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Orlowski v Sunrise Co-operative Housing Inc [2009] FMCA 31 (29 January 2009)
Last Updated: 2 February 2009
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ORLOWSKI v SUNRISE
CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC
|
|
HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability discrimination
alleged against housing cooperative by member – no discrimination
shown.
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Respondent:
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SUNRISE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC
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REPRESENTATION
Counsel for the Respondent:
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Mr S Cole
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Solicitors for the Respondent:
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Minter Ellison Lawyers
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ORDERS
(1) The application is dismissed.
(2) The applicant pay the respondent’s
costs.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATESCOURT OF AUSTRALIA
ATADELAIDE
|
ADG 357 of 2007
Applicant
And
SUNRISE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC
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Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The application
- This
is an application for compensation pursuant to s.46PO of the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (“HREOC Act”) for
alleged contraventions by the respondent of s.27(2) and s.39 of the
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
(“DD Act”).
- The
applicant lodged a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities
Commission (“HREOC”) on 28 November 2006.
After considering the
respondent’s response a decision was made by HREOC on 28 November
2007 that the complaint be terminated.
The applicant commenced these
proceedings on 24 December 2007 and therefore within the time allowed by
sub-s46PO(2) of the HREOC
Act.
The parties
- The
respondent, Sunrise Co-operative Housing Inc, is an organisation registered
under the South Australian Co-operative and Community Housing Act 1991
(SA) (“SACCH Act”). The applicant, Edward Orlowski, has been a
member of the respondent since it was established on
1 July 2005.
- The
SACCH Act provides a regime for the registration, incorporation and regulation
of housing co-operatives in South Australia. It
is a body corporate with full
juristic capacity to exercise any powers that are by their nature capable of
being exercised by a body
corporate (see sub-s.23(1)(a)(ii) of the SACCH Act and
is therefore capable of suing and being sued. All rights and liabilities
formerly exercisable against the members or officers of the co-operative in
their capacity as such immediately before the incorporation
of the co-operative
become rights and liabilities of the registered housing co-operative. (see
sub-s.23(1)(c) of the SACCH Act).
- Section
3 of the SACCH Act provides that, unless a contrary intention
appears:
- housing
co-operative means an association which is
formed-
- (a) on the
basis of the principles of co-operation; and
- (b) principally
to provide housing accommodation to its members.
- As
to the meaning of “principles of cooperation” sub-s.3(2) of the
SACCH Act says in part that:
- An
association will, for the purposes of this Act, be regarded as having been
formed on the basis of the principles of co-operation
if the following
conditions are satisfied:
- (a) membership
of the association must be voluntary and available without artificial
restriction or any discrimination based on sex,
sexuality, marital status,
pregnancy, race, physical or intellectual impairment, age or political opinion
to all who can make use
of its services and are willing to accept the
responsibilities of membership; and
- (b) the
affairs of the association must be administered on a fair and democratic basis
by persons who are elected or appointed by
the members of the association and
who are accountable to them; and
- ...
- The
respondent is a self managed non-profit organisation. It offers members long
term housing tenancy security with affordable rent
(generally 25% of the
member’s income) and involvement in housing management. The respondent
provides housing to people with
special needs including the aged, people with
disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, people from non-English speaking
backgrounds,
low income families, individuals who have difficulty accessing the
private rental market and people who have experienced homelessness.
- To
be eligible for community housing an applicant must meet the government based
eligibility criteria that apply to all applications
for community housing.
These criteria include current residency, income, assets and needs. In addition
an applicant must meet the
specific eligibility criteria of the individual
co-operative or association for which an applicant wishes to apply or register
an
interest.
- The
respondent here is managed by a committee of volunteers who are themselves
members and tenants of the respondent.
The applicant’s claims and the respondent’s response
- The
applicant, who has been unrepresented throughout these proceedings, alleges that
the respondent unlawfully discriminated against
him in that:
- during
his time as a member, he was never nominated for an elected position in the
respondent’s organisation such as Maintenance
Officer, Rent Coordinator or
Assistant Purchasing Officer;
- the
respondent was responsible for fabricating stories about the
applicant;
- the
respondent was responsible for the applicant being “marginalised”;
and
- the
respondent was responsible for threats of violence being made against the
applicant.
