You are here:
AustLII >>
Databases >>
Federal Court of Australia >>
2010 >>
[2010] FCA 13
[Database Search]
[Name Search]
[Recent Decisions]
[Noteup]
[Download]
[Help]
Blackmagic Design Pty Ltd v Overliese [2010] FCA 13 (22 January 2010)
Last Updated: 22 January 2010
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Blackmagic Design Pty Ltd v Overliese
[2010] FCA 13
|
Citation:
|
|
|
|
|
Parties:
|
BLACKMAGIC DESIGN PTY LTD (ACN 098 098 287) v
IAN OVERLIESE, JEROMY YOUNG, ATOMOS AUDIO PTY LTD (ACN 127 008 431) and CLARE
YOUNG
|
|
|
|
File number:
|
VID 328 of 2008
|
|
|
|
Judge:
|
JESSUP J
|
|
|
|
Date of judgment:
|
|
|
|
|
Catchwords:
|
EQUITY − Confidential information
− Senior employee having access to confidential information of employer
− Use of information
by employee in contemplation of establishing own
business − Sharing of information with proposed partner − Proposed
business
potentially in competition with employer − Whether employee and
partner should be restrained from using information.
INJUNCTION − Use by senior employee of employer’s
confidential information for employee’s own purposes − Information
recovered
under search order and employee restrained by interlocutory
injunction − No loss or damage suffered by employer − Whether
permanent injunction should go.
CORPORATIONS − Use by senior employee of information obtained
as such to gain an advantage for himself and his proposed business venture
−
No advantage in fact gained − Whether employee should be
restrained by injunction.
EQUITY − Fiduciary obligation of senior employee −
Employee allegedly coming upon an idea that had the potential to benefit
employer
− Whether employee obliged in equity to inform employer of idea
− Whether fiduciary obligations prescriptive −
Whether employer
entitled to equitable damages for loss of benefit of idea.
TRADE PRACTICES − Misleading conduct − Employee advising
employer as to possibility of particular product development − Whether
advice misleading
− Whether advice given in employee’s capacity as
such or in capacity as director of employee’s own company recently
established − Whether advice given in trade or commerce.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY − Copyright − Senior employee with
employer’s copyright works on private computer to facilitate work at home
−
Resignation of employee from employment − As former employee,
undertaking task of removing works from private computer −
Back-ups made
in pursuance of this task − Whether implicitly licensed to make copies for
that purpose − Whether infringement
of copyright.
CONTRACT − Restraint clause in contract of senior employee
− Whether the term “business, activity or operation” apt
to
include preparatory activities in establishment of new business.
|
|
|
|
Words and phrases:
|
“business, activity or operation”
|
|
|
|
Legislation:
|
|
|
|
|
Cases cited:
|
|
|
|
|
|
13 - 17 July, 3 - 7 August, 19 - 20 August
2009
|
|
|
|
Place:
|
Melbourne
|
|
|
|
Division:
|
GENERAL DIVISION
|
|
|
|
Category:
|
Catchwords
|
|
|
|
Number of paragraphs:
|
109
|
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Applicant:
|
Mr C Golvan SC and Mr M Wise
|
|
|
|
Counsel for the Respondents:
|
Mr M Rinaldi
|
|
|
|
Solicitor for the Applicant:
|
Middletons
|
|
|
|
Solicitor for the Respondents:
|
Cooper Mills Lawyers
|
|
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
|
|
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BLACKMAGIC DESIGN PTY LTD (ACN 098 098
287)Applicant
|
|
AND:
|
IAN OVERLIESEFirst
Respondent
JEROMY YOUNG Second Respondent
ATOMOS AUDIO PTY LTD (ACN 127 008 431) Third
Respondent
CLARE YOUNG Fourth Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
DATE OF ORDER:
|
|
|
WHERE MADE:
|
|
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The
proceeding be listed at 10:15 am on 5 February 2010 to receive the
parties’ submissions as to the orders that ought to be
made conformably
with the reasons of the court given this day, and as to costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of
the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using
Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
|
|
|
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
|
|
|
GENERAL DIVISION
|
VID 328 of 2008
|
|
BETWEEN:
|
BLACKMAGIC DESIGN PTY LTD (ACN 098 098
287) Applicant
|
|
AND:
|
IAN OVERLIESE First Respondent
JEROMY YOUNG Second Respondent
ATOMOS AUDIO PTY LTD (ACN 127 008 431) Third
Respondent
CLARE YOUNG Fourth Respondent
|
|
JUDGE:
|
JESSUP J
|
|
DATE:
|
22 JANUARY 2010
|
|
PLACE:
|
MELBOURNE
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
- The
applicant, Blackmagic Design Pty Ltd, is a Melbourne-based company engaged in
the business of the design, manufacture, marketing
and sale of hardware and
software for broadcast television and video production, and for consumer and
commercial feature film post-production,
and of the provision of post-production
services for the television and film markets. The first respondent, Ian
Overliese, is a
computer engineer who was, between about June 2002 and
5 May 2008, employed by the applicant as Director of Hardware Engineering.
The second respondent, Jeromy Young, was, between about April 2006 and
5 May 2008, employed by the applicant as Business Development
Manager. The
third respondent, Atomos Audio Pty Ltd (“Atomos”) is a company in
which Messrs Overliese and Young (equally)
held all of the issued shares, and of
which each was a director. The fourth respondent, Clare Young, is the wife of
Mr Young,
and assisted Messrs Overliese and Young in certain business
activities which have become controversial in this proceeding.
- This
proceeding concerns those activities, which were discovered by the applicant
shortly after Messrs Overliese and Young terminated
their employments with it in
May 2008. The applicant alleges that, during the course of their employment
with it, Messrs Overliese
and Young undertook detailed preparations to establish
a forthcoming business venture, of which Atomos would be the corporate vehicle.
The applicant alleges that they proposed that this venture would compete with it
in the markets in which it sold its own products,
that they made liberal use of
the applicant’s confidential information in their preparations for that
venture, and infringed
the applicant’s copyright in certain works. The
applicant alleges also that the respondents, in the course of those activities,
engaged in conduct which was in breach of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth), the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) and the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth). I shall refer to those allegations in more detail in due
course.
The facts in outline
- Grant
Petty is the Chief Executive Officer of the applicant. In his affidavit
affirmed on 13 February 2009, he explained that
the products which the
applicant designs, manufactures, markets and wholesales are the
following:
(a) products that capture and/or play back video to and from a computer in
either compressed or uncompressed video;
(b) products that capture and/or play back audio to and from a computer in
either compressed or uncompressed audio;
(c) products that perform video conversion from one video format to another,
including but not limited to SDI to HDMI conversion,
HDMI to SDI conversion, SDI
to analog video conversion and analog to SDI conversion audio imbedding, SDI
audio de-imbedding;
(d) products that generate video synchronisation signals in either standard
definition or high definition;
(e) products that perform video routing and switching in standard definition or
high definition;
(f) products that have video or audio wave form monitoring or testing
capabilities (which are currently being developed by BMD but
are not yet
commercialised) and
(g) products that perform SDI to DVI conversion for video monitoring in either
high definition or standard definition.
In the above passage, “SDI” means “serial digital
interface”, a high-quality video connection for interfacing
between video
products and the highest quality uncompressed format. “HDMI” means
“high-definition multimedia interface”,
a compact audio/video
interface for transmitting very high quality digital video.
- Mr Petty
said that, in November 2002, the applicant launched a product called the
“DeckLink” capture card, which
was, at the time, one of the first
10-bit uncompressed capture cards to work seamlessly with the Macintosh
operating system. Later,
the applicant launched its
“DeckLink HD” (high definition) product. All subsequent
DeckLink products with high
definition video were based on the DeckLink HD
design. In April 2004, the applicant launched its “DeckLink HD
Pro”
product, which Mr Petty said was the world’s first true
10-bit and 12-bit dual link 4:4:4 and 4:2:2 high-end video capture
card suitable
for both Macintosh and Windows systems. In the same month, the applicant also
launched what Mr Petty described
as its “HDLink HD Monitoring
Solution”, which allowed customers to use a 24-inch computer monitor for
the highest
quality HD TV video monitoring. In April 2005, the applicant
introduced a new type of video editing product called “Multibridge
Extreme” which solved the problem of insufficient space on standard
computer ports to add extra audio channels by moving the
electronics to an
external box. In April 2006, the applicant released its “DeckLink HD
Extreme” product, which
features both SDI and analogue input/output
connections that switch between high definition and standard definition video.
- Mr Overliese
commenced working for the applicant, through an employment-procuring
intermediary of some kind, in June 2002.
He took up direct employment with the
applicant in August 2004. At that time his position was Director of Hardware
(International
Video Markets). At some stage, and at least for the period which
is presently material, Mr Overliese assumed, and thereafter
continued in,
the position of Director of Hardware Engineering of the applicant. As the
applicant’s business grew, he recruited
and managed a large hardware
engineering team. Mr Overliese described the main part of his role as
“to lead the hardware
engineering team, and ensure the timely, effective,
and efficient development of the hardware products” for the applicant.
He
said that his role was as “technical lead, mentor and chief
engineer”; and to provide personnel and human resources
management of the
hardware engineering team. An idea of the responsibilities attaching to the
position occupied by Mr Overliese
may be gained by the following listing
thereof in the job specification written by the applicant for
Mr Overliese’s replacement:
Responsibilities
• To lead hardware development for Blackmagic
Design
- Oversee new
product development and design implementation in conjunction with the CEO and
Product Managers
• Define product specifications
• Manage product time-scales and time to market imperatives
• Manage product testing specifications
• Manage new part selection and pricing
negotiations
- Manage a bug
system and assignment of tasks to engineers as part of a planned product
release
- Joint
responsibility, along with the Director of Software, for ensuring
interoperability between hardware and software
development
• Authority to Hire and Fire
- Mr Young
commenced his employment with the applicant in April 2006, as Business
Development Manager. His job description, set
out in a schedule to a written
contract of employment executed in November 2006, was: “Developing the
sales channel for Blackmagic
Design, and finding new opportunities for
relationships with other manufacturers and industry partners”. He was, in
effect,
the head of sales for the applicant. His employment was covered by a
written contract dated 23 November 2006, some of the terms
of which are
presently relevant. Under that contract, Mr Young acknowledged that he
might, in the course of his employment,
become aware of confidential information
which was the property of the applicant. The relevant clause
provided:
(c) The Employee shall keep in strictest confidence all Confidential Information
and shall not disclose to any person any confidential
information without the
consent of the Company.
(d) The Employee will not use, or modify for his own use or benefit or the use
or benefit of any third party any Confidential
Information.
The contract required Mr Young to disclose any conflict of interest to
the applicant, and contained a cascading series of restraints
upon competition.
So far as presently relevant, Mr Young was thereby restrained from
participating in, having an interest in,
assisting with or otherwise being
directly or indirectly involved, engaged, concerned or interested in a business,
activity or operation
that was the same as, substantially similar to, or
competitive with, the business, or any material part of the business, of the
applicant.
- In
2006 (and possibly also early 2007) Mr Overliese built a pair of loud
speakers at his own home, in his own time and using
his own resources. Either
in December 2006 (as recalled by Mr Young) or in early 2007 (as recalled by
Mr Overliese) he
showed these speakers to Mr Young, who thought
“they represented a complete product close to being a product I could
sell”.
Thereafter, Messrs Overliese and Young occasionally discussed
the idea of going into business together, making electronic products
in the
audio industry. Evidence of a serious interest in such a venture is a
spreadsheet named “industry.xls” created
by Mr Overliese on
31 May 2007 which, as last modified on 27 November 2007, contains
details of speakers, suppliers,
organisations etc in the audio industry.
- In
June 2007 Mr Young was, it seems, about to undertake a business trip to
Europe on behalf of the applicant. On 5 June
2007, Mr Overliese sent
him an email with the subject line “planzz” and in which he
suggested that they should plan
a list of retailers that Mr Young could
visit while he was in Europe. About 10 minutes later on the same day,
Mr Overliese
sent Mr Young a further email in which he set out a list
of the information which they needed from dealers (inferentially in
Europe),
including “what the interest is in better-bang-but-bigger-bucks
speakers” and “how many units of powered
speakers do they
sell”.
- In
the same month, over (or possibly after) a few drinks, Messrs Overliese and
Young came up with a name for their proposed business,
“Atomos”. On
12 August 2007, they registered a new company called “Atomos Audio
Pty Ltd”. On 13 August
2007, Ms Young registered the domain
names “atomosaudio.com”, “atomosaudio.com.au”,
“atomosaudio.net”
and “atomosaudio.biz”. On
11 August 2007, Mr Overliese created a document on his word processor
headed “Patent”,
and in which four “primary claims” were
set out. The claims were all to do with loud speakers.
