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SZNKO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 978 (7 October 2009)
Last Updated: 7 October 2009
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZNKO v MINISTER FOR
IMMIGRATION & ANOR
|
|
MIGRATION – Review of RRT decision –
applicant a citizen of Bangladesh – where applicant provided the Tribunal
with
a supporting letter almost identical to a letter provided by another
applicant – where Tribunal relied on the identical nature
of the documents
to conclude that the applicant’s document was not genuine – where
Tribunal informed applicant of its
concerns at the hearing – whether
adequate particulars given – nature of the information considered –
whether the
other letter itself or fact of similarity constituted the
“information” – whether applicant told that he could
seek more
time to respond.
|
|
First Respondent:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
|
REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the
Applicant:
|
Mr J Young
|
Solicitors for the Applicant:
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Simon Diab & Associates
|
Counsel for the Respondents:
|
Mr Y Shariff
|
Solicitors for the Respondents:
|
DLA Phillips Fox
|
ORDERS
(1) Application dismissed.
(2) Applicant to pay the First Respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of
$5,500.00.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATESCOURT OF AUSTRALIA
ATSYDNEY
|
SYG 808 of 2009
Applicant
And
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION &
CITIZENSHIP
|
First Respondent
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
- The
applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in Australia on 17 July
2008 and applied to the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship for a
protection (Class XA) visa on 29 August 2008. On 24 November 2008 a
delegate of the Minister, who had interviewed
the applicant, refused to grant
him a protection visa. On 1 December 2008 the applicant applied for a review of
that decision from
the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant attended a hearing
before the Tribunal where he brought witnesses to give evidence and
produced
documents. On 4 March 2009 the Tribunal determined to affirm the decision not to
grant a protection visa and handed that
decision down on 5 March 2009.
- The
applicant’s claims to be a person to whom Australia owed protection
obligations arose from his political opinion as a supporter
of the BNP and his
religious faith as a minority Christian in a majority Muslim county. The
applicant claimed to have suffered persecution
as a minority Christian since he
was a student in 1985 when he was beaten up after returning from Church to
school. He told how he
was introduced to the BNP by a teacher when he was in
year 9 and how he introduced a number of Christians to the BNP. He continued
in
student politics when he enrolled in tertiary education in 1999 and claims that
he was threatened by Awami League supporters who
said they would shoot him if he
did not cease his association with the BNP. The applicant became a field officer
for an NGO in 1992
and was involved in an incident when village leaders claimed
that he was trying to convert them to Christianity. He then changed
his
occupation and in 1993 went to Kuwait where he worked as a cook. The applicant
did not return to Bangladesh until 1997 when he
married and after two months
returned to Kuwait. He claims that he got mail from his family stating that
Muslim people wanted to
kill him and had attacked his home. His wife was told
that if she kept in touch with him he would be murdered and she would be killed,
so she left and went to live with her parents. The applicant returned to
Bangladesh in 1998 and persuaded his wife to return to him.
He worked in a
restaurant in Bangladesh until 20 December 1999. But one day a man named
“D”, who the applicant said had
a direct link to an Awami League
cadre and terrorist group, came looking for him in order to kill him. He left
that job and then
in January 2000 joined another restaurant where he worked for
a year. He went to India and then went back again to Kuwait. He could
not stay
there because he kept getting information from his home that “D” and
his terrorist group had been looting his
house and destroying his fields. The
applicant finally returned from Kuwait on 24 March 2006 and went to Dhaka with
his family but
the terrorist group followed him and tried to shoot him. He went
to the police but they did not take any real action. He later joined
the
Bangladesh Christian Association and sought their help. He joined a protest in
Kalagong with the Bangladesh Christian Association
but when he was there the
terrorist group were looking for him to kill him. He was told about World Youth
Day and decided to apply
to come to Australia because his life was at risk in
Bangladesh.
- The
Tribunal questioned the applicant upon these statements and discussed with him
independent country information about the situation
for Christians in Bangladesh
that he had produced and that the Tribunal had found. Following the hearing,
Reverend Brown, who had
attended part of the hearing but had to leave, provided
a letter to the Tribunal concerning the situation in Bangladesh for Christians.
The applicant also provided some further submissions to the Tribunal.