- When
the applicant filed his complaint with HREOC on 28 November 2006 he alleged an
instance of unlawful discrimination concerning
the applicant which is not
referred to above, namely, that on 21 March 2006 the respondent’s Tenancy
Committee decided to offer
a rental property (“the Bowyer Avenue
property”) that had become available to another member and not the
applicant.
At trial before me the applicant abandoned this aspect of his
claim.
- The
applicant says that the discrimination resulted in deterioration of his health
for which he seeks compensation. He has provided
no evidence of the further
treatment that was needed as a result of the alleged deterioration or its cost.
He also claimed compensation
for lost earnings which he initially estimated to
be $300 to $500 per week but later confined to $300 per week. No supporting
evidence
was provided in relation to the alleged lost earnings.
- The
respondent denies that it has been guilty of unlawful discrimination and says
that in any event the applicant has not made out
any proper basis for an award
of compensation.
Evidence relied upon
- The
evidence in chief of all witnesses was to be by way of affidavit filed and
served well prior to trial. At trial, the applicant
relied on his two
affidavits filed on 2 June and 1 July 2008 respectively. Neither affidavit
was particularly helpful as trial affidavits
as they did not tell the
applicant’s story but simply annexed numerous documents without proper
explanation of their relevance.
I permitted the applicant to orally givefurther
evidence in chief so that he had every opportunity to put all appropriate
evidence
before the Court.
- The
respondent relies on three affidavits: two affidavits of Claire Joan Vogt (the
current Chair of the respondent) filed on 27 June
and 9 July 2008 respectively
and an affidavit of Juanita Ruth Jane Anderson (a former Membership Officer and
now Treasurer of the
respondent) filed 11 July 2008.
The law
- In
relation to the allegation that the respondent was guilty of unlawful
discrimination for failing to nominate the applicant for
an elected position in
the respondent’s organisation, the applicant relies upon sub-s.27(2)(c) of
the DD Act which states:
- It is
unlawful for (an) ... incorporated association ... or a member of the committee
of management of (an) ... incorporated association
to discriminate against a
person who is a member of the ... association on the ground of the
member’s disability ... :
- (a) ...
- (b) ...
- (c) By
denying the member access, or limiting the member’s access to any benefit
provided by the club or association;
- (d) ...,
or
- (e) By
subjecting the member to any other detriment.
- Disability
discrimination is defined in s.5 of the DD Act as follows:
- 5.5(1)
- For the
purposes of this Act, a person (discriminator) discriminates against another
person (aggrieved person) on the ground of a
disability of the aggrieved person
if, because of the aggrieved person’s disability, the discriminator treats
or proposes to
treat the aggrieved person less favourably than, in circumstances
that are the same or are not materially different, the discriminator
treats or
would treat a person without the disability.
- (2) For the
purposes of subsection (1), circumstances in which a person treats or would
treat another person with a disability are
not materially different because of
the fact that different accommodation or services may be required by the person
with a disability.
- In
relation to the applicant’s suggestion that the respondent is guilty of
unlawful discrimination as a result of false allegations
being made concerning
the applicant, the applicant being marginalised and the suggestion that threats
of violence were made against
the applicant, the applicant relies on s.39 of the
DD Act. The section states:
- 39. It is
unlawful for a person who, whether for payment or not, provides goods or
services, or makes facilities available, to harass
another person
who:
- (a) wants
to acquire the goods or services or to make use of the facilities; and
- (b) has a
disability;
- in relation
to the disability.
- “Harassment”
is not defined in the DD Act. In McCormick v Commonwealth [2007]
FMCA 1245 Mowbray FM sought assistance from the following meanings found in the
Macquarie Dictionary:
- Harass 1.
to trouble by repeated attacks, incursions, etc, as in war or hostilities;
Harry; raid. 2. To disturb persistently; torment,
as with troubles, cares,
etc.
- In
relation to the meaning of the phrase in s.39 “in relation to the
disability” Mowbray FM applied the following statement
of McKew J in
O’Grady v The Northern Queensland Company Limited (1990) 169 CLR
346:
- “The
prepositional phrase “in relation to” is indefinite. But, subject
to any contrary indication derived from
its context or drafting history, it
requires no more than a relationship, whether direct or indirect, between two
subject matters.
