr Murdoch
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Solicitors for the Applicant:
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Minter Ellison
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Counsel for the First Respondent:
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Solicitors for the First Respondent:
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Plass Lawyers
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Counsel for the Second Respondent:
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Solicitors for the Second Respondent:
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Plass Lawyers
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ORDERS
(1) That the matter be adjourned to a date to be
fixed.
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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE
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BRG 851 of 2008
Applicant
And
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ELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LIMITED
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First Respondent
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
- In
this proceeding the applicant on behalf of a worker, Scott Meyers, seeks orders
pursuant to section 719(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the Act)
for payment to him of a sum of $14,698.89 for underpayment of wages in breach of
various awards together with interest
and the imposition of a
penalty.
Background Facts
- By
an oral agreement entered into between Scott Meyers and Adam Maley in or around
July 2006 Meyers agreed to accept employment with
Sydney Horse Transport as a
truck driver. He was to commence employment immediately. Meyers was informed
by Maley that the rate
of pay would be $750 per week clear with a gross rate of
pay of $806 per week. He was told that he would be required to work 55
hours
per week and that any time worked above 55 hours would be taken as overtime.
Although not a condition of his contract he was
informed that he would have most
weekends off although there would be occasions when he would be required to work
on weekends. Meyers
accepted those terms and commenced employment with Adam
Maley Horse Transport Pty Ltd which traded as Sydney Horse Transport. On
21
July 2006 his employment was transferred to the first respondent, Ella
Enterprises Pty Ltd.
- The
second respondent, Lucas Waller was a director of the first respondent and was
involved in and responsible for the day to day
operations and management of the
first respondent. Meyers had in fact spoken to Waller prior to entering into
his agreement with
Maley. For some time following these events Meyers was
unaware that his employment had in fact been transferred from Adam Maley
Horse
Transport Pty Ltd to Ella Enterprises Pty Ltd as the proprietorship of Sydney
Horse Transport had changed hands. Notwithstanding
that matter, throughout the
term of his employment both Maley and Waller appear to have been involved in
that firm’s operation.
- Ella
Enterprises was bound by the Transport Industry (State) Award that operates as a
notional agreement preserving State awards under
the Act (the NAPSA). Pursuant
to subclause 34(1) subdivision C of Part 3 of Schedule 8 of the Act the award
operated as an “original State award” prior to 27 March 2006. The
original State
award determined in whole or in part the terms and conditions of
employees with Ella Enterprises prior to 27 March 2006. To that
extent, from 27
March 2006, certain relevant terms of the original State award became terms of
the NAPSA which bound Meyers and Ella
Enterprises upon the commencement of
Meyers’ employment with it. In addition Ella Enterprises was also bound
by a preserved
Australian Pay Classification Scale derived from the rate
provisions in the Award (the APCS). The Award contained rate provisions
within
the meaning of section 181(1) of the Act which determined the basic periodic
rate of pay to be paid to employees covered by the NAPSA. Pursuant to section
208 of the Act and the definition of a pre-reform wage instrument in section 178
of the Act the rate provisions in the NAPSA were an APCS which had effect from
27 March 2006. Additionally Ella Enterprises was
also bound by the provisions
of the Annual Holidays Act 1944 (NSW) which was preserved pursuant to
clause 34(2) of subdivision C of Part 3 of Schedule 8 of the Act which that
prevented the Holidays Act determined in whole or in part a
“preserved entitlement” as defined by subclause 34(3) of
Meyers’ employment with
Ella Enterprises and to that extent the relevant
terms of the Holidays Act were also terms of the NAPSA binding both Ella
Enterprises and Meyers.
- Throughout
the course of his employment Meyers performed duties as an employee within the
classification of the Transport Worker Grade
III in accordance with the NAPSA.
In particular he was required to perform duties as a driver of a two axle ridged
vehicle with
a gross vehicle mass over 4.5 tonnes. For that purpose he held a
valid medium rigid truck licence and drove a two axle medium rigid
truck
registration number 663-IUY with a gross vehicle mass of 10 tonne and an
enclosed body for transportation of horses and also
a two axle medium rigid
truck registration UBL-869 with a gross vehicle maximum of 10 tonne with an
enclosed body for the transportation
of horses.
- Meyers
continued in that employment until 16 January 2007 when he verbally resigned by
informing Adam Maley of his intention to do
so.
- It
is agreed between the parties that Meyers made a complaint to the Office of
Workplace Services on or about 7 February 2007 regarding
underpayment of wages
and underpayment of annual leave which were investigated by that office. It is
also agreed that in the course
of that investigation that office wrote informing
Ella Enterprises of its investigation and issued it with a notice to produce
documents,
in due course a notice of breach and ultimately a final notice, and
furthermore permitted Ella Enterprises at least one opportunity
for an extension
before filing its application on 17 December 2008.
- It
is not a dispute that the basic periodic rate of pay to be paid to Meyers under
the APCS was $15.56 per hour for the period 4 August
2006 to 30 November 2006
and $16.28 per hour for the period 1 December 2006 to 16 January 2007.
Furthermore it is agreed that the
appropriate overtime rates which applied under
the NAPSA were $23.34 for the first two hours of overtime per day and $31.12
thereafter
for the period 4 August 2006 to 30 November 2006; and $24.42 for the
first two hours of overtime per day and $2.56 for each hour
thereafter from 1
December 2006 to 16 January 2007. Finally it is also agreed that holiday rates
applicable under the NAPSA were
at the rate of $23.34 per hour for the holiday
worked on 2 October 2006 and $24.42 per hour for the holiday worked on 1 January
2007.
