AustLII [Home] [Databases] [WorldLII] [Search] [Feedback]

Federal Magistrates Court of Australia

You are here:  AustLII >> Databases >> Federal Magistrates Court of Australia >> 2009 >> [2009] FMCA 31

[Database Search] [Name Search] [Recent Decisions] [Noteup] [Download] [Help]

Orlowski v Sunrise Co-operative Housing Inc [2009] FMCA 31 (29 January 2009)

Last Updated: 2 February 2009

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ORLOWSKI v SUNRISE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC

HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability discrimination alleged against housing cooperative by member – no discrimination shown.

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), s.46BO(4)
Disability discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss.27(2) and 39
South Australian Co-operative and Community Housing Act 1991 (SA)

McCormick v Commonwealth [2007] FMCA 1245
McDonald v Hospital Superannuation Board [1999]
O’Grady v The Northern Queensland Company Limited (1990) 169 CLR 346

Applicant:
EDWARD ORLOWSKI

Respondent:
SUNRISE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC

File Number:
ADG 357 of 2007

Judgment of:
Simpson FM

Hearing date:
14 July 2008

Date of Last Submission:
14 July 2008

Delivered at:
Adelaide

Delivered on:
29 January 2009

REPRESENTATION

The Applicant:
In person

Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr S Cole

Solicitors for the Respondent:
Minter Ellison Lawyers

ORDERS

(1) The application is dismissed.
(2) The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
ADELAIDE

ADG 357 of 2007

EDWARD ORLOWSKI

Applicant


And


SUNRISE CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING INC

Respondent


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The application

  1. This is an application for compensation pursuant to s.46PO of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (“HREOC Act”) for alleged contraventions by the respondent of s.27(2) and s.39 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (“DD Act”).
  2. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (“HREOC”) on 28 November 2006. After considering the respondent’s response a decision was made by HREOC on 28 November 2007 that the complaint be terminated. The applicant commenced these proceedings on 24 December 2007 and therefore within the time allowed by sub-s46PO(2) of the HREOC Act.

The parties

  1. The respondent, Sunrise Co-operative Housing Inc, is an organisation registered under the South Australian Co-operative and Community Housing Act 1991 (SA) (“SACCH Act”). The applicant, Edward Orlowski, has been a member of the respondent since it was established on 1 July 2005.
  2. The SACCH Act provides a regime for the registration, incorporation and regulation of housing co-operatives in South Australia. It is a body corporate with full juristic capacity to exercise any powers that are by their nature capable of being exercised by a body corporate (see sub-s.23(1)(a)(ii) of the SACCH Act and is therefore capable of suing and being sued. All rights and liabilities formerly exercisable against the members or officers of the co-operative in their capacity as such immediately before the incorporation of the co-operative become rights and liabilities of the registered housing co-operative. (see sub-s.23(1)(c) of the SACCH Act).
  3. Section 3 of the SACCH Act provides that, unless a contrary intention appears:
  4. As to the meaning of “principles of cooperation” sub-s.3(2) of the SACCH Act says in part that:
  5. The respondent is a self managed non-profit organisation. It offers members long term housing tenancy security with affordable rent (generally 25% of the member’s income) and involvement in housing management. The respondent provides housing to people with special needs including the aged, people with disabilities, survivors of domestic violence, people from non-English speaking backgrounds, low income families, individuals who have difficulty accessing the private rental market and people who have experienced homelessness.
  6. To be eligible for community housing an applicant must meet the government based eligibility criteria that apply to all applications for community housing. These criteria include current residency, income, assets and needs. In addition an applicant must meet the specific eligibility criteria of the individual co-operative or association for which an applicant wishes to apply or register an interest.
  7. The respondent here is managed by a committee of volunteers who are themselves members and tenants of the respondent.

The applicant’s claims and the respondent’s response

  1. The applicant, who has been unrepresented throughout these proceedings, alleges that the respondent unlawfully discriminated against him in that:
    1. during his time as a member, he was never nominated for an elected position in the respondent’s organisation such as Maintenance Officer, Rent Coordinator or Assistant Purchasing Officer;
    2. the respondent was responsible for fabricating stories about the applicant;
    1. the respondent was responsible for the applicant being “marginalised”; and
    1. the respondent was responsible for threats of violence being made against the applicant.
  2. When the applicant filed his complaint with HREOC on 28 November 2006 he alleged an instance of unlawful discrimination concerning the applicant which is not referred to above, namely, that on 21 March 2006 the respondent’s Tenancy Committee decided to offer a rental property (“the Bowyer Avenue property”) that had become available to another member and not the applicant. At trial before me the applicant abandoned this aspect of his claim.
  3. The applicant says that the discrimination resulted in deterioration of his health for which he seeks compensation. He has provided no evidence of the further treatment that was needed as a result of the alleged deterioration or its cost. He also claimed compensation for lost earnings which he initially estimated to be $300 to $500 per week but later confined to $300 per week. No supporting evidence was provided in relation to the alleged lost earnings.
  4. The respondent denies that it has been guilty of unlawful discrimination and says that in any event the applicant has not made out any proper basis for an award of compensation.

Evidence relied upon

  1. The evidence in chief of all witnesses was to be by way of affidavit filed and served well prior to trial. At trial, the applicant relied on his two affidavits filed on 2 June and 1 July 2008 respectively. Neither affidavit was particularly helpful as trial affidavits as they did not tell the applicant’s story but simply annexed numerous documents without proper explanation of their relevance. I permitted the applicant to orally givefurther evidence in chief so that he had every opportunity to put all appropriate evidence before the Court.
  2. The respondent relies on three affidavits: two affidavits of Claire Joan Vogt (the current Chair of the respondent) filed on 27 June and 9 July 2008 respectively and an affidavit of Juanita Ruth Jane Anderson (a former Membership Officer and now Treasurer of the respondent) filed 11 July 2008.

