|
|
[Home]
[Databases]
[WorldLII]
[Search]
[Feedback]
Federal Court of Australia - Full Court Decisions |
Last Updated: 20 December 2007
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCAFC 199
MIGRATION – student visa
– condition of visa required visa holder to achieve an academic result
certified by education provider as satisfactory
with no time limit – no
enforceable duty on education provider to certify – whether condition
capable of breach by visa
holder – whether condition valid
Education Services for Overseas Students
Act 2000 (Cth), s 33, s 44
Education Services for Overseas
Students Regulations 2001 (Statutory Rule SR 2001 No. 96), reg
4.01
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 41(1), 116(1), 116(3),
504
Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 8 condition 8202,
reg 2.43(2)(b)
National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities
and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students
Wen Bi Dai v Minister for
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, [2006] FCA 1819;
(2006) 96 ALD 309, reversed
Cheng v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 71 applied
Claro v
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1993] FCA 581; (1993) 119 ALR
342; (1993) 46 FCR 494 cited
Conroy v Shire of Springvale and Noble
Park [1959] VR 737 distinguished
Jayasekara v Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 167; (2006) 156 FCR 199
discussed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
v Singh [2000] FCA 377; (2000) 171 ALR 53 cited
Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Ahmed [2005] FCAFC 58; (2005) 143 FCR 314
applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
v Yu [2004] FCAFC 333; (2004) 141 FCR 448 discussed
Murrumbidgee Groundwater
Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources [2005] NSWCA 10; (2005)
138 LGERA 11 cited
One.Tel Ltd v Australian Communications Authority [2000] FCA 1085;
(2000) 176 ALR 529 cited
Television Corporation Ltd
v Commonwealth [1963] HCA 30; (1963) 109 CLR 59 followed
Tian v Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 238
followed
Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189; (2005) 147 FCR 299 cited
Aronson M and Dyer B, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, (2nd ed, LBC Information Services, 2000)
Pearce D and Argument S, Delegated Legislation in Australia,
(3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005)
WEN
BI DAI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION REVIEW
TRIBUNAL
NSD 30 OF 2007
NORTH, GYLES & EDMONDS
JJ
20 DECEMBER 2007
SYDNEY
|
AND:
|
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.2. Paragraph 3 of the orders of 22 December 2006 be set aside.
3. A writ of certiorari issue out of this Court directed to the second respondent, quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 4 March 2005.
4. A writ of mandamus issue out of this Court directed to the second respondent to determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the first respondent dated 21 July 2004.
5. Each party bear their own costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the
Federal Court Rules.
|
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
WEN BI DAI
Appellant |
|
AND:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent |
|
JUDGES:
|
NORTH, GYLES & EDMONDS JJ
|
|
DATE:
|
20 DECEMBER 2007
|
|
PLACE:
|
SYDNEY
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NORTH J:
1 Before the Court is an appeal against orders made by a judge of the Court which dismissed two applications for review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (Wen Bi Dai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1819; (2006) 96 ALD 309). The decision of the Tribunal confirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, to cancel the visa held by the appellant.
2 The appellant entered Australia on 6 April 2003 on a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 572) visa. The delegate cancelled the appellant’s visa on 21 July 2004. The central question on the appeal concerns whether the first respondent had power to cancel the appellant’s visa in the circumstances.
3 The power relating to cancellation of a visa is conferred by s 116(1) and (3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) relevantly as follows:
116 Power to cancel
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:
...
(b) its holder has not complied with a condition of the visa; or
...
(3) If the Minister may cancel a visa under subsection (1), the Minister must do so if there exist prescribed circumstances in which a visa must be cancelled.
4 Clause 2.43(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) relevantly provided:
(2) For subsection 116(3) of the Act, the circumstances in which the Minister must cancel a visa are:
...
(b) in the case of a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa, that the Minister is satisfied that the visa holder has not complied with:
...(ii) condition 8202.
5 Condition 8202 relevantly stated:
(1) The holder ... must meet the requirements of subclauses (2) and (3).