- During
the relevant period from 4 August 2006 to 16 January 2007 Meyers was paid a base
weekly wage of $806 per week for 55 hours
work. In addition he was paid an
overnight allowance of $120 gross per week with the exception of the weekend
ending 29 December
2006 in which weekly overnight allowance paid was $20.
Whilst it is not agreed that the overnight allowance was an amount that was
paid
in addition to wages there is no contest concerning the broad figures.
- Overall
it is agreed that during the period 4 August 2006 to 16 January 2007 Ella
Enterprises paid to Meyers a total of $3,918 gross
as overtime
payments.
Factual Issues in Dispute
- The
following disputed facts remain to be resolved. The respondents do not agree
that Ella Enterprises failed to pay Meyers a basic
periodic rate of pay in
breach of the APCS. They say that is because they disagree on the terms
governing the employment agreement.
In particular Ella Enterprises contends
that the “overnight allowance” formed part of Meyers’ wage and
accordingly
ought be included in the assessment of sums paid pursuant to the
award and in respect of any underpayment it is contended there should
be a
setoff against any sums paid on that basis.
- The
respondents do not agree that Meyers worked the hours of work set out in the
documents described in the applicant’s material.
The case for the
respondents is that the documents both incorrectly record the work details and
also include allowances which are
in all the circumstances unreasonable having
regard to the duties that were undertaken. Insofar as there are unreasonable
claims
the respondents contend the applicant’s claims overclaim
Meyers’ reasonable entitlement to pay.
- The
respondents do not agree that the first respondent failed to pay Meyers’
overtime payments in breach of the NAPSA. This
in part arises because of the
agreed terms of the employment agreement and also the dispute between the
parties concerning setoffs
claimed against the “overnight allowance”
which has not been permitted in the applicant’s calculations. On this
matter it is also in contention that Ella Enterprises failed to pay
Meyers’ penalty rates for the hours worked by Meyers on
the Labour Day
public holiday on 2 October 2006 and the New Years holiday on 1 January 2007.
- On
the basis of those matters alleged by the applicant the underpayment totals
approximately $13,211.22. In addition to this sum
is an outstanding sum due
under the Holidays Act.
- Insofar
as overtime was undertaken they say appropriate allowance has been made.
- The
respondents do not agree that Meyers was requested or required by the first
respondent to undertake training for a heavy combination
licence. They do not
agree with the evidence of Meyers that there was an agreement to this
effect.
- The
respondents do not agree that there has been an underpayment of Meyers’
annual leave entitlement in breach of the Holidays Act. The
respondents’ position is premised upon the arithmetic calculation flowing
from an assessment of Meyers’ pay entitlements
rather than any
disagreement with its strict obligations.
- The
respondents’ allege that evidence of over claimed hours is supported by
the applicant’s obligation to take certain
breaks in accordance with the
provisions of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) (Driver
Fatigue) Regulations 1999. The applicant contends this regulation
did not apply to Meyers.
- The
respondents’ deny that the second respondent, Lucas Waller was a person
who aided, abetted or counselled or procured a breach
of the NAPSA, APSC or
Holidays Act or that he induced a contravention or was by his acts or
omission concerned to a party to a contravention of those
acts.
Terms of agreement
- The
contract of employment was not governed by any written terms or conditions. The
contract was concluded orally following a conversation
between Meyers and Maley
in late July 2006. The principle terms contracted by the applicant
were:
- The
rate of pay would be $750 per week clear (net) with a gross pay of $806 per
week; and
- Meyers
would be required to work 55 hours per week with overtime only payable after
working those hours.
- Although
not discussed at the time of engagement Meyers was also paid a weekly
“overnight allowance” of $120 per week.
This was paid as a bonus
payment.
- For
the respondents it was contended, the agreement was that Meyers would be paid
$760 per week after tax for up to 55 hours work
per week and overtime would be
payable for time in excess of 55
hours[1]. It was also
contended that the $120 weekly payment was in addition to the “after tax
amount” to $760 per
week.[2]
- Maley
was not called to give evidence. It was plain that despite the change in
identity of employer from Adam Maley Horse Transport
Pty Ltd to Ella Enterprises
Pty Ltd Maley was still involved in these matters. For instance it was not
challenged that following
Meyers resignation Maley and not Waller phoned Meyers
requesting that Meyers leave the keys to the truck and he (Maley) would arrange
for its collection. Further there is no suggestion that this did not occur.
- No
evidence was adduced to establish Maley was not reasonably able to be procured
for the trial or that he was not otherwise reasonably
available for the trial.
Given he was the initial employer and was the only witness associated with
Meyers’ employment he
was an important witness. He was not called by the
respondents despite being on notice that the contract was an issue in the case.
In the circumstances of this case where the Workplace Ombudsman was seeking to
prosecute the proceeding for the benefit of Meyers
it was in my view only
natural that the respondents produce Maley if he was to be produced to give
evidence. It follows the only
reasonable inference to be drawn was that his
evidence would have been adverse to the respondents’ case; see Jones v
Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298.
- Meyers
impressed me as an honest and accurate witness. He did not embellish his
evidence and made concessions when appropriate.
This was best demonstrated when
he was being cross examined about some minor discrepancies in his timesheets.
When on a handful
of occasions any discrepancy was identified, if he had no
answer to the discrepancy, he would appropriately concede the error. I
have no
hesitation in accepting his evidence on any matter.
