SZODN & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 269 (21 April 2010)

Last Updated: 12 May 2010

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZODN & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2010] FMCA 269

MIGRATION – Review of the Refugee Review Tribunal decision – Tribunal found it did not have jurisdiction to review delegate decision – application filed out of time – no reviewable error – review application dismissed. The Applicants in these proceedings is not to be identified pursuant to s.91X Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and have been given the pseudonyms “SZODN” and “SZODO”.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.65(1), 91X, 417, 422, 424A, 425, 477

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 BFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; [2003] 131 FCR 102 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264; (2004) 140 FCR 572 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32 M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293 SZIAI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1372 VHAP 2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 82

First Applicant:

SZODN

Second Applicant:

SZODO

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 222 of 2010

Judgment of:

Lloyd-Jones FM

Hearing date:

7 April 2010

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

21 April 2010

REPRESENTATION

Applicant:

The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of a Hindi interpreter.

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Ms Nanson (solicitor)Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

(1) The application filed on 5 February 2010 is dismissed on an interlocutory basis pursuant to r.44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth).
(2) The applicants are to pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application fixed in the amount of $2,750.00.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

SYG 222 of 2010

SZODN

First Applicant

SZODO

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The proceedings

1. This is an application file on 5 February 2010 pursuant to s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 4 March 2009 to affirm the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to refuse their application for a Protection (Class XA) visa. The applicants are self-represented litigants. The applicant husband was unable to appear so only the applicant wife appeared with a small child in her care. She was assisted by an interpreter. I believe it is in the interests of both parties to know with some certainty the future progress of this matter. Consequently, I made orders at the completion of the hearing and indicated I would publish my written reasons for those orders.
2. The applicants who claim to be citizens of India arrived in Australia on 26 May 2008 and applied to the Department of Immigration & Citizenship for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 26 August 2008. The delegate decided to refuse to grant the visa on 21 November 2008 and notified the applicants of the decision and their review rights by letter dated 21 November 2008. The delegate refused the visa application on the basis that the first named applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. The applicants applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 10 December 2008 for a review of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicants a Protection visa in a decision number 0808557 of Tribunal member Gabrielle Cullen dated 4 March 2009, which is the decision under review.
3. The applicant husband filed an application in this Court on 5 February 2010 in respect of the migration decision made by the Tribunal on 4 March 2009. The application contains four grounds of review which will be addressed later in this judgment.
4. The application seeks an extension of time which is not specifically particularised. However, with the application, an affidavit was filed by the applicants and it contains a statement that for the sake of natural justice, the application for an extension of time should be allowed. A copy of the Tribunal decision is attached to the affidavit.
5. A Court Book (“CB”) prepared and filed by the first respondent’s solicitors is marked Exhibit “A” and is the only evidence before this Court.
6. Information in the Protection (Class XA) visa application indicates that the first named applicant is a married man from Narkhera, District Udham Singh Nagar, Uttarakshand State India. He claims he is a Sihk, he lists his occupation as a farmer and was self employed from 2000. The second named applicant is the wife of the first named applicant and she claims her occupation to be a housewife.
7. The applicant husband claims he left India because of threats made by opposition political parties to harm himself and his family. He states that he joined the Congress party in 2000 and has been a very active member of the Youth Congress Party at District level. He claims he organised many rallies in support of his party and has a strong hold over local votes in favour of his party. He claims the BJP candidate threatened him to force his members to vote in his favour in the April 2007 election. He claims he was threatened with physical harm. He states that he reported to the police that the police are in the hands of the opposition party. He claims he was arrested just before the election and his members were forcibly stopped to vote by police and the opposition party candidate, Arvind Panday. He claims that the police even locked up his wife in gaol for a few days.
8. He states that he tried to contact the candidate of the Congress party to help but they do not have the capacity to influence the police. The opposition party told his party members that he had abandoned them and accused him of giving Congress Party money to the BJP and portraying them. He states that this discouraged his supporters and they did not vote for the Congress party which resulted in a loss of the seat. He claims that when he was released he told them the truth and reported to his party leader and police, but the opposition party, the BJP had formed and nobody has taken any action against the people that put him in gaol. He fears if he returns that the ruling MLA Avind Panday and his supporters will threaten him that he must join their party, the BJP and force him to put all his votes in their favour otherwise his family will face the consequences.

