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Schuhmacher v Blue Mountains City Council [2009] FMCA 909 (9 September 2009)
Last Updated: 5 October 2009
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SCHUHMACHER v BLUE
MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL
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BANKRUPTCY – Annulment of sequestration
order by Court – whether order ought not to have been made –
creditor’s
debt paid after sequestration order – outstanding
liabilities for costs – effect of 21 days stay on proceedings under
sequestration order – grounds for annulment not established –
application dismissed.
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Respondent:
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BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL
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REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the
Applicant:
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In Person
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Counsel for the Respondent:
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Mr D Riedstra
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Solicitors for the Respondent:
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Prime Lawyers
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ORDERS
(1) The application for annulment is dismissed.
(2) The respondent creditor’s costs, including all reserved costs, be
taxed and paid from the estate of the applicant bankrupt
in the priority fixed
by s.109(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966
(Cth).
FEDERAL MAGISTRATESCOURT OF AUSTRALIA
ATSYDNEY
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SYG 1565 of 2009
Applicant
And
BLUE MOUNTAINS CITY COUNCIL
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Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(revised from transcript)
- Mr
Schuhmacher applies to annul a sequestration order made by Driver FM on 12 May
2009, pursuant to s.153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
- He
incurred a default judgment for $6,468.63 in the Local Court at Katoomba on 1
August 2007, for rates owing to the Council. The
debt remained outstanding,
until Mr Schuhmacher paid it by two instalments on 28 May 2009 and 1 June 2009,
after the making of the
sequestration order. He did not make any payments in
reduction of the debt over the period during which bankruptcy proceedings were
pursued against him.
- The
history of the bankruptcy proceedings included the failure by Mr Schuhmacher to
comply with a bankruptcy notice based upon the
same judgment, which was served
personally on him on 21 August 2008. The petition was filed on 16 January 2009,
and was served personally
upon him on 3 February 2009. There were then three
adjournments of the petition at listings before the Registrars on 6 March 2009,
20 March 2009, and 14 April 2009.
- The
petition was referred for hearing to Driver FM on 5 May 2009. A transcript of
what transpired before His Honour is not in evidence
before me, but His Honour
made orders adjourning the petition. The orders note “the undertaking
of the applicant”, which I assume to mean Mr Schuhmacher, “to
make a payment of $4,000 to the respondent by 8 May 2009”. I take the
respondent to mean the Blue Mountain City Council. His Honour also ordered Mr
Schuhmacher to file an affidavit
of solvency by 8 May 2009.
- Neither
the undertaking nor the order to file an affidavit of solvency were met by Mr
Schuhmacher before the matter was listed again
before Driver FM on 12 May 2009.
His Honour, on that day, had before him two notices of grounds of opposition to
the petition.
These did not dispute the liability to the Council under the
default judgment, but protested that Mr Schuhmacher was unable to pay
the rates
without selling his home. He also alleged that it was “unclear as to
amount owing”, and:
- Offered to
pay $140 per week reasonable offer at first notice. Unreasonable to proceed to
this action for my home.
- Illness
– stroke – diabetes – pensioner –
invalid.
- There
is no transcript before me as to what transpired before Driver FM on 12 May
2009, and his Honour has not published a judgment.
I assume that Driver FM gave
reasons which would appear on a transcript or in a revised ex-tempore judgment,
if either of these
documents were procured. However, no party before me today
has tendered any such evidence of His Honour’s reasoning. The
Court’s file shows that there was before His Honour, all necessary
evidence of the existence of the debt and act of bankruptcy
relied upon in the
petition, and of satisfaction of the other requirements under s.52 of the
Bankruptcy Act which precondition the making of a sequestration order.
- There
was not, as I have indicated, any evidence before His Honour as to Mr
Schuhmacher’s ability to pay his debts generally,
and his grounds of
opposition appeared to concede that he was not able to do that in a reasonably
foreseeable period. The personal
circumstances of Mr Schuhmacher which were
asserted could not, in themselves, provide “other sufficient
cause” for the Court to decline to make a sequestration order
in its discretion under section 52(2)(b).
- Mr
Schuhmacher has not presented any better evidence in support of his grounds of
opposition before me today on the annulment application.
On all the evidence now
before me, I am far from satisfied that a sequestration order “ought
not” have been made on 12 May 2009 by Driver FM.
- Satisfaction
as to this is a necessary condition upon my having the power which is now
invoked by Mr Schuhmacher under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act
1966 (Cth). It requires the court to be satisfied “that a
sequestration order ought not to have been made”, and there is
long-standing authority that the reference to “ought not to have been
made” means that the Court must be satisfied that the earlier Court
would have been “bound” not to make a sequestration order
taking into account any additional evidence (see the authority cited by French J
in Rigg v Baker [2006] FCAFC 179; (2006) 155 FCR 531 at [62]).
- Mr
Schuhmacher’s arguments in support of annulment essentially went to
matters of discretion, both in relation to Driver FM’s
exercise of his
discretion not to proceed to make a sequestration order on 12 May 2009, or to my
present discretion under section 153B to annul the petition if there is power to
do so under that section.