- In
August 2007, Mr Overliese sent an email to Mr Young with an attachment
headed “Atomos”. The applicant described
this, not inappropriately,
as a “to-do” list. There were four columns, headed respectively
“What”, “Who”,
“Comments” and “Due
date”. With one exception, where there was an entry in the column headed
“Who”,
that entry was “Ian”, “Jeromy” or
“Both”. The dates in the “Due date” column ranged
from
12 August to 3 September and, although the year is not referred to,
there is little doubt but that it was 2007. Some
of the entries in the column
headed “What” were “Form a limited company”;
“US registration”;
“Get a URL”; “Get web
hosting/email/calendar”; “Write patent(s)”; “Cost of
goods”;
“Design first products”; “Investigate and report
on competitors’ sales channels”; “Investigate
trade
shows”; “Logo and website design/contact plans” and “Set
up FTP server”.
- It
appears that Mr Young engaged the services of a design or branding firm
called “Mekanica” since, on 28 September
2007, someone from
such a concern called Mark emailed him with the subject line “atomos
concept”. Mark apologised for
it having taken a while to do what he had
done, which was to prepare a preliminary design image for an audio speaker, a
logo for
Atomos, and an advertising brochure containing the line “Atomos
have revolutionised studio speakers by enabling linking to
your pro audio
computer to produce high quality monitoring of sound styles and effects”.
That was attached to the email.
- On
28 November 2007, Ms Young (at the request of Mr Young) opened an
account for Atomos at a collaboration web site
called “Grouphub”.
On the same day, Mr Young uploaded three files to Grouphub, namely
“industry.xls”
and two word processor files apparently related to
prospective patent applications, including the one to which I have
referred.
- In
mid-January 2008, Mr Overliese mentioned to Callum Hunter, a hardware
engineer working in his section, that he was in the
process of setting up a new
company with Mr Young that would create professional audio equipment. He
asked whether Mr Hunter
would be interested in joining the new company.
Mr Hunter replied that he could possibly be interested. Nothing further
came
of that proposal.
- On
10 January 2008, Mr Overliese created a spreadsheet on his private
computer called “ycalc.xls”. He made
changes to it, and added to
it, over the succeeding months. Various versions of the spreadsheet are in
evidence, reflecting Mr Overliese’s
practice of saving it with
different names from time to time. The spreadsheet was made up of different
pages, or “worksheets”
as they are called. The worksheets fall into
two quite distinct categories. The first relates to Mr Overliese’s
ideas
and calculations for the audio products which might have been made and
marketed by Atomos. No issue arises with respect to those
worksheets: counsel
for the applicant made it clear that their client had no objection to
Mr Overliese and Mr Young making
plans, in their own time, to develop
an audio business for Atomos. The second category consists of three worksheets
on which were
set out details about video products, including products of the
applicant. Those details were alleged to contain the applicant’s
confidential information and to bespeak the making of serious preparations by
Mr Overliese at least to take Atomos into the
video industry in competition
with the applicant. It was not until about 7 February 2008 that these
three worksheets were created,
or that the first of them was. Before describing
those worksheets in detail, I should return to the second half of 2007, and to
certain differences of opinion which then arose as between Mr Petty and
Mr Overliese.
- One
of the matters of concern which arose in late 2007 related to an idea that
Mr Petty had for the replacement of all the applicant’s
then existing
models with a new one-lane PCI express card, based on the product called
“Intensity Pro”. The replacement
product was to encompass all of
the features offered by the other cards in the applicant’s range. As
Mr Overliese recalled
it, the impetus for this idea was the discontinuation
by the manufacturer of one of the electronic parts used in a number of the
applicant’s products, called “SAA7129”. As a result, the
applicant’s products which used that part would
also need to be
discontinued, including the highly successful DeckLink Extreme. However that
may be, the fact is that, according
to Mr Overliese, Mr Petty wanted
to introduce this new card. In his witness statement, Mr Overliese said
that Mr Petty
laid down the following
stipulations:
(a) The card must offer the same or better selection of video inputs and
outputs;
(b) Must work in the same way as the cards it replaced;
(c) All video connections had to offer High Definition video;
(d) Certain features must be offered;
(e) Newer parts must be used; and
(f) The card must be 1 lane PCI express
Mr Overliese was opposed to this idea. He told Mr Petty that this
would leave a competitor with opportunities to introduce
a much simpler and
cheaper card, and thereby to undercut the applicant on price. According to
Mr Overliese, Mr Petty dismissed
this concern, saying that the feature
set offered in the card which he proposed would be so attractive that people
would not want
a cheaper card. He added that, if a competitor did come in with
a cheaper model, the applicant could make a cheaper version of the
product
quickly. Mr Overliese also opposed Mr Petty’s decision to have
no model which did not have the high definition
feature. According to
Mr Overliese, the inclusion of high definition added considerable cost to
the product.
- Mr Petty’s
evidence as to the events to which I have just referred was that, in August or
September 2007, he had a number
of ideas for new products that might be
developed, including the replacement of existing standard definition products
with models
based on the applicant’s “Intensity 1-lane PCIe”
design. He discussed the idea with Mr Overliese on several
occasions in
late 2007. In his affidavit affirmed on 13 February 2009, Mr Petty
said:
By late 2007 Overliese and I had referred this idea to engineers to start
developing. I asked Overliese to analyse the idea for the
design, and part of
this process is to calculate parts costs etc. The idea was to develop the
Intensity product which would use
lower costs architecture rather than the more
expensive architecture of the existing cards. The Intensity cards were to be a
1 lane
pcie card, meaning the bandwidth would be on 1 lane which allows high end
HD video quality at significantly lower cost. Intensity
had sold well, and was
a reliable design, so I knew the new SDI based product would work well. My
instructions to Overliese were
that he was to try and find a means of building
the same capabilities as a 4 lane pcie card in a 1 lane pcie card which would be
the most cost effective capture card on the
market.
Under cross-examination, Mr Petty asserted that these were not the
instructions he had given Mr Overliese in about September
2007. Rather, he
said that what he had instructed Mr Overliese to investigate was (as
described in par 8(a) of his affidavit
affirmed on 1 July 2009)
–
A product to be based on BMD’s Intensity 1-lane architecture. This
product was to be BMD’s Intensity Pro with the addition
of balanced analog
audio, SDI video in and out, RS-422 deck control and gunlock
inputs.
However, when Mr Petty was asked to recall the specific details of his
conversation or conversations with Mr Overliese,
he said:
Well, in some ways I told him both. It was like, the theme was to bring
Intensity up to the old DeckLink HD Extreme features roughly
and to bring our
Multibridge product down to where the old one was, but specifically when we
talked about the actual features it
was like 8(1) [sic]. The theme was, you
know, kind of like DeckLink HD Extreme down but it was a very sort of general
spirited theme
versus the – 8(a) was what I was actually was – we
were talking about and when it got to the nitty gritty and we discussing
features, that was what more specifically 8(a) was what I was saying. ...
It’s vague because we had a lot of discussions.
It was like a discussion
trade-off where what happens if we add, you know, high definition, you know,
what happens if we take this
out. You know, we sort of, you know, what would
you call it, negotiate almost the feature sets versus the costs and, you know,
we
sort of had it pretty much locked down and then they were going off to do the
product.
Mr Petty could not recall the “actual conversations” of the
first time he raised this matter with Mr Overliese.
He said that what he
set out in par 8(a) was “pretty much what I said”. He accepted
that he never asked Mr Overliese
to achieve 10-bit over 1-lane.
- In
saying that there were many discussions about his proposal for a one-lane PCI
card, Mr Petty made common ground with Mr Overliese.
The latter said
that the discussions occurred over several occasions, and included many more
details than those to which he referred
in his evidence. An aspect to which he
did refer, and about which he, apparently, felt strongly, related to a project
called “Kip”
which had been under way in late 2006. That project
involved the development of a 1-lane card incorporating the SDI features of
DeckLink HD Extreme. The project was based upon “Intensity”,
and used a microchip called “CYP 15 G 0101”.
However, as of
late 2007, the Kip project had been abandoned for about a year.
Mr Overliese said that Mr Petty refused
to re-enliven this project,
notwithstanding that it was, in Mr Overliese’s view, an inexpensive
means by which to produce
the 1-lane product which Mr Petty had in mind.
He said that Mr Petty was keen to use only new parts and to make “a
much more feature-rich product”. Mr Overliese said that he advised
Mr Petty of every option for reducing the cost
of the product by reducing
the feature set, offering different models, or changing the way the product
worked. He said that he advised
Mr Petty “clearly and
completely” in these respects. He said that, if the applicant made a card
that offered almost
identically the features of the DeckLink HD Extreme
card (retailing at $US995), but at a cheaper price ($US695), it would make
less
money as customers opted for the cheaper card.
- Mr Overliese
set about costing the kind of 1-lane card that, in his understanding of it,
Mr Petty had specified. He enrolled
the services of Mr Hunter to
assist him in this task. The conclusion they reached was that the card would be
only about $20
cheaper to build than a new version of the DeckLink HD
Extreme 2 which was in development at the time, the “DeckLink HD
Extreme 2”. Mr Overliese reported this to Mr Petty, and
the idea was not further pursued. This was at about
the end of 2007 or the
start of 2008.
- The
development of the “DeckLink HD Extreme 2” was of itself
the cause of some difference of view as between
Mr Overliese and
Mr Petty. According to the former, at some time in late 2007 Mr Petty
instructed the engineering
teams to design a new DeckLink HD Extreme
product. The proposal was that the existing HD Extreme product would be
discontinued
simultaneously with the commencement of production of the new
product. Mr Overliese considered this to be a “highly risky
strategy”, as the engineers could not guarantee that any new product would
be right the first time. His recommendation was
not to withdraw the old model
for a few months, until the new model was established. However, according to
Mr Overliese, Mr Petty
was adamant, and ordered that there be an
immediate changeover. Mr Overliese said (in his evidence) that
Mr Petty loudly
stated in the open office environment, for all to hear,
that the DeckLink HD Extreme product contributed about “25% of
the
company’s profit”, and put pressure on the engineers to be sure that
the new product was right the first time. He
said that he was stopping
manufacture of the old model completely, and stopping ordering parts for it.
Mr Overliese said that
there was “a huge amount of stress in
engineering” with respect to the new product, and that Mr Clarke, the
head
of software engineering, “looked at death’s door with the
massive workload he had”.
- The
events to which I have referred in late 2007 and early 2008 provided a kind of
context for the creation by Mr Overliese
of the contentious worksheets in
“ycalc”. The circumstance which led directly to it related to
Mr Overliese’s
interests in audio products, presumably in the context
of Atomos. In January 2008, a friend gave Mr Overliese a
“Traveller”
audio box made by a company called Motu. As an
engineer, Mr Overliese was interested in seeing the parts that made up the
Motu
product. So he dismantled it, then set about determining the cost of
building the product, using a parts sourcing company called
“Digikey” and the manufacturer’s website prices. He recorded
the results of his labours on a new worksheet, in
the then current version of
the “ycalc” spreadsheet, called “cp”. The worksheet
(not one of the three which
I have described above as contentious) has columns
which identify the parts within the Motu product, the source of those parts, the
quantity used in each case, the price, and the total cost for each part.
Mr Overliese said that the prices paid by the applicant
for similar or
corresponding parts were almost the same as those which he identified through
Digikey and the manufacturer’s
websites. Although the applicant did not
make an audio-only product of this kind, Mr Overliese realised that, had it
chosen
to do so, it could not have been cost-competitive with Motu. This made
Mr Overliese concerned that Motu (which also made products
in the video
industry) could have effectively competed with the applicant on price in that
industry. He said that he regarded this
potential competition from Motu
“as extremely concerning”.
- Having
looked at the Motu “Traveller” audio product, Mr Overliese
looked at Motu’s V3HD video product. This
was its first product in the
professional video market, and Mr Overliese was most impressed. According
to him, Motu had managed
to design and implement “every single type of
video technology” that the applicant had. There were also some
“clever
cost-saving design aspects” of the Motu video product.
Mr Overliese thought that Motu could quite easily launch a range
of SDI
video PCI cards which matched the applicant’s range at every level where
the applicant had a product.
- According
to Mr Overliese, it was because of these concerns of potential competition
from Motu, and because of his concerns
that Mr Petty was specifying a more
expensive product than was necessary, that he developed another worksheet in the
“ycalc”
spreadsheet called “SDI”. He said that he
“wrote down a line of products which Motu, or indeed any other competitor,
could do if they made a range of SDI video PCI cards which matched and competed
with [the applicant’s] range”. He listed
the corresponding existing
products of the applicant, and calculated costs and profits which might be
derived from those products,
and from the products of the hypothetical
competitor.
- The
“SDI” worksheet set out details of the components, and of the costs
of those components, with respect to five video
interface products.
