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Sutherland v Vale (No.2) [2010] FMCA 52 (5 February 2010)

Last Updated: 18 February 2010

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SUTHERLAND v VALE (No.2)

BANKRUPTCY – COSTS & INTEREST – Matter remitted by High Court to determine costs of original proceeding and award of interest upon the sum of judgment entered in the High Court.


Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam. 93
CGU Insurance Ltd v Corrections Corporations of Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 173
Colgate Palmolive Company& Anor v Cousins Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225
Fabersert Pty Ltd v ABB Warehousing (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 1198
Ferrier & Knight v Civil Aviation Authority [1994] FCA 1571; (1994) 55 FCR 28
Milroy v Lord [1862] EngR 951; (1862) 4 De GF & J 264
Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424
Regatta Development Pty Ltd; Westpac Banking Corporation (unreported, Federal Court, Davies J, 5 March 1993);
Vale v Sutherland [2009] HCA 26
WSA Online Ltd v Arms (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 108

Applicant:
RODERICK MACKAY SUTHERLAND

Respondent:
MALCOM GEOFFREY VALE

File Number:
SYG 1140 of 2006

Judgment of:
Lloyd-Jones FM

Hearing date:
3 December 2009

Delivered at:
Sydney

Delivered on:
5 February 2010

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:
Mr B. J. Skinner

Solicitors for the Applicant:
Sparke Helmore

Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr T.J. Johnson

Solicitors for the Respondent:
Watson Mangioni

ORDERS

(1) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court on a party-party cost basis, and if not agreed, be taxed in accordance with o.62 of the Federal Court Rules.
(2) The respondent pay interest up to the entry of judgment in the High Court of Australia in the sum of $208,350 from 19 April 2006 to 29 July 2009 at the rate in accordance with o.35, r.7A of the Federal Court Rules.
(3) The parties have liberty to apply on seven days’ notice.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

SYG 1140 of 2006

RODERICK MACKAY SUTHERLAND

Applicant


And


MALCOM GEOFFREY VALE

Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(As corrected)

The proceedings

  1. I have before me two discrete matters which remain following the disposal of this matter of S38/2009 in the High Court of Australia contained in the decision of Vale v Sutherland [2009] HCA 26. The two matters are:
    1. the issues of costs in this Court in accordance with o.4 of the Federal Court of Australia in NSD 2121 of 2007; and
4. Any issues relating to the costs of the original hearing in the Federal Magistrates Court and any re-hearing which takes place in accordance with these orders are to be determined by the Federal Magistrates Court.
  1. the question of interest on the judgment entered in the High Court of Australia:

3. Upon the cross-appeal, order that:
  1. The decision at first instance gave rise to an appeal against three of my findings. Two of those findings concerned that the s.139ZQ Notice (“the Notice”) was misleading for the reasons that:
    1. the Notice referred to a transfer “within two years” of bankruptcy; and
    2. the Notice referred to a registered valuation of the properties.

Both of these findings were unanimously set aside by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. The remaining ground of appeal concerned the finding that the best evidence of market value of one half share of the seven parcels of land (“the property”) was $208,350. That finding was the subject of the appeal before the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia but was dealt with by the majority referring the proceedings and issues of costs back to this Court.

  1. Leave was granted to Mr Vale to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court heard the appeal on 20 May 2009 and 21 May 2009. All members of the High Court accepted the Trustee’s submission that s.139ZQ notice was not invalid for having arguably misstated the value of the property and the amount that Mr Vale owed to the Trustee. The High Court of Australia granted the applicant leave to cross appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia and entered judgment for the applicant in the sum of $208,350. Questions of costs in the Federal Magistrates Court and interest on the judgment were remitted back to this Court.
  2. The initial application before this Court was filed on 19 April 2006. That application sought by way of relief three things. It sought possession of certain parcels of land, judgment against the respondent together with interest and an order for costs. The judgment has now been disposed of by order of the High Court of Australia.

