Comandate Marine Corp v The Ship *Boomerang I* [2006] FCAFC 106 (27 June 2006)

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION - surrogate arrest under s 19 of the Admiralty Act 1988 – the phrase "the owner" in s 19(b) does not include demise charterer.

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 3, 17, 18, 19

International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships done at Brussels on 10 May 1952

ASP Ship Management Pty Ltd v Bergvall [2006] FCAFC 23 referred to
Australasian United Steam Navigation Company Co Ltd v The Shipping Control Board [1945] HCA 45; (1945) 71 CLR 508 discussed
Baumwoll Manufactur Von Carl Scheibler v Furness [1983] AC 8 referred to
Colombo Drydocks Ltd v The Ship ‘Om Al-Quora’ [1990] 1 NZLR 601 referred to
I Congreso del Partido [1978] QB 500 discussed
McIlwraith McEachern Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [1945] HCA 11; (1945) 70 CLR 175 discussed
Sandeman v Scurr [1866] 2 QB 86 referred to
Sir John Jackson v Owners of Steam Ship Blanche (The ‘Hopper No 66’) [1908] AC 126 referred to
The ‘Andrea Ursula’ [1973] QB 265 discussed
The ‘Father Thames’ [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 364 referred to
The ‘Looiersgracht’ (1994) 85 FTR 265; [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 411 referred to
The ‘Loon Chong’ (1982) 1 MLJ 212 referred to
The ‘Maria Luisa’ [2002] FCA 1207; (2003) 130 FCR 1 discussed and approved
The ‘Nazym Khikmet’ [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 362 referred to
The ‘Permina 3001’ [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 327 referred to
The ‘Pyungwha 36’ (unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 22/10/96) not followed
The ‘St Merriel’ [1963] P 247 referred to
The ‘Union Darwin’ [1983] HKLR 248 referred to
Tisand (Pty) Ltd v The Owners of the Ship MV ‘Cape Moreton’ (Ex ‘Freya’) [2005] FCAFC 68; (2005) 143 FCR 43 referred to
Translink Pacific Shipping Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co. (unreported FCA, 6 October 1994) approved

The Australian Law Reform Commission Report on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction
Gilmore and Black in the Law of Admiralty, 2^nd ed, (1975)

COMANDATE MARINE CORP v THE SHIP "BOOMERANG I"
NSD 1223 OF 2006

EMMETT, ALLSOP & SIOPIS JJ
27 JUNE 2006
SYDNEY (VIDEO LINK TO PERTH)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NSD 1223 of 2006

BETWEEN:	COMANDATE MARINE CORP PLAINTIFF
AND:	THE SHIP "BOOMERANG I" DEFENDANT
JUDGES:	EMMETT, ALLSOP & SIOPIS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	27 JUNE 2006
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY (VIDEO LINK TO PERTH)

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NSD 1223 of 2006

BETWEEN:	COMANDATE MARINE CORP PLAINTIFF
AND:	THE SHIP "BOOMERANG I" DEFENDANT

JUDGES:	EMMETT, ALLSOP & SIOPIS JJ
DATE:	27 JUNE 2006
PLACE:	SYDNEY (VIDEO LINK TO PERTH)

1 I asked Allsop J to deliver the first judgment and agree that orders along the lines proposed by Allsop J should be made and generally for the reasons given by his Honour. I consider that the question is one of pure statutory interpretation in relation to s 19 of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the Act’). Section 19 must be construed in its context with ss 17 and 18, as Allsop J has observed. While there is a curious lack of symmetry in the language of those three sections, it is easy to discern a cascading scheme in the way the sections are intended to operate. Each is premised on there being a relevant person, namely a person who would be liable on a claim commenced as an action in personam who was the owner of a ship, or was the charterer of a ship, or was in possession or control of a ship.

