Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 155 (22 August 2005)

Last Updated: 24 August 2005

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd v Timania Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 155

CONTEMPT OF COURT – Timania provided trucking services to Inghams – agreement that Timania would provide additional trucking services to Inghams provided its price remained competitive – Timania initiated court proceedings against Inghams – Inghams withdrew offer of additional trucking work – original Statement of Charge was defective – Statement of Charge reformulated by primary Judge – no opportunity for parties to make submissions on reformulation – whether primary Judge erred in granting leave to amend the Statement of Charge and failing to give the parties an opportunity to make submissions – whether parties sufficiently informed that the primary Judge proposed to rely on his observations of Mr Turner in Court

Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151 discussed
Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399 discussed
Angaston and District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177 discussed
GIO of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304 discussed
Kappos v State Transit Authority (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Clarke, Meagher and Sheller JJA, 25 May 1995) discussed
Kassem v Crossley (2000) 32 MVR 179 discussed

Stead v State Government Insurance Office [1986] HCA 54; (1986) 161 CLR 141 discussed
Doyle v The Commonwealth [1985] HCA 46; (1985) 156 CLR 510 referred to
Coward v Stapleton [1953] HCA 48; (1953) 90 CLR 573 referred to
Carew Reid v Carew Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court, Malcolm, Franklyn and Nicholson JJ, 23 April 1993) referred to
Harmsworth v Harmsworth [1987] 1 WLR 1676 referred to
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1758 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949; (2002) 121 FCR 24 referred to
Castledine v Boronga Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 215 referred to
Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation v Minister of State for Industrial Relations [1982] FCA 134; (1982) 43 ALR 189 referred to

Crawford Fitting Co v Sydney Valve & Fittings Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 438 referred to



INGHAMS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 008 447 345) AND CHRISTOPHER TURNER v TIMANIA PTY LTD (ACN 006 315 064) AND WAYNE TONER

VID 823 OF 2004


TAMBERLIN, NORTH AND DOWSETT JJ
MELBOURNE
22 AUGUST 2005

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	VID 823 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:	INGHAMS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 008 447 345) FIRST APPELLANT CHRISTOPHER TURNER SECOND APPELLANT
AND:	TIMANIA PTY LTD (ACN 006 315 064) FIRST RESPONDENT WAYNE TONER SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGES:	TAMBERLIN, NORTH AND DOWSETT JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	22 AUGUST 2005
WHERE MADE:	MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders of the primary Judge made on 9 June 2004 are set aside.





Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	VID 823 OF 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:	INGHAMS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 008 447 345) FIRST APPELLANT CHRISTOPHER TURNER SECOND APPELLANT
AND:	TIMANIA PTY LTD (ACN 006 315 064) FIRST RESPONDENT WAYNE TONER SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:	TAMBERLIN, NORTH AND DOWSETT JJ
DATE:	22 AUGUST 2005
PLACE:	MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

1 This is an appeal against orders made by a Judge of this Court at first instance holding each of the appellants in contempt of court and consequential orders. The contempt charges arose out of litigation between the appellants, Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd ("Inghams") and Christopher Turner, and the respondents, Timania Pty Ltd ("Timania") and Wayne Toner, in this Court in connection with commercial dealings between them. The substantive litigation has now been resolved, and so the respondents have no interest in resisting the appeal. However, the Court has an interest in upholding its own orders. The grounds of appeal included allegations that there had been a failure to provide procedural fairness. Having regard to the fact that the appeal raised important issues in relation to a contempt of court, we therefore sought and obtained the assistance of Mr M J Collins of Counsel as amicus curiae. We are grateful to Mr Collins for his detailed and cogent submissions.

2 The relevant circumstances of the case can be briefly stated. At all material times, Mr Toner carried on a trucking business through the company, Timania. Since 1985, Timania has provided carrying services to Inghams. On 31 March 2004, Mr Toner and Timania commenced proceedings in this Court against Inghams, claiming damages and other relief, such claims arising out of previous business dealings between them. Mr Turner is employed by Inghams as its southern regional manager.

3 Prior to January 2004, Timania had regularly carted chickens from Inghams’ depot at Somerville to its depot in Thomastown and from Thomastown to a storage facility in Doveton. In January 2004, Mr Toner was informed that the Thomastown facility was to be closed and that Inghams would need additional transport services to carry loads to Doveton. Mr Toner inquired of Inghams whether or not, if he acquired an additional truck, he would receive the additional work. He was told that he would, provided that he could match the prices charged by another contractor. As a result, in April 2004, Mr Toner acquired a truck, allegedly in reliance upon the representation made by Inghams that he would get this extra work. After acquisition of the additional truck, Mr Toner was given his roster for the following week and commenced to perform his usual work, as well as carting the additional loads. Subsequent events appear sufficiently from the following paragraphs of the reasons given by the primary Judge in the contempt proceedings:

‘6. Unbeknown to Mr Toner, events were unfolding which would result in the termination (or more likely the repudiation) of Timania’s contract to carry the additional loads. These events had their genesis with Inghams’ weekly management meeting which was held on Thursday, 22 April 2004. Among the ten senior Inghams employees present were Mr Turner (the most senior person at the meeting) and Mr Lawrence, the Plant Manager at Thomastown. During the meeting Mr Turner mentioned that Mr Toner (he may have also mentioned Timania) had commenced an action against Inghams. Mr Turner knew very little about the action; he had not seen a copy of the statement of claim, Inghams’ solicitors had not discussed the claim with him and he described his own involvement with the case as "little to none". The details of the claim were not discussed. Mr Turner mentioned the action because Mr Toner had been invited to Inghams’ golf weekend and he voiced the opinion that Mr Toner should not attend whilst the proceedings were on foot. Those present agreed and Mr Toner’s invitation was subsequently withdrawn. Mr Lawrence then informed Mr Turner of the new contract with Mr Toner. Mr Turner canvassed whether Inghams should be providing additional work to Mr Toner in light of his action against Inghams. Mr Turner said that "[t]he general view expressed at the meeting [was] that it was not a good idea for ... Inghams to allow [Mr Toner] to do delivery services other than his usual runs."

7. Mr Tuner proffered an explanation for this view. He deposed that he was concerned that "if for some reason Toner was successful [in his action against Inghams] then the last few months of his income could be assessed to determine the extent of his claim and this could include income derived from the additional work." He gave the same explanation during cross-examination. I have no hesitation in rejecting his explanation. First Mr Turner did not impress me as a witness. I had the clear impression that Mr Turner, who was well aware of the difficult position he was in, was prepared to say whatever he thought necessary to avoid a finding of contempt. In passing I should mention Mr Turner’s conduct in court, conduct which I have tried to put out of my mind (but perhaps not with complete success) while assessing his credibility as a witness. During the cross-examination of another Inghams’ employee, I observed Mr Turner making signals to the witness indicating how he should answer questions. The signals included nodding and shaking his head, which I took to be an indication that the witness should answer yes or no (as the case may be), as well as mouthing words. I also saw the witness hesitate before answering questions, I suspect to allow the witness to take instruction as to the appropriate answer. What extraordinary conduct, especially for a person who is being tried for contempt. When I pointed out what was happening, his lawyer asked Mr Turner to leave the courtroom until the conclusion of the evidence.

[We have highlighted the latter part of this paragraph as it is relevant to a major ground of appeal.]

8. The second reason for rejecting Mr Turner’s explanation is that if he wanted to protect Inghams from additional damages, I believe that he would have said so at the meeting. I am satisfied that this did not happen. First Mr Turner did not say that he mentioned this concern at the meeting. The only other attendee to give evidence was Mr Lawrence. Mr Lawrence’s affidavit made no reference to Mr Turner making any statement with respect to mitigating Ingham’s [sic] loss. During cross-examination Mr Lawrence made what I regard as a feeble attempt at supporting Mr Turner. He said: "We discussed [Mr Toner] at the meeting, whether Wayne could go on the golf trip, given the legal writ, and he said: ‘What do you think we should do? Should we just keep to the current agreements? Should we be’ – or words to this effect – ‘giving him more income or extra business,’ and we sort of didn’t make a concrete decision, just thought we shouldn’t be adding to his business – or his, you know, extra deliveries." In my view Mr Lawrence gave this evidence for the sole purpose of backing up Mr Turner, without regard to its truthfulness.

9. The third reason for rejecting Mr Turner’s explanation is that if he made any comment about protecting Inghams at the meting, other attendees would have been called to verify that evidence due to its importance. The other attendees were not called and no explanation was given for their absence. I assume, as I am entitled to do, that they were not called because their evidence would not have supported Mr Turner.

10. The final reason arises from correspondence that passed between Middletons, who act for the applicants, and Freehills, the solicitors for the respondents. I will deal with that correspondence, as well as the inferences to be drawn from it, later in these reasons.’

4 His Honour then referred to certain other aspects of the evidence and concluded:

‘15. In these circumstances I reject Mr Turner’s and Mr Lawrence’s assertion that no final decision had ever been taken to cancel Timania’s contract. It is clear that the decision was taken either at the management meeting or shortly thereafter, and certainly no later than early Friday morning.

16. I find the facts to be as follows. Mr Turner decided that Timania should not be allowed to carry any extra loads. Two reasons informed his decision: one was to punish the applicants for bringing the Federal Court action and the other, which follows from the first, was to put financial pressure on the applicants to withdraw the action. Mr Lawrence was instructed (probably by Mr Turner) to implement the decision. Mr Lawrence subsequently informed Messrs Willox and Lawler that Mr Toner would no longer be given extra work. It was the responsibility of one of these gentlemen to see that the instruction was implemented.

17. This is just what happened. On Tuesday, 27 April 2004 Mr Toner arrived at the Thomastown depot to load his truck for an ordinary delivery to Doveton. Mr Lawler informed him that he would no longer be doing the additional runs. I have both Mr Toner’s and Mr Lawler’s account of the conversation. There is very little difference between them. The only difference is that Mr Toner recalls being told the reason why he would no longer be given the extra work. Mr Toner attributes to Mr Lawler the statement that he, Mr Lawler, had been told by Mr Turner that there would be "no more extra work for Toner whilst he is suing the company". Mr Lawler does not recall making this comment. I believe that he did: they were his instruction and there was no reason for him not to pass them on.’