...
(3) A holder meets the requirements of this subclause if:
...
(b) in any case – the holder achieves an academic result that is certified by the education provider to be at least satisfactory:
(i) for a course that runs for less than a semester – for the course; or(ii) for a course that runs for at least a semester – for each term or semester (whichever is shorter) of the course.
6 The appellant was enrolled at the International College of Tourism and Hotel Management in 2003. She failed to maintain a satisfactory academic performance in the September 2003 term, and was placed on academic probation for the January 2004 term. This term ended on 30 April 2004. In May 2004, the College notified her that her enrolment had been cancelled as a result of unsatisfactory academic progress. The College advised the Department of the dismissal. On 21 July 2004, the delegate of the Minister cancelled the appellant’s visa.
7 On review, the Tribunal concluded:
38. The Tribunal accepts that the review applicant found it difficult to achieve satisfactory results given the marking system of the College. The Tribunal also accepts that the review applicant had some personal problems in the first semester of 2004 which may have resulted in difficulties in studying. Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s only role is to consider whether the review applicant has in fact breached condition 8202. The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence provided by the International College of Tourism and Hotel Management indicates that the review applicant did not achieve an academic result certified by the International College of Tourism and Hotel Management, her course provider at that time, to be at least satisfactory for Semester 1 of 2004. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the review applicant breached condition 8202 in Semester 1 of 2004
39. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the review applicant has not complied with condition 8202 of her visa and is, therefore, liable for cancellation pursuant to s 116(1)(b) and s 116(3) of the Act.
8 In the course of argument on the hearing of the appeal, an issue was raised by the Court concerning the construction of condition 8202 that would activate the power of the Minister to cancel a visa under s 116(3) of the Act. Condition 8202 requires that the visa holder achieve an academic result that is certified by the education provider to be at least satisfactory. Thus, non-compliance with the condition, and the trigger for cancellation, arises upon non-certification of satisfactory performance rather than upon certification of unsatisfactory performance. The issue that emerges is how could a visa holder comply or fail to comply with the condition if required to provide certification, over which the visa holder has no control
9 The issue had not been argued before the primary judge, and was consequently not raised as a ground of appeal. As the argument involved a question of law and did not require further evidence, the first respondent, (the second respondent having filed a submitting appearance), properly, agreed that the Court should consider the argument even though it had not been raised before the primary judge.
10 The hearing of the appeal was adjourned to allow the appellant to amend her notice of appeal and to allow the parties to file and serve further written submissions on the point. Then, on 29 June 2007 a further hearing was held to address oral argument on that issue.
11 As the argument is determinative of the appeal in favour of the appellant, it is unnecessary to set out the reasoning of the primary judge or traverse the other grounds of appeal originally relied upon. We therefore move immediately to a consideration of that argument.
THE SUBMISSION OF THE FIRST RESPONDENT
12 The Minister acted under s 116(3) which requires him to cancel a visa where prescribed circumstances exist. The prescribed circumstances in relation to the student visa held by the appellant were that the Minister was satisfied that the visa holder had not complied with condition 8202. For the purpose of argument, the first respondent assumed without accepting that cl 2.43(2), by stating that "the visa holder has not complied with condition 8202", involved the visa holder not doing something. He accepted that, on such assumption, if condition 8202 "did not involve the visa holder not doing something then there would be no basis for the Minister’s satisfaction" that the visa holder had not complied with the condition, and the power to cancel the visa would not be available.