2 Those three concepts are capable of standing independently of each other. Indeed, as a matter of ordinary language one would expect them to be construed as standing independently of each other. That is, the owner of a ship is different from the charterer of a ship and is different from a person who is possession or control of a ship. It may well be that the owner and charterer of a ship would be in possession or control of the ship. The latter expression is clearly intended to cover the situation where a person is in possession or control of a ship but is neither the owner nor the charterer. Charterer, when used in paragraph (a) of each of ss 17, 18 and 19, would include demise charterer, as well as other forms of charterer.

3 However, the use of the word "owner" in paragraphs (b) of ss 17 and 19 in contradistinction to the use of demise charterer in s 18(b), indicates the intention of the drafter of the provisions to draw a distinction between the owner, on the one hand, and a charterer, whether a demise charterer or otherwise, on the other. Again, as a matter of the language of the provisions the word "owner" when used in s 17 must be capable of referring not only to the owner of a ship but to the owner of other property. While Senior Counsel for the plaintiff draws attention to contexts in maritime law where "owner" might extend to include a demise charterer, there is no reason to think that such an extension would apply in relation to property other than a ship. One would not ordinarily refer to a hirer of chattels, other than a ship as the owner.

4 The authorities for the contexts within which "owner" may mean demise charterer in maritime law, to which senior counsel for the plaintiff has drawn attention, have been referred to by Allsop J. Specifically, the decisions of the High Court in McIlwraith McEachern Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [1945] HCA 11; (1945) 70 CLR 175 at 194 and 216-218 and Australasian United Steam Navigation Company Co Ltd v The Shipping Control Board [1945] HCA 45; (1945) 71 CLR 508. There is no basis for concluding that the High Court was propounding a usage of the word "owner" of general application in all maritime contexts. In McIlwraith McEachern, the High Court was referring specifically to s 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, which provides that the owners of a ship are not in certain cases to be liable to damages beyond an aggregate amount not exceeding a fixed monetary limit. The High Court concluded that a person who had entire control of a ship was an owner within the meaning of that section (see McIlwraith McEachern per Latham CJ at 194). One can see good policy reasons for reading s 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, insofar as it confers the benefit of limited liability as extending to someone who has the entire control and possession of a ship. I do not regard that conclusion as constituting a general proposition that the word "owner" includes a hirer or a person in possession and control of a ship in all contexts.

5 The question that arose in the Australasian United case was whether the Commonwealth had power to acquire property within the meaning of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. The issue was whether or not a charterer had any proprietary interest. Sir John Latham drew a clear distinction between the hire of a chattel, on the one hand, and the hire of services, on the other, the distinction being between locatio rei and locatio operis or locatio operarum. In the former case, the hirer obtains control and possession of the thing. In the latter case, the hirer obtains the right to the provision of services. The case is not authority for anything other than the proposition that, where possession is not given to a charterer by virtue of the terms of the charter, no property in the ship passes. Even if it be accepted that the granting of a demise charter confers some property interest in the charterer, that property interest is not ownership. There is no reason to treat the interest of a demise charterer, albeit an interest amounting to exclusive right to use and possess, as being akin to ownership.

6 The construction contended for by the defendant is entirely consistent with the intention evinced by the Law Reform Commission report that gave rise to the Act. What is relevant, of course, are the words of the Act and not what was stated by the drafter or the legislators as their intention. While such statements may be relevant in the case of ambiguity they cannot change the meaning of the statute. However, if there were any ambiguity, and I am not disposed to consider that there is any, it is clear that ambiguity would be unequivocally resolved in favour of the defendant’s construction. I am firmly of the view that a demise charterer of a ship is not the owner of that ship for the purpose of s 19(b) of the Act.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Emmett.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NSD 1223 of 2006

BETWEEN:	COMANDATE MARINE CORP PLAINTIFF
AND:	THE SHIP "BOOMERANG I" DEFENDANT
JUDGES:	EMMETT, ALLSOP & SIOPIS JJ
DATE:	27 JUNE 2006
PLACE:	SYDNEY (VIDEO LINK TO PERTH)

8 Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd ("Pan") is the demise or bareboat charterer of Boomerang I, a container ship of Gross Tonnage 18,327 built in Guangzhou in 2005. Pan employs Boomerang I on a coastal shipping service, including between the west and east coasts of Australia.

