SZNHD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 829 (28 August 2009)

Last Updated: 1 September 2009

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZNHD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2009] FMCA 829

MIGRATION – Review of decision by Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision affected by jurisdictional error – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal considered whether the applicant would suffer serious harm if he was to relocate within India – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal approached its task with an apprehension of bias or actual bias – whether the Refugee Review Tribunal considered relevant country information.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s.39B Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1); 36(2); 65(1); 91R; 91S; 424; 424(2); 424(3); 474; pt.8 div.2

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 124 ALR 265 NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37 Applicant S256 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 170 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFA 10 SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 NADH of 2001 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 264 SZNAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 693 SZNJT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 730 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30

Applicant:

SZNHD

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

Second Respondent:

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

SYG 476 of 2009

Judgment of:

Emmett FM

Hearing date:

13 August 2009

Date of Last Submission:

13 August 2009

Delivered at:

Sydney

Delivered on:

28 August 2009

REPRESENTATION

Applicant appeared on his own behalf

Counsel for the Respondent:

Mr P. Reynolds

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Ms J. Dinihan, Clayton Utz

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

SYG 476 of 2009

SZNHD

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This is an application pursuant to s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and Part 8 Division 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 10 February 2009 and handed down on 11 February 2009.
2. The applicant claims to be a citizen of India and of Catholic faith (“the Applicant”).
3. The Applicant arrived in Australia on 8 July 2008 having departed legally from Delhi on a passport issued in his own name and a visitor visa issued on 4 June 2008.
4. On 19 August 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for a protection (Class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“the Department”) under the Act.
5. On 8 November 2008, a delegate of the First Respondent (“the Delegate”) refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa.
6. On 1 December 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal.
7. On 10 February 2009, the Tribunal affirmed decision of the Delegate not to grant a protection visa application.
8. On 2 March 2009, the Applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.

Legislative framework

9. Section 65(1) of the Act authorises the decision-maker to grant a visa if satisfied that the prescribed criteria have been met. However, if the decision-maker is not so satisfied then the visa application is to be refused.
10. Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that an applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied that Australia has a protection obligation under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Section 5(1) of the Act defines “Refugees Convention” and “Refugees Protocol” as meaning the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”).
11. Australia has protection obligations to a refugee on Australian territory.
12. Article 1A(2) of the Convention relevantly defines a refugee as a person who:
    • “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
13. Section 91R and s.91S of the Act refer to persecution and membership of a particular social group when considering Article 1A(2) of the Convention.

The Applicant’s application for a protection visa

14. The Applicant’s claims were set out in the statement accompanying the protection visa application and are accurately summarised in the written submissions of counsel for the first respondent, Mr Reynolds, as follows:
    • “8. The Applicant’s claims are set out in a statement accompanying the protection visa application (CB31-32). In summary, the Applicant made the following claims:
      • a) he is a Christian (Latin Church) and belongs to the ‘backward’ community (OBC) in the State of Kerala;
      • b) his community is in the ‘reserved’ category. The Gujjar community has ‘created’ problems ‘regarding reservation’. His family was a ‘target’ and the subject of attacks. His father was hospitalised as a result of an attack for a week. He could not leave his area because his place of employment was there and he was the ‘sole earner’ of his family;
      • c) the RSS and Bhajarang Dal posed a threat to Christians. They did not allow them to go to church and practice their faith openly. They were warned to ‘drop’ their religious faith or they would otherwise be killed. The groups also monitored them on a daily basis;
      • d) he ‘sent’ his family to Kerala and he went to Bangalore. However, people inquired of him at the ‘Kerala house’ and he was questioned by 3 unknown people in Bangalore who he later found out were from the local RSS office;
      • e) he then moved to Ahmedabad, faced the same situation there, and paid an agent to arrange for him to join a group heading to Australia;
      • f) after he left, his family were warned that they would be killed if they gave the Applicant anything upon his return;
      • g) they did not complain to the police because the police department was ‘with them’.”

The Delegate’s decision

15. In October 2008, the Applicant attended an interview with the Delegate.
16. On 8 November 2008, the Delegate refused the Applicant’s application for a protection visa on the basis that the Applicant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention.