- Given
he was the only witness to attest to the terms of negotiations leading up to and
ultimately the conclusion of the contract itself
and given that I accept his
evidence was provided in accurate and reliable terms I find the contract of
employment between Meyers
and the first respondent was one negotiated and
concluded orally between he and Maley. Its terms were simply, that Meyers would
be employed at the rate of pay of $750 per week clear with the gross rate being
$806. He was required to work 55 hours per week
and would be paid overtime for
any time in excess of 55 hours. There was no express agreement concerning the
overnight allowance.
However the employer paid a sum of $120 weekly in addition
to the agreed salary as a bonus payment. It did not otherwise form part
of the
agreed remuneration.
- It
was agreed between the parties that Meyers performed the duties of an employee
within the classification of Transport Worker III
in accordance with the NAPSA.
Accordingly the first respondent was required to pay Meyers the base periodic
rate of pay pursuant
to section 182 of the WR Act contained in the APSC. During
the period of Meyers’ employment with the first respondent that
rate
was:
- For
the period 4 August 2006 to 30 November 2006 $15.56 per hour;
- For
the period 1 December 2006 to 16 January 2007 $16.28 per hour.
- The
appropriate overtime rates that applied under the NAPSA for the first period
were $23.34 for the first two overtime hours per
day and $31.12 for each
subsequent hour thereafter. For the second period (1 December 2006 to 16
January 2007) the comparable rates
were $24.42 and $30.56. As public holidays
fell through the course of both periods the appropriate holiday rates were
$23.34 per
hour and $24.42 per hour in addition to the standard hourly
rate.
- As
the agreed rate was
$14.65[3] it was clear
that the agreed rate fell below the basic minimum guaranteed by the WR Act.
Section 82(1) of the WR Act relevantly
provided that:
- “If:
- (a) the
employment of an employee is covered by an APCS and
- (b) the
employee is not an APCS piece rate employee;
- the
employee must be paid a basic periodic rate of pay for each of the
employee’s guaranteed hours (pro rata for part hours)
that is at least
equal to the basic periodic rate of pay (the guaranteed basic periodic rate of
pay) that is payable to the employee
under the APCS.”
- Section
183 of the WR Act set out employee’s guaranteed hours for the purpose of
section 182. Relevantly section 183(1) of
the WR Act provided:
- “(1) For
the purposes of section 182, if an employee is employed to work a specified
number of hours per week, the guaranteed
hours for the employee, for each week,
are to be worked out as follows:
- (a) start
with that specified number of hours (subject to subsection (4));
- (b) deduct
all the following:
- (i) any
hours in the week when the employee is absent from work on deductible authorised
leave (as defined in subsection (6));
- (ii) any
hours in the week in relation to which the employer is prohibited by section 507
from making a payment to the employee;
- (iii) any
other hours of unauthorised absence from work by the employee in the
week;
- (iv) any
hours in the week when the employee is stood down (but only if the standdown is
an authorised standdown);
- (c) If,
during the week, the employee works, and is required or requested to work,
additional hours that are, under the terms and
conditions of the
employee’s employment, not count towards the specified number of hours
– add on those additional hours.
- (2) If an
employee is employed on a full time basis, but the terms and conditions of the
employee’s employment do not determine
the number of hours in a period
that is to constitute employment on a full time basis for the employee, the
employee is, for the
purposes of subsection (1) is taken to be employed to work
38 hours per week.”
- It
follows that by reason of section 182 and 183 of the WR Act and given that
Meyers’ periodic rate of $14.65 per hour was less
than the basic periodic
rate required by APCS the first respondent had an obligation pursuant to section
182(1) to ensure that the
rate paid to Meyers for each hour of work was no less
than the basic periodic rate under APCS.
- In
calculating the basic periodic rate it is important to note that the
“overnight allowance” has not been allowed for.
In the sums
contended for by the respondent the overnight allowance was incorporated. The
effect of the incorporation of the overnight
allowance was to raise the hourly
rate to $16.83 per hour which was in excess of the basic periodic rate of pay
contended for by
the applicant. However in order to achieve that outcome the
$120 overnight allowance was added to the basic $806 per week
pay.[4]
- Accordingly
the respondents’ case requires the overnight allowance to be characterised
as part of the basic periodic rate of
pay. Section 178 of the WR Act relevantly
provides:
- “178 ...Basic
periodic rate of pay means a rate of pay for a period of work (however the rate
is described) that does not
include incentive based payments and bonuses,
loadings, monetary allowances, penalty rates or any other separately
identifiable entitlements.”
- The
evidence was that the overnight allowance was a bonus paid. It did not form
part of the original remuneration package and was
not part of Meyers’
ordinary wages. It follows it did not form part of the “basic periodic
rate of pay” as defined
in the WR Act and upon that basis the
respondents’ contention concerning the calculation of the basic periodic
rate of pay
is in error.
Days and Hours Worked
- Aside
from the question of the terms of the employment contract the other principal
source of factual dispute concerned the hours
worked by Meyers. Despite the
recording of hours worked the respondent contended that:
- The
hours recorded included statutory rest breaks required under the Transport
Industry (State) Award; and
- The
time taken by Meyers to perform the tasks recorded in his tasking sheets were
excessive, the inference being that the hours actually
recorded were overstated.
- In
broad terms the system of work put in place by the employer depended
significantly on the honesty and integrity of Meyers as the
employee to do the
right thing. That was manifest by Meyers accurately recording start and finish
times and by Meyers employing
a reasonable application of effort in undertaking
the assigned tasks. This system in itself was not subject to internal checks
and
balances meaning that when disputes arose, as in this case, matters can only
be resolved by reference to the credibility of the competing
witnesses.