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING MR TURNER’S BEHAVIOUR

5 Ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal, which arises out of the highlighted part of [7] of his Honour’s reasons, is as follows:

‘The learned judge erred in that after observing the behaviour of the second appellant ("Mr Turner") in court, and the resulting response of the witness giving evidence, Mr Lawrence, His Honour failed to sufficiently detail those observations or their likely potential significance in the ultimate finding as to the credibility of those witnesses to the appellant’s counsel. As a result the appellants were deprived of the opportunity of having Mr Turner give instructions and/or evidence and/or calling evidence from Mr Lawrence in response to his Honour’s detailed observations.’

6 Mr Lawrence was another employee of Inghams. His Honour’s intervention is recorded in the transcript as follows:

‘His Honour:
Can I just interrupt for one second. Mr Harrison, it would be very much in your client’s interests to make sure that Mr Turner doesn’t seek to instruct the witness on what answers he should give. You’d better tell him or get your solicitor to tell him the consequences of doing what he’s doing.

Mr Harrison:
Perhaps I could take a second just to do that.

His Honour:
Yes. Thank you. Ask a question.’

7 The appellants’ complaint is, in effect, that his Honour had not indicated that he might, in deciding the matter, take into account his observations of Mr Turner’s conduct. Had he done so, it is said, the appellants would, or may, have sought to lead further evidence either from Mr Turner or from Mr Lawrence concerning the incident and make submissions concerning it.

8 Counsel have helpfully referred us to a number of cases in which similar problems were considered. In Minagall v Ayres [1966] SASR 151 (Minagall), Ayres was charged summarily with having driven a motor vehicle whilst under the influence of liquor. The prosecution led evidence as to his appearance and conduct at the relevant time, which evidence, if accepted, suggested that he was then under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Magistrate dismissed the charge, observing that Ayres’ behaviour in court during the hearing had satisfied him that the witnesses for the prosecution could have been honestly mistaken as to his conduct. On appeal to a Judge of the Supreme Court, Hogarth J held at 154:

‘It is, of course, proper and usual for the Court to take note of the demeanour of a witness when in the witness box giving evidence. This is one of the most common and valuable means available to the Court for arriving at the truth of a matter. It is entirely different, however, for a court to take into account the "actions, mannerisms and idiosyncrasies" of a party while he is sitting in the body of the court, that is to say, while he is out of range of vision of both his own and opposing counsel, when the conduct in question may be calculated to lead the court to a decision in his favour. Such conduct is analogous to a statement made by a party in his own favour out of court, evidence of which, in general, would not be admissible. No reference was made during the hearing of the conduct observed by the special magistrate, and of course counsel for the prosecution had no opportunity to investigate its genuineness.’

9 On appeal to the Full Court, Napier CJ and Travis J said at 156, referring to the above passage:

‘But, while we agree with Hogarth J, we desire to guard ourselves against being understood as laying down any absolute rule upon the subject. It seems to us that it is a matter of what we should regard as "fair play and common sense". The condition upon which a judge is at liberty to take notice of what he has seen for himself is that the party should know or be informed of what he has noticed, and have an opportunity of answering or dealing with it. ...’

Justice Chamberlain apparently concurred in this aspect of their Honours’ reasons.

10 In Jobst v Inglis (1986) 41 SASR 399, a trial Judge concluded that the plaintiff in a personal injuries action had exaggerated her injuries, basing that conclusion upon ‘the totality of the evidence’, including a film, observations of the plaintiff in the witness box and ‘her contrasting demeanour and behaviour in the body of the court’. After referring to the decision in Minagall, and in particular to the "fair play and commonsense" observation, Jacobs J (who dissented in the result) said at 402:

‘The trial judge, on his own initiative, obeyed that precept. He brought his observations to the attention of counsel for the plaintiff, expressly acknowledging the risk of drawing an unfair conclusion, and invited comment or explanation, an invitation which was accepted by counsel; and after discussion counsel said "it is perfectly true (sic) for your Honour to take all those things into account". Having regard to the explanation offered by counsel it is in my opinion quite unrealistic to suggest that the plaintiff should have been recalled to explain her conduct. A Judge cannot be required or expected to interrupt a trial every time a party gestures or grimaces from the body of the Court, which happens not infrequently; no doubt if the conduct is persisted in, it may be prudent to draw it to the attention of the counsel, or even "warn" the party concerned; but what is "fair play and common sense" in dealing with such a situation will vary from case to case. As I have already said, I can see no judicial impropriety in the present case.’

11 At 408, Matheson J said:

‘It is true that the trial Judge drew the attention of counsel to what he had observed, but at that time, notwithstanding that the appellant had been in and out of the witness box, his Honour, curiously, only contrasted what he had observed of the appellant in the body of the courtroom with how she had appeared on the film, making no mention of his observations of her in the witness box. Secondly, it seems extraordinary that if she was really "playing a part" in the body of the court, when she must have known that she was under his Honour’s observation, that she did not play the same part in the witness box. Thirdly, his Honour’s statement that the forlorn expression which he noticed whilst she sat in the body of the court (appeared) to be consistent with her presentation to the majority of her medical examiners, was not really in accord with the evidence, as counsel demonstrated. Finally, the exchange with counsel took place, not merely after all the defence evidence had been given, but defence counsel had finished his final address and counsel for the appellant was half-way through his address. He was clearly in a most invidious position. His Honour ultimately told counsel his observations, but, in my opinion, current concepts of natural justice required that he should have been told earlier, and at a time when he could have sought instructions, possibly over an adjournment, and possibly applied to recall the appellant.’