Mr Overliese called them the “simplest option”, the
“killer card”, the “ultracheap
SD card”, the
“4lane megamotha” and the “ultracheap HDMISDI
interface”. By this process, Mr Overliese
“sketched up a bunch
of 1-lane cards that could do various features”. He described the
“SDI” worksheet as
follows:
[W]hat I did here is, I kind of put my head into the engineer of the one who is
going to compete with [the applicant], and ... do
a set of products which fairly
much go across the range of a cheap product which is very limited and only has a
few connections and
they’re only standard definition, and then produce a
couple of models in between where you add one high definition output,
or you add
two and so on. But the idea is, like I was saying, it’s kind of a bit
like Lego, this process. You can bolt on
another piece, and you can come up
with a sketch of a possible product which has one standard definition output,
one high definition
output, one analogue video input, one analogue video output
set, and so on; two channels of audio. Each time you add a set of functions,
you generally increase the cost. So if you start off with a very simple, small
product, you’ve got a very cheap one. And
as you add functions, you can
build a range of products ... And so what I have sketched here is the
possibility of somebody making
a set of products to compete with [the
applicant].
In this way, Mr Overliese came up with a cost figure for each of the
five products dealt with in the “SDI” worksheet.
The result of
Mr Overliese’s calculations was a conclusion on his part that the
hypothetical competitor could well produce
corresponding products on a lower
cost base than that of the applicant.
- Mr Overliese
sought to raise his concerns with Mr Petty in about early February 2008.
He gave the following evidence about
the ensuing conversation:
I started the conversation with a [sic] words to the effect of “Grant,
I am very concerned about what MOTU could do”. Petty got immediately
furiously angry at the mention of the competitor MOTU. He yelled at me that he
did not want to ever discuss
competitors, and such discussions were the rot that
destroyed companies. Despite his reaction, I persisted. I recall I used an
analogy and that I said something like “you can’t play chess
without looking at your opponents’ moves”. He yelled, swore and
gesticulated while he instructed me that one should never consider a
competitor’s moves. He gave me a
lengthy lecture about how employees can
get obsessed with competitors, and that this was a destructive force within the
business.
Petty stated that the right way to achieve success was that Blackmagic
needed to have its own completely independent creative vision.
This is a vision
that Petty himself determined. Petty ordered me never to bring up competitors
again with him or anyone at Blackmagic
and this terminated the conversation. I
did not get to voice any of my concerns. Present at the time were Young, Lam,
Simon Kidd
and others I can’t remember. They had no trouble hearing him,
he was shouting at the top of his voice.
The correctness of this evidence was not challenged in cross-examination.
- Mr Overliese’s
concerns, together with Mr Petty’s reaction to the Motu aspect
thereof, prompted the former
to undertake further development of the
“ycalc” spreadsheet. It is not entirely clear when, or in what
sequence, Mr Overliese
developed the SDI worksheet and created two further
worksheets called “costs” and “allcosts”. For reasons
to which I shall come presently, 7 February 2008 was a busy day (or night)
for him (although he denied that any substantial
time was occupied by these
endeavours). I shall, however, first describe the contents of these two
worksheets, and set out what
Mr Overliese said about them.
- Mr Overliese
said that he commenced with the “allcosts” worksheet. There was a
column with the names of products,
the first four of which corresponded with the
first four mentioned on the “SDI” worksheet (see para 23 above)
and
were, respectively, “Simple card”, “Killer card”,
“SD card” and “4 lane”.
They represented
products of the hypothetical competitor. The remainder were products of the
applicant, or which the applicant
was contemplating introducing. The production
cost of each of the applicant’s then products was set out. The major
component
of that cost, and one which was stated accurately to the cent in the
worksheet, was the amount which the applicant would pay to obtain
the components
that, when assembled, made up the product. Mr Overliese said that these
costs figures were “based only
on information which I used daily for my
work” with the applicant. Mr Overliese included in the worksheet the
usage of
the parts in question per month from August 2007, details which he also
obtained from the applicant’s records to which he had
access. The
manufacturer’s margin, 65%, was, he said, a “guess” which he
applied across the board. However, he
said that he knew “roughly”
what the applicant’s margins were, because Mr Petty would discuss
with him how
much profit he would make whenever they talked about the total cost
of his ideas for a product.
- Mr Overliese
then created a further worksheet, called “costs”. Into that
worksheet, Mr Overliese copied the
contents of the “allcosts”
worksheet. He added two columns, headed “Bang for buck” and
“percent profit”.
At the time (ie in early February 2008) he
entered data only with respect to the applicant’s products. The cells in
the new
columns corresponding to the four hypothetical competitors’
products were left empty. The figures in the “bang for buck”
column
presented the annual unit profit for each of the applicant’s products, and
the column headed “percent profit”
represented the calculated
percentage contribution to overall profits made by the profit on each product.
- It
is not possible to put a firm date on Mr Overliese reaching the stage in
the development of the “ycalc” spreadsheet
that I have just
described. Neither is it possible to put a firm date on when he and
Mr Young came to thinking that Atomos
might produce video, as well as
audio, products. It seems that the first time that Mr Overliese uploaded a
version of “ycalc”
on to Grouphub was on 22 January 2008.
Mr Young said that that version of the spreadsheet “contained only
audio information”.
That would have been consistent with other evidence
in the case, and I have no reason not to accept what Mr Young said. I infer
that the spreadsheet, at this stage, had not been populated with the kind of
analysis that later found expression in the “allcosts”,
“SDI” and “costs” worksheets. That Messrs Overliese and
Young had at least a provisional intention that
Atomos should produce video
products is apparent from an email sent by Mr Young to Mr Overliese on
3 February 2008,
while he (Young) was travelling overseas on behalf of the
applicant (which he was for the period 2-22 February). On 2 February,
he sent the email to Ms Young and to himself (ie to a personal email
account). On 3 February 2008, he sent a copy of that
email to
Mr Overliese, describing it as “a simple overview of what is going
through my mind for both Audio and Video products
as guidelines from my side
...”. He told Mr Overliese that he thought the guidelines were
“right”, and that
they would give him “the picture for this
stage of development ...”. He added: “I hope you don’t think
I am not doing anything on this because it’s all I think about
...”
- The
email of 2/3 February 2008 consisted of a series of paragraphs of text
headed “Shows for A”, “Videographers
Problems”,
“Markets”, “Third Party Development”, “Sales
Channel”, and “Direct Model”.
The most significant paragraph
for present purposes was the one headed “Videographers Problems”,
which read as follows:
Camera codecs and file transfers from cameras, review cycle is lost because of
no ingest and edit becomes slower. Even if they want
to review and capture
higher, less compressed quality and review footage on the way in, they
can’t. Product idea ingest the
compressed format through file transfer to
HDD or solid state memory so they can store and reuse solid state memory in the
camera.
This stored footage would then be decoded using the TI chip or decode
using a specific companies camera encode decode chip to enable
realtime decoding
of compressed sources and CPU/hardware encoding of editing formats. This can be
done while the rest of the footage
is being taken and the camera memory card is
in use once again. The product would have card slots for all major camera
products
such as SD, P2 and SxS. This product should also have the Capability
to do uncompressed capture from standard sources such as SDI,
HDMI, All analog
connections. It should be USB and Firewire compatible over PCIe, USB3 and PCIe
1 lane for laptop editing. If possible
include RT effects processing and
acceleration within certain packages or in GPU?
- Mr Overliese
said that he was not entirely sure as to the product concepts which
Mr Young had in mind in this paragraph.
He said that the products referred
to were “loosely defined” and that Mr Young “wrote in a
really rambling
fashion”. However, he agreed that, if Mr Young was
proposing a video capture peripheral product, and Atomos were to make
such a
product, it would be going “head to head” with the applicant. The
potential for that to happen was recognised
by Mr Overliese in some notes
he made upon a copy of Mr Young’s email which he created in the form
of a word processor
file called “Shows for A Jeromy
2 Feb 08.doc”. Beneath each paragraph in the text of the email,
Mr Overliese
added his own comments. In the paragraph set out above, after
the words “laptop editing” in the second last sentence,
Mr Overliese added, in parenthesis, “not sure what this means”.
After the paragraph as such, Mr Overliese made
the following comments:
- Development time
for software – around 1 man yr
- Development time
to implement codecs for SD P2 SxS likely to be the substantial proportion of
development for the product.
- Discussions with
Panasonic over P2 before, had them wanting a high price for the module ($2500
from memory)
- Time for
relationship management with Sony & Panasonic
- Level of
commitment in relationship from Sony & Panasonic (potential for
uncontrollable delays)
- Product
lifecycle of P2 and SxS ?
- Market size of
P2 and SxS. Need these for a business case.
- Development for
P2 and SxS does not lead on to more opportunities – technological dead
end.
- 4 good h/w and 2
good s/w engineers for 9 months required
- Starting at deep
end – is this essential or unrealistic ??
- After this, we
would be a video capture peripheral company. We would be going head-to-head
with BMD, AJA, MOTU – is this a
good idea?
In the final bullet point, “BMD” was a reference to the
applicant. Mr Young could not recall receiving a copy of
these notes from
Mr Overliese, and there is no evidence that they were ever made part of a
communication. However, they are
contemporaneous evidence that, until he
received Mr Young’s email of 3 February 2008, he did not
envisage that Atomos
would produce video capture cards.
- Although
the original email was sent also to Ms Young on 2 February 2008, her
evidence was that, when she saw it, she realised
immediately that it had nothing
to do with her and had been sent to her email account because it was set up on
their home desktop
computer. She neither understood nor had any interest in the
contents of the email, although she assumed that the “A”
referred to
in the heading of the first paragraph was Atomos, and that the email probably
had something to do with Mr Young’s
ideas for trade shows at which
Atomos could be present. Ms Young was challenged on this evidence
(particularly since, in his
email to Mr Overliese of 3 February 2008,
Mr Young opened by saying that the email being forwarded was something
which
he had sent to Ms Young) but there is nothing in the context or facts
existing at about the beginning of February 2008 from
which I could infer that
Ms Young had any greater interest in the email than she claims to have had.
- It
was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the paragraph headed
“Videographers’ Problems” made it clear that
the respondents
were, at about the beginning of February 2008, planning to set up in business in
opposition to the applicant. Mr Young
denied that this was what he
intended by this paragraph. He said that the expression “camera
codecs” was a reference
to the compressed data that is recorded by the
camera. He said that this was not what the applicant did. Mr Young said
that
the applicant’s cards captured uncompressed information, and that the
absence of “codecs in their hardware” was
the reason that the
applicant’s cards were so cheap. However, in the paragraph headed
“Videographers Problems”,
Mr Young had also said that the
Atomos product “should also have the capability to do uncompressed capture
...”
When asked about that, he said:
Correct, and the reference to both of those – this also goes to your other
point earlier, that you moved away from, is that
the compressed – the
first part of the product that I’m talking about here, is expensive to put
into a product. The
products become more expensive when you try to do
compression inside the product. Uncompressed, you’re passing the data
directly
into the computer without processing it on your board. So by passing
it directly into the computer you don’t have to put so
many components on
your product and this is actually Blackmagic Design
strategy.
Mr Young accepted that, in offering the service of uncompressed capture,
the Atomos card would “cross over” with
the capacities of the
applicant’s cards. However, he said that it would not be competitive,
because the products would be
more expensive. He said that a compressed
product, with capacity also to handle uncompressed data was the “very
product”
which had been suggested to Mr Petty, and rejected by him.
- Within
about this same time-frame, Mr Petty raised again his idea of introducing a
new 1-lane card that might take the place
of some of the applicant’s
existing products. On 4 February 2008, he sent the following email to
Mr Overliese:
What are your thoughts about reducing some of the features on the one lane
version of Decklink Extreme PCIe 2.
We could then enable them if we need to as we want to later.
I was thinking about:
- No 24 fps frame
rates, just 1080p/50 and 1080p/5994
- No 3D lookup
table?
I am looking for a few things that we can disable, but then instantly enable if
we need to in the future. Any ideas?
Mr Overliese replied, seven minutes later, as follows:
We can easily do both those, which would mean the differences would be:
* Only 8 bit HD (forever)
* No RGB HD in premiere (forever)
* No 3G-SDI (ever) – i.e. no 2K or RGB-HD
* no 24 frame rates (can be enabled at any time)
* No 3D Luts (can be enabled at any time)
* no HD desktop (could possibly add a RGB-YUV s/w conversion?)
* every 3rd frame of HD output is watermarked with a
Blackmagic Design logo (could be disabled any
time)
In his affidavit affirmed on 13 February 2009, Mr Petty said that
what he proposed here had been discussed with Mr Overliese
previously, and
that he, Petty, “had in mind that this product would have 10-bit
capability”. In his oral evidence,
Mr Petty suggested that the words
“in SD” should be inserted after “capability”.
- The
matter was taken further in an email sent by Mr Petty to others within the
applicant’s organisation, including Mr Overliese,
on 5 February
2008. Mr Petty proposed doing a PCI express one-lane version of the
DeckLink HD Extreme 2 card,
to replace the DeckLink SP PCIe and
the DeckLink Extreme PCIe cards. The new card would have no desktop feature in
HD, and
would be only 8-bit HD, but 10 and 8-bit SD. It would have all the
features of DeckLink Extreme, and “plug into the cheaper
machines”.
