Lean v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 1 (28 January 2010)

Citation:		Lean v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 1

Appeal from:		Commissioner of Taxation v Lean [2009] FCA 490

Parties:		DAVID LEAN v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

File number(s):		NSD 529 of 2009

Judges:		EMMETT, EDMONDS & PERRAM JJ

Date of judgment:		28 January 2010

Catchwords:		TAXATION – Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – s 25-45 – whether money that was misappropriated was included in the taxpayer’s assessable income – the act of applying money towards expenses or investment is sufficient to break the necessary connection between money included in taxpayer’s assessable income and a subsequent misappropriation – the money that was misappropriated was not the money that had been included in assessable income of the taxpayer and therefore s 25-45 does not apply. Held: appeal dismissed.

Legislation:		Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 51AAA, 71 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 6-1, 6-5, 6-10, 6-15, 8-1, 25-45, 102-5 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Cases cited:		EHL Burgess Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 80 ALR 639 considered Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 77; (1956) 95 CLR 344 referred to

Date of hearing:	4 November 2009

Place:	Sydney

Division:	GENERAL DIVISION

Category:	Catchwords

Number of paragraphs:	53

Counsel for the Appellant:	Mr C J Bevan

Solicitor for the Appellant:	Blake Dawson

Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr M A Wigney SC with Mr A J O'Brien

Solicitor for the Respondent:	Australian Taxation Office

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.

1 This appeal concerns the effect of s 25-45 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (the 1997 Act) in relation to the misappropriation of a substantial sum of money belonging to the appellant, Mr David Lean (the Taxpayer). The money was misappropriated after the Taxpayer transferred it to a bank in Hong Kong.

2 The Taxpayer’s assessable income for the year ended 30 June 2002 included a net capital gain. The Taxpayer claimed deductions totalling $4,972,671 from his assessable income. The deductions included the sum of $3,287,749 in respect of the misappropriation. The respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner), disallowed the deductions and issued a notice of assessment to the Taxpayer dated 12 May 2006. The notice of assessment showed an outstanding tax liability of $1,309,196. The Taxpayer objected to the Commissioner’s assessment, disputing the Commissioner’s disallowance of the sum of $3,287,749. On 28 August 2006, the Commissioner made an objection decision affirming his decision to disallow that sum as a deduction.

3 The Taxpayer then commenced a proceeding in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), seeking review of the Commissioner’s objection decision of 28 August 2006. On 20 June 2008, the Tribunal set aside the decision under review. The Tribunal ordered that the matter be remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration, with the direction that the misappropriation loss claimed by the Taxpayer is, as to the amount of $2,315,157, a deduction allowed by s 25-45 of the 1997 Act.

4 The Commissioner then appealed to the Federal Court pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), which permits an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal on a question of law. On 14 May 2009, a judge of the Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, that the decision of the Tribunal be set aside and that the Commissioner’s objection decision of 28 August 2006 be affirmed. The Taxpayer has now appealed to the Full Court from those orders.

5 Under s 6-1(1) of the 1997 Act, assessable income consists of ordinary income and statutory income. Section 6-5(1) provides that a taxpayer’s assessable income includes income according to ordinary concepts, which is called ordinary income. Section 6-10(1) provides that a taxpayer’s assessable income also includes some amounts that are not ordinary income. Amounts that are not ordinary income, but are included in a taxpayer’s assessable income by provisions of the 1997 Act about assessable income, are called statutory income. Section 6-15(1) provides that, if an amount is not ordinary income and is not statutory income, it is not assessable income and a taxpayer does not have to pay income tax on that amount.

6 Section 102-5(1) of the 1997 Act provides that a taxpayer’s assessable income includes the taxpayer’s net capital gain, if any, for the relevant income year. Thus, net capital gain constitutes statutory income. Net capital gain is worked out as follows:

Step 1 Reduce the capital gains made by the taxpayer during the income year by the capital losses, if any, made during the income year.