13 But the first respondent contended that condition 8202 should not be construed as not requiring action from the visa holder. Rather, so it was argued, the condition involves in part an act of the visa holder, and thus provides a basis for a finding of non compliance. The act of the visa holder is the achievement of an academic result. That exists independently and before certification is provided by the education provider. Certification by the education provider evidences the acts of the visa holder. On this analysis, the first respondent contended that the condition had an ancipital or two headed character. The first respondent made reference to a condition of that character as explained by Burchett J in Claro v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1993] FCA 581; (1993) 119 ALR 342; (1993) 46 FCR 494, at [21] as follows:
21. Regulation 28(2) applies where the holder of an entry permit "refuses or fails to comply with a condition subject to which the entry permit was granted". Conditions which may be imposed are set out in s. 33(4) of the Migration Act and in reg. 28(1). The most cursory reading of these conditions will make it plain that some of them refer to matters entirely within the control of the holder of the permit, such as a condition that he shall not do any work of a specified kind while in Australia without the permission in writing of the Secretary (s. 33(4)(c)), while others are indubitably completely outside his control, such as the condition referred to in s. 33(4)(b) that he will not, after entering Australia, be entitled to be granted another entry permit while remaining in Australia. Most of the conditions set out in reg. 28(1) are within the control of the holder of the entry permit, but some clearly are not. For example, reg. 28(1)(i) authorizes the imposition of a condition "that the holder is not to be granted an entry permit other than a refugee (after entry) entry permit that has effect as a permanent entry permit". This plainly is directed to what the Minister or Department shall do, and if the holder of a temporary entry permit were granted an entry permit that had effect as a permanent entry permit, contrary to this condition, it certainly could not be said that the holder had refused or failed to comply with the condition. The Minister or the Department would have done so. Presumably action of that kind would amount, if valid, to a waiver of the condition, or a withdrawal of it. Likewise, the condition which may be imposed under reg. 28(1)(l), that "the holder is to be assessed, after entry to Australia, within a period specified by the Minister when granting the entry permit, in respect of public interest criteria and prescribed health criteria", relates to a matter which may be quite outside the control of the holder of the permit. This, however, is an interesting example, because a failure of compliance may be brought about, in a particular case, by a refusal by the holder of the permit to submit to the necessary assessment. In other words, this particular condition has an ancipital character, so that a breach may be due to a refusal or failure on the part of the Minister, or to a refusal or failure on the part of the holder of the permit.
14 The ancipital character of the provision depended upon his Honour’s conclusion that the provision imposed an obligation on the holder, namely, an obligation to submit to an assessment. This was something which, so his Honour held, the holder had to do. The question in the present case remains whether condition 8202 requires the visa holder to do anything.
15 The first respondent then challenged the appellant’s contention that the Minister was required under reg 2.43 to cancel the visa where there was no certification of the visa holder’s academic results. Instead, the first respondent contended that, as the Minister had to be positively satisfied that the visa holder had not complied with condition 8202, until the visa holder’s results were certified, the Minister could not be satisfied of non-compliance. That is so because compliance with the obligation is contingent in the sense that it only falls to be considered upon certification by the education provider. Putting it another way, the first respondent contended that the required acts of the education provider should be regarded as a condition precedent to the obligation imposed on the visa holder such that until there was certification, the visa holder’s obligation had not crystallised.
16 Finally, the first respondent contended that certification does not have to be in a particular form and that the regulation does not require the visa holder at all times to have a ‘certificate’. The visa holder’s academic results could be certified by the education provider to be at least satisfactory by the education provider keeping records of the student’s academic performance, which could be on the premises of the education provider. The condition is fulfilled if, at the time of enquiry, there existed a record which sets out the visa holder’s academic performance and whether the education provider considers that it is satisfactory. Condition 8202 does not stipulate that the student has to obtain certification or prove that the education provider is satisfied as to the visa holder’s academic performance.
CONSIDERATION
17 Following from the language of clause 2.43(2), the Minister must cancel the visa holder’s visa if satisfied "that the visa holder has not complied with condition 8202." Thus, the visa holder is the subject of the condition and it is the visa holder who must comply. Yet, when one turns to the condition about which the Minister had to be satisfied one sees that the condition required certification by the education provider that the academic result of the visa holder was at least satisfactory. The requirement imposed by the condition was certification of the academic result. This was to be the act of the education provider. The visa holder had no role to play in providing the certification.