Mr Petty proposed that the product would retail at $695, thereby sitting
between the SP and the Extreme cards
which it replaced. He said that the
product would have a profit of $226 per unit, but that there would be a good
chance of the build-cost
reducing over time, due to component volumes. On
certain assumptions which Mr Petty had made, the applicant would be down
about
$30,000 in profit by introducing such a new card, but he pointed out that,
if they did not follow that course, they would run out
of components to build
all the SD models just after mid-2008. He said that the
“upside” was that, if they increased
volume with better features,
hopefully they would get some increase in sales to reduce the loss somewhat,
“and then the margin
should also open up”. In a response to this
email, another of the applicant’s employees, Mr Kristian Lam,
expressed
quite obvious reservations to Mr Petty’s proposal. In a
short contribution, Mr Overliese responded to those reservations,
coming to
Mr Petty’s defence, albeit in a very limited way. Mr Young (who
was then in Japan) also responded, expressing
a preference for SD only at the
start, and saying that it was very important to keep HD Extreme going.
Mr Petty terminated
this round of exchanges (on 12 February 2008) by
saying that the card which he had in mind would “ship after NAB
anyway”,
and that they could talk about the matter later. The
“NAB” to which Mr Petty referred was the trade exhibition
conducted in April each year by the National Association of Broadcasters in the
United States, at which the applicant was a significant
exhibitor.
- Returning
to the plans for Atomos being developed by Messrs Overliese and Young, according
to the latter, while he was in Japan,
he received a phone call from
Mr Overliese to inform him that he had uploaded a new version of
“ycalc” on to Grouphub.
Mr Overliese said that he had added
some products that Atomos might be able to do. They were products that he would
like to
make, but that he was not allowed to make in his employment with the
applicant. He proposed that Atomos could make these products,
since the
applicant did not want to do so. Mr Young said that they (ie he and
Mr Overliese) would then be competing with
the applicant, something which
he did not want to do. He said to Mr Overliese something to the effect of
“You are crazy”.
Mr Overliese’s response was:
“Oh, yeah, all right”. Mr Overliese also gave evidence about
that phone
call. He recalled that, when Mr Young received the news that
Atomos might go into competition with the applicant, he laughed
and said
“That’s silly”. Mr Overliese himself (with the benefit
of hindsight, I rather gathered) said that
the idea involved “a mountain
to climb” and that, “in terms of overall business strategy it was
stupid”.
- The
records of Grouphub show that a lot happened on 7 February 2008. First,
Ms Young uploaded a document called “Objectives
to Outcomes”.
This was a copy of a file originally emailed by Ms Young to Mr Young
on 29 January 2008. Ms Young,
whose professional expertise is in
manufacturing and information technology, described this file as a template of a
kind used to
help clients develop a work breakdown structure based on their
objectives, and producing a set of “deliverables”. The
file, in the
form of a spreadsheet, took a high-level objective, converted that to parcels
and sub-parcels of work or activity, and
ended up with a great many detailed
“deliverables”. The first “objective” was “to
achieve $100m turnover
(within one year of launch) with 15% operating
profit”; the second was “to create unique products for Audio
professionals”;
and the third was “to create the best company to
work at”. Ms Young said that she came to send the file to
Mr Young
on 29 January 2008 because they were talking on the telephone
and she informed him that she was putting together “one
of the generic
templates” that she and Mr Overliese had discussed. She described
the file as a “mapping tool”.
Mr Young said that he had asked
his wife to undertake this kind of exercise so she would feel more involved in
the business
plans that he had with Mr Overliese.
- The
applicant described “Objectives to Outcomes” as “a
sophisticated planning topology ... [which included] a comprehensive
list of
business activities with sub-sets of actions and deliverables”. That it
was, but the content of the file was, as the
respondents submitted, wholly
generic. It was a template for organisation which might have been used in
almost any industrial setting.
My attention was drawn to nothing in it which
implied a specific concern with SDI technology or products or with a business in
competition
with the applicant. In the context of the allegations made by the
applicant in the present case, the file is quite benign.
- The
second document uploaded onto Grouphub on 7 February 2008 was a version of
“ycalc”, uploaded by Mr Overliese
together with a message with
the subject line “ycalc update”. It read as
follows:
BOM sheet has 3 cost/price scenarios for a 12ch audio box.
As it stands, it is about right. Whether we do this product or not is of course
another matter. “Costs” sheet is interesting:
it is BMD’s
last 6 months and cost/sale price comparison across the whole product
range.
Password is “atomos2924” and is not compatible with Numbers or any
other mickey-mouse apps :) (squeeek!)
Let me know if this is a problem.
I have some dramatically profitable ideas for SDI products, but have not
detailed them yet.
Thirdly, Mr Overliese uploaded a word processor document called
“marketing plan”, together with a message which related
to that
subject. I shall return to them later. Fourthly, Mr Overliese uploaded
yet another version of the “ycalc”
spreadsheet, together with a
message with the subject line “SDI products added to ycalc –
exciting news”. It read
as follows:
I have put down 3 SDI cards we could do, that all start from Intensity and
cost/features blow away everything BMD has.
Check the “Killer” card specs: I think it would be a product that
really hits the sweet spot. The cheap SD card is
$65 cheaper to make than
decklink extreme and would be hard to beat on price. Not that I think a price
war is a good idea, but that
is another story.
“BMD” was, of course, the applicant.
- By
placing these Grouphub postings alongside Mr Young’s evidence as to
Mr Overliese’s phone call while he (Young)
was in Japan, certain
inferences as to the order of things may, I consider, be drawn. In his first
message, Mr Overliese drew
attention to the fact that he had set out the
applicant’s cost/price comparison for the previous six months across the
whole
product range. That is consistent with his evidence that, in early
February, he commenced by entering data for the applicant’s
products only.
It was only as a kind of postscript that he said that he had “some
dramatically profitable ideas for SDI products”.
However, by the time
that Mr Overliese came to post his third message, and to upload the
spreadsheet a second time, he had
populated it with details of
“3 SDI cards we could do”. They involved at least the
“killer” card
and a “cheap SD card”. There is
little doubt but that Mr Overliese was then thinking, however theoretically
and however unrealistically, that Atomos might provide SDI cards in competition
with the applicant.
- It
was, I infer, at this stage that Mr Overliese telephoned Mr Young in
Japan and described what he had just added to the
spreadsheet, and which
prompted Mr Young to suggest that he (Overliese) was wrong to be thinking
of competing with the applicant.
As it happens, it appears that Mr Young
could not view the new spreadsheet on Grouphub, because it was
password-protected.
On 9 February 2008, Mr Overliese uploaded a
version of the spreadsheet which was called “ycalcNOPW.xls” –
the “NOPW” part of the file name denoting that there was “no
password” required. Mr Young said that
he downloaded
“ycalc.NOPW” from Grouphub. He looked at the “costs”
worksheet, to which Mr Overliese
had drawn his attention, and saw that it
looked like the applicant’s sales data. Mr Young did not really pay
much attention
to it, as it was information that was already in his possession;
and it was not of interest to him. He claimed to be more interested
in
“the audio parts of the equation”.
- The
version of the spreadsheet uploaded by Mr Overliese on to Grouphub on
9 February 2008 – “ycalcNOPW.xls”
– is in evidence
in its then form. It has formed the basis of my description of the various
worksheets as set out above.
In the “costs” worksheets, it is
revealed that Mr Overliese summed the monthly and annual profits with
respect to
the applicant’s products, and marked that “BMD”,
and he performed the like calculation with respect to the products
of the
hypothetical competitor, and marked that “Atomos”.
Mr Overliese sought to defend his actions by pointing
out that the
worksheet was organised from the applicant’s perspective in the sense that
Atomos was the hypothetical competitor
whose activities had been the subject of
his concerns raised with Mr Petty. I consider, however, that
Mr Overliese’s
messages on Grouphub on 7 February 2008 give the
lie to that self-serving explanation. I accept that, initially,
Mr Overliese
had no intention of competing with the applicant. However,
something happened in the first week of February 2008 (or thereabouts)
to cause
him (and Mr Young, it seems) at least to give consideration to the notion
that Atomos might trade in video products.
The most likely inference is that
Mr Young’s email of 3 February, together with
Mr Petty’s peremptory
rejection of any consideration of the potential
cost structures of a competitor, caused Mr Overliese to switch his analysis
to one in which Atomos would now be in competition with the applicant, but for
whatever reason, that is unambiguously what happened
on 7 February 2008 or
thereabouts.
- There
is an entry on the “SDI” worksheet in the
“ycalcNOPW.xls” spreadsheet which should be mentioned at
this stage.
There is no reliable evidence as to when this entry was made by
Mr Overliese, save that it must have been done on
or before 9 February
2008. The entry is in the form of text in the “simplest option”
section of the worksheet,
associated with a side heading reading “software
features”. The entry reads: “10 bit HD should be doable
– if the DMA style is changed”. In his evidence, Mr Overliese
explained that “DMA” was an acronym that
stood for “direct
memory access”, a reference to the software by which the card got
“the video out of the computer,
if you like”. He said that
“DMA is comprised of VHDL source code and the source code which runs on
the computer, which
is probably NC ... so if you changed both those pieces of
software, you will change the way the DMA works.” In re-examination,
Mr Overliese explained what he had in mind by this entry on the
“SDI” worksheet:
The thought came from the fact that computers were getting faster. Since PCI
express was first [put in] computers ... a few years
before, the chipset in the
computers was allowing the PCI express to run more and more efficiently as time
went on, and I just had
the thought that that’s the main constraint.
[W]hether 10 [bit] can be done is really up to the computer. ... [T]he
thought I had was that if someone’s writing a fresh DMA, like they
don’t have PCI express, which ... a couple of Blackmagic’s
competitors didn’t ..., in particular Motu didn’t, ... they would
... have the option to optimise their DMA to work for
PCI express by ... cutting
out unnecessary bits on the video, and perhaps with the computers coming up in
performance and the DMA
being made slightly more efficient, you might be in a
position where it starts to look better on the newer computers
...
Mr Overliese denied that, at the time of inserting this entry into the
“SDI” spreadsheet, he had actually worked
out, even with a change in
DMA, how to achieve 10-bit HD over 1 lane.
- The
“marketing plan” document uploaded by Mr Overliese on to
Grouphub on 7 February 2008 contained a series
of bullet-pointed
observations, grouped under the headings “Objectives”, “The
Message”, “Target Customer
Demographics” and
“USPs” (the latter of which represents “Unique Selling
Points”). The next (and the
largest) section of the document was headed
“Competitors”, and named three other companies, including Motu but
not including
the applicant. Under each company was a listing of the
characteristics thereof, including its strengths and weaknesses. The document
related only to audio products and the companies trading in them.
- Mr Overliese
gave evidence that the idea of competing with the applicant left him as rapidly
as it had come to him, over the
course of a few days in the first half of
February 2008. He received no support from Mr Young for such an idea;
indeed, Mr Young
as good as derided him for having contemplated it. The
applicant urged me not to accept this evidence, relying in this regard upon
versions of the “ycalc” spreadsheet that had been modified on
28 February, 23 March and 7 May 2008. It
was submitted on its
behalf that those versions spoke loudly of a continuing intention on the part of
Messrs Overliese and Young
to compete with the applicant. Mr Overliese
denied this, pointing out that the changes to the spreadsheet which occurred
after
7 February 2008 occurred because the cells in question contained
formulas, and were automatically altered when the date in a
source cell was
changed, as happened from time to time. Mr Overliese did not remove the
reference to Atomos, but more by reason
of inertia than anything else, as I
understood him.
- It
is nigh impossible to arrive at an objective resolution of this point of
evidentiary conflict between Mr Overliese and the
applicant. Although it
is possible to tell when a particular version of the spreadsheet was last saved,
there is no way of knowing
when, over a period of up to about three months,
detailed changes were made. For example, there is no good reason to infer
merely
from a modification (or saving) of the file on 7 May 2008 that
Mr Overliese then still entertained the notion of competing
with the
applicant.
- The
factual issues to which I have referred are complicated by the circumstance that
Messrs Overliese and Young did, it seems, continue
in their broad proposal to
deal in video, as well as in audio, products whenever Atomos should commence
business.
- According
to Mr Overliese, while Mr Young was overseas in February 2008, he
(Overliese) asked Ms Young to prepare
“a template for starting a
business”. As requested, she prepared three “generic planning
documents”. One
of them was a spreadsheet which showed anticipated cash
flows, based on various assumptions. For that purpose, Mr Overliese
asked
Ms Young to “insert some audio and video examples” from the
“SDI” and “BOM” worksheets
in the “ycalc”
spreadsheet. This must have occurred on or after 7 February 2008, given
that Ms Young obtained
the details of proposal from a version of the
“ycalc” spreadsheet that Mr Overliese had uploaded to Grouphub
on
that day (or possibly from “ycalc.NOPW” uploaded on
9 February). Ms Young created the cash flow spreadsheet
on
13 February 2008. She incorporated the “SDI” worksheet in her
own document, and in some respects used the SDI
capture cards referred to there
as a basis for her analysis. She insisted that she had no understanding of what
these products represented
– other than that they were video products of
some kind. For Ms Young, the exercise was almost a theoretical one, in
which she was using notional products merely for the purpose of setting up a
cash flow template. In this evidence, she had the support
of Messrs Overliese
and Young. They denied that the use of the products set out on the
“SDI” worksheet implied an intention
on their part to make those
products in competition with the applicant. Mr Young described the
products as “placeholders”
or “widgets”.