- At
[CB 253] the Tribunal commences its “Findings and
Reasons”
- “In
the Tribunal’s view, the applicant has not presented a truthful and
credible account of his past experiences in Bangladesh
and has not presented a
genuine account of his fears of harm should he return.
- In the
Tribunal’s view, the applicant’s actions in returning to Bangladesh
from Kuwait in 2006 are not consistent with
a person who held fears that he
claims. In respect of either his political activity or his religious faith, the
animosity which he
now claims to fear was established at that time. In the case
of fears from Bablu or his associates, this animosity has been experienced
for
an extraordinarily long period of time, the initial events and apparent short
detention of Bablu having occurred in 1985. Likewise,
the applicant claims to
have previously expressed his political preference for the BNP before that time
and to fear harm on this
basis should he return.
- In this
context, the Tribunal does not believe that, were his claims of past experiences
and fears of harm on return genuinely expressed,
he would have returned to
Bangladesh in 2006. When asked about this return in respect of the passport he
presented to the Tribunal
at the hearing, the applicant initially indicated that
this return was necessary due to the nature and length of the visa which he
then
held for stay in Kuwait. He indicated that he had to return to Bangladesh
because his visas were issued only for limited stay.
- When this
issue was further discussed it was apparent that in fact he held at that time, a
visa which would have allowed his stay
to 2007. The applicant then indicated
that in fact he had returned to Bangladesh during 2006 because he wanted to
assist his wife.
He was unable, however, to give any real detail as to how he
was at that time able to assist his wife, given that he had been out
of the
country for some period.
- A further
concern in respect of this issue is that the applicant not only returned to
Bangladesh itself, but did not merely remain
in Dhaka which he could have done
at that time, but during this period returned to his home village, where the
claimed threat to
him must be seen to be at its highest. Again, his evidence was
that he resided with his sister in Dhaka and did not work at any occupation
during the period between his return in 2006 and his departure for Australia. In
this context then, there was no reason for him to
return to his home village yet
he chose to do so. Even on his evidence, this appears to have been regularly
undertaken, although
the Tribunal doubts his evidence on this point in any
case.”
At [113] [CB 254] the Tribunal sets out
its views upon certain documentation provided by the applicant. These findings
formed the
basis of the applicant’s claim that the Tribunal fell into
jurisdictional error in the manner in which it reached its decision.
“This belief is further supported by the significant doubts the
Tribunal has about documents which the applicant has presented
to support his
claim. In the case of a letter purportedly issued by the Tumilia Union Council,
the translation of this document is
identical to another translation in respect
of a document purportedly signed with a different signature and prepared on a
different
date in Bangladesh. This document is held on departmental case file
CLF2008/124592 at folio 11 .The documents are of some length,
and as discussed
with the applicant at hearing, have very particular language regarding how the
applicant fell under the “livid
eye” of the “forbidden
religious organisation”, the JMB. He offered no explanation for how such
remarkably similar
documents could be prepared by different sources, other than
to assert the genuineness of the document he had presented.
In the Tribunal’s view, the identical nature of the documents, except
for the identification of the applicant by name and relationship,
indicates that
the applicant has presented fraudulent material from Bangladesh and which has
been presented without regard to the
truth of the claims made in the document.
It does not appear possible to the Tribunal that such identical documentation
could be
prepared in Bangladesh from different sources, on different dates, by
chance. In the Tribunal’s view, the nature of this material
indicates that
false documents have been prepared and presented to assist this application.
...
In the Tribunal’s view, the significant letters provided from
Bangladesh to support this case are unreliable. They are variable
in their
description and knowledge of the applicant’s circumstances and in at least
one instance is, in the Tribunal’s
view, a fabricated document designed to
support the applicant’s claims untruthfully.”
- The
applicant proceeded upon an amended application which had only one ground. That
was:
- “The
Second Respondent made jurisdictional error by failing to comply with sections
424AA or 424A in respect of information stated to be contained on a departmental
case file for a person other than the applicant.”
- The
applicant provided a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal. The letter
from the Union Council to which the Tribunal referred
is found in translation at
[CB 53]:
- “7-08-2008
- This is to
certify that [applicant] [other particulars provided]. I know him
personally. To the best of my knowledge he is a Christian (R.C.) religions
leader. He used to preach the Christian religion
among the various young
generation for long days. For this he falls into the livid eye of forbidden
religious organization JMB in
Bangladesh. It is jungi (Terror) organization who
kill men by crackers and are also engaged in demoralizing activities keeping
themselves
at the behind of the administration. As [applicant] is engaged
in preaching the Christian religion so JMB may attack him and his family
members. For this his life is in a great danger.