The Tribunal’s review and decision

17. On 1 December 2008, the Applicant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal.
18. On 22 December 2008, the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant informing him that the Tribunal had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on that material alone. The letter invited the Applicant to attend a hearing on 28 January 2009 to give oral evidence and present arguments.
19. On 28 January 2009, the Applicant attended the Tribunal hearing and gave evidence. The Applicant also provided further documents in support of his application at the hearing.
20. On 5 February 2009, the Tribunal received a letter from the Applicant enclosing further submissions and documents.
21. The Tribunal noted that it had before it the Department’s file, the Delegate’s decision record and other materials available to it from a range of sources.
22. The decision of the Tribunal is accurately summarised by Mr Reynolds, counsel for the First Respondent in his written submissions as follows:
    • “11. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was Roman Catholic and that in 2008, while living in Pathreri, he was targeted by Hindus who objected to his involvement in community Bible and English classes. It accepted that he was at risk of serious harm in Pathreri and was forced to leave the town (CB[49]).
    • 12. However, the Tribunal found that the Applicant exaggerated or fabricated some of his claims to enhance his protection visa application. It did not accept as credible that he was followed or monitored by Hindu extremists throughout India or that they targeted him and his family in Kerala, Bangalore or Ahmadabad. The Tribunal considered that his difficulties were confined to Pathreri ([50]-[51]).
    • 13. While the Applicant was fearful that he would be harmed, the Tribunal considered, having regard to country information, that the Applicant could safely and freely participate in religious activities of his choice in India if he lived in a place such as Kerala, where he was born and raised, which had a large Christian Community or some other area with a predominantly Christian community ([52]-[53]). Although the Applicant did not wish to live in Kerala, that was for lifestyle aspirations rather than his fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Applicant was multilingual, well-educated and resourceful, and had the ability and knowledge to successfully relocate to Kerala. It was reasonable for the Applicant to relocate to Kerala, where he could practice his religion freely and safely ([54]).
    • 14. The Tribunal further considered that the Applicant had access to a reasonable level of protection by the State if he required the protection, having regard to the country information ([55]).”

The proceeding before this Court

23. The Applicant was unrepresented before this Court, although had the assistance of a Malayalam interpreter.
24. The Applicant confirmed that he relied on the grounds contained in an amended application filed on 4 May 2009. Those grounds are in terms commonly seen in this Court. The grounds of the amended application are as follows:
    • “1. The Tribunal failed to consider properly the test whether the applicants would suffer serious harm as per sec. 91R(2)(a) of the Migration Act (which is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement for the Tribunal to do), if he asked to relocate in India. The tribunal failure to satisfy this statutory obligation was a serious jurisdictional error caused by the Tribunal.
    • 2. The Tribunal failed to act that the applicants satisfy the definition of “Refugee” as defined in article 1A(2) of the convention. To go further the Tribunal failed to see that the applicants satisfy, the four key elements that are required to satisfy the convention definition. The applicant state that the Tribunal refers to four key elements and since they satisfy them they are entitled to protection visa
      • (The tribunal accept the applicants claim that he is Roman Catholic, It accept his claim that during 2008, while he lived in the town of Pathreri, he was targeted by Hindu who objected to his involvement in community Bible and Community classes.
      • The Tribunal accept the applicant’s claim that he was at risk of serious harm in Patheri and he was forced to leave the town CB 142/4).
    • 3. The Tribunal did not use the country information as specific however, the general information gathered by the Tribunal considered to weigh against the case in the final outcome, The Tribunal used all information for matter of reasoning and evaluation of my case for the protection visa, The Tribunal was pre occupied and did not have a fresh look. The Tribunal failed to consider the country information in a proper way.”
25. Each of the grounds was interpreted for the assistance of the Applicant and the Applicant was invited to make submissions in support of each of the grounds and in support of the application generally. The Applicant confirmed that he had filed no evidence or submissions in support of his application, other than the accompanying affidavit required by statute and the amended application.