12 At 417, Johnston J said:

‘In my view it is inevitable that the judge will make observations of a party he observes in the court when that party is not actually giving evidence. Generally speaking such observations will be of no real moment, often perhaps confirming impressions already formed from seeing the person give evidence, perhaps adding slightly to the overall impression. I do not think that a judge is called upon to draw to the attention of counsel every single observation that he makes. I respectfully agree with what was said by Napier CJ and Travers J in Minagall v Ayres, that it is a matter of fair play and common sense, that if any real significance is to be attached to what is observed, the party should be informed of what has been noticed.

Here his Honour used his observations in respect of what he plainly regards as a very important finding, namely that the plaintiff had exaggerated her symptoms. I think if he was going to use his observations for this purpose, he was bound to draw the attention of counsel to his observations at a time when it was open to the party to bring forward such evidence as might be desired in explanation of it. I think that his indication to counsel was too late. (In this case it might well be that various of the doctors would have views about the observed behaviour of the plaintiff.’

13 We consider, with respect, that the majority view may be a counsel of perfection. Perhaps we are now a little more flexible in allowing the re-opening of a case, even at a very late stage in the trial. The general principle advanced in all three judgments is, in our view, correct.

14 In Angaston and District Hospital v Thamm (1987) 47 SASR 177 (Angaston), the Full Court was concerned with a workers’ compensation claim in which the trial Judge found that the claimant’s incapacity was partial and not total. In reaching this decision, the trial Judge took into account observations of the claimant’s actions and demeanour in the body of the court and out of sight of counsel, but he had not brought these observations to the attention of counsel. After referring to the decision in Minagall, King CJ continued at 178-9:

‘The rule, as appears from the passage cited, is not to be regarded as absolute in the sense that it must be applied rigidly to every observation which a judge might make of a party during the course of a trial outside the witness-box. Something will depend, no doubt, on the circumstances of the particular case and upon the significance of the particular observations. It is clear, however, that where the judge makes observations of the actions or demeanour of a party, which actions and demeanour are not observable by counsel, and makes use of those observations in a way which has a significant influence upon his decision of the case, he is required in justice, before making such use of those observations, to make those observations and the possibility of his using them in the course of his judgment known to counsel at a stage of the hearing at which counsel still has an opportunity of dealing with them in a proper and effective way.’

15 In GIO of New South Wales v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 304, Minagall and Angaston were quoted as authority for a general rule which was said to be ‘based upon considerations of fairness and justice’. The same line of decisions was cited by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales with apparent approval in Kappos v State Transit Authority (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Clarke, Meagher and Sheller JJA, 25 May 1995) and again in Kassem v Crossley (2000) 32 MVR 179.

16 If, in deciding the present case, the primary Judge proposed to rely upon his observations of Mr Turner, he was obliged to draw them to the attention of counsel. His Honour certainly communicated his view that Mr Turner had been seeking to instruct the witness as to answers. He did not precisely describe the conduct which he had observed but rather the inference which he had drawn from it. Nonetheless, had counsel been in any doubt as to the incident, they could have asked for further details. However, if his Honour proposed to take the incident into account in deciding the case, then he was also obliged to afford counsel an opportunity to lead evidence concerning it and to make submissions. Counsel could only have known that they should seek to do so if they were aware of his Honour’s intention. We are not satisfied that his Honour made it clear to counsel that he proposed so to consider the incident. It is true that he referred to "the consequences" but that expression did not necessarily mean that the incident would be relied upon in deciding the case. If anything, the contrary was indicated. The tenor of the remark was that Mr Turner should cease whatever he was doing. It was a reasonable inference that if he did so, there would be no further "consequences". Such "consequences" may well have been that his Honour would deal with Mr Turner for contempt in the face of the Court. We consider that the primary Judge ought to have stated clearly his intention to take the incident into account in deciding the case so that counsel could determine whether or not to lead evidence or make submissions concerning it.

17 In Stead v State Government Insurance Office [1986] HCA 54; (1986) 161 CLR 141, the High Court considered a case in which the trial Judge had invited counsel for one party to make submissions upon a basis which differed from that upon which the case was eventually decided. After observing that general principles require that a person’s case be tested at a fair trial, the Court (Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) observed at 145-6:

‘That general principle is, however, subject to an important qualification which Bollen J. plainly had in mind in identifying the practical question as being: Would further information possibly have made any difference? That qualification is that an appellate court will not order a new trial if it would inevitably result in the making of the same order as that made by the primary judge at the first trial. An order for a new trial in such a case would be a futility.

For this reason not every departure from the rules of natural justice at a trial will entitle the aggrieved party to a new trial. By way of illustration, if all that happened at a trial was that a party was denied the opportunity of making submissions on a question of law, when, in the opinion of the appellate court, the question of law must clearly be answered unfavourably to the aggrieved party, it would be futile to order a new trial.