In any time their life may be
ruined at the behind of the administration.
- To the best
of my knowledge his moral character is good and is not engaged in any misdeed or
demoralizing activities.
- In this
situation I do like to advise him not to returning to the
homeland.
- I wish him
all development & success in his life.
- Sd/-Illegible
- Md.
Abu Bakar Miah
- Chairman
- Tulmis
Union Council
- Kaligong,
Gazipur.”
The letter is first referred to in
the transcript at [T17]:
“T: All right. I’d like to talk to you a little bit about your
involvement with the BNP. Now, one of the things that
you provided to support
your claim of involvement with the BNP was this letter from the ... Union
Council. How did you organise this
letter?
A: My friend send this one ... Some of them send by
... some of them send by ...
T: O.K. Is the information in this letter true?
T: So do you know Mohammed Abu Bak Amir?
A: ...
- T: Abu Bak
Amir, yes. And you know him?
A: Yes.
T: And what he’s written in this letter is true?
- A: Yes.
- T: Right.
I’m concerned about this letter and that has made me concerned about all
of the documents in relation to your case,
because I am reviewing a case by
another person from Bangladesh and they have provided a letter from a different
union council signed
by a different person. Apart from the parts of this letter
that identify you, that letter is identical to this letter. It uses identical
phrasing and some of it is quite unusual phrasing. It, it says for example,
this, “For this he falls into the livered eye of
the forbidden religious
organisations.” And it appears to me hard to believe that two different
people in Bangladesh would
write exactly the same letter in relation to members
of the BNP. Can you think of any reason why there would be another letter
that’s
essentially identical to this one and only except it claims to come
from a different union council?
A: No, no. This is my union.
- T: Mmm.
Well, what it could suggest to me is that you have got letters made to order and
there just happens to be two letters got
by two different people made to order
and they happen to be identical. And in relation to two other letters of yours,
they are also
extremely similar to other material supplied by other applicants.
That might make me question whether the documents you provided
are genuine.
- A: Yes ... I
provide all the genuine documents.
- T: I suppose
the problem for me is partly I need to assess whether I think I’m being
told the truth about a situation, and
when you tell me today that between 2006
and 2008 you lived in Dhaka and but your application tells me you lived in your
village
during that time and when you tell me you did no work during that time
but your application from tells me you worked in business
during that period and
when I think that this letter talking about your experience and your fears is
identical to another letter
purportedly written by somebody else. That might
indicate to me that I’m really not being given a truthful account of your
past experiences.
A: No, no, no, it is...
- T: Well, can
you offer me some other explanation for why there’s differences between
this materials and what you’re
telling me today and there’s
similarity between your letter and this other person’s?
- A: No, no. I
think it is all same, because few mistake, they’re done by the
solicitors.”
7. The Tribunal discussed the letter again in the
context of s.424AA, firstly, at [T40]:
“T: Right..., I will now talk with you about some things that could be
seen as negative to your application. Now, these are
things that are of concern
to me and that might be a reason for finding that the Department of
Immigration’s decision was correct.
I haven’t made my mind up about
these things. What I want is your comments in relation to them, because I need
to consider
all of the available material. If you would prefer to not comment on
those things today, then let me know and we can talk about how
you might comment
on them in the future.”
Then at [T43]:
“T: Now, the fourth point concerns the issue to do with the documents
that have been supplied to support your case. I am
very concerned about this
Union Council letter that purports to give a background of your experiences and
your fears in Bangladesh.
It talks about you coming under the livered eye of
forbidden religious organisations and that you might be attacked by members of
the JNB or ... terrorist organisations and that your life is in great dangers.
Now, as I say, my concern is that in relation to another
case I’ve seen an
essentially identical letter purportedly written by a different union council.
Now, that might make me think
that you are giving me documents that have been
made to order and aren’t truthful.”
The Tribunal then
refers to another letter from the Bangladesh Christian Association which is in
identical terms with the letter which
it has received in another case. This
letter was not referred to in the reasons for decision. At [T44]:
“T: Well, I don’t propose to do that because it’s extremely
difficult to do that without identifying people and
that itself could create
problems. And I suppose what I need to point out in relation to these documents
is the ones that say that
you’re at great risk and in grave danger are
similar to other letters I’ve received. I can either...