Evidence

  1. Mr Skinner, Counsel for the applicant, read the affidavit of Patrick Kaluski sworn 21 September 2009. There was no objection to the affidavit which was admitted into evidence.

Legislation

  1. In this Court provision is made in Section 76 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) for payment of interest relevantly:
  2. Rule 26.01 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) provides that the rate of interest to be the rate of interest as prescribed by the Federal Court Rules noting that the Court may in a particular case determine a lower rate in the interest of justice.
  3. Order 35, rule 7A of the Federal Court Rules provides:

Whilst not in identical terms, the provisions of s.51A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is in substantially the terms as those in the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth). Notwithstanding that, the rate of interest is the critical provision.

  1. Section 79 of the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) relevantly provides in respect of the present proceedings:

(3) Except as provided by the Rules of Court or any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Federal Magistrates Court or Federal Magistrate.

Applicant’s submissions

Costs

  1. Mr Skinner submits that in the normal course costs would follow the event. However on the material facts of this case, the present application not only seeks costs pursuant to the original application filed in 2006 but seeks those costs on an indemnity basis. The reason for that is that on 24 October 2006, the Trustee’s solicitors, Sparke Helmore, sent a Calderbank offer to Mr Vale’s solicitors, Watson Mangioni. This intended offer to resolve the matter on the basis that the respondent pay the applicant $200,000 plus costs as agreed to be $32,000 or to be assessed. It is submitted that this Calderbank offer is less than the figure for which judgment was entered and accordingly, the applicant seeks an order for indemnity costs on the basis that the Calderbank offer could have resolved the matter. That offer was rejected and on 7 November 2006 Watson Mangioni made a counter offer to resolve the proceedings for $100,000 plus costs.
  2. On 10 November 2006 a second letter was sent by Sparke Helmore to Watson Mangioni offering to resolve the matter for $200,000 plus costs. No written response was received for that offer. On 13 November 2006 there was an oral conversation, where acknowledgment of receipt of the offer was made and rejected in an oral conversation. Mr Skinner submits that at no time did the respondent propose or submit that his indebtedness should be the sum of $208,350.
  3. In the initial proceedings before this Court there were two valuations of the property in Mr Vale’s possession. These included:
    1. a kerbside valuation of $540,000 for the property dated 28 September 1998 prepared by First National Real Estate; and
    2. a valuation of $416,700 dated 31 March 1999 prepared by Patrick Jones Wood, a registered valuer.

There is no dispute that the kerbside valuations were prepared under Mr Vale’s instructions and the second valuation, prepared by the registered valuer, was under instruction by the solicitor retained by Mr Vale. Moreover, the registered valuer was not instructed by the Trustee although they subsequently came into his possession.

  1. Mr Skinner submits that in respect to the Notice issued to Mr Vale pursuant to S139ZQ of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the validity of which is no longer under any doubt records, contains the following words:

That course was never taken. Mr Vale retained a solicitor to act on his behalf, Mr Kruit of Mudgee. Mr Kruit made submissions to the Trustee about the subject matter of the Notice and those submissions raised the issue about whether or not the transfers had occurred within the period of time specified in the Act. In a letter sent by Mr Kruit on 27 June 2002 to the Official Receiver in the response to the Notice under s.139ZQ, nothing was put by Mr Kruit pertaining to or touching upon any suggestion that Mr Vale ought to be indebted for some sum less than $270,000 or indeed $280,350.