Step 2 Apply any previously unapplied net capital losses from earlier income years to reduce the amounts, if any, remaining after the reduction of capital gains under Step 1.

Step 3 Reduce by the discount percentage (in this case 50%) each amount of capital gain remaining after Step 2.

Step 4 If any of the taxpayer’s capital gains qualify for certain concessions, those concessions are applied to each capital gain.

Step 5 The sum of the amounts of capital gains, if any, remaining after Step 4 is the taxpayer’s net capital gain for the income year.

7 Division 8 of the 1997 Act deals with deductions. Under s 8-1(1), a taxpayer can deduct from the taxpayer’s assessable income any loss or outgoing to the extent that:

• it is incurred in gaining or producing the taxpayer’s assessable income, or

• it is necessarily incurred in carrying on a business for the purpose of gaining or producing the taxpayer’s assessable income.

However, a taxpayer cannot deduct a loss or outgoing under s 8-1 to the extent that:

A loss or outgoing that a taxpayer can deduct under s 8-1 is called a general deduction. A taxpayer can also deduct from the taxpayer’s assessable income an amount that a provision of the 1997 Act outside Division 8 allows the taxpayer to deduct. Such an amount is called a specific deduction.

8 Division 25 sets out some amounts that a taxpayer can deduct. However, the general rules about deductions in Division 8 also apply to Division 25. Section 25-45 deals with loss by theft and other means. Section 25-45 provides that a taxpayer can deduct a loss in respect of money if:

• the loss was caused by theft, stealing, embezzlement, larceny, defalcation or misappropriation by the taxpayer’s employee or agent, and

• the money was included in the taxpayer’s assessable income for the income year or for an earlier income year.

9 In January 2001, the Taxpayer attended a meeting for customers of Metashare International Pty Ltd (Metashare), a company that provided research and a share trading system. At the meeting, a Metashare employee informed the Taxpayer of Mr Shayne Heffernan. The Taxpayer was led to believe that Mr Heffernan was a reputable and highly successful securities trader and investment fund manager. In May 2001, the Taxpayer transferred $5,000 to a Hong Kong account nominated by Mr Heffernan. The Taxpayer was impressed by Mr Heffernan and the apparent growth of the $5,000.

10 As at July 2001, the Taxpayer was the holder of options to acquire shares in Microsoft Inc in the United States. Encouraged by Mr Heffernan to increase his investment, the Taxpayer exercised the options and shares in Microsoft Inc were allotted to him as a consequence of the exercise. He then sold the shares through a United States stockbroker, who received the proceeds of sale. The Taxpayer instructed the US stockbroker to transfer the proceeds of sale of the Microsoft Inc shares to the Hong Kong bank account nominated by Mr Heffernan.

11 While the precise instructions to the US stockbroker are not clear, on 11 July 2001, a transfer of $AUS517,416 was made to the Hong Kong bank account from the proceeds of the sale of the Microsoft Inc shares. There is no evidence as to the Hong Kong bank to which that money was transferred. However, the Taxpayer received a document called an "E-ceipt". The E-ceipt stated that the money had been credited to a numbered account in the name of the Taxpayer’s wife. The E-ceipt was issued in the name of Our World Exchange Limited. Our World Exchange Limited, which is incorporated in Vanuatu, was totally subservient to Mr Heffernan and operated merely at his whim. As such, it was merely Mr Heffernan’s agent and did not act, in any sense, independently of Mr Heffernan.

12 In August 2001, the Taxpayer attended a seminar in the Philippines conducted by Mr Heffernan. During the course of that seminar, Mr Heffernan offered the Taxpayer a "partnership relationship" in relation to investment of funds and told him that a "private client account" arrangement would be established, which would be a "true partnership" in which all investment decisions would be made jointly. Mr Heffernan promised that such an account would be in the Taxpayer’s own name and that he would be able to maintain full control of the account. It is unclear whether the Taxpayer had the same understanding as to his relationship with Mr Heffernan at the time he effected the transfer in July 2001.

