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Jones v Australian Olives Limited [2009] FMCA 46 (30 January 2009)
Last Updated: 2 February 2009
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
JONES v AUSTRALIAN OLIVES
LIMITED
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BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside
bankruptcy notice – counterclaim set-off or cross demand – what
constitutes.
BANKRUPTCY – Application to set aside bankruptcy notice –
sufficiency of evidence.
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Respondent:
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AUSTRALIAN OLIVES LIMITED
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REPRESENTATION
The Applicant appeared in
person
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Counsel for the Respondent:
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Mr Shaw
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Solicitors for the Respondent:
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McMahon Clarke Legal
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ORDERS
(1) That the application to set aside the bankruptcy
notice is dismissed.
(2) That the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the
application to be
taxed.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATESCOURT OF AUSTRALIA
ATBRISBANE
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BRG 725 of 2008
Applicant
And
AUSTRALIAN OLIVES LIMITED
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Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
- On
18 September, 2008 the respondent issued a bankruptcy notice addressed to Mr
Jones. The bankruptcy notice claims the sum of $16,070.13
pursuant to a
judgment by default given by the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Brisbane on
4 September, 2008. Mr Jones applies
to set aside the bankruptcy notice.
- Mr
Jones argues that he has a counterclaim, set off or cross demand within the
meaning of s.40(1)(g) Bankruptcy Act 1966 equal to or exceeding the sum
specified in the bankruptcy notice which he could not have set up in the action
in which the judgment
upon which the bankruptcy notice is founded, was obtained.
Mr Jones applied to have that judgment set aside, but failed in his application.
- It
was not suggested that the bankruptcy notice was in any way defective. The only
matter argued on the application was whether the
applicant could, and had,
satisfied the court that he had the requisite counterclaim, set-off or
cross-demand. His arguments arise
against the background of the following
facts.
- The
respondent was the “Responsible Entity” of six agricultural managed
investment schemes. The stated purpose of the
schemes is to plant, grow,
harvest and market olives for commercial gain. Mr Jones is an investor in one
of those schemes, referred
to in the material as “Project No.1”. As
part of his investment, Mr Jones received 300 shares in Collective Olive Groves
Limited.
- Collective
Olive Groves Limited owns the land upon which Project No.1 is carried out. As
best as I can tell from the evidence, Mr
Jones shareholding entitles him to
enter into a licence with Collective Olive Groves Limited to use a certain
amount of the land
held by that company. That part of the land to which Mr
Jones is entitled by his licence is referred to as olive groves y517 and
y518
in the evidence.
- On
29 June, 1998 Mr Jones and the respondent entered into a written agreement
whereby they agreed, amongst other things, that for
an annual fee the respondent
would manage Mr Jones’ business of planting, growing, harvesting and
marketing olives from his
olive groves, in accordance with the terms and
condition of the agreement.
- Between
29 July, 2002 and 28 June, 2006 the respondent invoiced Mr Jones for work it
performed according to the agreement. Mr Jones
did not pay all that was claimed
from him and the respondent commenced the Magistrates Court proceedings against
him to recover the
amount claimed to be outstanding. After taking into account
certain payments and credits the amount claimed to be owing to the respondent
in
the Magistrates Court proceedings was $12,417.44. The respondent also claimed
interest and costs.
- Prior
to 28 April 2008, Mr Jones was represented by McKean Park Lawyers. They filed,
on his behalf, a Conditional Notice of Intention
to Defend. The relevant rules
of court pursuant to which it was filed required that within a certain time
after filing, an application
must be brought seeking dismissal of the
proceedings on the grounds set out in the Conditional Notice of Intention to
Defend (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1989, rule 16). No such
application envisaged by UCPR 16 was filed by Mr Jones, and so his Conditional
Notice of Intention to Defend became
unconditional.
- A
defence and counter claim dated 10 May, 2007 was sent by McKean Park Lawyers to
the respondent’s lawyers. It was never filed.