- Ms Young
said that the only work she did with respect to the cash flow spreadsheet was to
create it on 13 February 2008
(over a period of about an hour) and to
forward it to Mr Overliese. For his part, Mr Overliese saved the
spreadsheet with
a new name – “cashflow_iano.xls” on
19 February 2008. A worksheet called “sales” set out the
prices, ratios, costs and sales (on “high”, “med” and
“low” assumptions) for eight products.
They were: “Killer
external no SDI”, “Killer external (with SDI)”, “Ultra
cheap SD only”,
“Basher”, “Flasher”,
“Killer 1-HD extreme killer 1 x lane PCIE”,
“Killer 2
– high end killer” and “Killer 3
– SD only”. Mr Overliese acknowledged that none of these
was
an audio device, and that all of them (save “Basher” and
“Flasher”) were video devices. However, he
said that none of them
was a “real product” – they were all no more than
“placeholders”. He continued:
This was, you know, conjecture. It was just if we did – you know, if you
had a company that had these kind of product line
up and, you know, I fiddle
around with the cost of goods and the retail price and see what kind of cash
flow you’d get for
products. ... You [ie counsel for the applicant,
cross-examining] keep saying we’re making plans all the time, but
there’s
a difference between making a plan to do something and just
playing with an idea.
- Messrs
Overliese and Young met together on 4 March 2008. Mr Overliese
subsequently made notes of their meeting, as
follows:
Agenda
- Go over the
cashflow_iano spreadsheet and insert realistic sales targets and analyse
results
Outcomes
- Growth goals are
realistic and achievable!
- It is very
important, for the strength of the company, to quickly produce as many products
as possible in the early stages. This is
for company growth and protection from
competition.
- Do video
products as early as possible, related to the above point, and the fact that
these are strong capabilities we have
- Sales have three
main mechanisms for growth:
- Volume
(maximization). Sales and marketing techniques to ensure maximum sales of the
product by considering and targeting the end
users/purchasers
- Growth
into new markets
- Producing
products which answer the needs and requirements of end
users/purchasers
Actions
Ian
- Get the windows
DDK as quickly as possible for software engineer(s) to start work on
drivers
- Book appointment
for lawyers to go over Jeromy’s contract and advise on competitive actions
in video market
Jeromy
- Put sales growth
mechanisms into sales plan document
As will be seen, the purpose of the meeting was to consider the
“cashflow_iano” spreadsheet. An objective was for Atomos
to produce
as many products as possible in the early stages, commencing with video (rather
than audio) products. Lawyers were to
be engaged to advise on
“competitive actions in video market”. Mr Overliese accepted
that his notes of the meeting
on 4 March 2008, together with the contents
of the spreadsheet, gave the impression that his focus then was on the sale of
video
capture cards. However, he reiterated that his only purpose “was to
examine my cash flow spreadsheet and work out if we’re
going to be able to
put together some kind of functioning business, particularly in relation to what
kind of cash you need to put
into the company to get a company going.”
Mr Overliese denied that the video products that he envisaged getting out
more
quickly were capture cards, but, given the nature of the products referred
to on the spreadsheet, it is hard to take this denial
seriously.
- On
18 March 2008, Mr Overliese created a word processor document headed
“business Plan Jeromy Ian Both”. He
agreed that it was an
“outline for a business plan” rather than a business plan as such.
It had bullet-pointed notes
under the headings “Sales Channel”,
“Competitive Analysis”, “Product Plan” and
“Marketing
Plan one for Audio, one for Video”. The notes under
“Product Plan” make it clear that both audio and video products
were
contemplated. The document then lays out three “scenarios”,
namely:
- All
video: 5 video products first year, 5 second year more video
- Video
start, adding video: 3 video capture, then 2 other video + 2 audio, second year
2 & 2
- Audio
start, adding video: 3 audio products then 2 video, second year 3 video + 1
audio
Details were provided by the first scenario only. As to
that, the document stated:
- Start with 3
video devices:
1. Killer external SDI
2. Killer external analog
3. Killer internal 1 lane
And:
1. Killer Pro x 4 + codec accel
2. Killer converter SDI-DVI single?
3. Killer audio embedder?
4. CF – raid
Although at first reluctant to do so, ultimately Mr Overliese accepted
under cross-examination that this document was concerned
with video capture
cards. Notwithstanding, he maintained his insistence that he and Mr Young
never intended that Atomos would
produce such products, and that the document
was another example of purely conceptual work on his part. I regard this
evidence as
quite unconvincing.
- On
19 March 2008, Messrs Overliese and Young met informally with a
Ms Angelina Zubac, with whom they had been put in contact
by Ms Young.
The idea was, apparently, that Ms Zubac, who had some expertise in such matters,
would provide some guidance to
them on the preparation of a business plan. In
an email to Mr Young on the same day, Ms Zubac did provide that
guidance.
However, save to confirm the impression that he and Mr Overliese
were proposing to go into business on their own account, nothing
of present
importance turns on the meeting with Ms Zubac or the advice which she
provided.
- On
21 March 2008, Mr Overliese created a word processor document which
was, he said, a series of biographical notes about
himself which might form the
basis of a later document that could be used to impress investors in Atomos. In
part, the document
was a rudimentary curriculum vitae, but it also set out
Mr Overliese’s reasons for leaving the applicant as follows:
- Company
direction for first 4.5 years was determined largely in cooperation with CEO.
After this period, CEO changed my role to only
management of hardware team,
removing me from most strategic decision making.
- Products
development under sole direction of CEO has slowed from 6-8 new products per
year to 2-3 new products.
- Hardware
engineering productivity gone from 100% to 60%, due to continually abandoned
projects.
- Company
management highly dysfunctional under CEO. My desire to fix other divisions:
software and manufacturing in particular vetoed.
- Can see clear
easy product openings in the audio & video markets not exploited.
- Want to go
because I know Atomos will be a great business. We are sitting on a
goldmine!
- NB: I am not
starting a business because I am unhappy with my job!
As this extract makes clear, Mr Overliese was still,
on 21 March 2008, intending that Atomos should operate in the video
(as
well as in the audio) market. Under cross-examination, he explained that the
expression “sitting on a goldmine”
was something he observed being
used to advantage by a manager with whom he had previously worked, when seeking
venture capital.
He denied that the relevant section of the document was
informed by his profit calculations in the “SDI” page of the
“ycalc” worksheet. Again, I regard that as an improbable denial.
Whether or not by reason of that worksheet as such,
the court would be
naïve not to recognise that Mr Overliese’s assessment of the
potential profitability of video
products, derived from his knowledge of the
applicant’s cost and profit figures, was very much in his thoughts as he
created
this document.
- I
refer next to the “marketing plan” document which I have mentioned
briefly at para 43 above. It related to the
video industry, and was headed
“Atomos Video Marketing Plans”. It included details relating to two
“competitors”,
the first of which was the applicant. The way
Mr Overliese (who created this document) set out the details which related
to
the applicant and those which related to the other potential competitor is
instructive. For example:
The
applicant: “$25m turnover”
The other:
Revenue estimate TBD. Guess around $50M?
Would say around 15 hardware & 10 software engineers, sales
offices?
The
applicant:
- Profitability too low, a 20% slump in sales will result in cutbacks.
- Quality of manufacturing poor, few capabilities and high return rate
- Marketing & advertising strategy nonexistent
- Reputation for “cheap, so you get what you pay for”
- Poor customer support
- Software very weak and not much chance of
improving
The other:
- Slow and conservative engineering, easy to beat features
- Actual signal quality does not live up to the reputation – though mostly
in spec.
- Marketing extremely techie, relies almost 100% on sales channel for
explanation.
The evidence is that this document was last saved by Mr Overliese on
30 March 2008. To an extent at least, Mr Overliese
was using his
knowledge of facts about the applicant that would have come to him only in the
course of his employment, to develop
a video marketing plan for Atomos.
- On
1 April 2008, Mr Overliese created another word processor document,
saved as “Plan Overview”. In part,
the document consisted only of a
series of headings beneath which no text appeared. In other respects, the
document contained seemingly
well thought-out notes of what Atomos might do. It
was clear that participation in the market for video products was a significant
element of Mr Overliese’s intentions. Under cross-examination, he
insisted that the document was consistent only with
an intention to use
compressed video technology, whereas the applicant’s main focus was on
uncompressed technology. I do not
accept that. The document contains a number
of references to uncompressed products.
- In
mid-April 2008, the trade show of the National Association of Broadcasters was
held in Las Vegas. Most of the senior personnel
of the applicant, including
Messrs Petty, Overliese and Young, attended. At the show, a Canadian competitor
of the applicant called
“Matrox” announced that it would introduce a
new 1-lane card with 10-bit HD capacity for use in conjunction with
Macintosh computers. This was, it seems, an announcement of some importance,
and the matter was discussed as between Mr Petty
and Mr Overliese.
Mr Overliese said (to Mr Petty) that it was not possible for the
applicant to do 10-bit with its
DMA, “but that since Matrox claimed it, we
could investigate it by changing the DMA”. Mr Petty did not deny
Mr Overliese’s
account of this conversation, but said that the
environment at the show was not conducive to holding confidential discussions
about
future product ideas, so the issue was not progressed at that stage.
- Shortly
after his return from the United States, Mr Overliese gave
four weeks’ notice to the applicant. He did so
by letter addressed
to Mr Petty dated 28 April 2008. He stated no reason for his
resignation. He handed the letter to
Mr Petty on 29 April 2009. When
Mr Petty asked him why he was leaving, Mr Overliese said that it was
due to
personal issues, that he was feeling stressed with his job, and that he
wanted to do something different. He said that he was going
to be working from
Melbourne until the end of the year freelancing for a UK-based French company
that developed chips for application-specific
integrated circuits.
Mr Petty offered to have Mr Overliese remain with the applicant,
albeit in a different role, but
Mr Overliese’s response was that he
was restless, and wanted to do something different. He said that he was
interested
in moving overseas and getting out of Melbourne, and that he might
move to northern California to work. Mr Petty said that
the applicant had
an office there, and, if he wanted to remain with the applicant, he could be
there the following week and do something
from that office. However,
Mr Overliese declined that offer.
- In
his evidence, Mr Overliese said that his real reasons for leaving the
employ of the applicant were not as he had told Mr Petty
on 29 April
2008. He said that he was then “evasive”, as he wanted to avoid
confrontation and bad feelings. His
real reasons for leaving had much to do
with his disenchantment with his job at the applicant, and with the applicant
generally.
He perceived a number of problems both in the software and in the
hardware engineering activities of the applicant, but had been
constantly
rebuffed by Mr Petty when he sought to suggest solutions. He found this
very demoralizing. He was frustrated that
he lacked the authority to make
decisions about the products which the applicant would produce, and he was
unhappy that his ideas
were dismissed by Mr Petty in terms which were
“ardent and dictatorial”.
- Mr Overliese
referred also to the failure of Mr Petty to implement a share options plan,
which had been discussed positively
as long ago as two years previously. After
some negotiation, in early 2007 Mr Petty had offered Mr Overliese
options the
equivalent of 5% of the applicant’s equity. However, a scheme
to implement these options was never produced. By early 2008,
Mr Overliese
felt that his career with the applicant had reached a dead-end, that
Mr Petty’s intention was that his
role should be limited to the
management of hardware engineering and the ordering of parts, and that the limit
of his career progression
would be as a salaried employee engaged in such
activities.
- Mr Overliese
said that, for these reasons, he decided to “use my substantial
accumulated skills to come up with my own
products”. What he had in mind,
of course, was going in to business with Mr Young, with Atomos as their
corporate vehicle,
in the production and marketing of audio and video products.
- Mr Petty
required Mr Overliese to work out his period of notice. He conducted an
“exit interview” with him
on 30 April 2008. Mr Petty was
most concerned to obtain a complete picture of Mr Overliese’s role,
initially
for the purpose of recruiting a replacement. At the exit interview,
Mr Overliese reiterated the generally uninformative (and,
as it happens,
incorrect) reasons he had for leaving the applicant’s employ.
- After
the exit interview, Mr Overliese said that he was not feeling well, and
went home. He did not attend at work on 1, 2
or 5 May 2008 (Thursday,
Friday and Monday), as he remained unwell. He returned to work on Tuesday
6 May 2008.
- On
28 April 2008, Mr Young had no intention of resigning. However,
events occurred over the next few days which caused
him to change his mind. On
a day that Mr Young identified as the day of Mr Overliese’s
resignation (but it may,
from context, have been 30 April 2008), there was
a discussion involving Messrs Petty, Young and some other members of staff,
during the course of which Mr Petty (according to the evidence of
Mr Young, which was not denied by Mr Petty) said
that
Mr Overliese was “a shit engineer anyway” and something to the
effect of the applicant not needing him. Mr Young
responded: “How
can you say that? I am astounded that the person who made the first ten
products for you by himself would
be spoken about in this way by you”.