18 The education provider is obliged to keep a record of a student’s academic performance (paragraph 34 of the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students established under s 33 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000), and this record may be required by the Department as evidence that the student satisfies visa requirements relating to academic performance (paragraph 36 of the Code). A breach of paragraph 34 is an offence punishable by a fine (reg 4.01 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Regulations 2001 (Statutory Rule SR 2001 No. 96). But there is no statutory right conferred on the visa holder allowing the visa holder to compel the education provider to furnish certification for the purpose of condition 8202. This circumstance highlights the fact that the visa holder is given no role to play in the certification referred to in reg 8202. In Tian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 238, the Full Court recognised that compliance with the condition is dependent alone on certification by the education provider and no act of the visa holder was involved. At [56] the Full Court said "if there is no certificate, compliance with Condition 8202 has not been achieved." Similarly, even if the first respondent was correct in the contention that the education provider keeping records constitutes certification, there is no role for the visa holder in compliance or non-compliance and no apparent trigger for cancellation.
19 There was no act of the visa holder which could satisfy the requirement of condition 8202. The achievement of the academic result was irrelevant unless certified. No matter what the student did or did not do, the absence of a certificate would be fatal.
20 Thus, there was no way in which the visa holder could not comply with the condition 8202. It follows that it was not possible for the Minister to be satisfied that the visa holder had not complied with condition 8202. It further follows that the power of the Minister to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 116(3) was not engaged.
CONCLUSION
21 The appeal against the orders of the primary judge which dismissed the application for review of the decision of the Tribunal will be allowed albeit on a ground not argued at first instance and paragraph 3 of the orders of 22 December 2006 will be set aside. A writ of certiorari will issue to quash the decision of the Tribunal, and a writ of mandamus will issue to require the Tribunal to determine the application according to law. This will require the Tribunal to set aside the decision of the delegate to cancel the appellant’s visa.
22 In view of the way in which the successful argument arose, each party
should pay their own costs of the appeal, and the order
for costs of the trial
made by the primary judge should remain unchanged.
|
I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a
true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable
Justice
North.
|
Associate:
Dated: 20
December 2007
|
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
WEN BI DAI
Appellant |
|
AND:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent |
|
JUDGES:
|
NORTH, GYLES AND EDMONDS JJ
|
|
DATE:
|
20 DECEMBER 2007
|
|
PLACE:
|
SYDNEY
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GYLES J:
23 I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of North J in draft. Those reasons explain the necessary background and the manner in which the point for decision arises and need not be repeated. Condition 8202 has attracted much litigation in its various forms. It has been described as "difficult to construe and apply" (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Ahmed [2005] FCAFC 58; (2005) 143 FCR 314 at [49]). That is true of the form of the condition relevant to this case. I agree with North J that the appeal should be allowed on a ground not argued before the primary judge. Indeed, all other grounds of appeal were bound to fail in the face of the decision of the Full Court in Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 71 and were effectively abandoned.
24 The trigger for cancellation pursuant to s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and reg 2.43(2)(b) was that the holder of the visa "has not complied with" condition 8202, subclause (1) of which required that the holder "must meet the requirements of" subclause (3), including:
"(b) the holder achieves an academic result that is certified by the education provider to be at least satisfactory:
(i) for a course that runs for less than a semester – for the course; or(ii) for a course that runs for at least a semester – for each term or semester (whichever is shorter) of the course."
25 The form of condition 8202(3)(b) does not sit easily with reg 2.43(2)(b) or s 116(1)(b). The failure on the part of a visa holder to comply with a condition most naturally connotes failure on the part of the visa holder to do, or refrain from doing, something within his or her control. However, condition 8202 subclause 3(b) requires the visa holder to achieve an academic result that is certified by the education provider, certification not being in the control of the visa holder. The form of s 116(1)(b) can be contrasted with that of s 116(1)(a) and (c).