Tribunal “Findings and Reasons”

9. The applicant husband appeared before the Tribunal on 11 February 2009 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi (Indian / Pakistani) and English language. The applicants have one child who lives in a hostel in a different state in Uttaranchal but comes home on holidays. The applicant husband said he lives in the hostel because his life is in danger. He states that it is a place where children study and they sent their child to a different state because of his safety. The applicants confirmed that they travelled to Singapore and Malaysia in August 2007 because of their danger in India. They returned to India on 23 August 2007. The Tribunal asked why they returned and they indicated that they thought things would have settled down in India. When asked whether they sought protection in Singapore or Malaysia they indicated that they were not aware that this could be done.
10. The Tribunal asked the applicant husband the official name of the Youth Congress Party and who were the office bearers at various levels of the organisation. The Tribunal indicated to him that his lack of knowledge raised doubts whether he ever worked with the youth wing of the party and would have expected anyone who was active with the youth wing of the Congress Party or the Indian Youth Congress would have known the official name of the Youth Wing party, the names of the national president and the state president.
11. While the Tribunal accepted that elections were generally held in February 2007, it did not accept that the applicant husband was involved in either the Congress Party or the Indian Youth Congress, as claimed. As a result, the Tribunal did not accept as true that the applicants left India because of the harm claimed. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence “internally inconsistent, inconsistent with independent country information and implausible amounting of fabrication” (CB 115 at [80]).
12. In respect of the documents provided by the applicant in support of his claim, the Tribunal noted the discrepancies between the information contained in these documents relating to the applicant and his own evidence. This fact, in addition to independent information relating to document fraud in India, led the Tribunal to conclude that the documents had been “...manufactured for the purpose of this claim...” (CB 116 at [84] and CB 107 at [38]).
13. The Tribunal did not accept that there was a real chance of the applicants being persecuted if they return to India and was not satisfied, on the evidence before it, they had a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention related reason.

Consideration

14. At the hearing of this matter before this Court, the applicant husband was not present. However, the applicant wife appeared with a small child in her care. With the assistance of a Punjabi – English interpreter, she explained to the Court that her husband was not well enough to appear as he was suffering a severe psychological disturbance. I indicated to the applicant wife that I would be willing to allow her husband to attend by phone to assist in her presentation as the claims made in the Protection visa application primarily concern him and the wife was relying on those claims for her claim for a Protection visa.
15. The applicant wife indicated to the Court that she did not believe that her husband was well enough to appear as he was unable to address these issues at this time. I note that the only material before me in respect to the husbands health is his wife’s submissions made from the bar table. There is an absence of any medical reports tendered in affidavit form. As the applicant wife relied on identical claims as her husband and that she had travelled from Griffith in rural New South Wales with a young child in order to appear, together with her indication that her husband’s appearance by telephone would be of no assistance to her or the Court, I believed it was appropriate to proceed with the hearing.

Time limits on application to the Federal Magistrates Court

16. In the application filed on 5 February 2010 in response to the question “does the applicant apply for an order that the time of making the application be extended under s.477 Migration Act 1958?” the response was “yes”. The application form carries the following instruction
    • NOTE: An extension of time is required if the application is not made within 28 days of the actual (as opposed to deemed) notification of decision – see section 477 of the Migration Act 1958. If it is required, the applicant must file an affidavit explaining the delay and the reasons why an extension of time should be granted.

As indicated above, an affidavit was filed however the request for an extension of time is limited to “for the sake of natural justice my application be allowed to be for filing for the extension of time”.