(O’Grady v The Northern Queensland Company
Limited [1990] HCA 16; (1990) 169 CLR 356 at 376 per McKew J.)
- On
the basis of these authorities I consider that for there to be a finding here of
harassment the applicant must not only prove on
the balance of probabilities
that disparaging or other comments have been made about him but also that the
disparaging comments were
made in relation to his disability and to him
personally. (See also McDonald v Hospital Superannuation Board [1999]
HREOCA 13 (extract at (1999) EOC 93-025).
Findings
- In
what follows, statements of fact constitute findings of fact. Findings of fact
are here made by me on the balance of probabilities
having regard to the
evidence and my observations of the witnesses.
- The
applicant is now 55 years old and has for many years suffered from an anxiety
disorder and major depression. He has not worked
since 2000 and has been in
receipt of a disability pension since that time. It is not disputed by the
respondent that the applicant
suffers from a disability within the meaning of
s.4 of the DD Act.
- In
2000 the applicant became a member of the Hills Housing Co-op Inc. Whilst a
member of that co-op he rented and lived in a property
at 6 Easter Street,
Nairne (“the Nairne property”). For reasons that were not made
clear to the Court on 1 July 2005
the Nairne property was transferred to the
newly created respondent. The applicant thereafter was a member of the
respondent and
paid rent for the property to the respondent.
- The
applicant suggested that one of the main reasons that he decided to transfer to
the respondent when it was formed rather than
remain with the Hills Housing
Co-op was that he had received an assurance from an individual (or individuals)
associated with the
respondent (he did not specify who) that he would be offered
the Bowyer Avenue property. He acknowledges in his evidence that he
was very
upset that the respondent did not offer him the Bowyer Avenue property but
instead offered it to another member.
- As
well as the respondent’s failure to offer him the Bowyer Avenue property,
the applicant, in his oral evidence and in the
voluminous documents annexed to
his two affidavits, makes reference to numerous other matters that resulted in
the applicant sending
letters of complaint to the respondent. The respondent
complained also about the applicant’s conduct. In an “open”
letter that the applicant sent to the respondent on 10 January 2007 the
applicant summarises what the respondent’s complaints
were about the
applicant. He stated that the respondent was unhappy about the fact that:
- the applicant
did not involve himself in the respondent’s activities;
- he remained
antagonistic towards other members who were trying to help;
- he had been
unwilling to assist any other members; and
- the
applicant’s relationship with the other members had deteriorated to the
point that it was irreparable.
The applicant says in the
letter that the first three matters were false but that the fourth matter is
“absolutely correct”.
- It
will not assist resolution of this claim to examine the detail of the complaints
that each of the parties make of the other. I
propose instead to examine all of
the evidence to determine whether any of the four claims that the applicant
brings against the
respondent as particularised by him in his opening and as has
been summarised in these reasons is made out.
- The
applicant’s uncontradicted evidence is that nobody ever nominated him for
an elected position in the respondent’s
organisation. There is no
evidence from the applicant that this was because he had a disability. The
material before me and in
particular the applicant’s letter of January
2007 earlier referred to leads me to conclude that it was the breakdown in the
relationship that he had with other members of the respondent that dissuaded
them from nominating him for an elected position. It
is clear to me that there
was a lot of animosity between the applicant and the other members of the
respondent and that this had
been growing since the applicant was not to be
offered the Bowyer Avenue property. There is no evidence before me that
suggests
that the animosity was anything to do with the applicant’s
disability.
- I
accept Ms Vogt’s evidence contained in her affidavit of 9 July 2008
in which she says as follows:
- “3.1 As
stated in my affidavit sworn on 27 June 2008 Mr Orlowski transferred over
to Sunrise from the Hills Housing Co-operative
along with other members and
properties on the 1st July 2005.
- 3.2 Initially,
Mr Orlowski attended meetings of Sunrise.
- 3.3 Sunrise
usually holds a general meeting every month. This is essentially a management
meeting when decisions are made in relation
to the running of the properties
managed by Sunrise.
- 3.4 The
members of Sunrise also cooperate in relation to the maintenance of the houses
it manages, including participating in working
bees.
- 3.5 At some
time following Sunrise’s decision in relation to the Bowyer Avenue
property, Mr Orlowski stopped participating
in meetings of Sunrise.