26 It is relevant to note the existence in the Migration Act of subdivision GB of Div 3 – Visas for non-citizens – of Pt 2 – Control of arrival and presence of non-citizens – consisting of ss 137J–137P inclusive and entitled "Automatic cancellation of student visas". Subdivision D deals with cancellation of visas on certain grounds and the general procedure for cancelling visas under subdivision D is dealt with by subdivision E. Those two subdivisions are applicable to the present case. Subdivision GB was inserted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Overseas Students) Act 2000 and links with the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000. There was no detailed examination of the interplay between subdivision GB and the balance of Div 3 in argument. In particular, there was no analysis of how condition 8202 fits with that regime. It suffices to note that there is a procedure for cancellation of visas which is linked with, and complementary to, the statutory regime applicable to education providers that was not applied here.
27 It was put for the appellant that a condition that depends upon the uncontrolled and uncontrollable actions of a third party is bad (Conroy v Shire of Springvale and Noble Park [1959] VR 737 per Herring CJ at 748; Gavan Duffy J at 753 and Sholl J at 758–9). That can be illustrated at its highest by taking the case of a visa holder who achieved a satisfactory academic result but the education provider did not, for one reason or another, certify accordingly. Reasons could include incompetence, loss of records, closing down of the institution, corruption (the certificates only issued upon payment of a significant sum), personal animus and so on. Counsel for the Minister submitted that a formal certificate may not be necessary to comply with this condition but, even if that is correct, it does not avoid the problem as the result must be "certified by the education provider". Counsel for the Minister sought to reduce the sting of the argument by referring to the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 and the Education Services for Overseas Students Regulations 2001. Whilst those provisions require the keeping of records, there is no statutory obligation upon the education provider to certify results or any means of enforcing any such obligation. Furthermore, there is no statutory link between the Migration Act and the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (cf Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 71 and the authorities referred to in that decision). Condition 8202 in the form relevant to this case was introduced together with that Act and Regulations. It would have been expected that the obligation to obtain certification would have been matched by an obligation to certify and the failure to so legislate is at the root of the problem in this case.
28 In my opinion, a scheme could be devised including a properly framed condition that depended upon a visa holder holding certification of a result by the education provider. The holding of a particular qualification evidenced by certification is a common enough requirement for the licensing of various kinds of activity – the holding of different kinds of driving licences and educational qualifications evidenced by degrees from an educational institution are examples. The issue here relates to a condition of a student visa. Academic progress is obviously relevant to the grant or revocation of a student visa. Academic progress, or lack of academic progress, is therefore within the scope of the enabling legislation. The ascertainment as to whether there has been satisfactory academic progress, bearing in mind all relevant circumstances, may be difficult involving contestable questions of fact and degree. The choice of certification by the educational institution as the only evidence of the fact removes those elements of uncertainty. As was said by Heerey and Sundberg JJ in Jayasekara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 167; (2006) 156 FCR 199 at [16]:
"There is an obvious policy behind the way the condition is framed. Questions of academic progress should be left to the judgment of the education provider rather than a Departmental decision-maker or the Tribunal, who are less well fitted to make such judgments: Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 141 at [4]."
29 In my opinion, the decision in Conroy [1959] VR 737 cannot be relied upon to establish the appellant’s argument at its highest. The real ground of the decision is not easy to discern from the separate judgments. The reasons of Sholl J at 758 are clearest, although the precise basis for invalidation is not expressed. Those reasons are too broadly expressed – as I have pointed out, holding of a certificate or consent from one authority is often a condition precedent to obtaining a consent or certificate from another authority. Counsel for the Minister drew attention to the criticism of the decision in Pearce D and Argument S, Delegated Legislation in Australia, (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at par 15.14.
30 The question is whether this is such a scheme and such a condition. In my opinion, it is neither. The preponderance of authority favours the view that certification is the gist of this condition – Tian v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 238 at [55] and [56]; Ahmed [2005] FCAFC 58; 143 FCR 314 at [50]; Jayasekara [2006] FCAFC 167; 156 FCR 199 per Heerey and Sundberg JJ at [15] and [16]; and Cheng [2007] FCAFC 71 at [35]. The opinion of Finkelstein J in dissent in Jayasekara [2006] FCAFC 167; 156 FCR 199 at [25]–[27], relied upon by counsel for the Minister, does not represent the law. Condition 8202 is not framed so as to expressly impose an obligation upon the visa holder to hold or procure certification – certification is rather a free standing requirement. Compliance depends upon the existence of a positive certificate. Non-compliance is therefore the absence of a positive certificate rather than the existence of a negative certificate.