  1. Mr Skinner submits that Mr Vale’s proceedings in this Court were conducted on the basis that the transfer of the parcels of land had been an imperfect gift. It was argued that this amounted to a Milroy v Lord [1862] EngR 951; (1862) 4 De GF & J 264 situation and equitable relief was sought. This argument was rejected by me.
  2. I also note that in the ultimate resolution of this matter in the High Court of Australia, Counsel appearing for Mr Vale conceded that the transfers of land were void against the applicant under s.120 of the Act. Mr Skinner submits that in conformity with the principle that costs should follow the event, there is no room for the respondent in this matter to escape liability for the costs incurred in the preparation and conduct of the hearing at first instance. Further, there are also some incidental costs which would have arisen following the remission back to this Court by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.
  3. Mr Skinner submits that by Mr Vale refusing an offer which would be considered reasonable caused considerable expense and loss of time. Mr Skinner therefore submits that Mr Vale should be responsible and that indemnity costs should be awarded: Colgate Palmolive Company & Anor v Cousins Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 536; (1993) 46 FCR 225 per Sheppard J. In that case, His Honour identified five circumstances where indemnity costs were properly awarded. The two that are relevant to this matter are:
    1. making allegations which should not have been made or the undue promulgation of a case by groundless contentions: Regatta Development Pty Ltd; Westpac Banking Corporation (unreported, Federal Court, Davies J, 5 March 1993); and
    2. the imprudent refusal of an offer of compromise.
  4. Mr Skinner submits that the groundless contention in the matter before this Court was the Milroy v Lord (supra) point and the decision to ignore and refuse the reasonable offer by the Trustee was an imprudent refusal. It is submitted that this comment in itself, is sufficient for the Cousins test to ground the order for costs on an indemnity basis.

Interest

  1. Mr Skinner submits that in the original application interest was claimed from the outset of this case which was filed on 19 April 2006. It is also submitted that in a case of a liquidator recovering a preferential payment, pursuant to the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), interest should be made payable from the date of demand by the liquidator for the payment of the preference: Ferrier & Knight v Civil Aviation Authority [1994] FCA 1571; (1994) 55 FCR 28 at [28] per Beaumont, Gummow and Lindgren JJ where their Honours stated:
  2. Mr Skinner invites the Court to adopt the course that interest should run on the sum of $208,000 from the date of the demand in this matter.
  3. Mr Skinner submits that the decision in Ferrier & Knight v Civil Aviation Authority (supra) reignites the relationship between corporate law and bankruptcy. The principle that interest would run from the date of demand under corporations law is consistent with the law that interest would run in this matter from the date of the demand. The date of service of the Notice in this case was 28 May 2002 and the Trustee seeks interest from that date to the date of entry of judgment, namely 29 July 2009.
  4. Mr Skinner acknowledges that the problem is the rate of interest that will apply. There is no rate of interest prescribed under the Federal Magistrates Rules 2001 (Cth) for pre-judgment interest. There is a rate for post entry of judgment namely 10.5%. In Fabersert Pty Ltd v ABB Warehousing (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 1198, His Honour Driver FM held that Fabersert should receive interest up to judgment from the date of termination of the contract at the rate of 10.5%. Therefore, His Honour applied the same rate of interest that is applicable to post judgment interest pursuant to r.26.01 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
  5. The affidavit of Patrick Kaluski provides the rates of interest calculated from the date of service of the Notice to the date of judgment in accordance with a rate of 10.5%. There are 2,620 days at the rate of 10.5% comes to a total of $150,033.11. It is submitted that this amount of interest ought to be allowed on the judgment sum entered by the High Court of Australia and entered in this Court.

Respondent’s submissions

Costs

  1. Mr Johnson submits that it is acknowledged that his client was required to pay costs of these proceedings that are properly payable. However the costs associated with the issue of statutory notices are not relevant. He does not cavil with the fact that there were offers of compromise made but they were made very late. That is 24 October 2006 with a hearing commencing 16 November 2006 some four weeks later. Mr Johnson argues that a claim for indemnity costs could only occur after 24 October 2006.
  2. Mr Johnson advances the argument that the letter sent to Mr Vale by the Trustee’s solicitors dated 10 November 2006 should be totally disregarded as the letter was issued less than seven days before the hearing of these proceedings in this Court. Consequently, Mr Johnson submits that the issue then becomes the non-acceptance of that offer is reasonable on the part of Mr Vale. Mr Johnson submits that his client was faced with a Notice that had a criminal sanction for non-compliance and an application was made to have that Notice set aside. He submitted that the position is that no order of sale has been ordered in respect of these properties under the charge and no order for acquisition has been made. The situation now stands that there is a monetary amount some $70,000 less than what was claimed in the Notice. It was argued that in those circumstances it was reasonable at the time at which the settlement offers were made to Mr Vale, as events have now transpired, not to accept those offers.
  3. Mr Johnson submits that the general concept, if costs are to be awarded on an indemnity basis is that they would only normally be ordered from the time of the offer to be taken up, or the date of the offer, and not prior to that date.