- In
this case the respondents sought to attack the credibility of Meyers. However
for reasons that I have earlier addressed I am satisfied
his evidence was both
honest and reliable. The respondents did not advance any evidence in support of
their own case, it being a
case prefaced principally upon unfounded
suspicions.
- To
appreciate the allegations made by the respondents and of the applicant’s
response it is necessary to understand the employer’s
system.
- The
evidence is that the respondent would arrange to fax out each day to
Meyers’ residence a task sheet entitled “Driver’s
Sheet”. That sheet detailed the duties to be undertaken for that day. At
the end of each week Meyers was required to forward
to the respondent companies
head office a “Drivers Weekly Summary Sheet”. This was a form
completed by him noting the
start and finish times for each day worked together
with odometer readings.
- Finally
from this documentation the employer would raise and complete a “Weekly
Time Sheet with Breaks”. This document
appears to incorporate material
sourced from the “Drivers Weekly Summary Sheet”.
- To
explain the system and to illustrate the case advanced by the respondent in
respect of one of the contentious days I will refer
to the driver’s sheet
and documents emanating from Friday 1 September 2006. In general terms the
system of work was the same
for each and every day that Meyers was employed by
the first respondent and other days as are relevant will be addressed in due
course.
- The
evidence is that on the day preceding Friday 1 September 2006 staff from the
first respondent’s office faxed to Meyers at
his place of residence the
driver’s sheet for Friday 1 September 2006. Each row on the
driver’s sheet constituted an
instruction. For Friday 1 September 2006
there were initially four instructions.
- Looking
then at the instructions taking serial 1 by way of illustration and working
through the columns across the page, the next
column was the time at which the
first instruction was to be undertaken. In that case it was 4.40am on Friday 1
September 2006.
At that time Meyers was to be at Aberdeen (Brooklyn Lodge) the
location identified in the third column. He was to travel from Aberdeen
(Brooklyn Lodge) to Jerry’s Plains (Coolmore Stud) being the location
identified in the fifth column and he was to transport
the horse “Silver
Success (mare and foal)” that being the livestock identified in the sixth
column. The handwritten
note in the seventh column “by 5.30am” was
a note made by Meyers following the receipt of additional instructions.
Accordingly
consistent with that instruction Meyers was to be at the
Jerry’s Plain (Coolmore Stud) by 5.30am.
[5]
- Continuing
with the driver’s sheet the second serial then required Meyers to collect
Silver Success (mare and foal) from Jerry’s
Plains (Coolmore Stud) and
transport that horse to Aberdeen (Brooklyn Lodge) where he was to disembark that
horse and then travel
to Widden (Widden Stud) to collect the horse
“Looming” for transport to Grafton (at Stropps) Andrew 785
Summerland Way
where he would in turn collect “Mor Rene” and
“Royal Dawn” for subsequent transport to Scone (Cressfield
Stud).
In addition along the way there were additional instructions provided to him.
The handwritten notes indicate that he was
orally instructed to collect from
Riverslea – Scone two mares and two yearlings who were to be transported
to “Byerley
Stud”. Handwritten notations along the top of the sheet
indicate that his start time was at 4.00am (partly obliterated) –
and
finish time 2.00pm (partly obliterated) but to which the numerals
“10” underneath relate meaning 10 hours. The second
notation
related to a start time at 11.00pm – with a finish time of 1.30am
totalling 2.5 (hours) being the numerals indicated
under those hours. A
handwritten note on the bottom of the page notes in the same pen 12.5 hours
(being 10 hours plus 2.5 hours)
and 544 kms.
- The
driver’s sheet for Sunday 8 October 2006 would have been forwarded to
Meyers by fax on the evening of 7 October 2006. Six
serials were noted on that
sheet. In broad terms the second column of the driver’s sheet identified
the hour at which Meyers
was required to be at the stud identified in the third
column and the stud identified in the fifth column was the destination stud.
The seventh column identified the livestock to be collected or delivered and the
eighth column was left blank and used for making
notes. In addition other
handwritten notations occur on the driver’s sheet. The evidence of Mr
Meyers was that occasionally
those notes would be made either while he was
driving or at other times throughout the day as aide memoirs in relation to
additional
instructions including further collection and delivery instructions.
For instance on the driver’s sheet for Sunday 8 October
2006 two
additional instructions are noted they being for a collection from Brooklyn for
delivery to Arrowfield of a mare and foal
and a further collection from Brooklyn
for delivery to Dorley at 5.00pm of a mare. Other relevant notations on the
sheet include
the start time, in this case of 2.30am and the starting odometer
reading being at 103940 together with the finish time being 6.30pm
and the
finish odometer reading being 184520.
- At
the end of each week Meyers would then prepare a “driver’s weekly
summary sheet”[6].
Taking the date of 8 October 2006 as an illustration and looking to the relevant
driver’s weekly summary sheet the relevant
details can be seen. For
instance for that day it notes that Meyers commenced at 2.30am with a kilometre
reading of 183940 and finished
at 1630 with a kilometre reading of 184520. It
records him as having worked 15 hours and having travelled 580 kilometres. In
addition
it noted that he had refuelled. Meyers evidence was that one of these
sheets was completed quickly and returned to the employer.