Ground 1

26. Ground 1 was unsupported by particulars, evidence or relevant oral submissions. In support of ground 1, the Applicant stated that the Tribunal wanted him to relocate to Kerala but that the same things would happen to him there.
27. Ground 1 appears to assert that the Tribunal did not assess whether the Applicant would suffer serious harm if he relocated within India. However, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record does not support such an assertion.
28. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s written claims and all documents provided by the Applicant in support, including material provided by the Applicant post-hearing. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal explored the Applicant’s claims with him at a hearing and put to him concerns it had arising out of his evidence and noted the Applicant’s responses. In particular, the Tribunal noted that it put to the Applicant country information before it that suggested that Christians in Kerala are able to practice their religion freely and safely. The Tribunal identified with particularity the country information to which it had regard.
29. The Tribunal noted that it put to the Applicant that independent country information before it also indicated that citizens of India had access to a reasonable level of protection provided by the state and that Christians in the predominantly Christians parts of India were provided with reasonable protection by the state.
30. The Tribunal also noted in its decision record that it put to the Applicant that he appeared to have fabricated his claim of having been pursued by Hindu fundamentalists, such as the RSS, around the country and noted the Applicant’s response that he had made mistakes in presenting his claims.
31. The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s claims of being monitored or approached by Hindu fundamentalists in Kerala, Bangalore or Ahmedabad were fabricated for the purpose of enhancing the applicant’s protection visa application. The Tribunal did not accept as credible the Applicant’s claims that he was followed from the northern states of India to the southern states of India by Hindu fundamentalists who were seeking to harm or kill him because of his involvement in Bible and English studies in Pathreri.
32. The Tribunal did accept that the Applicant was an active Roman Catholic who was involved in Bible studies with non-Christians. However, in accordance with country information before it, the Tribunal found that the Applicant could safely and freely participate in religious activities of his choice in India if he lived in a place, such as Kerala, where he was born and raised and which has a large Christian community. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant said that he did not wish to live in Kerala because he would not be safe in Kerala. However, the Tribunal found that the Applicant’s reluctance to return to Kerala was because of his “lifestyle aspirations” rather than his fear of persecution for a Convention related reason. The Tribunal found that the Applicant was a “multilingual, well educated and resourceful person”. The Tribunal found that the Applicant had the ability and knowledge to successfully relocate to Kerala and that it was reasonable for the Applicant to relocate within India to a place with a large Christian community such as Kerala.
33. The Tribunal also considered whether authorities were unable or unwilling to protect him in India and, based on country information before it, was satisfied that the Applicant would have access to a reasonable level of protection by the state, if he required protection.
34. As stated above, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal considered whether it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the Applicant to relocate. There is no evidence before this Court to suggest there were any particular circumstances of the Applicant that would impact on his ability to relocate within India. No error has been established by the Applicant in relation to the Tribunal’s consideration of relocation or its findings made in respect of that issue or its conclusion that it was reasonable for the Applicant to relocate were he to return to India. In the circumstances, the Tribunal considered the issue of relocation in accordance with the material and evidence before it and in the light of the individual circumstances of the Applicant, as it was bound to do (Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 124 ALR 265 at 269-270 per Black CJ and 277-278 per Beaumont J; NAIZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 37 at [22] and Applicant S256 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 170 at [18]).
35. In the circumstances, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal considered carefully whether the Applicant would suffer serious harm if he was to relocate in India.
36. The Tribunal’s findings in respect of the Applicant’s claims were open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave, including its adverse credibility findings. Credibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal (Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67] per McHugh J).
37. Accordingly, ground 1 is not made out.

Ground 2

38. Ground 2 was not supported by particulars, evidence or relevant submissions. In support of ground 2, the Applicant repeated his claim of having taught Bible classes in the area and as a result was pursued by the Hindu extremists.
39. Ground 2 in its terms does not disclose any error capable of review by this Court.
40. As stated above, the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant was a practicing Roman Catholic but rejected his claims of past persecution of himself and his family. The Tribunal considered whether it was reasonable and practicable for the Applicant to relocate within India and was satisfied it was. The Tribunal was also satisfied that effective state protection existed in India in areas such as Kerala where there was a large Christian community. As stated above, the Tribunal’s findings and conclusions were open to it on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave.
41. Accordingly, ground 2 is rejected.