Interest

  1. Mr Johnson acknowledged that it is agreed between the parties that the earliest date from which interest could be calculated was the date that the demand was served upon his client being 28 May 2002 if interest is to be awarded. However Mr Johnson submits that the Statement of Claim makes it clear that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court on 19 April 2006. Conduct prior to that time does not relate to the present proceedings.
  2. Mr Johnson referred to the offers of compromise in their chronological sequence as follows:
    1. An offer was made on 24 October 2006 (Annexure “A” of affidavit of Mr Kaluski) which detailed that Mr Vale pay $200,000 (the judgment sum) and to pay reasonable costs as agreed of $32,000 or to be assessed.

There is no information provided in that letter relating to the basis on which the calculation of $32,000 was made. Further there is nothing in that letter which deals with the statutory charge arising under s.139ZR or the matters, both of which are documents issued by the Official Receiver. Both of these documents would involve, if the matter was to be resolved, a withdrawal of those notices. Significantly non compliance with a notice under this section is, one of the very terms of the legislation, a criminal offence.

  1. The second offer was made on 7 November 2006 (Annexure “B” of the affidavit of Mr Kaluski) due to expire at 5pm on 10 November 2006. Four days later the hearing commenced on 16 November 2006.
  1. Mr Johnson submits that the appropriate rate of interest is the rate that is provided under the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and the Federal Court Rules for pre-judgment interest which is 4%. In this case, interest is not designed as a penalty which the applicant is proposing to impose on Mr Vale.
  2. It was submitted that in this respect it is important to have regard to the timing. The following events took place.
    1. the sequestration order was made on 24 April 2001;
    2. just over a year later the Notice, the subject of these proceedings, was issued by the Official Receiver;
    3. nothing then appears to have been done by the Trustee between May 2002 until April 2006;
    4. a concession was made and leave was sought during the course of the hearing before the High Court but leave could have been sought at any time prior to the hearing before the High Court to agitate a fixed amount of $208,350.00. That was a figure that was capable of being calculated readily by the Trustee prior to the issue of the original demand. The kerbside valuation dated 28 September 1998 addressed to Mr Vale was the valuation relied upon by the Trustee for the purpose of issuing the Notice and not the appraisal conducted by a registered valuer seven days prior to the relevant transfer.
  3. Mr Johnson submits that the real issue he invites the Court to take into account is the lack of explanation as to why a trustee should seek to procure the issue of a notice which has a criminal sanction for non-compliance to be issued by the Official Receiver which now has been conceded in the High Court as claiming too much.
  4. Mr Johnson invites the Court not to take lightly the way in which this administration has been conducted. Further he asks the Court to take into consideration that the Trustee is seeking to gain a monetary advantage from the estate because of his own inordinate and unexplained delay. Mr Johnson submits that having regard to the conduct that is apparent from the history and the evidence, this is a matter where interest would only be paid from 19 April 2006 and prior to the High Court appeal substantial injustice would have been occasioned on Mr Vale. The rate for pre-judgment interest provided under the Federal Court Rules is a cash rate set by the Reserve Bank of Australia from time to time plus 4%. This is a readily available rate on the Reserve Bank website.