In turn the employer
would prepare the weekly timesheet with
breaks.[7]
- The
weekly timesheet with breaks was a document prepared in the office of the first
respondent. For instance for Sunday 8 October
2006 it records Meyers having
commenced at 2.30am and having concluded at 4.30pm. This is consistent with the
information forwarded
in the driver’s weekly summary sheet. It is to be
noted that Meyers was in error in his recording of his times on that date
for
the driver’s sheet shows he concluded work at 6.30pm not 1630 hours and
that he had completed 16 hours and not 15 hours
as recorded as was noted in the
weekly timesheet with breaks. See in particular Meyers handwritten notes in the
bottom right hand
corner of the driver’s sheet which shows his rough
workings noting his conclusion that he had worked 16 hours in total. It
is
clear that there was a transcription error in his weekly driver’s summary
sheet leading to an error in the total hours worked.
In fairness to the
employer the employer’s calculations were correct in this instance having
regard to the primary information
provided to it of the commencement and
finishing times on that date. This process was adopted for each working day and
each working
week during which Meyers was employed by the first respondent.
- Given
the nature of the system of recording the focus of the respondents’ attack
on the hours worked by Meyers was to closely
examine the time taken by Meyers to
undertake various of the journeys the subject of the driver’s instructions
and/or to identify
and analyse the transcription errors that occurred in the
course of transferring source information from one document to the next
such as
was illustrated by reference to the documentation for 8 October.
- The
respondents’ initially challenged Meyers’ records in respect of the
following dates: 4, 8 and 30 August; 1, 8, 22,
28 and 30 September; 5, 8 11,
14, 17 20, 23, 24 and 30 October; 1, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 27, 28 and 30 November;
and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 12, 13 and 14 December 2006.
- Save
for complaints in respect of August 4 and 8; September 8 and 30; and December 2,
the remaining dates in dispute were particularised
in Exhibit 8.
- Except
for the respondents’ complaints specifically addressed below the complaint
was more simply that the records were not
completed in accordance with the
records maintained. No case was put except to allege that Meyer did not work
the hours as recorded.
The matter in each instance ultimately fell to be
determined by reference to whether or not I accepted that Meyers was providing
an honest and reliable account of his recollection. I accept Meyers as a
truthful and reliable witness. I have no reason to doubt
the veracity of any
matter stated by him and I accept his evidence on these matters.
- Save
for concessions made by Meyers in respect of 1 September and 2 December he was
firm in his evidence that the records accurately
recorded his commencement and
completion times on those days. Cross examination of Meyers in respect of those
days claimed fortifies
my view that his evidence on those matters was accurate.
For instance much of the cross examination was directed to the time it
took to
undertake the collection and delivery of the various horses. Despite the
respondents’ assertion that Meyers had been
inefficient in the performance
of his duties I do not accept that to be the case. Meyers was able to explain
the difficulties that
were occasioned between collections and deliveries and
matters that delayed a standard turnaround. For instance Meyers was required
to
remain on station when horses were being mated. It was not uncommon for horses
to take some time for this activity. In addition
the speed with which horses
could be loaded and offloaded depended upon their state of anxiety. Some
livestock were docile but others
frisky. In addition particular care had to be
taken because the livestock in question was valuable. Many of the horses in
question
had a value in excess of a million dollars. Other factors that
impacted upon productivity included the speed with which the truck
containing
valuable livestock would travel about the roads. Notwithstanding the maximum
regulated speed of 100 kilometers per hour
Meyers said he often travelled at a
speed significantly less than that in order to ensure that the livestock was
transported comfortably
across the rural roads. I consider Meyers’
evidence in relation to these matters appropriate, reasonable and satisfactory
and accept his evidence concerning the time taken to undertake each of the tasks
which were recorded in the driver’s sheets.
- Generally
the respondents sought to criticise Meyers because of his failure to produce a
drivers log book which he maintained while
driving the truck. Meyers’
evidence was the log book was lost and was not able to be produced at the
hearing. Despite the
criticism I was satisfied his explanation for its loss was
reasonable.
- The
log book was also relied upon to support an argument that Meyers’ hours
should have been reduced to take account of unpaid
rest breaks. It was alleged
that Meyers’ hours claimed would have put him in breach of the Road
Transport (Safety & Traffic Management) (Driver Fatigue) Regulations
1999 (NSW). However these regulations did not apply to the class of vehicle
being driven by Meyers so that argument is in my view inconclusive.
- Concerning
the specific dates that are particularised and in dispute:
- 1
September 2006: The driver’s sheet maintained by Meyers for 1 September
2006 has written upon it in handwritten notations
a commencement time of 4.00am
through to 2.00pm with the numerals 10 underneath it and then 11.00pm to 1.30pm
with the numerals 2.5
underneath it. That gave a total of 12.5 hours which
corresponds with the figure 12.5 hours and the numerals 544 kms written
elsewhere
on the sheet. The driver’s sheet also noted the addition of a
number of other taskings which were not otherwise provided for
on the sheet. It
seems likely that those two taskings related to the 2 ½ hours undertaken
late in the night whereas the four
taskings identified on the sheet related to
the duties undertaken through the day. Following cross examination it was
conceded
that approximately seven hours driving was involved in the execution of
the first four taskings leaving the remaining three hours
for waiting around
while horses were being covered at the various studs. There were no
driver’s weekly summary sheets prepared
for that period. However the
weekly timesheet with breaks prepared by the employer showed a commencement time
of 4.30am with a conclusion
at 2.00pm followed by a commencement of 8.00pm
followed by a conclusion time of 1.30am. All up that came to 15 hours. In the
course
of cross examination Meyers conceded that he probably did not work 15
hours. He noted that the weekly timesheet with breaks was
not a document
prepared by him. He was however insistent that he did work the hours noted on
the driver’s sheet. Those hours
would have come from his own
driver’s sheets and notes he kept before the practice of submitting
Driver’s Weekly Summary
Sheets was introduced. I accept those hours as
reflecting the hours worked and find that on 1 September 2006 he worked 12.5
hours.