13 On 24 August 2001, on the basis of the assurances given by Mr Heffernan at the seminar, the Taxpayer instructed his US stockbroker, to transfer $AUS4,112,898.59 to the Hong Kong bank account from the proceeds of a further sale of Microsoft Inc shares. The Taxpayer received two E-ceipts that stated that the money had been credited to two different numbered accounts in the Taxpayer’s name and had been deposited to a "private client" account.

14 The Taxpayer regularly discussed with Mr Heffernan trading and other supposed investment activities involving the private client account. He requested documents confirming the details of the transactions, but none was provided and there was no documentary evidence to demonstrate, for example, that the Taxpayer incurred any trading losses in relation to the money he caused to be transferred to the Hong Kong bank account. The Taxpayer thought Mr Heffernan was trading as an agent for him or was in some business arrangement with him but did not ever have any clear understanding of the precise nature of his relationship with Mr Heffernan and Our World Exchange Limited.

15 The Tribunal found that the money sent by the US stockbroker was received in Hong Kong with general instructions that it be held on behalf of the Taxpayer and be applied for authorised investment purposes. However, the Taxpayer did not derive any investment income and could not show that any investment transactions actually occurred.

16 The Tribunal found, from the generality of the proposal discussed between the Taxpayer and Mr Heffernan, and the absence of clear evidence of more limited instructions from the Taxpayer to Mr Heffernan, that the private client account was a means of facilitating any kind of investment opportunity that presented itself and was recommended by Mr Heffernan to the Taxpayer. The Tribunal also found that it was not restricted to ordinary trading activities and was open to participation in capital investment opportunities. The Tribunal found further that the money transferred on 24 August 2001 was an amount that could be resorted to for any of a very wide range of possible investment activities, a range limited only by the subjectivity of Mr Heffernan’s preferences and assessment of the potential profitability of individual proposals.

17 The Tribunal rejected the view that the transfer of the money to Hong Kong gave rise merely to a debtor and creditor relationship, either with Mr Heffernan or Our World Exchange Limited, that merely gave the Taxpayer a contractual entitlement to share in the growth of the investments that was supposed to be made. The Tribunal concluded that Mr Heffernan and Our World Exchange Limited held the money for the absolute benefit of the Taxpayer and subject to his instructions. The Tribunal concluded that they were, in relation to their custody and control of the Taxpayer’s private client fund, his agents.

18 The Tribunal characterised the position of Our World Exchange Limited and Mr Heffernan as "custodial agents" in relation to the money, although it is not entirely clear what the Tribunal meant by custodial agent. However, whatever the relationship between the Taxpayer, on the one hand, and Mr Heffernan and Our World Exchange Limited, on the other, was, it is clear that Mr Heffernan had a very wide discretion as to the investments that he could make with the money. Nevertheless, he clearly had no authority to apply the money for his own benefit.

19 The Tribunal found that, as a result of misappropriation by Mr Heffernan, the Taxpayer lost the net balance of the money that the US stockbroker transferred to the Hong Kong bank account. The Tribunal concluded that the money was misappropriated when it was received and that the intention to do so existed from the outset, as did the intention to avoid the return of the money. The Tribunal found that the misappropriation and losses should be regarded as having occurred soon after the money was transferred in August 2001. However, there was no evidence and no finding as to the precise mechanism of the misappropriation by Mr Heffernan.

20 The question in the appeal is whether the money in respect of which the Taxpayer has incurred a loss, being the money that was transferred to Hong Kong and misappropriated, was money that was included in the Taxpayer’s assessable income. In order to satisfy s 25-45, the money that was misappropriated must be capable of being characterised as the same money that was included in the Taxpayer’s assessable income. It must be possible to identify the misappropriated money with the money included in the Taxpayer’s assessable income. The act of a taxpayer in applying money of the taxpayer towards expenses or investment is sufficient to break the necessary connection between money included in the taxpayer’s assessable income and a subsequent misappropriation. By applying the money towards expenses or investment the taxpayer has received the benefit of the money that was assessable income.