- 3.6 Mr
Orlowski has also not made himself available to assist in working bees or
similar activities and has not been prepared to
do any gardening or maintenance
work in relation to Sunrise properties, including his own. Rather, Mr Orlowski
appears to be of
the view that other members of Sunrise should attend to this
for him.
- 3.7 ...
- 3.8 ...
- 3.9 In
relation to attendance at meetings, Mr Orlowski has been in the practice of
calling Mr Brian Elley, a member of Sunrise, to
arrange for Mr Elley to pick
Mr Orlowski up to take him to meetings. Although I am not aware of the
precise date, at some time after
the decision was made by Sunrise in relation to
the Bowyer Avenue property, Mr Orlowski stopped calling Mr Elley prior to
meetings
and accordingly Mr Elley stopped picking Mr Orlowski up to take him to
meetings.
- 3.10 Mr
Orlowski appears to have suggested to Dr Asokan ... that Sunrise changed the
location of its meetings when his relationship
with Sunrise deteriorated. Since
its commencement, Sunrise has always held its meetings in Mt Barker.
Initially, they were held
at the Mt Barker RSL Hall and sometime in early 2006
the meetings were moved to the Mt Barker TAFE Campus because there was no
shelter
at the RSL Hall and because the RSL members were on occasions late to
attend to open the hall for meetings.
4. Decision to terminate Mr Orlowski’s membership.
- 4.1 In my
affidavit sworn on 27 June 2008 I annexed documentation to the decision of
Sunrise made at a special general meeting on
10 February 2007 to terminate
Mr Orlowski’s membership of Sunrise.
- 4.2 A
special resolution to terminate Mr Orlowski’s membership was presented at
a Special General Meeting on 10 February 2007
and was put by me as the Chair of
Sunrise.
- 4.3 The
decision to put the Special Resolution was based on Mr Orlowski’s failure
to participate in Sunrise’s activities
and the fact that he remained
antagonistic to other Sunrise members who were trying to assist him and because
he was unwilling to
assist other members of Sunrise. It was considered that the
relationship between Mr Orlowski and other members of Sunrise was irreparable
and Mr Orlowski’s attitude was detrimental to Sunrise and its
members.
- 4.4 The
decision to put the Special Resolution to the Special General Meeting was in no
way based on any disability, psychiatric
or psychological or otherwise, Mr
Orlowski may suffer from.
- 4.5 Sunrise
is a community housing organisation and is self managed. The organisation
cannot operate successfully unless all members
cooperate with Sunrise and other
members and provide whatever assistance they are reasonably able to provide to
other members and
to Sunrise.
- 4.6 Mr
Orlowski was simply not prepared to cooperate with other members or Sunrise or
provide any assistance to other members (of)
Sunrise.
- In
Ms Vogt’s affidavit filed on 27 June 2008 she says that
Mr Orlowski’s membership of Sunrise was terminated by unanimous
vote
at the Special General Meeting on 10 February 2007. She says that Mr Orlowski
appealed that decision on 26 February 2007 and
on 11 April 2007 the
respondent’s appeal’s panel upheld Mr Orlowski’s appeal and
his membership was re-instated.
- The
importance of all of this evidence is that it demonstrates the depth of ill
feeling that existed between the applicant and the
other members of the
respondent. I accept the evidence from the applicant that the relationship
between he and the other members
had irrevocably broken down. There is not
sufficient evidence before me of less favourable treatment of the applicant
because of
his disability. Nowhere is there any claim by the applicant that the
respondent’s members made reference to or adverse comments
about his
disability. In addition, I am by no means convinced that all of the conduct of
members of the respondent can be attributed
to the respondent as the applicant
would wish. Clearly not all acts or omissions of members will be acts or
omissions of the respondent.
But as no point to this effect has been taken by
the respondent I do not propose to make any finding on the topic.
- For
the above reasons the applicant has not established any discriminatory conduct
by the respondent. The application must be dismissed.
I certify
that the preceding 32Error! Style not
defined.!Syntax Error, !Error! Style not defined.Error! Style not
defined.!Syntax Error, !thirty-twothirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy
of the reasons for judgment of Simpson FM
Associate: Julie Davey
Date: 29 January 2009
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