17. The applicant wife indicated from the bar table that the notification of the Tribunal decision was given to a local Indian (unnamed) lawyer in Griffith. He indicated to them that he would handle the application to this Court and charge them a fee in advance of that work. The applicant wife stated that they became aware that the (unidentified) lawyer had not undertaken the filing of that application when they received notification from the department that their visas were about to expire.
18. It has to be assumed, in the absence of any supporting evidence, that the notification letter must have been received sometime in August 2009 because on 19 August the same unidentified lawyer prepared a s.417 application direct to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. I shall return to the significance of this letter below. An acknowledgement of that application dated 25 August 2009 was forwarded to the applicant husband which significantly contains the following passage:
    • You should also be aware that the Minister is under no obligation to intervene in your case. This means you should not discontinue any application for judicial review on the expectation that the Minister will intervene. (CB 129)
19. On 14 January 2010, the Department advised the applicant husband that the Minister had decided that it would not be in the public interest to intervene and substitute a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal with a more favourable decision. Subsequently, on 5 February 2010, the applicants filed an application in the Federal Magistrates Court pursuant to s.476 of the Act. Consequently, a decision of the Tribunal dated 4 March 2009 and forwarded that day by facsimile transmission to the applicant’s nominated representative being a Mrs Margaret King of Griffith City Council and a further copy for the applicant and his wife, however the Federal Magistrates Court application was not filed until 5 February 2010 which represents a delay of some 338 days.
20. The applicant wife’s submissions from the bar table indicate that the (unidentified) Indian lawyer prepared both the s.417 letter and the application to this Court and that the applicant husband signed those documents. The applicant wife claimed that it was the fault of their lawyer for the failure of lodgement of the documents on time, but she declined to identify him.
21. Section 477 of the Act was amended by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2009, assented to on 25 February 2009 and this section became operative on 15 March 2009. The section states
    • (1) An application to the Federal Magistrates Court for a remedy to be granted in exercise of the court's original jurisdiction under section 476 in relation to a migration decision must be made to the court within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
    • (2) The Federal Magistrates Court may, by order, extend that 35 day period as the Federal Magistrates Court considers appropriate if:
    • (a) an application for that order has been made in writing to the Federal Magistrates Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order; and
    • (b) the Federal Magistrates Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.
22. Section 477(3) defines the date of the “migration decision” to include the date of the written statement given by the Tribunal. The 35 day period begins to run despite the Tribunal’s failure to comply with any of the requirements referred to under s.477(3) and s.477(4) and irrespective of the validity of the migration decision (s.477(5)). In the matter before this Court it is clear the filing of the application falls outside of the 35 day period required under the Act. The applicants have, accordingly, sought an extension of time.
23. In the affidavit sworn by the applicant husband on 3 February 2010 and filed on 5 February 2010 he states:
    • 2. The Tribunal member failed to analyse properly the ‘future harm’ I may face if I have to go back to India. Hence, due to this failure the Tribunal had committed a serious jurisdictional error. I have made request to the Honourable Minister to consider my case in humanitarian ground,
24. Clearly, the application filed in this Court on 5 February 2010 is significantly out of time. Consequently, the remaining question is whether the 35 day period should be extended.

Application made pursuant to s.417 of the Act

25. As indicated above, the application to the Minister dated 19 August 2009 was received by the Department on 25 August 2009 and was acknowledged by letter. It was then forwarded to the Ministerial Intervention unit and received on 22 August 2009. On 14 January 2010 the applicants were advised that the Minister had declined to exercise his power under s.417 of the Act. In written submissions of Ms Nanson, appearing for the first respondent, she submits that the applicant’s conduct in making an application pursuant to s.417 is indicative of a decision to abandon a course that would seek to challenge the decision of the Tribunal on grounds available under the act, or otherwise at law. The subsequent delay in the making of the s.417 application also reinforced the propriety of the proceedings had been brought to an end.
26. This issue is considered in the decision M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293 per Black CJ, Sackville and Sundberg JJ at [22] – [24] where their Honours review this issue.
    • 22 In Applicant M29 of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1266 Weinberg J considered an application for an extension of time in which to apply for mandamus and certiorari. After referring to Marks his Honour said at [10] and [12]:
      • "In the present case, the decision of the RRT, which is impugned, was made on 26 November 1999. The application to the High Court for an order nisi was not made until approximately sixteen months later, on 29 March 2001. The only explanation proffered for the delay was the request that the applicants made, in October 2000, some eleven months after the RRT’s decision, for ministerial intervention pursuant to s 48B and s 417 of the Act.
        ...
        In my view, the delay has not been adequately explained. I agree entirely with the comments of von Doussa J regarding this very same issue in Applicant A2 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 576 at pars [8]–[10]. There was nothing to prevent the applicants from pursuing their application for constitutional writs in the High Court while, at the same time, seeking ministerial intervention. The absence of any adequate explanation would, of itself, be sufficient to refuse the application for an extension of time."
    • 23 In Applicant VUAD of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1331 Weinberg J again dealt with a s 417 request put forward as an explanation for the delay in applying for constitutional writs. His Honour said at [18]-[20]:
      • 
        "It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the applicant’s request under s 417 should be viewed as an indication that he was prepared to accept the RRT’s decision as correct, and that rather than challenge that decision by way of judicial review, he had elected to take another course. In making that submission, counsel relied upon a series of decisions of this Court...
        