Where, however, the denial of natural justice affects the entitlement of a party to make submissions on an issue of fact, especially when the issue is whether the evidence of a particular witness should be accepted, it is more difficult for a court of appeal to conclude that compliance with the requirements of natural justice could have made no difference. True it is that an appeal to the Full Court from a judgment or order of a judge is by way of rehearing and that on hearing such an appeal the Full Court has all the powers and duties of the primary judge, including the power to draw inferences of fact ... . However, when the Full Court is invited by a respondent to exercise these powers in order to arrive at a conclusion that a new trial, sought to remedy a denial of natural justice relevant to a finding of fact, could make no difference to the result already reached, it should proceed with caution. It is no easy task for a court of appeal to satisfy itself that what appears on its face to have been a denial of natural justice could have had no bearing on the outcome of the trial of an issue of fact. And this difficulty is magnified when the issue concerns the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of a witness at the trial.’

18 At [7] of the reasons for judgment in the present matter, immediately prior to the impugned observations, his Honour was dealing with Mr Turner’s credit. His Honour rejected a significant aspect of his evidence, observing that ‘First, Mr Turner did not impress me as a witness. I had the clear impression that Mr Turner, who was well aware of the difficult position he was in, was prepared to say whatever he thought necessary to avoid a finding of contempt.’

19 His Honour then commented "in passing" upon the incident with which we are presently concerned, observing that he may not have been able to put it out of his mind. This inevitably suggests that his Honour was frankly conceding that he may have been influenced by it. That would not have mattered had he offered counsel the opportunities to which we have referred. In the circumstances, we cannot be satisfied that the outcome of these proceedings could not have been affected had Mr Turner been given an opportunity to explain the incident and/or had counsel made appropriate submissions. The rejection of Mr Turner’s evidence was a significant step in reaching the ultimate decision in this case. Accordingly, there has been a failure to afford procedural fairness. For that reason, the appeal ought to be allowed and the orders below set aside.

20 We turn now to a further ground of appeal.

AMENDMENT OF THE STATEMENT OF CHARGE

21 The Statement of Charge dated 10 May 2004 ("the Original Statement of Charge"), which was the subject of oral submissions before the primary Judge at the hearing, was in the following terms:

‘The applicants allege as follows:

AS AGAINST CHRIS TURNER

1. On or about 23 April 2004 you did telephone persons within the respondent including Mark Lawler of the respondent and did say to them that there was no more extra work for Wayne Toner, the second applicant, whilst he Toner, is suing the respondent.

AS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT

1. On or about 23 April 2004 Chris Turner, employed by the respondent as its Southern Regional Manager did telephone persons within the respondent including Mark Lawler of the respondent and did say to them on behalf of the respondent that there was no more extra work for Wayne Toner, the second applicant, whilst he Toner, is suing the respondent.’

22 The hearing before his Honour on 20 May 2004 was conducted on the basis of the charges contained in the Original Statement of Charge. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for Timania and Mr Toner ("counsel for Timania") said:

‘ ... Your Honour, the conduct which we allege amounts to contempt of court are the words which appear in paragraph 7 of the outline, and that is the words which were stated by Mark Lawler, who is the leading hand of the respondent, to Wayne Toner, being the second applicant. "Two hours after you did the load on Friday we got a call from Chris Turner and he said, ‘No more extra work for Toner whilst he’s suing the company, I’m sorry there’s nothing I can do about it.’ Yesterday afternoon I did receive affidavits from Chris Turner and from Tom Moralee, and this morning we received affidavits from Mark Lawler and from a Mr Lawrence. The respondent’s version of events is that whilst there was discussion about whether or not the work should be restricted, that it wasn’t ultimately decided upon but somehow through some error it was effected.’

23 During closing submissions, the following exchange took place between his Honour and counsel for Inghams and Mr Turner ("counsel for Inghams"):

‘HIS HONOUR: Mr Harrison, there’s something I meant to raise. I’m terribly sorry, I did mention earlier that although the Statement of Charge has Turner and the company, he’s not been named as a defendant to any proceeding that I’ve got. Now, criminal or civil, I work on the theory that until you’re a party to the case, there’s no case against you. It’s really just a question of making sure that the proceeding is properly amended.

MR HARRISON: Well, criminal presentments or charges are not anywhere near as flexible as civil pleadings that can be amended at pretty well any stage to conform with the evidence – because you come to meet a charge, and that’s the charge you come to meet. I mean, limited amendments can be made if someone’s got a date wrong, or something like that. But it becomes unfair to the defendant, because it is a prosecution of criminal standard that he should have to anticipate a number of potential permutations of differing cases. This is the charge that is here, and it’s:

On or about 23 April 2004, Chris Turner, employed by the respondent as a Southern Regional Manager, did telephone persons within the respondent, including Mark Lawler of the respondent, and did say to them on behalf of the respondent that there was no more extra work for Wayne Toner, the second applicant, while he, Toner, is suing the respondent.