9 Pan was the time charterer of another vessel, Comandate. Pan previously employed Comandate on the Australian coastal service operated by it. A dispute arose between Pan and the plaintiff in this proceeding, Comandate Marine Corp, which is the owner of Comandate, in connection with the performance of the mutual obligations under that time charter. Pan previously arrested Comandate by invoking the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) (‘the Act’) through a Marshal of this Court in support of its claim for damages against the plaintiff arising from the asserted breaches by the plaintiff of the time charter of Comandate. Comandate was released after security was provided for Pan’s claims against the plaintiff.

10 The plaintiff says that Pan is liable to it under the time charter. It claims over $4,000,000 in damages for breach and repudiation of the time charter of Comandate. In support of that asserted liability of Pan to it, the plaintiff seeks to arrest Boomerang I.

11 It is clear from the above facts that the general maritime claim of the plaintiff (see s 4(3)(d) and (f) of the Act at least) is not "concerning" Boomerang I within the meaning of that word in ss 17 and 18 of the Act. The general maritime claim concerns Comandate. Thus, for that reason alone, if no other, neither s 17 nor s 18 of the Act is relevant to found the authority to commence an action in rem against Boomerang I and thereby arrest the ship under the Admiralty Rules. Sections 17 and 18 are in the following terms:

12 The plaintiff relies on s 19 of the Act as founding the authority to commence the action in rem in this Court. Section 19 is in the following terms:

13 There was only one issue debated before the Court. Pan, the nominated "relevant person" (see the definition of that phrase in s 3 of the Act), says that, on its face, the writ is bad and no statutory authority exists to arrest Boomerang I because, at the time when the proceeding was commenced, Pan was not the owner of Boomerang I, but was merely the demise or bareboat charterer of her. The phrase "the owner" or the word "owner" in Part III of the Act, and relevantly s 19(b) of the Act, does not, Pan says, encompass a demise or bareboat charterer. The plaintiff says it does.

14 Pan claims the following relief in a notice of motion filed in Court at 1930 hours on Saturday 24 June 2006.

15 These documents were filed at an urgently called hearing last Saturday night (the vessel having been arrested in the early hours of Saturday morning). By way of interlocutory relief, the Court permitted the loading and movement of the vessel. She is presently proceeding to Sydney (either to Port Jackson or Port Botany).

16 The Chief Justice has made a direction that the original jurisdiction of the Court in hearing the notice of motion (other than paragraph 6) and in hearing the application for release be heard by a Full Court.

17 This issue has arisen before, both under the Act and under differently worded, though cognate provisions of, or based on, relevant English legislation.

18 In England in the 1970s, there was a divergence of view amongst different judges. At that time the relevant statutory provision was s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK) as follows:

19 It is to be noted that there was at the time in the English legislation no in rem action directed, in terms, to a ship chartered by demise. (Compare s 18 of the Act and the later English provision s 21(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK).) In that context Brandon J (as he then was) in The ‘Andrea Ursula’ [1973] QB 265 at 269 - 272 said that the phrase "beneficially owned" encompassed demise chartered. Brandon J noted that the International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships done at Brussels on 10 May 1952 (the "Arrest Convention") contemplated demise charterer arrest in some circumstances. Brandon J also referred to, and relied upon, the cases on the Merchant Shipping Act 1893 (UK) dealing with the right to limit in which "owner" was held to include "demise charterer": The ‘Hopper No 66’ [1908] AC 126. (See in this regard The ‘Cape Moreton’ [2005] FCAFC 68; (2005) 143 FCR 43 at [73] and [177].) In so concluding, Brandon J disagreed with Hewson J in The ‘St Merriel’ [1963] P 247 at 257 who had expressed a view that beneficial ownership of all the shares therein indicated the statutory intent to be the true owner, that is, the person with a right to sell all the shares.