According to Mr Young, “the office went silent and Petty did not
reply”.
- There
was a further clashing of swords as between Messrs Petty and Young on 2 May
2008. It related to some arrangements that
Mr Young had made with
representatives of a business called Adobe Video Systems whilst he was in Las
Vegas. Mr Young recalls
that the undertaking of a cooperative sales
promotion between Adobe and the applicant was then discussed with, and approved
by, Mr Petty.
Mr Young said that he and the Adobe representatives
commenced work on the promotional activities proposed. Less than two weeks
later, Mr Young asked Mr Petty to approve a particular aspect of the
arrangement with Adobe. According to Mr Young,
Mr Petty said that he
“recalled no such deal and ordered me to stop all activities relating to
it”. This left Mr Young
in an embarrassing situation, in that he
would have to explain to Adobe that his boss had cancelled the project, despite
previously
agreeing to it. Mr Young said that Mr Petty told him that
he recalled no such agreement, that the conversation became
heated, and that he
(Young) asked Mr Petty to write things down, “because you can’t
remember what you decide from
day to day”.
- Mr Petty’s
recollection of his conversation with Mr Young on 2 May 2008 was
rather different. He made no reference
(either in his original affidavit or in
his affidavit in reply to Mr Young) to the suggestion that there had been
an agreement
on his part to the cooperative activities whilst they were in Las
Vegas. He said that it was on 2 May 2008 that Mr Young
first
indicated that he wanted to do “advertising for a bundle software
deal” between the applicant and Adobe. Mr Petty
expressed the
concern that the applicant did not have the budget at that time for such a
proposal. According to Mr Petty, Mr Young
then said that he had
purchased 22 units of an Adobe product, then situated in the applicant’s
USA office, that now needed
to be sold. Mr Petty said that he was shocked
to hear that, as he had never approved the purchase of such stock. He told
Mr Young
so. Mr Young responded that there were emails about it, that
he (Petty) had agreed to it, and said that he should write things
down because
he had no memory of anything. At the time, Mr Petty assumed that the stock
in the USA was worth about $US20,000.
After making inquiries, he discovered
that the stock was worth $US109,600. He claimed that this had been done without
his authority
or knowledge. He said, in one of his affidavits, that he then
knew that he needed to have a serious discussion with Mr Young
to determine
how these commitments had come to be made, and to make sure that the experience
was not repeated.
- Mr Petty
did have a discussion with Mr Young on Monday 5 May 2008. According
to Mr Young, Mr Petty chastised
him, saying in effect that he was
undermining his authority. According to Mr Petty (which was not denied by
Mr Young),
he told Mr Young that there had been no authority for the
purchase of $US110,000 worth of stock. He told him that it was necessary
to
have some protocols laid down, and that he wanted to be provided with profit and
loss statements from each overseas office by
the fifth of every month, an
itinerary of every overseas business trip undertaken by Mr Young before he
left for each trip,
a report following each trip (so he knew exactly what
Mr Young had been doing) and expense reports provided after every trip.
He
also told Mr Young that he did not want him to undermine his authority in
the office.
- Mr Young
then indicated that he would resign. Mr Young’s recollection of what
he then said to Mr Petty was
(in effect);
As you know, I have always wanted to go and start my own business. I think I
will do that. And don’t worry, this business
won’t compete with
you. I want to make new and exciting products and open up new markets.
Mr Petty did not deny this, but his own recollection was that
Mr Young had said: “That’s it, you block my sales
initiatives,
I’m tired, I think we should go our separate ways”. Whatever was
said, it is common ground that Mr Young
thereupon produced a letter of
resignation. To the extent that it gave any reason for Mr Young leaving
the employ of the applicant,
it was that he had completed the task of building
“a very formidable worldwide team of excellent employees and functioning
sales channels”, and that his effectiveness at the applicant “has
come to an end”. It is evident from this letter
that
Mr Young’s decision to resign on 5 May 2008 was no spur of the
moment thing. Indeed, on Friday 2 May 2008,
he had told Mr Simon
Hollingworth, the marketing manager of the applicant, that he had already signed
his resignation letter,
as he was fed up with Mr Petty’s
“inadequate management and strategic direction and Ian Overliese’s
resignation
had left him lacking in confidence about the future success of the
company” (Mr Hollingworth’s words).
- Mr Young’s
resignation letter gave four weeks’ notice. It stated that 30 May
2008 would be the last day upon
which he would work for the applicant. However,
when Mr Petty received the letter on 5 May 2008, he told Mr Young
to leave immediately. He instructed Mr Young to change the password on his
computer to something generic so that other staff
of the applicant could access
it and to collect his personal effects from his desk. Mr Young told
Mr Petty that he had
“some personal expense” spreadsheets on
his computer that he wanted to copy, but did not then have a USB memory stick
with him. Mr Petty said that he could do that later.
- Mr Young
said (in his evidence) that he had an extensive amount of the applicant’s
information in his possession (ie, I
infer, on his private computer), and
was not sure whether he should delete it, or return it to the applicant, and if
the latter,
how he should do so. On the evening of 5 May 2008, he
telephoned Mr Petty to discuss what should be done about the
applicant’s
information which he had at home. Mr Petty said
“I’m not sure what to do with the information, I will let you
know”.
However, Mr Petty did not return to Mr Young with any
such instructions and, notwithstanding several attempts made over
the ensuing
days by Mr Young to contact Mr Petty and other management at the
applicant, Mr Young was not informed
about how he should deal with the
applicant’s information which remained in his possession.
- After
Mr Young had left the applicant’s premises on 5 May 2008,
Mr Petty arranged for another employee of the
applicant to check
Mr Young’s computer to obtain contact data in relation to the sales
channels for which Mr Young
had been responsible. The employee drew
Mr Petty’s attention to an email sent by Mr Young to
Mr Overliese on
10 April 2008 which gave him (Mr Petty) cause to
suspect that Messrs Young and Overliese might have been involving themselves
in
some kind of video business other than that of the applicant. Mr Petty
then also found a copy of the email of 2/3 February
2008 to which I have
referred in paras 28-32 above. He noted that one of
Mr Overliese’s email domain names was “atomosaudio.com”,
he had the applicant’s solicitors undertake a company search of
“Atomos”, he searched Mr Young’s computer
for the word
“Atomos” and he located amongst other things, the file
“ycalc.NOPW”.
- Mr Overliese
was not at work on 5 May 2008. When he arrived at work on 6 May 2008,
Mr Petty refused him admission
to the premises. He did not work again for
the applicant.
- On
8 May 2008, Mr Overliese went to Mr Young’s residence, and
they discussed their future plans. One of the
things they discussed was how
they needed to remove or to return to the applicant work-related information
that was on their own
computers. Mr Overliese kept all of the
password-protected documents on his computer in a 35GB “Truecrypt”
volume.
They included both his own personal documents and material which
related to his employment with the applicant. They included, of
course, all of
the files and documents to which I have referred above, including those
presently contentious. Amongst the documents
which related to
Mr Overliese’s employment was a number which contained copyright
works of the applicant (a circumstance
admitted by Mr Overliese). While at
Mr Young’s house on 8 May 2008, Mr Overliese anticipated
that he would
be deleting the files on his computer that related to the
applicant. For that purpose − principally, I infer, to guard against
the
risk that some files might be unintentionally lost − Mr Overliese
backed up the entire Truecrypt volume onto a DVD,
which he labelled
“d”. He said he did this backup “momentarily” and did
not consider “particularly
what to do afterwards”. He did not think
that there was any information that the applicant would want returned. He left
the
back-up DVD on a desk at Mr Young’s residence.
- On
12 May 2008, Mr Overliese purchased a “USB Key” and copied
to it all of the encrypted files on his computer.
The object was then to use
the USB key as the working medium from which would delete the files that he no
longer wanted (principally
files containing the applicant’s information),
to format his computer and to copy back to it the remaining contents of the
USB
key. He completed these tasks only partly on 12 May 2008. He thought that
he had removed all of the applicant’s
material from the USB key, but there
were some older files (ie files that had been placed on to his computer more
than a year previously)
which he missed, and which remained on his USB key. He
commenced to format the relevant partition on his hard drive but, after about
15 minutes the formatting was incomplete, and Mr Overliese wished to
use his computer for other things, so he aborted the
formatting operation.
Notwithstanding that, he checked to see whether there were any files remaining
on the Truecrypt volume. As
a result of receiving an error message that
informed him that the drive was not formatted, he inferred that there were not.
- The
investigations put in train by Mr Petty to which I have referred in
para 69 above led to the commencement of the present
proceeding on
12 May 2008, and to the making of a search order by the court on the same
day. The execution of that order on
13 May 2008 yielded a number of
electronic files and media (including the DVD which Mr Overliese left at
Mr Young’s
residence and the USB key to which Mr Overliese
copied files on 12 May 2008) in the custody of Messrs Overliese and Young.
To the extent that they are presently important, I have referred to them above.
The applicant’s case
- Not
surprisingly perhaps, when Mr Petty saw the nature of the material that was
contained on the electronic media seized under
the search order, he feared the
worst. He feared that Messrs Overliese and Young, with the active cooperation
and assistance of
Ms Young, were at an advanced stage of establishing a
business to compete directly with the applicant, and that they had reached
that
point by the utilisation of information to which they were privy as senior
employees of the applicant holding responsible positions,
being information that
the applicant would wish to keep confidential, particularly from the eyes of
actual or potential competitors.
By the time that final submissions were made
on behalf of the applicant, however, its case had come down to the following
points.
First, it alleged that Messrs Overliese and Young, while still employed
by the applicant, had used the applicant’s confidential
information, to
which they were privy by reason of their senior positions in the employ of the
applicant, for the purposes of establishing
a potentially competing business.
In so doing, they disclosed the applicant’s confidential information to
Ms Young and
to Atomos. Secondly, it alleged that Messrs Overliese and
Young had contravened ss 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act. Thirdly, it
alleged that Messrs Overliese and Young, while still employed by the applicant,
diverted certain business opportunities
away from the applicant in order to
exploit them for themselves. Fourthly, it alleged that Mr Overliese did
not advise the
applicant of business opportunities available to it of which he
was aware, being the opportunities alleged to be diverted as previously
referred
to. As the applicant’s fiduciary, Mr Overliese should have so
advised it, and his failure to have done so makes
him now liable to compensate
the applicant for the lost opportunities. Fifthly, it alleged that
Mr Overliese engaged in misleading
and deceptive conduct when he informed
Mr Petty that to produce a 1 lane card with 10-bit capacity would cost
only $20
less than the then cost of producing the DeckLink HD Extreme
2 card and when he informed him later that a 1 lane version
of that
card would be “8 bit forever”. Sixthly, it alleged that, when
he made a copy of the contents of the Truecrypt
volume on his personal computer
− first to the DVD labelled “d”, and secondly to the USB key
− Mr Overliese
infringed the applicant’s copyright in a number
of the works which were so copied. Seventhly, it alleged that Mr Young
breached the terms of his employment agreement to which I referred in
para 6 above. Against Mr Overliese, Ms Young
and Atomos, it is
said that they induced Mr Young’s breach of that agreement.
Confidential information
- As
pleaded, the applicant’s case involved allegations that Messrs Overliese
and Young had in their possession, without proper
authority, a great deal of
information that was confidential to the applicant. As the evidence emerged, it
was only Mr Overliese
that had the information referred to (apart, that is,
from the sharing of information as between the respondents necessarily involved
in the forwarding by Mr Overliese of the “ycalc” spreadsheet).
He admitted that much of the information was confidential
to the applicant.
There is some dispute as to the confidentiality of some of the information, but
the essence of Mr Overliese’s
defence is that he had this information
on his personal computer as a necessary concomitant of being required to work
away from the
office from time to time and of his very senior position with the
applicant. There were, for example, layouts of hundreds of printed
circuit
boards (an item which Mr Overliese did not, as it happened, admit to be
confidential to the applicant) on Mr Overliese’s
computer. This is
only to be expected in the case of someone who was the head of hardware
engineering. For the most part, there
is nothing in the evidence that would
sustain the proposition that Mr Overliese misused, or intended to misuse,
any of the information
that was conventionally in his possession as a result of
his position with the applicant.
- The
exceptions are the categories of information which Mr Overliese used to
develop the various versions of the “ycalc”
spreadsheet. He himself
accepted that the parts usage figures incorporated in to the
“allcosts” worksheet (see para
26 above) were confidential to the
applicant. He resisted the suggestion that the prices paid by the applicant for
the parts which
went into the various cards were confidential, saying that those
prices were very close to those which could be derived by the application
of a
conventional wholesale mark-up to the manufacturers’ published prices.
That may be, but the prices in fact used by Mr Overliese
were those paid by
the applicant pursuant to contracts which it had struck with its suppliers.