Now, that is not made out, on any version, and it was not even put to Mr Turner, that that’s what happened, and it wasn’t put to any of the witnesses who explained how the misunderstanding occurred – that they were making it up, that it was inaccurate – so you have before you ---

HIS HONOUR: I hadn’t picked that up, but in fact, even if true it depends on what’s meant by it. The allegation is that instructions were given that you weren’t to be given extra work, not that there were internal communications. Internal communications ---

MR HARRISON Well, but that’s not the charge.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I know that, but saying to them there was no more extra work for Toner is intended to mean, isn’t it, that you shouldn’t give him extra work whilst he is suing the respondent. I understand that’s not what it says.

MR HARRISON: No, it’s not what ---

HIS HONOUR: I understand that but ---

MR HARRISON: In my submission to your Honour ---

HIS HONOUR: And not only that, you ran the defence on the basis that there was an instruction given to not give Toner work for the reason that he was suing the respondent.

MR HARRISON: The defence is, Toner was told, "There is no more work for you." That was not given on instructions, that was given as a result of a misapprehension. That was subsequently adopted, essentially, and it was determined to – that information having been conveyed, "we’ll go along with that". That means that the only formulation of charge would be something along the lines of on or about – whatever date it was – 23 April, Mr Toner was advised that there was no more work for him. That advice was given in error, but wrongfully, at some later date unknown, Inghams determined not to withdraw that advice or to only withdraw it on conditions.’

24 At the conclusion of the hearing, his Honour asked counsel for Timania to furnish a note regarding any changes they wished to make to the Original Statement of Charge. As a consequence of his Honour’s request, an Amended Statement of Charge ("the Proposed Amended Statement of Charge") was sent to the primary Judge in the following terms:

‘AMENDED STATEMENT OF CHARGE
(Order 40, rule 6)

The applicants alleged as follows:

AS AGAINST CHRIS TURNER

1. On or about 23 April 2004 and thereafter you did:

(a) advise or enable employees of the respondent under your managerial supervision and/or control;
(b) further or in the alternatively subsequently ratify the conduct of the employees of the respondent under your managerial supervision and /or control

telephone persons within the respondent including Mark Lawler of the respondent and did say to them that there was no more to remove the extra work from Timania Pty Ltd, the first applicant, and for prevented Wayne Toner, the second applicant, from performing the additional work, whilst he Toner as each of the applicants is suing the respondent.

AS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT

1. On or about 27 3 April 2004 and thereafter you did Chris Turner, employed by the respondent as its Southern Regional Manager did telephone persons within the respondent including Mark Lawler of the respondent and did say to them on behalf of the respondent that there was no more remove the extra work for from Timania Pty Ltd, the first applicant, and prevented Wayne Toner, the second applicant, from performing the additional work whilst he Toner, is as each of the applicants is suing the respondent.’ (Original emphasis and mark ups)

25 The Proposed Amended Statement of Charge was the subject of written submissions by both parties after the conclusion of the hearing. In his written submissions in relation to the Proposed Amended Statement of Charge, counsel for Inghams noted that Inghams and Mr Toner would suffer prejudice if the amendments were allowed. It was said that there had been a change in the first charge to an allegation of continuing contempt and a reference to ratification, which was not the subject of substantial cross-examination by counsel for Inghams, had been added. It was said by counsel for Inghams that had they been on notice that the contempt alleged was to be ratification of the erroneous communication, then they would have called further evidence as to both Mr Turner’s decision-making and the involvement of additional persons. Counsel then submitted that the second charge was a wholly different charge to that which Inghams and Mr Turner came to face and that they should not be at the risk of conviction on the basis of evidence called to support a different charge to that which Timania and Mr Toner now sought to be substituted, at the close of the evidence and after oral submissions.

26 Counsel for Inghams submitted that had the Amended Statement of Charge been brought initially, they would have brought additional evidence relevant to the meeting and attempting to refute an allegation of continuing contempt. The additional evidence, it is said, would have supported Inghams’ case that no decision to refuse to grant the extra work to Timania was made. Moreover, Inghams and Mr Turner would have called evidence as to the implications of a successful claim for loss of goodwill. However, each of these issues was merely background and of minimal relevance to the Original Statement of Charge, which merely alleged an internal telephone call.

27 On 9 June 2004, his Honour delivered his reasons for judgment and made orders, including orders finding both Inghams and Mr Turner guilty of contempt of court, in the following terms:

‘THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The applicants be granted leave to amend their statement of charge filed 13 May 2004 to read:

As Against Christopher Turner: On or about 23 April 2004 you did instruct persons within Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd that no extra work should be given to Timania Pty Ltd whilst Wayne Toner and Timania Pty Ltd were suing Inghams Pty Ltd.

As Against Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd: On and from 23 April 2004, Inghams Pty Ltd refused to grant extra work to Wayne Toner and Timania Pty Ltd for the reason that Timania Pty and Wayne Toner are suing Inghams Pty Ltd.

2. Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd be adjudged guilty of contempt and until further order it shall continue to engage Timania Pty Ltd in accordance with the contract made in April 2004 to carry all additional produce from its depot in Thomastown to the storage facilities in Doveton provided however that it be at liberty to apply to discharge this injunction on 72 hours’ notice.

3. Christopher Turner be adjudged guilty of contempt and he be fined $5000, such fine to be paid within 14 days to the District Registrar of the Federal Court.

...’

28 The Final Amended Statement of Charge, as formulated by his Honour, was not the subject of oral submissions by either party during the hearing. Nor did his Honour invite written submissions from the parties regarding the Final Amended Statement of Charge after the close of the oral hearing and the filing of written submissions shortly thereafter.