Ground 3

42. Again, ground 3 was unsupported by particulars or evidence. It is in identical terms to grounds regularly seen in this Court.
43. In support of ground 3, the Applicant stated that the Tribunal had only looked at information on the website from London and America and had not looked at proper information in respect of India and Kerala. The Applicant also asserted that the Tribunal had not considered information provided by the Applicant on India and Kerala which he said was to be found in the Daily Times newspaper in India.
44. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision makes clear that the Tribunal did consider the material provided by the Applicant in support of his claims, including the newspaper report. However, the Tribunal found that the source of the material was not provided and the Tribunal was unable to determine whether the information was reliable. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant could not recall the source of the newspaper article, although he stated it may have been the “all India Christian Council”. The Tribunal noted that it had located the internet page for that Council but that no such article was submitted at that site. The Tribunal noted that the Applicant stated he would provide details to the Tribunal after the hearing and the Tribunal gave the Applicant a further week to provide further submissions.
45. The Tribunal noted that it received a submission post hearing from the Applicant, which included a restatement of the Applicant’s claims and articles from the internet, mostly from Christian organisations, which indicated that persons implicated in proselytizing were targeted by fundamentalist religious groups. The Tribunal noted from the Applicant’s post hearing material that it appeared that the article was from a powerpoint presentation released by the Ecumenical Fellowship of Indian Christian Churches for the purpose of advertising a protest rally in Philadelphia, USA.
46. In the circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to prefer the country information, which it identified with great particularity. The independent country information to which it had regard appears to be relevantly recent and includes information from the Times of India; BBC News; India Today; Compass Direct; Frontline; Asia Times; the US Department of State Country report on Human Rights Practices 2007; and the UK Home Office Country of Origin Information Report. As stated above, the information indicated that state protection was effectively available at least in predominantly Christian areas, such as Kerala, where the Applicant had lived.
47. To the extent that ground 3 states that the Tribunal “used all information for matter of reasoning and evaluation”, such a statement is not capable of establishing any error on the part of the Tribunal.
48. Ground 3 also asserts that the Tribunal was “pre occupied (sic) and did not have a fresh look” and “failed to consider the country information in a proper way.” No relevant submissions were made by the Applicant in support of those assertions. Neither were they supported by particulars or evidence.
49. As stated above, the Tribunal considered carefully all claims made by the Applicant and put to the Applicant at the hearing concerns it had about various aspects of his claims and noted his responses. The Tribunal also had regard to all material provided by the Applicant in support of his application. However, where the Applicant’s material departed from country information before the Tribunal, or was inconsistent with that information, the Tribunal preferred the country information it identified. As stated above, the Tribunal was entitled to prefer that body of material in preference to the Applicant’s evidence and for the reasons it gave. Moreover, it is a matter for the Tribunal the country information to which it has regard and the weight it gives that information (NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFA 10 at [11]).
50. If the allegation in ground 3 that “the Tribunal was preoccupied and did not have a fresh look” is intended to be some sort of allegation of bias, there is no evidence to support such an allegation. Such a claim is serious and requires evidence, such as a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. Further, it is a rare and exceptional case where bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons of a decision. Similarly, the mere fact that the Tribunal makes adverse findings in respect of the Applicant does not give rise to an inference of bias or, by itself, suggest that the decision-maker approached its task other than with a mind open to persuasion (SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]).
51. The Applicant was directed on 23 March 2009 by this Court to file and serve any affidavit containing additional evidence to be relied upon including the transcript of the hearing, by 4 May 2009. The Order informed the Applicant that evidence of a Tribunal hearing was to be presented as a transcript verified by affidavit and that a tape recording would not be received without leave of the Court obtained prior to the hearing. No evidence was filed by the Applicant.
52. There was no transcript of the Tribunal hearing provided to this Court, nor did the Applicant provide any evidence to this Court to suggest that the Tribunal’s decision record is not accurate. At the directions hearing on 23 March 2009, the Applicant was given an opportunity to file a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The Applicant was directed to ensure any such transcript was verified by affidavit. The Applicant was also directed to give notice if he wished to rely on recordings of the hearing, however, no step was taken by the Applicant to rely on any such evidence. In the circumstances, the Court accepts as accurate the Tribunal’s summary of the oral evidence given by the Applicant and exchanges it had with the Applicant at the Tribunal hearing.
53. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision does not disclose any prejudgment on the part of the Tribunal in the sense that the Tribunal was “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, or of being persuaded differently, whatever evidence or argument may be presented.” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69], [71]-[72], [127]).
54. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision does not suggest that the Tribunal approached its task other than open with a mind open to persuasion. There is no evidence upon which a fair minded lay observer, properly informed as to the nature of the proceedings, the matters in issue and the conduct of the Tribunal, might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal may not have brought an impartial mind in determining the application for review (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28 at [27]- [32]; NADH of 2001 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 328; (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [115]).
55. Accordingly, any allegation of bias or apprehended bias is rejected.
56. Accordingly, ground 3 is rejected.