However close those prices may have
been to the hypothetical educated guess,
they were the applicant’s own commercial information which should be
regarded as confidential
in Mr Overliese’s hands consistently with
the tests adumbrated by Gummow J in Smith Kline & French
Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Department of Community Services and Health (1990)
22 FCR 73, 87. The applicant’s profit margins were also, quite
obviously, confidential to itself in accordance
with normal commercial
assumptions. The fact that Mr Petty shared information about those margins
with Mr Overliese in
no sense gave the latter a right to treat the
information effectively as public property or to use the information for
purposes unconnected
with the applicant.
- The
next question is whether Mr Overliese used the applicant’s
confidential information for his own, or for Atomos’s,
purposes. He
clearly incorporated such information into the versions of the
“ycalc” spreadsheet developed in early February
2008, which he
placed on to Grouphub on 7 February and which he sent to Mr Young in
the form of “ycalc.NOPW”
on 9 February. For reasons which I
have given above, I am satisfied that, by 7 February at the latest,
Mr Overliese’s
use of that information was for the purposes of
Atomos. I allow for the possibility that he may originally have developed
−
or commenced to develop − the offending worksheets in
“ycalc” for benign purposes, but this was confidential information
to which he was privy as a senior employee. It does not, I consider, come well
from a person in his then position to ask the court
to perceive the existence of
nice distinctions between his own separate purposes, particularly when he chose
to incorporate the information
into pages of a spreadsheet which he had created,
and on which he was regularly working, to facilitate the establishment of his
own
company.
- For
those reasons, I consider that the applicant has, prima facie at
least, made good its claim for a permanent injunction to restrain
Mr Overliese from using the information in the “ycalc”
spreadsheets otherwise than with the authority of the applicant. However,
Mr Overliese resists such a course, even on the assumption
that I might
find against him on the substance of the matter. He submits that he was
dispossessed of all the media on which the
relevant information was stored when
the search order was executed on 13 May 2008. He has been subject to
interlocutory restraints
which have given the applicant everything, in point of
content, for which it might reasonably have asked by way of permanent
injunction.
He also points out that the information in question is not such as
he might carry around in his head, since it was essentially a
mass of statistics
that one either has − electronically or otherwise − or has not; and
if the latter, it would be artificial
to consider that the information could be
“used”.
- The
applicant does not accept this approach to its presumptive entitlement to
permanent injunctive relief. It points out that its
claim has been contested on
the merits to the end, and that Mr Overliese, therefore, implicitly asserts
the right to continue
to use the information which I have held to be
confidential. Were I not to restrain him, he would, as a matter of law, have
that
right, whether or not he had the means to restore to his conscious thinking
the details of that information. In point of principle,
these submissions on
behalf of the applicant must be accepted. The pragmatic arguments advanced by
Mr Overliese in the capacity
of someone who has used his position as a
senior employee to acquire his employer’s confidential information and
then to make
use of it − however transiently − for his own purposes
are not such as a court of equitable jurisdiction should find
attractive.
I shall grant the applicant permanent injunctive relief in relation to such
information.
- As
proposed by counsel for the applicant, I shall list the proceeding for the
purpose of hearing the parties on the terms of such
an injunction. What I have
in mind is that Mr Overliese should be restrained from using, or disclosing
to any person, the information
which I have found to be confidential to the
applicant, without the applicant’s prior written consent. However, I
shall confine
the terms of the injunction to information which can be
specifically identified by reference to the evidence in this case. It is
not my
intention, for example, that everything in “ycalc” would, ipso
facto as it were, be covered.
- What
of the position of Mr Young? He was the recipient, rather than the
originator, of the confidential material to which I
have referred, most
obviously when a version of it was posted for his attention on Grouphub on
9 February 2008. I accept that
he quickly resisted the idea that Atomos
should compete with the applicant. But the present issue is concerned not with
potential
competition but with possession of, or access to, confidential
information. It is likely that Mr Young already had access to,
and was
familiar with, a deal of the information which he was sent by Mr Overliese.
I note that one comment he made about the
“ycalc” spreadsheet was
that it concerned sales data with which he was already familiar and which,
therefore, was of
no interest to him.
- On
balance I am persuaded that Mr Young should be bound by an injunction in
the same terms as will apply to Mr Overliese.
He was a co-principal in the
embryonic Atomos project, and was the author of an email (sent to
Mr Overliese on 3 February
2008) which first proposed that their
business should include the production and sale of video capture cards. He too
was a senior
manager in the employ of the applicant, his familiarity with the
sales data on the “ycalc” spreadsheet deriving from
that
circumstance. No less than that of Mr Overliese, Mr Young’s
conscience is, in my view, affected by the confidential
nature of the
information to which he became privy, by the circumstances by which he became
privy thereto, and by his former position
with the applicant.
- Self-evidently,
in the circumstances, Atomos should be similarly restrained.
- I
take a different view about Ms Young. She was never a part of the Atomos
project. She helped out where she could, but more
in the role of a useful
volunteer than in that of a participant. She was, it is true, exposed to
confidential information in “ycalc”,
but it was meaningless to her,
save in the sense of a series of figures by reference to which she could develop
a template for the
others. She never worked for the applicant, and I accept her
denial of any appreciation that the figures to which she was being
exposed were
confidential. Further, I think it quite unlikely that she would now have either
the recollection or the inclination
to make any use of those figures. The
applicant has not made good its case for an injunction binding on Ms Young.
The Corporations Act
- The
applicant seeks injunctions under s 1324 of the Corporations Act
for alleged contraventions of ss 182(1) and 183(1) of that Act. It
says that Mr Overliese used his position as its employee, and used
information which he had obtained as
its employee, to gain an advantage for
himself and for Atomos and to cause detriment to itself (the applicant). The
submissions
made on behalf of the applicant under ss 182 and 183 proceeded,
however, at a very high level: almost no attention was paid to the detailed
requirements of these provisions, nor to
how Mr Overliese’s conduct
was said to come within them.
- The
applicant and the respondents were in agreement on one legal point arising under
ss 182 and 183. They all submitted that the content of the norms of
conduct conveyed by the expression “improperly use” was no different
from the kind of impropriety which equity would require to restrain a breach of
confidence or of fiduciary duty. The parties relied
upon the recent Full Court
judgment in Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (2009)
81 IPR 1, 9-10, [44]-[46]. I accept the parties’ agreement in this
respect: indeed, I am bound to apply the law as contained in
Futuretronics. I note, however, that the Full Court does not appear to
have been referred to Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410, 416-417 or to
R v Byrnes [1995] HCA 1; (1995) 183 CLR 501, 514 (which I had cause to discuss in
Dais Studio Pty Ltd v Bullet Creative Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 2054; (2007) 165 FCR 92, 128-130,
[100]-[105]).
- I
have held that a court of equity would restrain Mr Overliese from making
use of the information of the applicant’s which
should be regarded as
confidential. Albeit perhaps fleetingly over a few weeks in early 2008,
Mr Overliese did make use of
that information (which was in his possession
because of his position as employee of the applicant) to gain an advantage for
Atomos.
This conclusion is unaffected by the circumstance that, as things
turned out, no advantage was in fact gained by Atomos: Chew v R [1992] HCA 18; (1992)
173 CLR 626, 633. It follows that, for the reasons given above in connection
with the applicant’s claim that Mr Overliese had misused
its
confidential information, I am of the view that he has likewise contravened
s 183(1) of the Corporations Act. I do not, however, propose to restrain
him more than once in respect of what is essentially a single pattern of
conduct. I shall
hear the applicant as to the terms of a single permanent
injunction that would reflect Mr Overliese’s breach of confidence
and
of s 183(1).
- Although
the applicant sought declarations in a number of respects, none was sought under
s 1317E of the Corporations Act. Notwithstanding that omission, I note
that that section is expressed in a way that appears to leave the court no
choice but to
make a declaration. This was not a matter addressed by the
parties in their submissions, and I shall hear from them on the subject
in the
course of settling the orders that should be made in consequence of these
reasons.
- The
applicant sought compensation under s 1317H of the Corporations Act, but it
was not suggested that it had suffered any damage as a result of
Mr Overliese’s use of information which I have
held to be in breach
of s 183(1).
- I
am not satisfied that Mr Young improperly used any information, being
information obtained by him because he was an employee
of the applicant, to gain
an advantage for himself or for Atomos. The applicant’s submissions dealt
with Mr Young at
a high level of generality, focussing on the circumstance
that he was a co-venturer in the project that was to become Atomos. It
is true
that, one way or the other, Mr Young became privy to the information
(passed to him by Mr Overliese) which I have
held to be confidential to the
applicant, and that I have concluded that a permanent injunction should go in
his case. However,
the information in question was not obtained by
Mr Young because he was an employee of the applicant: it was obtained by
him
because it was provided to him by Mr Overliese. Further, I am not
satisfied that Mr Young used the information within
the terms of
s 183(1): indeed, he seems to have discouraged Mr Overliese from
steering Atomos down a track where this confidential information would
have been
to greatest advantage. I shall dismiss the applicant’s s 183
case as against Mr Young.
- That
leaves s 182(1) of the Corporations Act. In a sense it was
Mr Overliese’s position as an employee of the applicant that enabled
him to obtain the information
which I have held to be confidential and
which he then used to the advantage of Atomos. However, this is the province of
s 183. Although I was not addressed on the subject, I am disposed to think
that s 182 is concerned with the direct use of an employee’s position
to gain an advantage of the kind referred to, rather than with the
circumstance
that the position is the means by which the employee comes to have in his or her
possession information which is then
used to gain such an advantage. What
Mr Overliese did that was (as a matter of purpose if not reality) to the
advantage of
Atomos was done wholly outside the context of his position with
Atomos. It was done in his own time, on his own computer and at
his own
premises. It had neither an intended nor an apparent reference to his role
or capacity as employee of the applicant.
For these reasons, I propose to
dismiss the applicant’s case under s 182 against Mr Overliese.
The like case against Mr Young will also be
dismissed.
Diversion of business opportunities
- The
“business opportunities” which Messrs Overliese and Young were
alleged to have diverted from the applicant were “a
card-incorporating
DeckLink HD Extreme features using [the applicant’s] Intensity 1-lane
architecture”, “the
incorporation of 10-bit video signal capability
into a modified 1-lane version of the DeckLink HD Extreme card” and
“the
incorporation of 10-bit video signal capability into products
utilising [the applicant’s] Intensity 1-lane architecture”.
As
became apparent during the running of the trial, these formulations were
essentially three different ways of referring to the
one thing, namely, the
“Simple card” included on the “ycalc” spreadsheet. As a
point separate from the one
to which I refer next, however, it is hard to see
what this allegation adds to that relating to confidential information. The
truth
of the matter is that the Simple card did not represent a “business
opportunity” at all, but, at the most, a product
concept of some
potential. The applicant’s point was that it should be regarded as the
owner in equity of that concept. The
value of the concept, however, was that
10-bit capability could possibly be achieved over 1 lane, if the DMA Style
were changed.
That was a technical matter within Mr Overliese’s
expertise. Had he, while still employed by the applicant, devised
a practical
way of producing a card that would perform in that way and then used that
technology for the benefit of himself or of
Atomos, the applicant might well
have had an argument that he should be restrained. But
Mr Overliese’s workings, such
as they were, never reached that stage.
Neither, in my view, was there ever a business opportunity that was diverted.
Further, Mr Overliese
now having been out of the employ of the applicant
for a period approaching two years, the circumstances referred to provide no
basis
for a permanent injunction. And if there is no case to restrain
Mr Overliese in these respects, Mr Young’s situation
is a
fortiori.
Equitable damages
- I
turn next to the applicant’s case for equitable damages against
Mr Overliese. This related to what the applicant claimed
was a lost
opportunity to exploit one of the hypothetical capture cards that
Mr Overliese included in his workings of the product
possibilities for
Atomos and recorded in the “ycalc” spreadsheet. The applicant
contended that the “Simple card”
proposed by Mr Overliese was a
product that would have been of great commercial value to it, substantially
because it would
have had 10-bit capability over 1 lane. It contended that
this ought to have been obvious to Mr Overliese and, as a fiduciary
who had
devised the card, even if only conceptually and subject to a modification to the
DMA, he was obliged to disclose his ideas
to the applicant. It further
contended that although sourced in Mr Overliese’s fiduciary
obligation, equity would award
the applicant compensation for the loss it
suffered by being unable to produce and market such a card until at least 6
months after
it would have done if it had had the benefit of
Mr Overliese’s ideas immediately they were formulated in early
February
2008. In this respect, the applicant relied upon the judgment of
Tadgell J in Hill v Rose [1990] VR 129, 143-144.
- I
was referred to no reported instance of a senior employee having been held to be
in breach of his or her fiduciary obligation merely
by failing to disclose to
his or her employer the details of a clever or potentially useful idea. For my
own part, I am unaware
of any such instance. Here several things must be
remembered. The argument put on behalf of the applicant was not based on
contract.
In one of the alternative formulations of the applicant’s
allegation in its Further Amended Statement of Claim, it was said
that it was an
implied term of Mr Overliese’s contract of employment that he owed
the applicant a duty “to exploit
for [the applicant] alone, and to the
exclusion of any interest [he] may have after the end of [his] employment by
[the applicant],
each and every opportunity to expand [the applicant’s]
business”. This allegation (which was not as a matter of contract
pursued
in the applicant’s final submissions) is at best tangential to the point
now under consideration. That point is based
wholly upon what was said to be a
breach of Mr Overliese’s duty as a fiduciary.