- He
made various assertions as to what had been said in the course of the
proceedings before Driver FM, suggesting that he had been
led to understand that
his bankruptcy would be ended if he paid the Council’s debt. However, in
the absence of a transcript
and/or judgment I am unable to give these assertions
from the bar table any weight. Mr Schuhmacher also made contradictory
assertions
that the Council had agreed to enter into a debt agreement for the
payment of the outstanding rates by way of instalments, and also
that the
Council had not agreed to this, but that it should have agreed to enter into
such an agreement. He asserted also that Driver
FM either ordered, recommended
or suggested to the parties at some stage in the proceedings before him, that
they should agree upon
the payment of the debt by way of instalments.
- Whatever
was said in the course of proceedings before Driver FM as to the desirability of
Mr Schuhmacher reaching agreement with the
Council for the payment of all his
outstanding rates and their expenses, the fact is that the Council moved on a
petition for a sequestration
order before His Honour on 12 May 2009, His Honour
exercised his discretion to proceed on the petition on that day, and the making
of that order was clearly open to him. I am not now sitting on appeal from His
Honour’s exercise of discretion, although I
note that on the material
before me there is nothing to suggest that his discretion in relation to
adjourning the petition miscarried
in any fashion on that day. The matters
asserted by Mr Schuhmacher could only become relevant to my decision today in
relation to
annulment, if they could establish that Driver FM was
‘bound’ not to make the sequestration order, or if Mr Schuhmacher
could otherwise establish this. I am not satisfied that he has done so.
- Mr
Schuhmacher now points to the regrettable fact that the making of the
sequestration order and the consequential costs order in
favour of the
petitioning creditor has given rise to further substantial liabilities which
will have to be met from his estate.
These include taxed costs of the petition
of $6,252, and the costs of administration which have been incurred to date,
which the
trustee claims exceed $18,000. It is not my function in the course of
today’s proceeding to assess the correctness or appropriateness
of the
trustee’s calculations of the costs of administration, but undoubtedly,
there would be a substantial amount which would
be properly due in relation to
administration. As was pointed out by the solicitor for the trustee, these
expenses and all the debts
of the Council owing at the time of the bankruptcy
will have to be paid, if not with Mr Schuhmacher’s agreement and
co-operation,
then by the sale of what appears to be the one asset in the
estate, a property at Blackheath.
- I
can understand Mr Schuhmacher’s dismay that the matter has now reached a
stage where he is looking at a liability far exceeding
the amount of the rates
which he did not pay over the long period after the entry of the judgment in
2007. However, I do not have
power in the present proceeding, in my opinion, to
discharge him from his bankruptcy which has resulted from his slowness to pay
his debt.
- Mr
Schuhmacher referred to Order 5 in Federal Magistrate Driver’s Orders made
on 12 May 2009. This said:
- Proceedings
under the sequestration order be stayed for a period of 21 days in accordance
with s.52(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
- His
Honour’s reasons for making that order are not shown in the absence of a
published judgment or a transcript. However, it
is reasonable to assume that
Driver FM thought it appropriate to allow that period for Mr Schuhmacher to pay
all his debts and to
reach arrangement with the trustee to allow the trustee to
issue a certificate of annulment under section 153A(1). Such a certificate
could only have been issued once “all the bankrupt’s debts have
been paid in full”, and subsection (6) of 153A indicates that the
bankrupt’s debts include all debts that have been proved in the
bankruptcy,
interest payments on those debts if they bear interest,
“and the costs, charges and expenses of the administration of the
bankruptcy, including the remuneration expenses of the trustee.”
- It
is clear on the evidence before me that, although Mr Schuhmacher did attend
within the 21-day period to the payment of the $6,468.63
upon which the petition
was based, he did not pay or reach agreement for the payment of the other
amounts which would have been required
to have been paid before the trustee
could issue an annulment certificate under s.153A at that time or, indeed, at
the present time. The trustee therefore became obliged to commence his
administration of the estate
upon the expiry of that period.
- The
effect of a s.52(3) stay order is that the status of bankruptcy and the vesting
effects of the making of a sequestration order arising under the Bankruptcy Act
itself are not affected (see the Full Court’s judgment in Evans v
Heather Thiedeke Group Pty Ltd which is extracted by Ryan J in Re
Ginnane (1994) 60 FCR 429 at 449). The order only stays
“proceedings” under the order, and this encompasses any judicial or
administrative steps
which are required to be taken under the [1994] FCA 1442; Act (see
Coleman v Lazy Days Investments Pty Ltd (1994) 55 FCR 297 at 301).
However, contrary to Mr Schuhmacher’s submission, it did not have the
effect that he was not made bankrupt on 12
May 2009, nor that he was discharged
from bankruptcy merely by paying the creditor’s debt relied upon in the
petition, nor
that he was not liable for the costs awarded in the sequestration
order or for the expenses of the bankruptcy administration incurred
after the
lapse of the 21 days.
- Considering
all of Mr Schuhmacher’s submissions today, I am not persuaded that the
making of Order 5 by Driver FM, or his other
orders, was attended by any
irregularity providing grounds for an annulment under section 153B(1).
- For
all the above reasons, I shall therefore refuse the present application for
annulment.
I certify that the preceding twenty (20) paragraphs
are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Smith FM
Associate: Michael Abood
Date: 2 October 2009
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