Negotiations ensued
between the solicitors for both parties until about 19 June, 2007. No agreement
was reached to settle the dispute.
There was a period of inaction on the part
of the respondent.
- Correspondence
between the solicitors recommenced by letter from the respondent’s
solicitors to Mr Jones’ solicitors sent
on 30 January, 2008.
- On
the 23 April, 2008 Mr Jones “informed” the Magistrates Court that he
would be acting in his own defence. He assumed
(wrongly) that the Defence that
had passed between the solicitors had been filed.
- The
respondent changed its solicitors and by letter dated 11 July, 2008 Mr Jones was
informed of that change.
- On
24 July, 2008 the respondent’s solicitors wrote to Mr Jones and sent that
letter to him by way of e-mail. It foreshadowed
an application for judgment
against him if he did not file a defence to the respondent’s claim within
a certain period of time.
Mr Jones says, however, that he had a computer virus
problem between April and 10 October, 2008 and he needed to have his computer
repaired. Consequently, he did not receive the e-mail or the notice that it
gave.
- From
3 September, 2008 to 5 October, 2008 Mr Jones was overseas. Mr Jones says that
he received no further communication from the
respondent’s solicitors
until after the judgment by default was given against him on 4 September, 2008.
He became aware of
the judgment against him upon his return from overseas.
- Mr
Jones contends that on 6 November, 2008 the respondent was replaced as the
“Responsible Entity” for Project No.1 by
Huntley Management Limited.
There is, apparently, a dispute about that between the respondent and Huntley
Management Limited.
- Collective
Olive Groves Limited has been placed under external administration. According
to the respondent’s evidence, the
directors of Collective Olive Groves
Limited formed the opinion that the company did not have the capacity to pay its
debts as and
when they fell due and in particular was unable to pay a debt owed
to the respondent. That debt is said to arise from a water supply
agreement
under which the respondent alleges an entitlement to force a sale to and
purchase by Collective Olive Groves Limited of
certain water pumping and
reticulation equipment. The purchase price is the debt upon which the decision
to call in the administrators
was founded.
- In
Shepherd v Blueberry Farms [2001] FMCA 2 Driver FM summarised the
obligation upon an applicant for an order to set aside a bankruptcy notice who
sought to establish that
he or she had counterclaim, set off or cross demand
within the terms of s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act in the following
way:
- 47. As I
have already noted the applicant claims that he has a counterclaim, set off or
cross demand within the terms of s.40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The
relevant legal principles are usefully set out in the
5th Edition of McDonald, Henry & Meek; Australian
Bankruptcy Law and Practice, Law Book Co, at [40.1.340-350]. For convenience, I
incorporate extracts from that text below at paragraphs 47-50. A debtor upon
whom a bankruptcy notice has been served must offer evidence that he
or she has such a counterclaim, set off or cross demand. The mere production
of
a statement of claim in an action for which he or she alleges facts, which, if
true, might give rise to such a claim, is not evidence
and is insufficient
unless supported by prima facie evidence of their truth. The applicant must
first establish the existence of
a counterclaim, set off or cross demand.
Secondly he must establish that the counterclaim "could not have been set up in
the actual
proceedings in which the judgment or order was obtained" and,
thirdly, he must establish that the counterclaim is equal to or exceeds
the
amount of the judgment debt.
- 48. As to
the first issue, it has been held by the High Court that the degree to which the
bankruptcy court should be satisfied that
a debtor has a counterclaim, set off
or cross demand of the required amount "may be expressed by saying that the
debtor must show
that he or she has a prima facie case, even if then and there
he or she does not adduce the admissible evidence which would make
out a prima
facie case before a court trying the issues that are involved in his or her
counterclaim, set off or cross demand": Ebert v Union Trustee Co (Aust)
Ltd [1960] HCA 50; (1960) 104 CLR 346 at 350. However, the demand must
be more than bona fide. The Court must be satisfied that it has a reasonable
probability of success.