- 28
September 2006: The driver’s sheet for 28 September 2006 listed three
tasks. Handwritten notations on the sheet indicate
a starting time of 4.30 and
a concluding time of 7.30. In addition there were two further notations being
“10.30 – 12.00”.
However the driver’s weekly summary
sheet for 28 September 2006 shows a commencement at 4.30am with a finish at
8.00am followed
by a commencement at 11.30 am followed by a finish at 2000
hours. A total of 12 hours were claimed. Meyers’ evidence was
that the
various studs referred to in the driver’s sheet are all within relative
proximity of each other. That matter is significant
because the driver’s
weekly summary sheet shows the kilometers travelled on that day to be 541 which
is far in excess of the
kilometers which would ordinarily have been covered by
the taskings provided for in the driver’s sheet. In broad terms
Meyers’
evidence was that the driver’s weekly summary sheet was a
document that was largely maintained on a contemporaneous basis or
at least one
that was completed with the assistance of other documents which had been
contemporaneously prepared. It follows that
in view of his reliance upon the
contemporaneous recording of times to assist in refreshing his memory on these
matters I am satisfied
that the hours recorded in the driver’s weekly
summary sheet reflect the true hours worked by Meyers despite him not being
able
to adequately particularise each of those matters. It is plain that there were
additional taskings given the kilometers involved.
In the ordinary course it is
to be expected that the employer would have the tasking records that would have
enabled Meyers to address
the extra driving undertaken on that day. None were
produced. In the circumstances I find that Meyers worked 12 hours on 28
September
2006 as claimed.
- 8
October 2006: The driver’s sheet for that date was marked with
Meyers’ handwriting indicating a 2.30am start working
through to 6.30pm.
Additional handwritten notes appeared on the driver’s sheet indicating
further taskings as well as notations
relating to arrivals and departures from
certain studs. The driver’s weekly summary sheet entry for 8 October
however showed
a start time of 2.30am and a finish time of 1630. In twenty-four
hour time 1630 equates with 4.30pm. It is plain from the handwritten
notation
on the driver’s sheet that Meyers in fact completed work at 6.30pm or 1830
hours. Accordingly the driver’s
weekly summary sheet is in error and
should have recorded the hours worked at 16 hours. I am satisfied that Meyers
did in fact work
between 2.30am and 1830 hours on 8 October 2006 and find
accordingly.
- 2
December 2006: No driver’s sheet exists for 2 December 2006 but an entry
appears in the driver’s weekly summary sheet
claiming for 14 hours in
respect of work between 0730 and 2130 hours. The applicant does not make a
claim for wages on this day
but this matter was pursued by the respondents in
order to attack Meyers’ credibility. When cross examined about that
matter
Meyers conceded that he had no recollection about what he did on that
day. He did state however that he could have been driving
a truck but had no
specific recollection of that matter. The only observation he could make was
that given he had written the hours
down it would only be because he had done
something on the day. Given the absence of any driver’s sheet or
independent recollection
by Meyers of the events of 2 December 2006 I consider
Meyers’ concession in respect of any claim for wages on this date to
be
appropriate. In my view rather than being a basis on which to attack his
credibility his concessions having been made early and
appropriately serve to
fortify my view that Meyers has sought only to pursue those claims in respect of
which he has a just and proper
entitlement.
Outstanding Wages
- To
assist the Court the applicant prepared the schedule, exhibit 8 which identified
the dates in dispute. As I have earlier indicated
many of the disputed
occasions were premised upon the first respondent’s belief that Meyers had
taken an unreasonable length
of time to execute the tasks provided for him. I
do not accept that to be the case. In respect of the four occasions where
discrepancies
have been identified within the documentation I confirm my finding
that the hours worked were as follows:
- 1
September 2006 – 12.5 hours;
- 28
September 2006 – 12 hours;
- 8
October 2006 – 16 hours; and
- 2
December 2006 – 0 hours.
The applicant will have to
recalculate its outstanding wages schedule exhibit 2 to allow for these
findings.
- Exhibit
2 is a schedule of wage calculations prepared by the applicant for Meyers
premised upon the hours claimed and in accordance
with his entitlement pursuant
to the NAPSA.
- Exhibit
2 is a precise calculation of Myer’s entitlements less sums paid to him
through the course of his employment. The sums
paid by the employer to Meyers
were paid in breach of the NAPSA. The NAPSA made provision for rest breaks and
ordinary and overtime
payments including a basis for computation of those
payments when an entitlement arose. In addition overtime rates were provided
for in respect of Saturday and Sunday work. The flat weekly rate paid by the
employer did not take account of the various award
conditions. Although the
evidence demonstrates that on occasions Meyers worked less than 55 hours in any
particular week there were
occasions when he worked in excess of that number of
hours. Generally however the NAPSA provided that the employer had to pay
overtime
for all time worked within the spread of ordinary hours in excess of
the ordinary hours of work in any week including time worked
in excess of daily
limitations on working hours and for time worked outside the spread of ordinary
hours. In addition weekly ordinary
hours and daily ordinary hours were defined
together with special rates which applied for Saturday’s, Sunday’s
and public
holidays. Exhibit 2 was a calculation prepared of Meyers’ wage
entitlements pursuant to the NAPSA given the recorded hours
contained in the
driver’s weekly summary sheets.