21 Where money that was included in the assessable income of a taxpayer has left the taxpayer’s hands, there can be no relevant misappropriation of, or in respect of, that money. Money will have left a taxpayer’s hands where it has been used to pay off that taxpayer’s debts (see EHL Burgess Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 80 ALR 639 at 647). Similarly, where money that was included in the assessable income of a taxpayer is applied by way of investment, the money has left the taxpayer’s hands, and there can be no relevant misappropriation of or in respect of that money.

22 In the present case, the proceeds of sale of the Microsoft Inc shares, which were received by the Taxpayer, through his US stockbroker, constituted money that was included in the assessable income of the Taxpayer by the operation of s 102-5 of the 1997 Act. While the precise details are not clear, the money was transferred to the Hong Kong bank account and was credited to an account or accounts with Our World Exchange Limited in the name of the Taxpayer. It is clear that the US stockbroker dealt with the proceeds of the sale of the Taxpayer’s Microsoft Inc shares in accordance with the instructions of the Taxpayer. That is to say, the Taxpayer instructed the US stockbroker to transfer the proceeds to an account with a bank in Hong Kong and the US stockbroker acted in accordance with those instructions. While the particulars of that account are not known, the proceeds of sale were in fact dealt with and applied in accordance with the instructions of the Taxpayer. So far as the Taxpayer was concerned, the money was then available for investment at the direction of Mr Hefferman. The Taxpayer thus received the benefit of the proceeds of sale that constituted assessable income. That money left the Taxpayer’s hands.

23 Accordingly, the money that was misappropriated from the account in the name of the Taxpayer with Our World Exchange Limited was not the money that had been included in assessable income of the Taxpayer. The primary judge did not err in concluding that the Taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction under s 25-45 in respect of the money that was misappropriated.

24 The Commissioner sought leave to raise, by notice of contention, the possible application of s 51AAA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the 1936 Act). That question had not been ventilated before the Tribunal and had not been raised before the primary judge. The Taxpayer objected to the raising of the question on appeal on several bases. Since the Commissioner sought to raise that matter only if he failed in relation to the primary question of the application of s 25-45, it is unnecessary to deal with the matter.

25 The appeal should be dismissed. The Commissioner does not ask for his costs of the appeal.

26 I have had the advantage of reading a draft of the reasons for judgment of Emmett J. I agree with his Honour’s conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons his Honour gives. I merely want to add some observations of my own on the scope of s 25-45 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (‘the 1997 Act’) and its application to the facts of a case such as this.

27 His Honour’s reasons and conclusion are predicated on what a Full Court of this Court said in EHL Burgess Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 80 ALR 639 at 647:

29 The Court was there dealing with s 71 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (‘the 1936 Act’) which, at the relevant time, read:

31 Clearly s 25-45, like its predecessor s 71, requires an identity between the money misappropriated and the money included in assessable income. On the other hand, in many cases, certainly for accruals basis taxpayers, it will not be money that is included in assessable income but the amount of a receivable. The subsequent discharge of that receivable by the payment of currency or the delivery of a bill of exchange is not included in the assessable income of such a taxpayer. In my view, there is no room for the operation of s 25-45 in such cases because the money that is misappropriated, whatever it is, cannot be money which has been included in the assessable income.

32 What is said in the preceding paragraph presupposes that, for the purposes of s 25-45, the term ‘money’ extends beyond currency and encompasses modern mediums of money exchange such as cheques and other negotiable instruments. In this day and age, I think that must be the preferable construction.

33 Equally, where as here, a taxpayer makes a capital gain from the disposal of an asset (CGT Event A1), it is not money that is included in his assessable income but an amount calculated by reference to the provisions of Part 3-1 of the 1997 Act starting with the capital proceeds from the disposal and the cost base of the asset. Money equal in amount to the amount of the capital proceeds may well be received by the taxpayer; indeed, in most cases, will be received, but that money is not included in the assessable income of the taxpayer. If that be right, then the money misappropriated on the facts of the present case, could never give rise to an allowable deduction under s 25-45.