31 The problem is illustrated by considering how and when failure to comply is established. It was decided in Ahmed [2005] FCAFC 58; 143 FCR 314 at [50] that certification could not take place until completion of the relevant course, term or semester and therefore there could be no anticipatory failure to comply. Condition 8202 was in a somewhat different form at that time but condition 8202(c), as it then stood, is the same as the relevant part of the present condition. The situation after completion of the course, term or semester was not considered in that case. There will normally be a gap between completion of the course, term or semester and certification of results by the education provider. No doubt, education providers vary significantly in the size of the gap and the gap may vary from course to course or even from student to student depending upon particular circumstances. At what point does the visa holder fail to comply with the condition? Refusal to issue a visa where no certification is held (such as in Jayasekara [2006] FCAFC 167; 156 FCR 199), is different from cancellation of a visa for failure to comply with the condition on that basis.
32 In order to operate as contended for by the Minister, the condition would have to be read as not only imposing a positive obligation upon the visa holder to procure or hold certification but also as requiring it to be procured or held by a particular time. In my opinion, each would amount to a substantive redrafting of the condition. Furthermore, it cannot be concluded that, if attention had been directed to the issue, the condition would have been drafted to require certification within a reasonable time after completion of the course. That would involve uncertainty by contrast with the very prescriptive nature of the visa scheme generally and, in particular, in its application to student visas. It is just as likely that the condition would have required certification to be obtained within a fixed period of time after completion of the course so as to withdraw subjective judgment from the issue.
33 It was submitted for the Minister that, if this argument succeeded, condition 8202 would not be invalidated but, rather, a question would arise as to the application of s 116. There is a s 116 question. It was submitted for the Minister that the present case was not a "no certificate" case as the records in evidence showed that there had been unsatisfactory academic performance by the appellant, citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Yu [2004] FCAFC 333; (2004) 141 FCR 448. The records in evidence do not amount to certification or the absence of certification within the meaning of condition 8202. As I have said, there is no legal interaction between the records kept by an education provider and condition 8202. The Full Court said in Cheng [2007] FCAFC 71 at [35]:
"The condition was to be satisfied only by the requisite certificate on the part of the education provider. There is nothing in the language of condition 8202 that invites a consideration of the internal processes of the education provider which has led to a certificate or refusal to certify for a satisfactory academic result."
The decision in Yu [2004] FCAFC 333; 141 FCR 448 is consistent with that conclusion – see Tamberlin J at [7] and Allsop J at [36]–[40]. Indeed, Moore J dissented in substance on that issue ([2]–[6]). The precise point in issue here was not raised in that case. The merits or otherwise of this appellant are irrelevant. Failure by the appellant to comply with the condition has not been established.
34 I do not agree that the consequences of the argument end there. The validity of condition 8202 is affected by the conclusion I have reached. The disconformity between s 116(1)(b) (and reg 2.43(2)(b)), on the one hand, and condition 8202 subclause (3)(b), on the other, is also reflected within condition 8202 itself. Subclause (1) obliges the visa holder to meet the requirements of subclause (3)(b) in those cases to which it is applicable. In my opinion, the form of condition 8202 that was in force at the time relevant to this case was ultra vires the legislation, at least in circumstances where subclause (3)(b) came into play. On pain of cancellation of the visa, it compelled compliance by the visa holder with requirements that were not practicable or certain.