20 Goff J in I Congreso del Partido [1978] QB 500, in a closely reasoned judgment, rejected the views of Brandon J in The ‘Andrea Ursula’ and preferred the view of Hewson J in The ‘St Merriel’.

21 That view prevailed in England until the introduction of s 21(4) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), which introduced demise charter arrest: The ‘Father Thames’ [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 364. The Court of Appeal of Singapore in dealing with a cognate provision to s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act declined to follow The ‘Andrea Ursula’. (See The ‘Permina 3001’ [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 327.)

22 Other jurisdictions have followed I Congreso del Partido in preference to The ‘Andrea Ursula’: the Full Court of the Federal Court of Malaysia, The ‘Loon Chong’ (1982) 1 MLJ 212; the High Court of Hong Kong, The ‘Union Darwin’ [1983] HKLR 248; the High Court of New Zealand, Colombo Drydocks Ltd v The Ship ‘Om Al-Quora’ [1990] 1 NZLR 601; and the Federal Court of Canada, The ‘Looiersgracht’ (1994) 85 FTR 265; [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 411. See also the later English Court of Appeal decision in The ‘Nazym Khikmet’ [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 362.

23 The Australian Law Reform Commission (the "ALRC") considered the issue in [131] and [207] of its Report on Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction. At [207] the ALRC said:

24 In this context, the Act, drafted in the terms suggested by the ALRC, provided specifically for demise charter arrest in s 18.

25 In The ‘Pyungwha 36’ (unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 22/10/96) Slicer J in the Tasmanian Supreme Court expressed a preference in analysis for the approach of The ‘Andrea Ursula’ in respect of the question whether the word "owner" or the phrase "the owner" included demise charter. It is not entirely clear from the text of the decision as to whether s 18 or s 19 was being addressed; nevertheless, there is a clear preference expressed by his Honour for The ‘Andrea Ursula.’ I should note that a number of authorities to which I have referred were not cited to his Honour.

26 At first instance in The ‘Maria Luisa’ [2002] FCA 1207; (2003) 130 FCR 1, Beaumont J (at 7-10) examined a number of the authorities, and disagreed with Slicer J. Beaumont J in addressing the proper approach to the understanding of the word "owner" in the Act, preferred the approach exemplified in I Congreso del Partido. The point was not contested on appeal. In that respect, counsel for the plaintiff in the proceeding (the respondent to the motion) submitted that Beaumont J impermissibly addressed irrelevant cases, being cases on the English phrase and other foreign jurisdictions’ phrases being "beneficially owned as respect to all the shares therein". I disagree. Beaumont J was addressing the question of the content of the terms of the Australian statute. The ALRC dealt with the cases and with the question of policy advice, having examined all jurisdictions that it thought appropriate. Beaumont J was examining the cases by reference to construing the fruit of the ALRC’s work, the policy behind the Act and the meaning of the Act.

27 Before turning to the arguments of the parties, it is important to note that the task is one of statutory interpretation and that the above cases on differently worded, but cognate, legislation take their place as part of a context to the background of the interpretation of the Act alongside the ALRC Report. This is so not only by reference to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), but also by reference to the common law of statutory interpretation in this country. The High Court has, on a number of occasions in the recent past, indicated that a necessary analysis of the words of a statute requires, in the first instance and not only when ambiguity arises, the whole context of the words to be examined.

28 The arguments of the parties, if I may respectfully say so, particularly in the light of the shortness of time that counsel have had to prepare them, are fully and carefully set out in detailed written submissions that senior and junior counsel, together with the assistance of the solicitors, have prepared. May I express my gratitude to all the legal representatives for the care and skill which has been so exhibited. The fullness of those submissions and the care with which they have been drafted relieves me of the obligation to deal with them in detail.