Holiday entitlements
- Meyers
also had an entitlement to annual leave in accordance with the provisions in the
Holidays Act. The Holidays Act also acts as a NAPSA under the
WR Act in accordance with Schedule Part 3 of Division 1 of the WR
Act. The annual leave entitlement under the Holidays Act as a
“preserved notional term” within the meaning of the WR Act.
As Meyers ceased employment before completing one year of service he was
entitled to be paid out annual leave upon termination:
Holidays Act
section 4(3).
- Based
upon his entitlement of one twelfth of his ordinary pay for his period of
employment Meyers was entitled to $1,596.39 by way
of holiday leave
entitlements. Meyers’ final pay slip issued for the period 12 January
2007 to 18 January 2007 indicated that
an amount of $1,022.92 was deducted from
his final pay for an “employee purchase”. He was only paid a net
payment of
$38.64. The repayment concerned monies paid by the first respondent
for Meyers to obtain his HC licence. That matter is dealt with
below.
Notwithstanding that the net effect is that Meyers did not receive payment for
any accrued annual leave upon cessation of
his employment as well as not being
paid for any hours worked by him during the period 12 January 2007 to 18 January
2007.
- It
follows that the respondents breached the Holidays Act by failing to pay
to Meyers the sum of $1,596.39 which was his just entitlement at the time of
termination.
- It
follows by reason of my findings that there was a total underpayment of wages by
the first respondent to Meyers in contravention
of the NAPSA in the sum of
$13,676.40 less adjustments for the above findings an Order may be made against
the first respondent for
payment to the employee of the underpayment: S719 of
the WR Act.
Provision of heavy combination licence
- In
his evidence Meyers attests that Maley asked if he was interested in obtaining a
semitrailer licence. When asked in cross examination
about the need for a
licence and/or its benefit he stated that there was no need for him to have a
semitrailer licence to undertake
his work but stated that there was an occasion
when he received a phone call from Maley advising him that one of the drivers
had
resigned and that the respondents did not have anyone to drive a semitrailer
truck. Maley asked Meyers if he was willing to get
a licence for a semitrailer
to which Meyers responded in the affirmative but noting that he could not afford
to pay for it. He says
Maley informed him that he (Maley) would pay for it. He
was quite adamant in his evidence that the payment by Maley was not a loan
and
that there was no expectation that he would be required to make a repayment.
Maley was not called to give evidence nor did he
file an affidavit in the
proceeding. I have no reason to disbelieve Meyers’ evidence on this
point. Accordingly I find that
Maley approached Meyers and inquired of him
about his willingness to obtain a semitrailer licence and informed Meyers that
he would
fund that licence. There was no suggestion that Meyers would be
required to repay any costs associated with the licence. The licence
was
clearly for the advantage of the employer.
Set-off
- Given
my findings concerning the contract of employment between the parties the
payment of the overnight allowance cannot be computed
in the calculation of the
“basic periodic rate of pay” as provided for by section 178 of the
WP Act.
- The
employee cannot contract out of its award obligations. Given my findings as to
the hours worked the wages due are capable of
ready calculation. In addition
the applicant submitted the respondent could not set-off any above award
payments in satisfaction
of any amount ordered by reason of an entitlement under
the NAPSA.
- It
is well settled that a worker’s rights to recover outstanding wages are in
no way dependant upon the contract of employment
between the parties once it is
established he was employed. The employee’s entitlement to recover
payment of any difference
between what his employer has paid and the amount
which he would be entitled to for wages under the award is a statutory right:
Ray v Radano [1967] AR 471 at 474.
- The
correct approach to addressing matters of set-off in the industrial context has
been explained by various Full Courts and more
recently restated by the Full
Court in ANZ Bank v Finance Sector
Union[8] where at
[47] the Court noted that to resolve the question it is useful to return to the
passage from Poletti v Ecob No
2[9] which
accurately analyses the relevant judgment of Sheldon J in Ray v Radano
and annunciates the relevant principles. At [41] the Full Court
noted:
- "It is to
be noted that there are two separate situations dealt with in the passage from
the judgment of Sheldon J which has been
quoted and in the reasoning of the
Commission in Pacific Publications. The first situation is that in which the
parties to a contract
of employment have agreed that a sum or sums of money will
be paid and received for specific purposes, over and above or extraneous
to
award entitlements. In that situation, the contract between the parties prevents
the employer afterwards claiming that payments
made pursuant to the contractual
obligation can be relied on in satisfaction of award entitlements arising
outside the agreed purpose
of the payments. The second situation is that in
which there are outstanding award entitlements, and a sum of money is paid by
the
employer to the employee. If that sum is designated by the employer as being
for a purpose other than the satisfaction of the award
entitlements, the
employer cannot afterwards claim to have satisfied the award entitlements by
means of the payment. The former situation
is a question of contract. The latter
situation is an application of the common law rules governing payments by a
debtor to a creditor.
In the absence of a contractual obligation to pay and
apply moneys to a particular obligation, where a debtor has more than one
obligation
to a creditor, it is open to the debtor, either before or at the time
of making a payment, to appropriate it to a particular obligation.
If no such
appropriation is made, then the creditor may apply the payment to whichever
obligation or obligations he or she wishes:
see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th
ed, vol 9, para505 and para506."
- Accordingly
it is necessary to consider which of the two circumstances is applicable. The
first situation noted is one where “the
parties to a contract of
employment have agreed that a sum or sums of money will be paid and received for
specific purposes, over
and above all extraneous to award requirements”.