Other Issue

57. At the hearing, the Court raised with the Applicant the recent issue that has arisen as a result of the decision in SZNAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 693 (per Raphael FM) relating to the proper construction of s.424 of the Act and whether the obligations in s.424 are triggered by the standard Refugee Review Tribunal letter to an applicant. The Applicant told the Court he wished an opportunity to consider the issue and for the proceeding to be adjourned. By consent, the Court gave the Applicant leave to file and serve a further amended application relating to the issue referred to above and submissions in support within 7 days. To assist the Applicant, the Court provided to the Applicant copies of the following:
    1. The reasons for judgment in SZNAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 693 and SZNJT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 730;
    2. The Notice of Appeal for SZNAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 693 filed on 10 August 2009;
    3. A contact list of lawyers and translating services.
58. The Court also informed the Applicant if no document was filed by him in accordance with these directions then after the expiration of 7 days, the Court would notify the parties when its reasons were ready for publication and that those reasons would be confined to the grounds relied upon by the Applicant in his amended application filed on 4 May 2009.
59. No document has been filed by or on behalf of the Applicant in accordance with the directions referred to above. The Court notes that there is no presently binding authority on this Court that s.424 of the Act applies to the standard letter to an applicant from the Refugee Review Tribunal acknowledging receipt of an application for review. Accordingly, it not being a ground relied upon by the Applicant, the Court gives no further consideration to the issue, save to note SZNAV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 693 (“SZNAV”) is the subject of an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia. I also note that the High Court of Australia handed down its reasons for judgment in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30 two days ago which makes clear that the Tribunal may get additional information in ways other than only the manner prescribed in ss.424(2) and 424(3) of the Act. I note that the decision in SZNAV was predicated on the proposition that the Refugee Review Tribunal could only obtain additional information only in accordance with ss.424(2) and 424(3) of the Act.

Conclusion

60. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal understood the claims being made by the Applicant; explored those claims with the Applicant at a hearing; and, had regard to all material provided in support, including post hearing material and submissions. The Tribunal put to the Applicant matters of concern it had about his evidence and noted the Applicant’s responses. The Tribunal also identified independent country information to which it had regard and put such information to the Applicant where such information was inconsistent with the Applicant’s claims and noted the Applicant’s responses. The Tribunal then made findings based on the evidence and material before it. Those findings of fact were open to the Tribunal on the evidence and material before it and for the reasons it gave. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s decision record makes clear that the Tribunal reached conclusions based on the findings made by it and to which it applied the correct law.
61. In the circumstances, the Tribunal complied with its obligations under the statutory regime in the making of its decision, including the conduct of its review.
62. The Tribunal’s decision is not affected by jurisdictional error and is therefore a privative clause decision. Accordingly, pursuant to s.474 of the Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere.
63. The proceeding before this Court should be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Emmett FM

Associate: S. Kwong

Date: 26 August 2009