35 The role of unreasonableness, proportionality and uncertainty in relation to subordinate instruments is controversial – see the analysis in Pearce D and Argument S, Delegated Legislation in Australia, (3rd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at Ch 21 and Ch 22 and Aronson M and Dyer B, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (2nd ed, LBC Information Services, 2000) at pp 275–292. There has been valuable recent discussion as to reasonableness and proportionality by Weinberg J sitting in the Full Court in Vanstone v Clark [2005] FCAFC 189; (2005) 147 FCR 299 at [140]–[161] and [170]–[172]. See also Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources [2005] NSWCA 10; (2005) 138 LGERA 11 per Spigelman CJ at [127]–[139]; One.Tel Ltd v Australian Communications Authority [2000] FCA 1085; (2000) 176 ALR 529 per Hely J at [27]–[35]; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 377; (2000) 171 ALR 53 per O’Connor and Mansfield JJ at [36]–[51].
36 The most illuminating discussion of uncertainty in the context of a licence condition, breach of which would render the licence subject to cancellation, is that by Kitto J in Television Corporation Ltd v Commonwealth [1963] HCA 30; (1963) 109 CLR 59 at 70 as follows:
"In this context it seems to me a necessary conclusion that what the Act means by a ‘condition’ is a specification of acts to be done or abstained from by the licensee company--a specification telling the company what it is to do or refrain from doing, and thus on the one hand enabling it in regulating its conduct to know whether it is imperilling the licence or not, and on the other hand making clear to the Minister for the time being what test he is to apply in order that any judgment he may form as to compliance or non-compliance may not be vitiated by error of law. A specification cannot, I think, fulfil this dual function if it is so vaguely expressed that either its meaning or its application is a matter of real uncertainty; and for that reason it seems to me that on the proper construction of the Act the Minister's power to impose conditions is to be understood as limited to the imposition of conditions that are reasonably certain--that is to say (as has been said in a long line of cases with respect to conditions of forfeiture created by the dealings of private persons with other forms of property) conditions such that from the moment of their creation the Court can say with reasonable certainty in what events forfeiture will be incurred: cf In re Sandbrook; Noel v Sandbrook [1912] 2 Ch 471, at p 477. Such certainty includes both certainty of expression and certainty in operation."
37 In my opinion, condition 8202 as it stood in 2004 was both uncertain and unreasonable in the sense explained in the authorities and so was not authorised by the legislation.
CONCLUSION
38 I agree that the appeal should be allowed. I agree with the orders
proposed by North J.
|
I certify that the preceding sixteen (16) numbered paragraphs are a true
copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable
Justice Gyles.
|
Associate:
Dated: 20 December 2007
|
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
|
|
|
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
|
NSD 30 OF 2007
|
|
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF
AUSTRALIA
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
WEN BI DAI
Appellant |
|
AND:
|
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent |
|
JUDGES:
|
NORTH, GYLES AND EDMONDS JJ
|
|
DATE:
|
20 DECEMBER 2007
|
|
PLACE:
|
SYDNEY
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EDMONDS J:
INTRODUCTION
39 I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of North J in draft and gratefully adopt his Honour’s summary of: the background facts leading up to the cancellation of the appellant’s visa; the Migration Review Tribunal’s (‘the Tribunal’s’) conclusion on review of that decision; and the evolution of argument in this Court on appeal leading to an adjournment, an amendment of the notice of appeal and the further argument on resumption of the hearing of the appeal. I have, however, come to a different conclusion from his Honour.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
40 The Amended Notice of Appeal abandoned all grounds of the Notice of Appeal other than the first three grounds. This included abandonment of ground 4 – denial of procedural fairness – which, understandably, was said to be abandoned having regard to the decision of the Full Court in Cheng v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 71 – handed down on 18 May 2007, the first day of the hearing of this appeal.
41 The Amended Notice of Appeal included the following grounds and particulars:
‘Her Honour erred in failing to find that the decisions of the Minister’s Delegate and the Migration Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) were affected by jurisdictional error on the grounds that:
1. The Delegate and the Tribunal applied Visa Condition 8202(3)(b) of Schedule 8 of the Migration Regulations (1994) to cancel the appellant’s student visa when that Condition was invalid.