Consideration

Costs

  1. The power of the Court to make orders for costs is contained in the Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s.79(2) which states:
  2. the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.21.02(2) which states:
  3. In the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s.43(2) gives a general power to award costs that:
  4. The discretion to award costs is unfettered, but must be exercised judicially: Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 per Bray CJ at [11].
  5. This passage has been quoted with approval in the Federal Court in Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises (1970) 28 ALR 201 per Fisher J at 206-207 and in the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of Australia (1991) 100 ALR 568 per Morling J at 569.
  6. The issue of costs was addressed in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) at s.32 which states:
  7. This section in no way fetters the general power to award costs as referred to above.
  8. In Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association ([1986] FCA 382; 1986) ATPR 40-748 Toohey J at 48, 136:
  9. The issues of costs in this matter are whether they should be awarded on an indemnity basis and the relevant date from which they should apply. Relevantly two Calderbank offers were made during the course of these proceedings. These letters were in the usual form of a Calderbank offer which is an offer in writing, contained in a letter, that is expressed to be without prejudice save as to the question of costs, and which indicates that the letter will be relied upon on the question of costs. A Calderbank offer is a significant factor in favour of indemnity costs but does not dictate them or require them as a matter of routine. There is a significant body of law which supports the view that a Calderbank offer is a significant factor in favour of indemnity costs but does not dictate them or require them as a matter of routine. Factors relevant to the exercise of discretion include the clarity with which the terms of the offer were expressed, the stage of the proceedings of which the offer was made, the time allowed for the offeree to consider the offer, the reasonableness of the offeree in rejecting the offer, whether the offer stated that indemnity costs would be sought if the offer were rejected and the contents of the response by the offeree to the offer.
  10. In the matter of WSA Online Ltd v Arms (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 108 their Honours Nicholson, Mansfield and Bennett JJ at [16] stated:
  11. In CGU Insurance Ltd v Corrections Corporations of Australia Staff Superannuation Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 173 the Full Court indicated that it was necessary for parties seeking indemnity costs to demonstrate the other party’s refusal was unreasonable. Their Honours Moore, Finn and Jessup JJ at [75] stated:
  12. In respect to the issue of the clarity of the terms of the offer, significantly the Notice under s.139ZQ of the Act addressed to Mr Vale and served by registered mail on 28 May 2002 clearly states:

Although Mr Vale had retained Mr Kruit solicitor, the issue in respect to the reasonableness or the validity of the amount was not raised.

  1. The main argument raised as the basis of rejection of the Calderbank offer was that it was made very late. The initial letter from Sparke Helmore to Watson Mangioni was dated 24 October 2006 which was approximately four weeks, being sixteen business days prior to the scheduled hearing date. Significantly during this sixteen day window, the initial offer was rejected in correspondence dated 7 November 2006 together with a counter offer. A further Calderbank offer dated 10 November 2006 was issued but no formal reply was received. However on 13 November 2006 oral communication occurred between the parties when it was acknowledged that the second Calderbank offer had been received but was also rejected.
  2. However the issue of clarity is significant in that there was nothing in the offer letter that deals with the statutory charges arising under s.139ZR on the notices both of which are documents issued by the Official Receiver, and both of which would involve, if the matter was to be resolved, a withdrawal of those notices. It was argued that the aspect of withdrawal of the notices was essential for settlement as non-compliance with a notice under this section is, by the terms of the legislation, a criminal offence.
  3. I note that the initial Calderbank offer dated 24 October 2006 contains a paragraph that states:

Similarly the reply from Watson Mangioni dated 7 November 2006 which rejects the original offer sets out a counter offer in clear terms and contains a paragraph with respect to the principles of Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam.93 and the contents of this letter will be relied upon in any claim that Mr Vale may bring.

  1. The other arguments that had been raised that resulted in extending the proceedings in respect to preparation and conduct resulting in a greater liability for costs was that the issue in respect of the transfer of land which was void against the trustee under s.120 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) was not conceded until the High Court. The other was the argument that was pursued in respect of the transfer an imperfect gift.
  2. In circumstances where both parties were represented and both Calderbank offers were acknowledged and rejected I am not satisfied that the argument that the Calderbank offers were made late can be sustained. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that Watson Mangioni solicitors experienced any difficulties with communicating these offers to their client or obtaining instructions to reject their respective offers.
  3. In Stipanov v Mier (No 2) [2006] VSC 424, Hollingworth J did not order indemnity costs from the date of the offer of compromise. Her Honour stressed the dangers of “judging the reasonableness of a settlement offer through the prism of hindsight and, in having regard to all the circumstances and matters, did not believe that the plaintiff acted unreasonably in rejecting the first offer of compromise. It follows that the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs on a party party basis”.
  4. In the circumstances of this matter although the respondent was initially successful before this Court this was subsequently overruled on appeal or conceded before the entry of the judgment in the sum of $208,350. There is associated with matter a certain element of complexity and uncertainty in the law requiring proceedings for the Full Court of the Federal Court and the High Court seeking clarity. Mr Vale was seeking to have the s.139ZQ Notice set aside on the basis that it was invalid. In the circumstances it was not unreasonable for Mr Vale to reject the Calderbank offer where his clear intention was to have the complete Notice set aside.