34 The point of these observations is that, in my view, s 25-45 has an extremely limited field of operation; it is limited to income derived by cash basis taxpayers by the receipt, actual or constructive, of money, in the sense referred to in [32] above, where the same money is lost in and through circumstances which trigger the application of the section.

35 The question in this appeal is whether the appellant taxpayer is entitled to claim a deduction for money lost following its investment in what turns out to have been a fraudulent scheme, probably of the Ponzi variety. The scheme, whose precise mechanics were not fully laid bare in the evidence, was conducted by a rogue, Mr Shane Heffernan. This evidence suggested that Mr Heffernan was a sophisticated criminal and that the taxpayer was far from being alone in being gulled by him. In July and August 2001 the taxpayer made two investments in Mr Heffernan’s scheme which totalled approximately $4.63 million. This was done by means of two electronic fund transfers to nominated bank accounts in Hong Kong.

36 Before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") there was considerable debate as to the nature of the taxpayer’s "investment". The Tribunal found, and it is not disputed, that the taxpayer’s purpose in transferring the funds and dealing with Mr Heffernan was to derive profit both from trading and capital investment as opportunities presented themselves to Mr Heffernan. The Tribunal concluded, and it is not in dispute, that Mr Heffernan misappropriated the taxpayer’s money shortly after each of the two electronic transfers were made.

38 Because the taxpayer’s purpose in making the investments was the derivation of profit the Tribunal concluded that the first, positive, limb of s 8-1(1) of the Act was satisfied. However, it also concluded that the loss was of a capital nature with the consequence that it fell within the second, negative, limb of s 8-1(2)(a) and was, therefore, not available as a general deduction.

39 This conclusion flowed from the Tribunal’s finding that the breadth and generality of the activities which Mr Heffernan portrayed to the taxpayer did not permit the taxpayer’s deposit of $4.112 million to be characterised as a revenue item.

40 Essentially, so the Tribunal thought, the taxpayer’s interest in the moneys advanced was in the nature of a capital investment and was not some kind of enterprise carried on in the course of gaining or producing assessable income by the taxpayer: cf. Charles Moore & Co (WA) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 77; (1956) 95 CLR 344 at 349-350. In an attempt to avoid the conclusion that the investment was capital in nature, the taxpayer had argued that he was carrying on business through or with Mr Heffernan, but the Tribunal was not persuaded that this was so.

41 The conclusion that the loss was capital in nature and not deductible under the general deduction provision then made relevant the taxpayer’s alternate argument, with which this appeal is concerned, based on s 25-45 of the Act. It provides:

42 The taxpayer’s argument was straightforward. There was no debate that the requirements of subsection (a) and (b) were satisfied. Further, subsection (c) was satisfied because the taxpayer had included in his 2002 return an amount of $2,804.049 reflecting the exercise by the taxpayer of share options in the United States (which had netted a total of $5,608,099), and it was those proceeds of sale which had been electronically transferred to the accounts controlled by Mr Heffernan. In that sense the share sale profits were the money stolen by Mr Heffernan.

43 It is necessary then to turn to the language of s 25-45 itself. Because "assessable income" is a measure of money rather than money itself, it cannot literally be true that money is ever "included" in "assessable income" if the word is given its ordinary meaning of treating something as part of a whole. This suggests the presence of an ellipsis and a corresponding need to understand the expression "included in your assessable income" as meaning, in effect, returned as assessable income.

44 The Commissioner argued, and the trial judge accepted, that the money which was lost had to be the same as the money which was included in the assessable income. The contrary was not really argued before this Court. The question which arises is the highly artificial one of determining whether one sum of money is the same as another. To be clear, neither the word "same" nor the concept of "identity" appear in s 25-45 of the Act, but the need for an identity between the money lost and the money returned inevitably arises from the reference in subsection (c) to "the money" which, as a result of the definite article, can only refer to the word "money" when it first appears in the section.