        In Applicant A2 of 2002, von Doussa J said of the applicant that:
      • ‘having taken that other course, [to make an application under s 417, and await a decision in respect of that application] in my opinion he must live with the consequence of the delay that occurred’.
    • This statement by von Doussa J crystallised the legal consequences of what Gray J, in Re Batuwantudawa, characterised as ‘inconsistent courses’.
    • It is also useful to have regard to what was said by Heerey J in Re Ruddock; ex parte LX [2003] FCA 561 at [42]:
      • ‘As a matter of law there was no reason why that should have held up the filing of an application in the High Court. The terms of s 417 itself, including the provision that the power may only be exercised personally by the Minister, suggest that it is to be reserved for rare cases and that it would usually be unwise to rely on the success of such application where other avenues of possible relief are available as of right.’"
    • 24 In Daniel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 21; (2004) 205 ALR 198 Goldberg J said at [14] that the applicant’s course of conduct in making a s 417 application was indicative of a decision to abandon any course that would seek to challenge the decision of the Tribunal on grounds available under the Act or otherwise at law. At [15] his Honour said that the s 417 application in that case was not a sufficient special circumstance to warrant excusing the delay and allowing the extension of time, particularly because the applicant’s conduct implicitly accepted that the Tribunal’s decision was not to be the subject of challenge.
27. If the person referred to by the applicant wife, which I have called the (unidentified) Indian lawyer, is in fact a qualified legal practitioner holding a current practicing certificate holding himself out to advise on migration matters, he should be fully aware of the significance of pursuing the avenue of the s.417 application which is clearly set out in the authorities above. However, to ensure the self-represented applicants appearing before the Court are given the opportunity to present their case in the interest of the administration of justice and the alleged errors in the Tribunal decision, I will consider those issues before making my final decision in respect of the application. I rely substantially on the written submissions prepared by Ms Nanson in responding to the four grounds.

Ground 1

1. The Tribunal did not give to the applicants before the hearing the independent information that it had about India. The Tribunal used this information (RRT decision record pages 13 to 15). This was against section 424A of the Migration Act 1958.

28. Section 424A(3)(a) states
    • (3) This section does not apply to information:
    • (a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member;
29. The material referred by the applicant at paragraph [69] – [77] at (CB 112 – 114) falls within the exception identified in s.424A(3)(a): VHAP 2002 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 82 at [12] – [14], [21]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW [2004] FCAFC 264; (2004) 140 FCR 572 at [64] – [74], [112] – [138].

Ground 2

2. The Refugee Review Tribunal denied the Applicant procedural fairness by reaching adverse conclusions that the applicant was not a witness of truth, being conclusions that were not obviously open on the known material, without giving the applicant the opportunity to be heard in respect of those matters.

30. Section 425 of the Act requires the Tribunal to invite the Applicant to appear before it and give evidence and argument relating to the “issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The decision record indicates that the applicant husband appeared before the Tribunal on 11 February 2009 to give evidence and present argument. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi (Indian/Pakistani) – English language. The applicant wife indicated that she would like to act as an observer and to make a statement at the end of the hearing. The Tribunal decision in paragraphs [29] – [68] give a detailed account of the issues raised with the applicants during that hearing. At the end they were asked if there was anything they wished to add.
31. This response was limited to an indication as to the difficulties they were encountering because of a lack of resources and funds, but they could not go back to India because of the political situation. The applicants were clearly on notice of the issues arising from the delegate’s decision and as the Tribunal’s reasons disclose, the applicants were given every opportunity to expand their claims at the hearing and to respond to the Tribunal’s questions. The applicants do not provide any details in relation to this claim. Further, this provision of the Act is subject to s.422B which sets out the requirements of the “natural justice hearing rule” in relation to such matters. On a fair reading of the Tribunal decision and in the absence of any particularisation of an alleged error, this ground of review cannot be sustained.

Ground 3

3. The applicants satisfy the four key elements of the Convention definition as detailed in page 2 and 3 of the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal has not considered this aspect and therefore committed factual and legal error.