29 On the appeal, it was submitted by counsel for Inghams that the Statement of Charge was reformulated by the primary Judge in the terms set out in [27] above to reflect his Honour’s findings and that, in so doing, without informing the parties and giving them an opportunity to address this amendment, his Honour failed to afford procedural fairness to the parties.

30 In his Honour’s reasons for judgment, after reviewing the authorities in relation to the formulation of a Statement of Charge at [22]-[31], his Honour proceeded to apply the principles to the evidence before him. At [32]-[37], his Honour said:

‘32 It is now necessary to apply these principles to the facts in this case. Earlier I found that Inghams withdrew the additional work from Timania in order (1) to punish Timania for bringing the Federal Court action and (2) to pressure the applicants financially to withdraw the action. That is more than sufficient to justify the conclusion that the respondents have committed a serious contempt. First there is the intention to punish. Then if that were not enough there was pressure by unlawful means, namely the termination of the contract: whatever view one takes of the contract it was terminated without reasonable notice. And the termination had the clear tendency to pressure the applicants into bringing the action to an end.

33 I would also find a contempt even if I were to accept the respondents’ evidence that the contract for additional work was terminated in order to mitigate Inghams’ loss in the Federal Court action. The pressure that would be brought to bear by the termination was neither "fair, reasonable nor moderate". It would inevitably place strong economic pressure on the applicants to discontinue their claim. Moreover, I would even find a contempt (confined to Inghams) if Mr Lawrence’s instruction to Messrs Willox and Lawler not to use Timania and that Mr Lawler’s termination of the contract was a mistake. First, the respondents did not contend that Mr Lawler’s conduct should not be attributed to Inghams. Secondly, Inghams adopted Mr Lawler’s action and did not seek to rectify the mistake. Remember that here we are concerned with the objective impact of conduct in relation to a party to proceedings who is unaware of the mistake.

34 It is now necessary to decide whether there should be convictions for contempt. The respondents contend (following comments I made during final submissions) that the charges are deficient and that no convictions should be entered. Mr Turner is charged (and I paraphrase) with telephoning other Inghams employees informing them that there will be no additional work for Mr Toner while he is suing Inghams. That is not the real complaint which is made against Mr Turner. The complaint is that he gave instructions, by telephone or otherwise, to employees of Inghams that no extra work should be given to Mr Toner (Timania), while he was suing Inghams. The particulars of the charge are the same as against Inghams, save that it is alleged that Mr Turner’s actions were carried out on its behalf. The real complaint is that Inghams refused to give Mr Toner (Timania) additional work because he was suing Inghams.

35 It is trite that a charge for contempt must be distinctly stated: Coward v Stapleton [1953] HCA 48; (1953) 90 CLR 573, 579-580; Doyle v The Commonwealth of Australia [1985] HCA 46; (1985) 156 CLR 510, 516. Precision is necessary so that the defendant knows the case he has to meet, and can defend himself effectively: Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64, 73.

36 Although the charges in this case were not carefully drawn this did not affect the respondents’ ability to defend themselves. The whole of the case on all sides, both in respect of evidence and submissions, was conducted on the basis that the alleged contempt was that Mr Turner procured Inghams to withdraw the additional work from Timania in order to punish it and force it to drop the Federal Court action. Moreover, the respondents did not object to evidence which went beyond the charges as formulated. Nor did they submit that the charges could not amount to a contempt, until I raised the issue during closing submissions.

37 In these circumstances, the applicants contend the respondents were aware of the gist of the charges, and that is all that is required. There is some justification for this submission, but it may not altogether be correct. In this event the applicants seek leave to amend the charges so they accord with the case that was presented and defended at trial. There is no doubt that the particulars of a charge of contempt may be amended: Lane v The Registrar of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Equity Division) [1981] HCA 35; (1981) 148 CLR 245, 257. There is a view that the circumstances in which an amendment will be allowed are narrow, in particular that an amendment will not be allowed to cure a "seriously defective" charge: Carew v Carew Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, 23 April 1993, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court); Castledine v Boronga Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 215. It is unnecessary in this case to decide whether the court’s undoubted power to amend a charge should be confined in any way. Here the amendments should be allowed because they will cause no prejudice. Nor will they revive a "seriously defective" charge. In any event, it is in the interest of justice that faulty drafting which did not affect how the respondents conducted their defence at trial should stand in the way of the court’s power to punish a serious contempt.’