This Court is not called upon to determine the validity
of the counterclaim, set off or cross demand but it must be satisfied that
the
claim is a substantial and bona fide claim which the debtor should fairly be
permitted to litigate before the bankruptcy proceedings
are allowed to
continue: Re A Debtor; ex parte Bolam (1909) 9 SR (NSW) 580. The state of
satisfaction required involves weighing up considerations as to the legal and
factual merit of
the claim relied upon by the debtor, and the justice of
allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to go ahead or requiring them to await
the
determination of the claim.
- To
facilitate the proper consideration and disposition of an application such as
this, rule 3.02(2) of the Federal Magistrates Court (Bankruptcy) Rules
2006 provides:
- 3.02(2) If
the application is based on the ground that the debtor has a counter-claim,
set-off or cross demand mentioned in paragraph
40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act,
the affidavit must also state:
- (a) the
full details of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand; and
- (b) the
amount of the counter-claim, set-off or cross demand and the amount by which it
exceeds the amount claimed in the bankruptcy
notice; and
- (c) why the
counter-claim, set-off or cross demand was not raised in the proceeding that
resulted in the judgment or order in relation
to which the bankruptcy notice was
issued.
- In
Bhagat v Global Custodians Ltd [2002] FCAFC 223 the Full Court of the
Federal Court of Australia pointed out (at [53]):
- ... that
the mere production of claim in an action that pleads facts which, if proved,
would support a claim, has long been held
to be insufficient: “[a]
statement of claim is no evidence of anything”: In re Foster, Ex parte
Basan (1885) 2 Morr 29 at 33 per Brett MR: see also Re Cox (supra) at
101 and Re Verma; Ex parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1984] FCA 340; (1985) 4 FCR
181 at 187. It is not even sufficient for a debtor to file an affidavit which
merely propounds a claim and states how the debtor proposes
to establish it:
Ebert v The Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd [1960] HCA 50; (1960) 104 CLR 346 at 350.
There is an obligation on the debtor to adduce evidence that provides reasonable
grounds for the institution of proceedings
Vogwell v Vogwell (supra) at
85 per Lathan CJ. The task that Mr Bhagat faced was an onerous task. He has
raised serious allegations but has not placed
before the Court the material (if
indeed such material exists) that would justify a Bankruptcy Court from
interfering with the judgment
that founded the Bankruptcy
Notice.
- Mr
Jones raises a number of complaints about the respondent both in terms of the
representations it made to him as a potential investor
in Project No.1, and also
in respect of its performance of the management duties cast upon it pursuant to
its agreement with him.
In summary he says:
- There
are issues with the accounting procedures of the respondent that concern him.
The amount claimed from him in the Magistrates
Court proceeding is
incorrect;
- There
has been no disclosure by the respondent of the way in which it has disbursed
the annual fees to which it is entitled pursuant
to the management agreement.
Mr Jones calculates that having regard to all projects managed by the
respondent, it must receive income
in the order of $5,000,000 per
annum;
- No
accounts have been made available to him in respect of the payment and costs of
processing olive by S.A. Olives of Inglewood, nor
the “investment in Viva
Olives”;
- He
was not presented with an opportunity to invest in S.A. Olives of Inglewood, nor
in Viva Olives;
- The
annual statements of Collective Olive Groves Limited do not disclose payments to
the directors of that company of $10,000 each
approved at the 2001 Annual
General Meeting of that company. The directors of Collective Olive Groves
Limited are said to be the
same people as are directors of the respondent;
- The
financial projections set out in the Prospectus (presumably the prospectus
relied upon by Mr Jones to make his investment) were
not only erroneous, but
were misleading and deceptive because cash outlays to the date that returns on
investment started were accounted
wrongly and there was no discounting in the
relevant projections to allow for inflation or the “COL Index”,
- He
was unable to “exit” his investment and sell his olive groves,
either using the respondent’s assistance or on
his own account;
- In
some years there has been no harvest from the olive groves and there have been
no dividends paid to grove holders. Nonetheless,
the respondent has not
discounted its management fees, whereas the incoming manager Huntley Management
Limited, has discounted its
fees by 40% “for Projects 4 –
6”;
- There
have been three changes in the directors of the respondent or Collective Olive
Groves Limited since the inception of “the
projects”. No reason was
apparently given for their appointment or resignation. Mr Jones says
“This was at a time when
losses to Members were increasing...”;
- The
CEO for the respondent claimed in connection with the 2004 Harvest: “So
far your investment has delivered on all of these
essential elements...”.