A: He can give it for other person but the subject is different from other
person.”
Finally the Tribunal said to the applicant at
[T47]:
“T: Right. Could I have someone in Room 11, please. Right. I
didn’t have anything else I wanted to ask you about. Is
there anything we
haven’t talked about that you think is important that you’d like to
tell me?
A: As far as I know that I am telling the truth. All the incident ... all are
true. I know that you people don’t believe
in this but at least you can
try to prove it, that whatever I’m telling, it is all the truth.
T: Again I’d indicate to you, I haven’t made my mind up about
that. I need to think about what you’ve said today
and the other evidence
that’s available, but it’s important you have the opportunity to
comment on things that I’m
thinking about. Now, I’m conscious that
Mr Brown wasn’t able to give his evidence. What happens after today is, I
need
to think about everything and reach a decision about your case. I need then
to type up the reasons for the decision I reach. Up until
the time I have typed
up, finished and signed that decision, you can give me any material you would
like me to consider. And what
I can indicate to you is, I will not have finished
your decision before Tuesday of next week. So if, if there are things that Mr
Brown wishes he had been able to tell me or anything else you think of that you
think is important, you can write that down and give
it to me before Tuesday of
next week. So if tonight you think of something you wish you had said, then by
all means, get that written
down and provide that to me. Do you understand
that?”
- The
applicant contends that the “other letter” referred to by the
Tribunal constituted information for the purposes of s.424A of the Act and that
the Tribunal was obliged to provide particulars of the other letter to the
applicant pursuant to s.424A or s.424AA. The respondent submitted that the
“other letter” itself did not constitute
“information” rather the relevant information was the fact
that the “other letter” was similarly worded to a letter
submitted by the applicant and that this may suggest that the letter and the
other documents
submitted by the applicant were not genuine. The Minister
concedes that the Tribunal did not issue a letter pursuant to s.424A but submits
that the transcript of the Tribunal hearing disclosed that the Tribunal
discharged its obligations by complying with
s.424AA. The applicant says that
the Tribunal did not comply with s.424AA because it did not provide the
applicant with full details of the letter. Whilst the applicant accepts that the
Tribunal would not
have been obliged to name the person who was the subject
matter of the letter, he says that the Tribunal should have told him who
wrote
the letter, which Union Council it purported to come from and the date. The
provisions of these “full particulars” would have enabled the
applicant to provide an explanation about the similarity of the documents which
was itself a dispositive
issue in the case. The second argument which the
applicant puts forward is that to the extent that the Tribunal purported to
comply
with s.424AA in relation to this information it did not comply with the
strict provisions of that section:
- “424AA
Information and invitation given orally by Tribunal while applicant appearing
-
If an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under
section 425:
-
(a) the Tribunal
may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the
Tribunal
considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the
decision that is under review; and
-
(b) if the Tribunal
does so--the Tribunal
must:
-
(i) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant
understands why the information
is relevant to the review, and the consequences
of the information being relied on in affirming the decision that is under
review;
and
-
(ii) orally invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the
information; and
-
(iii) advise the applicant that he or she may seek additional time to
comment on or respond to the information;
and
-
(iv) if the applicant seeks additional time to comment on or respond to
the information--adjourn the
review, if the Tribunal
considers that the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or
respond to the information.”
In
particular, it did not comply with s.424AA(b)(iii) or (iv) in so far as it did
not explain to the applicant with any clarity his option to seek additional time
to make comments and
the possibility that if he did so the Tribunal would
adjourn the review. The phrase “if you would prefer not to comment on
those things today then let me know and we could talk about how you might
comment on them in
the future” would not have indicated to the
applicant that an adjournment was possible or that he might seek additional time
to respond
to the information. The applicant argues that the general statement
“is there anything we haven’t talked about that you think is
important that you’d like to tell me” does not advance the
position and the discussion about providing further evidence at q.306 would be
taken objectively to be
a reference to Mr Brown and his evidence rather than
providing commentary upon the Tribunal’s concerns about the identical
letters.