31 His Honour then proceeded to deal with the question of punishment.

32 There is no real contest between the parties in this matter as to the relevant legal principles to be applied in relation to the formulation of a Statement of Charge. These principles can be summarised as follows:

(a) appropriate safeguards must be applied to protect the rights of parties accused of contempt: Doyle v The Commonwealth [1985] HCA 46; (1985) 156 CLR 510 at 516 per the Court;

(b) parties accused of contempt are entitled to know the gist or substance of the charges against them: Coward v Stapleton [1953] HCA 48; (1953) 90 CLR 573 at 579-80 per Williams ACJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ;

(c) where there is a Statement of Charge, the gist or substance of the allegations must be contained within the Statement of Charge and any particulars, and any deficiency cannot be remedies by resort to affidavit evidence: Carew Reid v Carew Corporation Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Full Court, Malcolm, Franklyn, and Nicholson JJ, 23 April 1993) (Carew Reid); Harmsworth v Harmsworth [1987] 1 WLR 1676 at 1683; Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1758 at [31] per Lee and Finn JJ (BHP Steel); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949; (2002) 121 FCR 24 at [9] per Nicholson J;

(d) amendments to charges will only be allowed to correct minor deficiencies, in circumstances where the accused suffers no prejudice: Carew Reid; Castledine v Boronga Pty Ltd [2000] WASC 215;

(e) where amendments are allowed, accused parties must be given an opportunity to put anything they fairly wish to say as to the evidence, the law and the sentence as they pertain to the amended charges;

(f) parties accused of contempt are entitled to conduct their case on the basis that the only charge which they are required to meet is that which has been particularised against them: BHP Steel at [31] per Lee and Finn JJ; Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders Labourers Federation v Minister of State for Industrial Relations [1982] FCA 134; (1982) 43 ALR 189 at 206-207 per Evatt and Deane JJ (Builders Labourers Federation); and,

(g) appellate courts should not speculate as to whether, if a charge had been properly drawn or amended, the evidence adduced would have been the same or the conduct of the accused party’s case would have been unaltered: Builders Labourers Federation at 206-207 per Evatt and Deane JJ.

33 It is apparent from his Honour’s reformulation of the Statement of Charge that the Final Amended Statement of Charge is less elaborate than the Proposed Amended Statement of Charge and that it was drawn to encapsulate what his Honour understood as the "gist" of the charges sought to be brought by Timania.

34 The concept of the "gist" of the charge is one that should be approached with some caution in the area of contempt, where precision in formulation is critical. This concept can tend to distract attention away from the language of the original Statement of Charge to an inference as to what is the intent of the Statement of Charge. In this case, the reformulation by counsel for Timania and subsequently by the primary Judge is based on the evidence of communication to Timania that is set out in the affidavits. Both Amended Statements of Charge were formulated to accord with the evidence rather than to accord with the substance of the defective Original Statement of Charge. In this instance, the case that Inghams and Mr Toner were given the opportunity to address was that set out in the Original Statement of Charge and the Proposed Amended Statement of Charge. In relation to the latter, counsel for Inghams said in their written submissions that their case would have been conducted differently had the charges contained in the Proposed Amended Statement of Charge been raised initially. The appellants were not informed of, and nor were they given any opportunity to consider, the unilateral amendment made by his Honour after the hearing and the written submissions of counsel for Timania in relation to the amended charge.

35 The primary Judge justified the reformulation on the basis that the amendment would cause no prejudice to Inghams. This was because Inghams had conducted its case, so his Honour found, on the basis that Mr Turner procured Inghams to withdraw the additional work from Timania to punish it and force it to drop the litigation. However, his Honour made these findings without hearing from Inghams and Mr Turner. The conclusions are not sufficiently self-evident that they justified his Honour failing to give Inghams and Mr Toner the opportunity to argue that it would suffer prejudice from the reformulation or to call further evidence to meet the reformulated case if it desired to do so.

36 The Proposed Amended Statement of Charge that Inghams was given the opportunity to address included an alternative charge of subsequent ratification and spoke of removing work and preventing Mr Toner from performing additional work. The Final Amended Statement of Charge formulated by his Honour referred to instructions given by Mr Turner to persons within Inghams and the refusal of Inghams to grant extra work to Mr Toner and Timania for the reason that they were suing Inghams. The Proposed Amended Statement of Charge raises different issues in relation to advising or enabling, or, alternatively, ratifying and removing extra work, as opposed to instructing and refusing extra work. The Proposed Amended State of Charge also introduces the concept that Inghams prevented Mr Toner and Timania from performing the additional work.

37 In this case, it is important that counsel for Inghams has informed the Court that additional evidence may have been called or the case may have been conducted differently if the Final Amended Statement of Charge formulated by His Honour had been brought to the attention of Inghams and Mr Turner at an earlier stage.

38 In our view, where a Court, after a hearing, makes an amendment to a Statement of Charge without informing the parties and the Amended Statement of Charge is materially different from the Statement of Charge sought to be amended, the Court has failed to provide procedural fairness and the orders of the Court should be set aside.

39 Accordingly, for these reasons, we consider that the order finding Inghams and Mr Turner guilty of contempt of court should be set aside.

40 The question then arises as to the disposition of the proceeding. In view of the fact that the substantive dispute has been resolved and that the parties are in, and wish to continue in, an ongoing commercial relationship, we can see no useful purpose in remitting the matter for further consideration. This appeal will therefore be allowed. The orders below are set aside. We note that the appellant does not make any application for costs in view of the settlement.

I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Tamberlin, North and Dowsett JJ.

Associate:

Dated: 22 August 2005

Counsel for the Appellants:	J E Middleton QC and BF Quinn
Solicitor for the Appellants:	Freehills
Counsel for the Respondents:	T J Ginnane SC and T Angelopoulos
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Middletons
Date of Hearing:	16 and 18 November 2004 and 3 March 2005
Date of Judgment:	22 August 2005