Paramasivam v Tay [2002] FCAFC 143 (21 May 2002)

Last Updated: 21 May 2002

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Paramasivam v Tay [2002] FCAFC 143

GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM v ALICE ERH-SOON TAY

N 1069 of 2001

O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ

21 MAY 2002

SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	N 1069 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:	GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM APPELLANT
AND:	ALICE ERH-SOON TAY RESPONDENT
JUDGES:	O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:	21 MAY 2002
WHERE MADE:	SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	N 1069 of 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:	GAJA LAKSHMI PARAMASIVAM APPELLANT
AND:	ALICE ERH-SOON TAY RESPONDENT

JUDGES:	O'LOUGHLIN, WHITLAM and MARSHALL JJ
DATE:	21 MAY 2002
PLACE:	SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

1 This is an appeal from a judgment of Madgwick J dismissing an application under s 46PO of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986, in which the appellant alleged unlawful discrimination by the respondent.

2 The respondent is the President of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. In that capacity, on 16 December 2000, she terminated a complaint of racial discrimination made by the appellant against another person on the ground that she was satisfied it was lacking in substance. The appellant complained to the Commission that the termination of her complaint on 16 December 2000 was unlawful under Pt II of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. This complaint was also terminated by the respondent on the same ground.

3 Madgwick J found that there was "not a shred of material to ground any inference" that any aspect of the respondent's treatment of the appellant was on account of the appellant's racial origins. His Honour later repeated his view that there was "nothing at all, in the evidence presented to the Court, from which any inference of racial discrimination against the respondent might be drawn."

4 The notice of appeal is not in the form required by the Federal Court Rules. It does not state "briefly, but specifically, the grounds relied upon in support of the appeal". Instead, the notice reproduces the text of two long letters apparently written by the appellant to Madgwick J after he delivered judgment. Her written submissions on the appeal are scarcely more informative. However, the solicitor for the respondent suggests that the appellant's case seems to be that the trial judge fell into error by requiring "gross evidence" of the respondent's motive in terminating the complaint on 16 December 2000. He submits that, if that is the appellant's contention, then it is clear from the way in which the trial judge expressed his findings that his Honour did not take the view that appellant needed to prove any such motive by direct evidence. We accept that submission. There was no error in his Honour's approach and we agree with his findings.

5 The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court.

Associate:

Dated: 21 May 2002

The appellant appeared in person.

Solicitor for the respondent:	Mr Andras Markus of the Australian Government Solicitor
Date of hearing:	28 November 2001
Date of judgment:	21 May 2002