2. At the relevant time Condition 8202(3)(b) was invalid because it was an ultra vires or impermissible subdelegation of the legislative power delegated by s 41(1) Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
3. At the relevant time Condition 8202(3)(b) was invalid because it was not made within the power to make regulations under section 41(1) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or within any power under that Act.
Particulars
• Condition 8202(3)(b) imposes a condition which is not capable of compliance by the visa holder, that is the student, who is bound to perform it under s 116(3) of the Act and Regulation 2.43(2)(b)(ii):
o An essential prerequisite for compliance by the visa holder is that the education provider certify the visa holder’s academic result;o The education provider is under no legal obligation under the Migration Act 1958 or the Migration Regulations 1994 to certify the academic results of visa holders;
o Certification of the visa holder’s academic results by an education provider is not made with respect to, and the education [provider] is not bound by, the objects of the Migration Act 1958.’
ANALYSIS
42 Dealing first with the ultra vires head of challenge to the validity of Regulation 8202(3)(b) of Schedule 8 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (‘the Regulations’), that it is an ultra vires or impermissible sub-delegation of the legislative power the powers granted by subs 41(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’). I am unable to accede to that challenge. I agree with the first respondent’s (‘Minister’s’) submission that there can be no doubt that Regulation 8202(3)(b) is within the regulation-making power or powers conferred by subs 41(1) of the Act read, if necessary, with s 504. What is being dealt with is a student visa. Academic progress is obviously relevant to the grant or revocation of a student visa. Academic progress or lack of academic progress is therefore within the scope of the enabling legislation, being subs 41(1) of the Act read, if necessary, with s 504.
43 The second head of challenge is less clear, although the particulars provide some guidance. The alleged invalidity of Regulation 8202(3)(b) under this second head appears to be predicated on the ground that it is beyond the power conferred on the Minister, under s 116 of the Act, to cancel a visa; specifically, because the s 116 power is premised on the holder of the visa not complying with a condition of the visa, whereas the condition that is Regulation 8202(3)(b) is not capable of compliance by the visa holder; whether or not the condition that is Regulation 8202(3)(b) is complied with is in the hands of the education provider.
44 I do not agree with this analysis in so far as it suggests that the condition that is Regulation 8202(3)(b) is not capable of compliance by the visa holder; nor do I agree that whether or not the condition is complied with is in the hands of the education provider.
45 Clearly, the achievement of the academic result is the act of the visa holder. That result exists before and independently of any certification. The recordation of that result, in the records of the education provider, is mandated by those provisions of the legislation, regulations and codes referred to in [18] of the presiding judge’s reasons: see ss 33 and 44 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (Cth); reg 4.01 of the Education Services for Overseas Students Regulations 2001 (Statutory Rule SR 2001 No. 96); and paras 34 and 36 of the National Code of Practice for Registration Authorities and Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students.
46 There is no form or other requirement as to how the education provider is to certify the academic result. In those circumstances, the mandatory recordation of that result in the records of the education provider, in my view, amounts to a certification for the purposes of Regulation 8202(3)(b). So understood, an education provider’s refusal to provide a visa holder with further or additional certification, in the form of a certificate or otherwise because it is not legally obliged to do so or, correspondingly, because the visa holder has no legal entitlement to compel the education provider to provide such further or additional certification, is not to the point. It is not to the point because certification has already occurred in the education provider’s recordation of the academic result.
47 For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that Regulation 8202(3)(b) does not impose on the visa holder a requirement he cannot comply with; his or her achievement of an academic result that is satisfactory will carry with it mandatory certification to that effect.
48 For these reasons, in my view, the appeal should be dismissed with
costs.
|
I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy
of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice
Edmonds.
|
Associate:
Dated: 20 December
2007
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the First
Respondent on 29 June 2007: |
Mr A.C. Robertson SC with Ms S Kaur-Bains
|
|
|
|
|
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Second Respondent appeared and submitted
|
|
|
|
|
Date of Hearing:
|
|
|
|
|
|
Date of Judgment:
|
|
|
|
|
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2007/199.html