29 In outline, senior counsel for the plaintiff says that the word "owner" should not be read down by any limitation whatsoever by reference to notions of beneficial ownership or the kind identified in different wordings in different statutes in the cases to which I have referred. He refers to the cases such as Sandeman v Scurr [1866] 2 QB 86 and Baumwoll Manufactur Von Carl Scheibler v Furness [1983] AC 8 which illustrate the importance of the consequence of demise charter in a practical shipping context. Those matters are further embedded in the views of learned authors such as Gilmore and Black in the Law of Admiralty, 2^nd ed, (1975), The Foundation Press Inc. It goes without saying that a fundamental and basally important characteristic of the use of a ship is created by demise charter in the proper sense, whereby total possession and control of not only the ship but also the crew is taken. It can be said, in a maritime context, and for various purposes in maritime law recognised by the jurisdiction contemplated by s 76(iii) of the Constitution, that there can be seen to be a species of right referable to property in the ship which can be seen to rest in the person who has possession and control under such a charter. Such a conclusion is, of course, subject to the terms of the demise charter. The expression of views of the High Court in McIlwraith McEachern Ltd v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [1945] HCA 11; (1945) 70 CLR 175 and Australasian United Steam Navigation Company Co Ltd v The Shipping Control Board [1945] HCA 45; (1945) 71 CLR 508 reflect this important notion of possession and control giving a species of right akin to, or having some identity with, the property which is possessed and controlled in full. It may be that there is an analogy with terrene notions of estates in land in the possession of real estate by leasehold. It is unnecessary to explore that jurisprudential link.

30 The expressions of view, in particular of Latham CJ in Australian United Steam Navigation Company (at 521 - 522), indicate the importance in the shipping industry and in maritime law of the possession and control given by the demise charter. However, nothing said in those cases should be understood as subsuming or overtaking property law notions underlying the concept of ownership. All the comments of Latham CJ in McIlwraith and Australasian United were founded upon the notion that, ultimately, the relationship between the owner and the demise charterer is one based on hire, in which the total possession and control of the vessel is given to the charterer, as distinct from charters such as time charters where, strictly speaking and in legal substance, the ship is not hired at all, rather a control of deployment of the commercial working of the ship is given to the charterer to require the master on behalf of the owner to take the ship subject to the terms of the charter where the charterer wants it taken: cf ASP Ship Management Pty Ltd v Bergvall [2006] FCAFC 23 at [103].

31 Senior counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Street SC, also referred to Sir John Jackson v Owners of Steam Ship Blanche [1908] AC 126, (that is The ‘Hopper No 66’ referred to by Brandon J in The ‘Andrea Ursula’) in relation to the Merchant Shipping Act and limitation of liability thereunder. In that different statutory context, the word "owner" for the benefit of maritime protection and limitation of liability has been extended to that party who has, in all practical reality, the position of the owner operating the ship, that is the demise charterer, who acts as if it were the owner in total control and possession of the ship.

32 There are in maritime law competing notions of what ownership is in different contexts. This is best illustrated by the lucid decision of Brandon J in The ‘Andrea Ursula’ [1973] QB 265. The context here, however, as counsel for Pan, Dr Bell, identified in his submissions, is the operation of the structure of the provisions of the Act providing for in rem actions, and thereby, through the Rules, arrest. Before leaving Mr Street’s submissions I should add that Mr Street indicated that this Court should not apply and should disapprove Beaumont J’s decision in The ‘Maria Luisa’ and Lee J’s decision in Translink Pacific Shipping Ltd v Baltic Shipping Co (unreported FCA, 6 October 1994) which was to the same effect.

33 Counsel for Pan submitted, correctly in my view, that one should look at all these decisions that I have referred to as the background to the proper construction of the simple words of the statute. The text of s 19 and the other sections in Part III of the Act make a clear distinction between notions of ownership and chartering and the general practical position of being in possession and control of the ship. For the reasons that Ryan J and I expressed in The ‘Cape Moreton’, the structure of the arrangement of in rem actions in the Act was based upon conforming to international standards and to requiring, in paragraph (b) of each of ss 17 and 19, a notion of a relationship, between the relevant person and the property in question, of ownership in the proprietary sense. As Ryan J and I said in The ‘Cape Moreton’, notions of ownership are not amenable to crisp a priori definition. That may or may not have been why the ALRC did not attempt it, but this Court, in the The ‘Maria Luisa’ [2003] FCAFC 93; (2003) 130 FCR 12 and in The ‘Cape Moreton’, has said that the notion of ownership is a proprietary one linked to the ultimate rights of control and dominion and sale of the ship and property. (This should not be taken to be a summary of these two cases for all purposes, but is sufficient for present purposes.)