The law

  1. In relation to the allegation that the respondent was guilty of unlawful discrimination for failing to nominate the applicant for an elected position in the respondent’s organisation, the applicant relies upon sub-s.27(2)(c) of the DD Act which states:
  2. Disability discrimination is defined in s.5 of the DD Act as follows:
  3. In relation to the applicant’s suggestion that the respondent is guilty of unlawful discrimination as a result of false allegations being made concerning the applicant, the applicant being marginalised and the suggestion that threats of violence were made against the applicant, the applicant relies on s.39 of the DD Act. The section states:
  4. “Harassment” is not defined in the DD Act. In McCormick v Commonwealth [2007] FMCA 1245 Mowbray FM sought assistance from the following meanings found in the Macquarie Dictionary:
  5. In relation to the meaning of the phrase in s.39 “in relation to the disability” Mowbray FM applied the following statement of McKew J in O’Grady v The Northern Queensland Company Limited (1990) 169 CLR 346:
  6. On the basis of these authorities I consider that for there to be a finding here of harassment the applicant must not only prove on the balance of probabilities that disparaging or other comments have been made about him but also that the disparaging comments were made in relation to his disability and to him personally. (See also McDonald v Hospital Superannuation Board [1999] HREOCA 13 (extract at (1999) EOC 93-025).

Findings

  1. In what follows, statements of fact constitute findings of fact. Findings of fact are here made by me on the balance of probabilities having regard to the evidence and my observations of the witnesses.
  2. The applicant is now 55 years old and has for many years suffered from an anxiety disorder and major depression. He has not worked since 2000 and has been in receipt of a disability pension since that time. It is not disputed by the respondent that the applicant suffers from a disability within the meaning of s.4 of the DD Act.
  3. In 2000 the applicant became a member of the Hills Housing Co-op Inc. Whilst a member of that co-op he rented and lived in a property at 6 Easter Street, Nairne (“the Nairne property”). For reasons that were not made clear to the Court on 1 July 2005 the Nairne property was transferred to the newly created respondent. The applicant thereafter was a member of the respondent and paid rent for the property to the respondent.
  4. The applicant suggested that one of the main reasons that he decided to transfer to the respondent when it was formed rather than remain with the Hills Housing Co-op was that he had received an assurance from an individual (or individuals) associated with the respondent (he did not specify who) that he would be offered the Bowyer Avenue property. He acknowledges in his evidence that he was very upset that the respondent did not offer him the Bowyer Avenue property but instead offered it to another member.
  5. As well as the respondent’s failure to offer him the Bowyer Avenue property, the applicant, in his oral evidence and in the voluminous documents annexed to his two affidavits, makes reference to numerous other matters that resulted in the applicant sending letters of complaint to the respondent. The respondent complained also about the applicant’s conduct. In an “open” letter that the applicant sent to the respondent on 10 January 2007 the applicant summarises what the respondent’s complaints were about the applicant. He stated that the respondent was unhappy about the fact that:

The applicant says in the letter that the first three matters were false but that the fourth matter is “absolutely correct”.

  1. It will not assist resolution of this claim to examine the detail of the complaints that each of the parties make of the other. I propose instead to examine all of the evidence to determine whether any of the four claims that the applicant brings against the respondent as particularised by him in his opening and as has been summarised in these reasons is made out.
  2. The applicant’s uncontradicted evidence is that nobody ever nominated him for an elected position in the respondent’s organisation. There is no evidence from the applicant that this was because he had a disability. The material before me and in particular the applicant’s letter of January 2007 earlier referred to leads me to conclude that it was the breakdown in the relationship that he had with other members of the respondent that dissuaded them from nominating him for an elected position. It is clear to me that there was a lot of animosity between the applicant and the other members of the respondent and that this had been growing since the applicant was not to be offered the Bowyer Avenue property. There is no evidence before me that suggests that the animosity was anything to do with the applicant’s disability.
  3. I accept Ms Vogt’s evidence contained in her affidavit of 9 July 2008 in which she says as follows:
4. Decision to terminate Mr Orlowski’s membership.
  1. In Ms Vogt’s affidavit filed on 27 June 2008 she says that Mr Orlowski’s membership of Sunrise was terminated by unanimous vote at the Special General Meeting on 10 February 2007. She says that Mr Orlowski appealed that decision on 26 February 2007 and on 11 April 2007 the respondent’s appeal’s panel upheld Mr Orlowski’s appeal and his membership was re-instated.
  2. The importance of all of this evidence is that it demonstrates the depth of ill feeling that existed between the applicant and the other members of the respondent. I accept the evidence from the applicant that the relationship between he and the other members had irrevocably broken down. There is not sufficient evidence before me of less favourable treatment of the applicant because of his disability. Nowhere is there any claim by the applicant that the respondent’s members made reference to or adverse comments about his disability. In addition, I am by no means convinced that all of the conduct of members of the respondent can be attributed to the respondent as the applicant would wish. Clearly not all acts or omissions of members will be acts or omissions of the respondent. But as no point to this effect has been taken by the respondent I do not propose to make any finding on the topic.
  3. For the above reasons the applicant has not established any discriminatory conduct by the respondent. The application must be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding 32Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !Error! Style not defined.Error! Style not defined.!Syntax Error, !thirty-twothirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Simpson FM


Associate: Julie Davey


Date: 29 January 2009


AustLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FMCA/2009/31.html