32. The Tribunal was obliged to consider whether the applicants’ claims satisfied the Convention definition and it did so by addressing whether it was satisfied as to the applicant’s claims on the evidence put before it. Having rejected those claims for reasons given, there was no further issue to be considered or addressed by the Tribunal. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal that the relevant criteria required for being a refugee are met: Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576. If the Tribunal is not satisfied that the relevant criteria are met, s.65(1) of the Act requires the Tribunal to affirm the decision under review. The Applicants have not particularised or made submissions indicating which elements of their claims were not addressed and considered. The decision record shows that the Tribunal considered the applicant’s history in its entirety, but was not satisfied as to the credibility of the claims put forward.

Ground 4

(3) 4. The RRT has failed to investigate the applicant’s claim, specially the grounds of persecution in India. Therefore, the Tribunal decision dated 4 March 2009 was effected by actual bias constituting judicial error.

33. Apart from the assertion that the Tribunal failed to investigate the applicants’ claims of persecution in India, the applicants have not particularised or made submissions identifying which of their claims the Tribunal failed to investigate. Having regard to the fact that the Tribunal only had before it the facts, as alleged by the applicant husband, that were contained in the papers, it is the only material upon which the Tribunal could proceed. The relevant facts pertaining to the application need to be supplied themselves, in as much detail as necessary to enable the applicant to establish the facts. It is for the applicant to make out his own case: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 per Kirby J. In this case, the Applicant had an opportunity to attend the hearing and furnish additional facts. To the extent that he did, the applicant could not complain that any other facts were not taken into account or furnished additional facts and asked them to be taken into account. The Tribunal is under no general duty to make its own enquiries: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32. The Tribunal’s decision record reveals the contrary and disclosed that the applicant’s claims were closely considered and there was nothing evident from those reasons which would have compelled the Tribunal to make any further enquiry: SZIAI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1372.
34. In respect of the claim of actual bias, this can be said to exist where the Tribunal member had a pre-existing state of mind which disabled him from understanding or rendering him unwilling to undertake any proper evaluation of the relevant materials before him which are relevant to the decision to be made: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17. Actual bias may be said to exist when a Tribunal member is so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration whatever evidence or argument may be presented: Jia Legeng (supra) at [71] and [72]. A party alleging actual bias on the decision maker’s part carries a heavy onus and it must be clearly proved: Jia Legeng (supra) at [69]. A case of actual bias is seldom made out by reference solely to the reasons for decision and no inference of bias or prejudice can be drawn from the mere fact of adverse findings in the Tribunal’s decision: BFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; [2003] 131 FCR 102 at [21].
35. In this matter, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes it clear that the Tribunal accurately summarised the applicant’s written claims and the questions put to him during the hearing and the responses. The Tribunal’s “Findings and Reasons” then set out the findings reached which were based on this evidence and there is nothing in those reasons to suggest actual bias on the part of the Tribunal.

Conclusion

36. The applicants are self-represented litigants who are clearly unfamiliar with the language and have no knowledge of the legal system in which they are attempting to pursue their visa claims. However, they have been provided with assistance by various parties who have some knowledge of the system. This has been demonstrated by the filing of relevant documents, both before this Court and directly to the Minister in respect of their claims. They have also been provided with the opportunity to participate in the Court sponsored legal advice scheme and they did attend a meeting with that advisor and received written advice.
37. The applicant husband who has made the claims for the Protection visa was unable to appear at the final hearing because of ill-health which the applicant wife described as a ‘serious psychological disturbance’. Clearly the application was filed out of time and the reasons for that delay were provided in oral submissions by the applicant wife from the bar table, but there is no substantiation for that claim. A further issue that competes against these claims is the fact that their unidentified advisor took the step of submitting a s.417 application to the Minister. Anyone involved in migration proceedings would have been well aware of the significance of taking this step as it effectively signals that attempts to pursue judicial review through the Court system had been abandoned. This is confirmed in respect of the failure to continue pursuing judicial review while an application to the Minister is undertaken. In this matter the application to this Court was not made until the Minister had indicated that he had declined to intervene.
38. Despite the issues set out above, I did undertake a review of the grounds pleaded in the application to ensure there was no issue of jurisdictional error that would justify the extension of the period in which to file the application in the interest of the administration of justice. There is nothing within the pleaded grounds, or anything that appears on the face of the decision record which would indicate the existence of jurisdictional error. In those circumstances, there is no justification for an extension of time that has been applied for. Consequently, the application should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lloyd-Jones FM

Associate:

Date: 28April 2010