34 Counsel for Pan refers to the background to the drafting of the Act and the direct attention by the ALRC to the cases to which I have referred. This is the correct approach. Dr Bell, in my view, does not seek impermissibly to apply cases from other jurisdictions to a different form of words in an Australian Act. He legitimately identifies as the appropriate context of the terms of ss 17, 18 and 19 and, in particular, s 19, the views of the ALRC in dealing with surrogate arrest. These views were that Australian legislation should be expanded to cater for surrogate arrest, but not beyond that which other cognate jurisdictions apply.

35 Taking this complete legal background into account, one then comes to the fairly simple words of ss 17, 18 and 19, and in particular s 19, which distinguish between the owner, charterer and the person in possession or control of the ship. The wide group of categories in paragraph (a) of each section is then limited to the more narrow funnel in paragraph (b) of each of those sections: in ss 17 and 19 by reference to the owner; in s 18 by reference to the demise charterer. In my view, the phrase "the owner" in the total background and context of the ALRC and the body of jurisprudence behind it, together with the Arrest Convention, was not intended to incorporate demise charterer.

36 These conclusions are not based upon a precise and fine scalpel attempting to divide each provision of the Act into self contained portions. That would be an inappropriate way to construe the Act. However, it is not without relevance to say that if it be the case that the phrase "the owner" includes demise charterer there is a significant degree of repetition, not mere overlap, in the operation of ss 17 and 18. The operation of the sections would be only made different by the different scope of the phrases "general maritime claim" and "maritime claim."

37 In all the circumstances, and in particular against the background of the preparation and drafting and passing of the Act, the jurisprudence lying behind that consideration and the Arrest Convention, in my view the phrase "the owner" in s 19(b) does not include demise charterer and, on its face, the writ cannot be sustained. Subject to more precision in the formulation of the orders, I would set aside the writ, set aside the arrest and release the vessel.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Allsop.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NSD 1223 of 2006

BETWEEN:	COMANDATE MARINE CORP PLAINTIFF
AND:	THE SHIP "BOOMERANG I" DEFENDANT

JUDGES:	EMMETT, ALLSOP & SIOPIS JJ
DATE:	27 JUNE 2006
PLACE:	SYDNEY (VIDEO LINK TO PERTH)

38 I agree with the reasons which have been given by Allsop J and Emmett J and with the orders that are proposed.

I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraphs is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Siopis.

Counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent:	Mr A W Street SC with Mr D McLure

Solicitor for the Plaintiff/Respondent:	Norton White

Counsel for the Defendant/ Applicant:	Dr A S Bell with Mr S Gray

Solicitor for the Defendant/Applicant:	Ebsworth & Ebsworth

Date of Hearing:	27 June 2006

Date of Judgment:	27 June 2006

1.	The writ in rem dated 23 June 2006 be set aside.
2.	The MV "Boomerang I" be released from arrest.
3.	Order 1 be stayed up to and including Thursday, 29 June 2006, on the undertaking by Pan Australia Shipping Pty Limited to the Court that Boomerang 1 continue to operate in accordance with its published schedule and not leave Australian waters until after the expiration of 14 days prior written notice to the solicitors for the plaintiff.
4.	The costs of the notice of motion be reserved.
5.	The balance of the notice of motion be stood over before Allsop J for directions at 9:30am on Wednesday, 5 July 2006.

Federal Court of Australia - Full Court Decisions

Comandate Marine Corp v The Ship Boomerang I [2006] FCAFC 106 (27 June 2006)