45 The concept of two sums of money being the same is problematic. It is notorious that the meaning of "money" is mercurial both in law and economics. It extends from the simple concept of cash and coins through negotiable instruments and on to debts and other more obscure interests. Given that money is very often a medium of exchange it is particularly susceptible to changes in form. Cash, if placed by a depositor in a bank account becomes a debt; if a cheque is drawn the debt "becomes" a negotiable instrument and new debts and relationships arise. All of these, in some sense, represent the same money.

46 That observation ensures that the kind of "sameness" demanded by s 25-45 cannot be concerned only with the form that the money takes. This Court has previously determined that the section requires the money in question to be traceable. In EHL Burgess Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 80 ALR 639 ("EHL Burgess") the Full Court, speaking of s 25-45’s predecessor, s 71 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), said (at 647):

47 Whilst I would agree that traceability is a necessary condition to establish the identity of two sums of money I do not think that it is always a sufficient one. I do not understand EHL Burgess to hold to the contrary. The difficulty in this case is to identify some stable criterion by which identity, in that sense, may be judged.

48 It is tempting, no doubt, to say that money must always maintain the same "nature". But that concept is itself somewhat elusive. The Tribunal found that both the investments and the loss were capital in nature and that capital quality might, it could be thought, be contrasted with the "nature" of the money immediately before its investment. The learned trial judge went down this path and characterised the money included in the return as income and the money invested with Mr Heffernan as capital. Having that different quality the money, though traceable, could not be the same money. With respect, however, the money never had the quality of being income. This was for two reasons. First, it was in truth a capital receipt resulting from the disposal of a capital asset, namely, the shares resulting from the exercise of the United States share options. Such a receipt was not income according to ordinary concepts. It was returned in the taxpayer’s assessable income only because s 102-5(1) of the Act required net capital gains to be so returned.

49 Secondly, even if that were not so, money does not ever partake of the quality of being income which, in truth, is but a measure of an amount of money derived. As a quantity, it is conceptually distinct from the revenue it gauges; it is the difference between the measure and the measured, between the number and the thing.

50 It follows that an approach to identity which focuses on the capital or revenue nature of the money which has been lost is likely to prove difficult to apply. A better approach is, I think, to ask whether the money has been used in a way which is other than interim. Had the proceeds of sale of the stock been stolen from the taxpayer’s broker’s account whilst awaiting the taxpayer’s instructions, the holding by the brokers would have been, in that sense, interim. If the taxpayer himself had placed the money in his own cheque account whilst choosing between different investment options then that too would have been an interim use.

51 The taxpayer, however, was not using his money in such a way when he placed it with Mr Heffernan. That investment was a wholly new enterprise. Whilst it was true that the investment was derived, in a traceable form, from the money realised on the sale of the stock it was not the same money. Perhaps another way of reaching the same conclusion is to observe that the taxpayer’s decision to invest the proceeds of one investment in another denied the possibility that the same money was at both ends of the transaction.

52 It is not, in that circumstance, necessary to deal with the Commissioner’s alternative contention based on s 51AAA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth).

53 Edmonds J is of the view that s 25-45 of the Act is limited in its operation to income derived by cash basis taxpayers on the receipt of money understood as cash or other ready means of exchange. There is, with respect, much to be said for this view. It is difficult to see, in practice, how the provision could practicably operate outside those circumstances. However, I would hesitate to close the door finally on that issue; the concept of money is perpetually evolving as are the frauds perpetrated to obtain it, and the enterprises in which those frauds occur.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	NSD 529 of 2009

BETWEEN:	DAVID LEAN Appellant
AND:	COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Respondent

JUDGES:	EMMETT, EDMONDS & PERRAM JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	28 JANUARY 2010
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION	NSD 529 of 2009

BETWEEN:	DAVID LEAN Appellant
AND:	COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Respondent

JUDGES:	EMMETT, EDMONDS & PERRAM JJ
DATE:	28 JANUARY 2010
PLACE:	SYDNEY

Federal Court of Australia - Full Court

Lean v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 1 (28 January 2010)