These “elements” include “a future recurring annual income
stream”. Mr Jones
regards such a statement as “errant
nonsense”;
- He
has never been informed of the availability of the Compliance Plan for the
Prospectus. He understands that the Plan should highlight
a protocol which
ensures or attempts to ensure that the Prospectus forecasts will be
met;
- The
respondent denied him access to the Members’ Register for Project
No.1;
- The
projections for average fruit yields in year 10 (2008) for the Project of 40kg
per tree are misleading and deceptive because they
were based upon data from
tress in the Mildura area. Mr Jones’ own research reveals that a more
realistic estimate is 15kg
of fruit per tree at 5 years relying upon
“Burr, an authority in the Australian olive industry” which is also
“on
a par” with the “Henggeler estimate”;
- Water
for the olive groves is supplied via a water licence owned by the respondent
and/or Collective Olive Groves Limited. Mr Jones
says that the respondent has
been irresponsible in relation to water management issues, and in particular was
negligent when it enlarged
the diameter of the lagoon from which the irrigation
water is drawn, rather than deepening it. He further says that the respondent
will cause him loss and damage because Collective Olive Groves Limited has been
placed in administration by its directors and the
current farm managers are
being denied access to irrigation water.
- The
draft defence and counterclaim promulgated by Mr Jones in 2007 is not in
evidence before me.
- It
is difficult to discern any counterclaim or cross-demand or set-off that Mr
Jones has against the respondent. I was not taken
to any contractual term said
to have been breached by the respondent by reason of any of the above complaints
and which would sound
in damages for Mr Jones. In so far as the complaints
about the projections in the Prospectus is concerned, there is no evidence,
even
of a prima facie nature, that the circumstances of the making of those
projections would give rise to liability to Mr Jones.
That projections may not
have come to be realised does not mean that the making of them was misleading,
deceptive or fraudulent:
see for example Lake Koala Pty Ltd v Walker
[1991] 2 Qd R 49.
- Mr
Jones says that insofar as Projects 4, 5 and 6 are concerned there are class
action proceedings by the investors in those projects
against the respondent
concerning its conduct in relation to those projects. Even if that was so, it
does not assist in this matter
because, Mr Jones does not purport to be a member
of that class action. To the extent that it is suggested that the class action
might be widened to include Project No.1, there is no evidence about the basis
of the claims made in the proceedings – not
even a pleading from that
action.
- There
is no attempt at any quantification of the counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand
that Mr Jones wishes to pursue. Indeed, on
his own evidence some money is due
to the respondent. He has paid $5,000 of the amount claimed. He does not say
how much more,
if any is conceded as owing.
Conclusion
- I
am not satisfied that Mr Jones has demonstrated to the requisite standard that
he has counterclaim, set-off or cross-demand against
the respondent.
- Even
if I am wrong about that conclusion, the claims which Mr Jones wishes to pursue
were, as a matter of law, a counterclaim, set-off
or cross-demand that he could
have set up in the original proceedings. That is evidenced by the fact that had
drawn and delivered,
apparently, an unfiled defence and counterclaim.
- Setting
aside the bankruptcy notice is not warranted. The application is dismissed with
costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) paragraphs
are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Jarrett FM
Associate: S. Haysom
Date: 30 January 2009
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