In that situation the Full Court said, “a contract between the parties
prevents the employer afterwards claiming that payments made pursuant to the
contractual obligation
can be relied upon in satisfaction of award entitlements
arising outside the agreed purpose of the
payments.”[10]
- In
this case there was no agreement. The only evidence addressed to the point was
the evidence of Meyers. He swore the matter concerning
the overnight allowance
was never discussed at the time of his employment. He said he noticed that he
received a sum of $120 in
his pay packet so he queried the respondents’
administration which informed him of its nature. He says he challenged his
entitlement
because he was only occasionally away overnight. He was told it was
a payment in the nature of a bonus. Nothing in the evidence
suggests it was in
the nature of a payment for an award entitlement. In addition nothing in the
evidence suggests it was a payment
to be made in lieu of an award entitlement
and was the subject of that express agreement.
- It
follows that the first circumstance contemplated in the judgment of Sheldon J
does not apply.
- That
then leaves the matter to be resolved by reference to the second situation,
namely whether the payment “is designated by
the employer as being for a
purpose other than the satisfaction of award entitlements”.
- Clearly
in this case that seems apparent.
- In
the respondents’ submissions it was contended that the $120 a week was
“always agreed to be a part of Meyers’
wages rather than an
extraneous amount which the first respondent is now trying to
set-off.”[11]
As a matter of fact I do not find this to be the case. For reasons I have
earlier explained I do not think there was ever any agreement
concerning the
payment of this sum.
- It
was further contended that even if I were wrong on my characterisation of the
terms of the agreement I should distinguish the principle
in Polletti &
Ecob in any event because that case concerned non cash benefits and this
case concerns cash benefits. I see no basis in principle for
such a point of
distinction. The absence of any basis for such distinction can be inferred from
the illustrations provided by Sheldon
J in Ray v Radano which majority
judgment was expressly considered and cited with approval by both the Full Court
in Polletti and subsequently followed by the Full Court in ANZ v
FSU.
- The
arguments advanced by the respondents particularly those relying upon the
remarks in James Turner Roofing Pty Ltd v
Peters[12] are
unhelpful because they pertain to circumstances where the payments were made
pursuant to the employment contract. In this case
while the payments were made
because of Meyers being the subject of a contract of employment they were not
payments agreed to be
made as a condition of that contract of employment. The
distinction is significant.
- For
completeness the applicant has noted the decision of Martin v Fresho Foods
Pty Ltd [2009] FMCA 15. In that decision a Court did permit an offset of
overpayment against underpayments. However, in fairness to that single judge
decision
His Honour was not referred to any of the authorities which have been
the subject of debate in this Court and accordingly the decision
is one made per
incuriam.
Accessorial liability
- The
applicant contends that the second respondent was involved in the contraventions
in accordance with section 728 of the WR Act.
At paragraph 3 of the agreed
statement of facts the respondents agreed that the second respondent was the
sole director and shareholder
of the first respondent and was involved in and
responsible for the day to day operation and management of the first respondent.
He was also the officer of the first respondent who was involved in the
management and employment of Meyers and by reason of those
matters responsible
in a practical sense for ensuring that the first respondent complied with its
legal obligations to Meyers. He
was made available for cross examination during
the course of the trial. Nothing in his evidence suggested to the
contrary.
- Accordingly
I am satisfied he had actual knowledge of the contraventions and should be
treated as having committed the contraventions
and be liable for penalties.
- Section
727 sets out the rules that apply for the purposes of Division 3 of Part 14 of
the WR Act. Specifically it applies to s719
which deals with both penalties and
recovery of underpayments by an employer. Section 728 provides that a person who
is involved
in a contravention of a civil remedy provision is treated as having
contravened that provision. Accordingly the second respondent
is also subject to
penalty recovery proceedings pursuant to s719.
Summary
- Overall
I am satisfied to the requisite standard, being on the balance of probabilities,
of the contraventions alleged by the applicant
against each of the respondents
as determined above. Those contraventions are particularised in the table
provided in Exhibits 2
and 8 subject to the findings I have made and are
detailed in paragraphs 55 and 56.
- Given
my findings I direct the matter be adjourned for penalty
hearing.
First Respondent
- Between
the date of conclusion of the hearing and judgment the first respondent was the
subject of a winding up order and a liquidator
appointed. Given the first
respondent is now in liquidation the applicant no longer seeks orders against
it. However it does maintain
its claim for orders and penalties against the
second respondent. I accept the Applicant’s submission that the winding up
Order
made against the first respondent does not operate to prevent the delivery
of the judgement in the proceedings as it does not amount
to continuing with a
proceedings in a Court as provided by s471B Corporations Act 2001
(Cth).
Orders
- Application
adjourned to a date to be fixed.
I certify that the preceding
83106one hundred106106sixeighty-threeeighty-three (83) paragraphs are a true
copy of the reasons for
judgment of Burnett FM
Associate: B Schmidt
Date: 3 February 2010
[1] Exhibit
3.
[2] Exhibit
4.
[3] $806 divided
by 55 hours equals
$14.65.
[4] (806 +
120) divided by 55 equals
$16.83.
[5] Affidavit
Steven Williams Annexure SW14 page
137
[6] Affidavit of
Steven Williams Exhibit SW11 page
46.
[7] Affidavit of
Steven Williams Exhibit SW9 page
29.
[8] (2001) 111 IR
227; [2001] FCA
1785.
[9] (1989) 91
ALR 381 at 332 -
333.
[10] At
238.
[11]
Respondents’ submissions at para
25.
[12] [2003] WASCA 28; (2003) 132
IR 122.
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