- In
relation to the first issue, the respondent relies on the decision in SZBYR v
Minister for Immigration [2007] HCA 26 in which it was said that information
that “would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the
decision that is under review” must contain in its terms a
“rejection, denial or undermining of the appellant’s claims to be
persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations”. In that case,
the “information” was a statutory declaration provided by the
applicant in his PVA which was inconsistent with other evidence provided by the
applicant. It was said that, had portions of that statutory declaration been
believed, they may have been a “relevant step towards rejecting, not
affirming, the decision under review.” Therefore, the information
relied on by the Tribunal in reaching its decision was not the statutory
declaration itself but
the inconsistencies arising from a comparison of that
document with the applicant’s other evidence.
- In
the instant case, the contents of the other letter do not support the
applicant’s claims, as was the case in SZBYR. But neither can they
be said to reject, deny or undermine those claims. For this reason, the other
letter itself is not information
which “would be the reason, or part of
the reason, for affirming the decision under review”. Instead, it is
the fact of the similarity between the letters which led the Tribunal to affirm
the decision. It is with this
distinction in mind that the Court must consider
what particulars were required to be given to the applicant. If the relevant
information
is the fact of similarity rather than the letter itself, the
requirement to provide clear particulars of this information cannot
be said to
extend to details of the letter such as the author, source and date it was
written.
- This
finding appears to be the logical result of applying the reasoning in
SZBYR though it is not entirely satisfactory. In SZLIQ v Minister for
Immigration [2008] FCA 1405 the Court considered the Tribunal’s
obligation under s.424A to provide particulars of information relating to a book
extract. The Tribunal had relied on an extract from an Australian book
which
suggested a certain distance to be left between sweet potato plants which was
different to that suggested by the applicant
whose experiences related to
farming practices in China. The Court found that the Tribunal had failed to
provide particulars of the
source of that information which, had it done so, may
have alerted the applicant to the fact that the information was not clearly
relevant to the applicant’s situation. Similarly, in the instant case,
particulars regarding the date of the other letter may
have provided the
applicant with an answer to the Tribunal’s concerns which the bald
reference to the existence of the letter
could not. For example, the other
letter may have been written after the applicant’s letter allowing the
applicant to claim
that the other letter had been copied from his own. In the
circumstances of SZLIQ disclosure was mandated but in the instant case
the applicant is denied similar protection. The two examples demonstrate a
distinction
(perhaps unintended) between information which is adverse because it
states something different to the applicant’s claims and
information which
is adverse because it is identical to information provided by the applicant.
- It
would be argued by those promoting the SZBYR dicta that the letter, not
being about the applicant, could not undermine his claims, only the similarity
did that. The applicant
would say this is a distinction without a difference; if
there was no letter there could be no undermining suspicion. Whilst this
is an
attractive argument, it does not seem to be one which this Court can accept in
the face of the firm views expressed by the
High Court in SZBYR.
- In
relation to the second issue raised by the applicant, I cannot see how the
transcript demonstrates a failure on the part of the
Tribunal to advise the
applicant that he was entitled to seek additional time to comment on the adverse
information. The phrase used
by the Tribunal at [T40] and extracted at [7] of
these reasons is similar to that used by the Tribunal which was the subject of a
recent Full Court decision. In SZMCD v Minister for Immigration [2009]
FCAFC 46 the Tribunal gave details of country information it considered adverse
to the applicant’s claims and stated:
- “Now,
would you like to comment on or respond to that and you don’t have to do
that immediately. You can ask for more
time if you want to.”
[9]
The Full Court considered that, had the Tribunal been
required to give details of the information, the Tribunal’s words would
have adequately addressed the requirement to inform the applicant that he could
seek additional time to comment [110 – 111].
The fact the Tribunal did not
elaborate further or mention the possibility of an adjournment did not indicate
to the Court that the
Tribunal’s advice had fallen short of the
requirements in s.424AA. The language used by the Tribunal in the instant case
was to the same effect.
- It
is also clear from the transcript that the applicant elected to provide
immediate responses to the adverse information at the hearing.
His response to
the Tribunal at [T40] was “Yes. If you ask me I can tell you”.
In these circumstances the Tribunal was not obliged to consider whether it
ought to adjourn the review.
- The
applicant has not been able to show that the Tribunal failed to address the
requirements of s.424AA. As such, s.424A(2A) was engaged and there was no breach
of s.424A. I dismiss the application and order that the applicant pay the first
respondent’s costs assessed in the sum of $5,500.00.
I
certify that the preceding fifteen (15) paragraphs are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment of Raphael FM
Associate:
Date: 7 October 2009
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