Interest

  1. There is no issue that a claim for interest was listed in from the original application filed in this Court on the 19 April 2006. In a matter where a liquidator is recovering a preferential payment interest under Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be allowed from the date of demand by the liquidator for the payment of the preference. Section 51A(1) of that Act states

This approach was adopted in Ferrier & Knight v Civil Aviation Authority [1994] FCA 1571; (1994) 55 FCR 28 at 91G.

  1. The Full Court of the Federal Court in Ferrier & Knight then considers the relevant date from which interest is paid. This passage is reproduced above at [18]. The date of service of the Notice in this matter was 28 May 2002 and the date of entry of judgment in the High Court of Australia was 29 July 2009.
  2. The exercise of power conferred by s.51A of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) was conditioned by the words

Mr Johnson in his submissions indicated that interest is not designed as a penalty and it is important to have regard to the timing in this matter. The sequestration order was made against Mrs Linda Anne Vale on 24 April 2001. Just over a year later the Notice pursuant to s.139ZQ of the Bankruptcy Act was signed by the Official Receiver on the 27 May 2002. On the 28 May 2002 the s.139ZQ Notice was served on Mr Vale by registered post at address Lot 18, Spring Park Road, Gulgory NSW 2852. The Notice claimed payment of the bankrupt’s half interest in the parcels of land to the value of $270,000.

  1. It is submitted that nothing appears to have been done by the Trustee between May 2002 until April 2006. The valuation relied upon by the Trustee was in effect a kerbside estimate, confidentially addressed to Mr Vale dated 28 September 1998. The kerbside valuation was obtained by Mr Vale to assist in determining his future financial strategy.
  2. That kerbside valuation was relied upon by the Trustee for the purposes of issuing the Notice instead of the appraisal prepared by a qualified valuer which was conducted seven days prior to the relevant transfers. I acknowledge Mr Johnson’s submissions in respect of the administration and conduct of the Trustee may be seen to gain a monetary advantage from Mr Vale because of the Trustee’s own inordinate delay. I believe this is a circumstance where the power conferred by s.51A of the Federal Court Act should be conditioned by the words “unless good cause is shown” and it would be more appropriate that interest would be payable from 19 April 2006 which is the date these proceedings were commenced.
  3. In respect to the issue of the rate of pre-judgment interest the rules of this Court are silent. Accordingly, r.1.05(2) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 applies. The rule states
  4. Order 35, r.7A of the Federal Court Rules addresses the issue of interest up to judgment and states
  5. In the circumstances I believe that this rate of interest is appropriate in the circumstances of this matter payable from the 19 April 2006 being the date on which these proceedings were commenced in this Court and the 29 July 2009 being the date that judgment was entered in my Court.

I certify that the preceding fifty-eight (58) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM


Associate:


Date: 5 February 2010
Corrections

Order (2) changed from:

The respondent pay interest up to the entry of judgment in the High Court of Australia in the sum of $208,350 from 26 October 2006 to 29 July 2009 at the rate in accordance with o.35, r.7A of the Federal Court Rules.

And changed to:

(2) The respondent pay interest up to the entry of judgment in the High Court of Australia in the sum of $208,350 from 19 April 2006 to 29 July 2009 at the rate in accordance with o.35, r.7A of the Federal Court Rules.

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