- Further,
the applicant seeks equitable compensation quite apart from its claim for an
injunction to restrain the use of confidential
information or the use, in a
potentially competitive capacity, of any information which came to
Mr Overliese while he was employed
by the applicant. The point is
unrelated to the question of Mr Overliese’s actual or intended
activities in competition
with the applicant. The point does not depend on
Mr Overliese having taken anything of the applicant’s for his own
benefit,
or having made, or having put himself in a position to make, any profit
from information acquired in the employ of the applicant.
Neither does the
point depend on the applicant having suffered any actual loss; nor upon the
applicant being the worse off for Mr Overliese
having denied it the benefit
of a commercial opportunity that would, absent Mr Overliese’s
actions, have come to the applicant
in the normal course. The point is simply
that, where Mr Overliese (in his own time but admittedly by reference to
the applicant’s
information) came upon an idea, equity would impose on him
a positive obligation to inform the applicant of it, and, failing him
doing
that, would require him to pay compensation to the extent necessary to place the
applicant in the same commercial position
as it would have occupied had the idea
been disclosed promptly.
- The
applicant’s point is met directly by long-established authority to the
effect that the obligations imposed by equity upon
a fiduciary are proscriptive,
not prescriptive. In P & V Industries Pty Ltd v
Porto [2006] VSC 131; (2006) 14 VR 1, Hollingworth J canvassed the authorities on this
point, and concluded (14 VR 1 at 9,
[43]):
The law in Australia, as outlined in [Breen v Williams
(1996) 186 CLR 71] is that fiduciary duties are
limited to imposing constraints on conduct which the fiduciary has in fact
embarked upon and not by imposing
a positive obligation of disclosure of the
kind assumed by a duty to disclose.
Her Honour’s judgment has since been followed by the Supreme Court of
New South Wales in Levy v Bablis [2007] NSWSC 565,
[18] and cited with approval by the Court of Appeal of Western Australia in
Wilden Pty Ltd v Green [2009] WASCA 38, [106], [212]. Although I
was not referred to this line of authority by either side in the present case,
it
is fatal to the applicant’s claim that Mr Overliese came under a
positive fiduciary obligation to disclose the details
of the Simple card to
Mr Petty.
- I
mention, for the sake of completeness only, that it was fleetingly suggested in
final submissions made on behalf of the applicant
that Mr Overliese’s
failure to disclose the concept, and the details, of the Simple card to the
applicant would sound
in compensation under s 1317H of the Corporations
Act. The applicant provided no explanation, however, of how that failure would
amount to a contravention of s 182 or s 183 of that Act. It is not at
all self-evident that it would. In the circumstances, there is no need to
develop such a possibility
further.
Misleading conduct
- The
applicant’s claims under the Trade Practices Act and the Fair Trading Act
relate to the events which I have described in outline at paras 15-18 and
33 above. It was submitted that, in informing Mr Petty
that a 1-lane card
with the characteristics which he had specified in late 2007 would be only about
$20 cheaper to build than the
then proposed DeckLink HD Extreme 2, and
in responding to Mr Petty’s email of 4 February 2008 with the
words “only 8 bit HD (forever)”, Mr Overliese engaged in
misleading conduct in trade or commerce within the
meaning of s 9 of the
Fair Trading Act and, because he engaged in that conduct on behalf of Atomos, it
too engaged in such conduct under s 9 and also in like conduct in
contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. In each case the basis
of the allegation was that Mr Overliese, in the preparations which he was
making for the start-up of
Atomos, well knew that 10-bit capability was feasible
over 1 lane, and that his representations to the contrary to Mr Petty
were crafted to serve the interests of Atomos and to ensure that the applicant
did not derive the benefit of that knowledge.
- The
applicant’s submissions in support of this aspect of its case were
off-hand and cursory in the extreme. They amounted
to little more than a
reference to its case as pleaded. I am not satisfied that
Mr Overliese’s statements to Mr Petty
were misleading. They
were made in the context of the then conventional wisdom that 10-bit was not
feasible over 1 lane. At
the time when he made the “$20
cheaper” representation to Mr Petty, even Mr Overliese had not
surmised that
10-bit might be feasible over 1 lane. He may have (but I
could not find that he had) reached that point by the time he responded
to
Mr Petty’s email of 4 February 2008, but he made clear in his
evidence that all of the advice which he gave to
Mr Petty proceeded from
the assumption that the DMA used by the applicant would remain as it was. His
supposition that 10-bit
might be feasible in a 1-lane card such as the
“Simple card” proceeded from an assumption that a new form of DMA
would
be used. Mr Overliese responded to Mr Petty’s inquiries
in the context in which they were made, and he engaged in
no misleading conduct
when he did so.
- It
was submitted on behalf of Mr Overliese that such representations as he
made to Mr Petty were not made in trade or commerce
as required by
s 52 and s 9. In this respect, counsel relied on Concrete
Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson [1990] HCA 17; (1990) 169 CLR 594. The point was that
Mr Overliese’s responses to Mr Petty were wholly internal to the
applicant, and did not of their
nature bear a trading or commercial character.
The applicant sought to deflect this point by asserting that, when he gave those
responses, Mr Overliese was (albeit unknown to Mr Petty at the time)
speaking with intended reference to his role with
Atomos, and on behalf of
Atomos. That assertion amounts to a serious charge of duplicity on the part of
Mr Overliese, and I
have no hesitation in rejecting it. There is nothing
in the evidence that would sustain it. I find that, in relevant respects,
Mr Overliese was acting with intended reference to his position with the
applicant, and was giving Mr Petty, bona fide, the benefit of
his considered reaction to the proposals that had been put forward. These
transactions concerned the applicant and
the applicant alone, and did not bear a
trading or commercial character. In the circumstances, I would hold that
Mr Overliese’s
conduct was not in trade or commerce.
Copyright
- The
applicant’s copyright case relates to certain of the files that were on
Mr Overliese’s personal computer and
which he copied on to the DVD
marked “d” on 8 May 2008, and on to the USB key on 12 May
2008 (see paras 71-72
above). The applicant made no complaint about these
files being on that computer in the first place. It was accepted that that
was
an unobjectionable incident of Mr Overliese’s employment. However,
those files included many documents which were,
or which contained, original
literary or artistic works in which the applicant claimed copyright, and it
contended that the acts
of copying them onto the DVD and the USB key were
unauthorised reproductions of the works, and thus infringements of copyright
within
the meaning of s 36 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).
- This
aspect of the applicant’s case was to a large extent resolved on the
pleadings. With minor exceptions which the applicant
accepted,
Mr Overliese admitted the existence of copyright in the works specified by
the applicant, and admitted that he had
reproduced the works on 8 and
12 May 2008. However, he alleged in his Defence that his copying of the
relevant files on that
day was implicitly licensed by the applicant. He
alleged:
(i) it was an implied term of Overliese’s unwritten contract of employment
with the Applicant that after the cessation of his
employment he was to return
to the Applicant or destroy (as the Applicant may direct) all Copyright Works in
his possession ...;
(ii) there was an implied licence or authority from the Applicant, as the
copyright owner, to Overliese to reproduce Copyright Works
in material form for
the purpose of complying with the Implied Return or Destroy Term ...;
and
(iii) Overliese acted in accordance with the Implied Return or Destroy Term
pursuant to the Implied Post Employment Licence in reproducing
the Copyright
Works as pleaded in this paragraph and particularised
below;
(iv) there was an implied licence or authority from the Applicant to each of
Overliese and J Young to reproduce copyright works
of the Applicant,
including the Copyright Works, during the course of each of his employment and
for the purposes of complying with
the duties and terms of each of their
employment contracts with the Applicant ...;
(v) to the extent that either Overliese or J Young reproduced any of the
Copyright Works as otherwise alleged by the Applicant
and not admitted by them,
such reproduction was authorised by the Applicant pursuant to the Implied During
Employment Licence.
Mr Overliese relied also on s 115(3) of the Copyright Act.
- In
final submissions made on behalf of the applicant, counsel did not take issue
with the jurisprudential basis of Mr Overliese’s
defence. Rather,
they submitted that the facts did not line up with it. They drew attention to
Mr Overliese’s evidence in chief
that, having made the DVD,
he left it at Mr Young’s residence, as he “did not particularly
want it for anything”;
that he “did not consider particularly what
to do with it afterwards”; and that he did not think he had any of the
applicant’s
information that it would want returned and “could not
remember having anything important”. They drew attention to his
evidence
under cross-examination that the USB key was not a backup at all, but was the
final destination for the files that he wanted
to keep. They pointed out that
Mr Overliese had said in chief that he had no instructions from
Mr Petty as to what
to do with any “work information” that he
had, and that he “did not think about it much, or have time to go through
every single device and computer ... and search for whatever might be hanging
around after almost 6 years of work”.
- I
am satisfied that the sole purpose of Mr Overliese copying files onto the
DVD and later onto the USB key was to separate out,
and then delete or destroy,
the applicant’s files. For many years, to the applicant’s
advantage, Mr Overliese had
been carrying out work at home and on his own
computer. Unsurprisingly, the drive on his computer contained a deal of the
applicant’s
files together with, presumably, much of his own personal
material. He had assumed that he would be in the employ of the applicant
for a
number of weeks beyond 6 May 2008, but was peremptorily excluded from the
applicant’s premises by Mr Petty
on that day. He had no opportunity
for a conventional or orderly removal of the applicant’s files from his
computer –
nor for one that might be undertaken under such supervision as
Mr Petty might have required. He commenced by placing the entire
contents
of the Truecrypt volume onto the DVD as a security backup, lest any wanted files
became lost or destroyed in the process
that was to follow. It is true that he
casually and, I infer, inadvertently, left this at Mr Young’s
residence, but this
is neither here nor there apropos his purpose in copying.
He then placed the contents of the volume onto the USB key, and commenced
to
format the drive on his computer. His purpose, as he stated in his evidence and
as I accept, was to delete from the USB key everything
which related to the
applicant, and ultimately to return the remainder to his newly-formatted
computer drive. As I have explained,
the formatting process was aborted at
Mr Overliese’s discretion because he needed his computer for other
things, and the
operation overall was cut short by the execution of the search
order the following day.
- I
regard the facts as so outlined as consistent with Mr Overliese’s
Defence. Since it was implicit in the submissions
made on behalf of the
applicant that, if the facts did accord with the Defence, the Defence would be a
good one, I must dismiss the
applicant’s claim in copyright.
Mr Young’s contract
- The
submissions made on behalf of the applicant in support of its claim under
Mr Young’s contract of employment were also
very spare. They went
little beyond directing my attention to the clauses in the contract upon which
reliance was placed, much as
though the relationship between the facts of the
case and those clauses ought to have been self-evident. It was not.
Consistently
with my reasons under s 183 of the Corporations Act in
relation to Mr Young, I am not satisfied that he used, either for his own
benefit or for that of a third party, confidential
information of the applicant.
Neither does it appear to me that he disclosed such information to another
person: indeed, he was
the recipient (from Mr Overliese) of the
information which I have held to be confidential. The applicant made no attempt
to
relate Mr Young’s circumstances to the “conflict of
interest” clause in his contract, in which circumstances
I need say
nothing further about it.
- That
leaves the non-competition restraints. I have summarised them at para 6
above, but I should here set out the actual provisions
of Mr Young’s
contract. They were:
(a) The Employee must not, in any capacity including on his own account or as a
member, shareholder, unitholder, director, partner,
joint venturer, employee,
trustee, beneficiary, principal, agent, adviser, contractor, consultant,
manager, associate, representative
or financier or in any other way or by any
other means:
(i) during the period specified below (Restraint Period) and in the area
specified below (Restraint Area) perform the duties of a
software developer
– broadcast video products, participate in, be interested in, assist with
or otherwise be directly or indirectly
involved, engaged, concerned or
interested in a business, activity or operation that is the same as,
substantially similar to, or
competitive with, the Company’s business or
any material part of it (Restrained
Business).
(The reference here to a “software developer” was a curiosity
which the applicant could not explain. Mr Young was
never a software
developer. Perhaps his contract was based on one previously used for another
employee.) The “restraint period”
was defined as each of a series
of stated periods, consisting of the terms of Mr Young’s employment
plus 1, 2, 3, 6 and
12 months respectively. If I were of the view that
Mr Young had contravened this provision of the contract, and that in
other
respects an injunction should go, I could not so proceed because the most
extensive of these periods has long expired. I should
add that the applicant
did not suggest that it had suffered any loss or damage as a result of what it
claimed was a breach of this
provision. As it happens, however, as a matter of
construction I do not think that the provision caught anything done by
Mr Young
at any time that might be relevant to it. I consider that the
expression “business, activity or operation” is not apt
to include
the very embryonic structure that Atomos was down to the point when the search
order was executed. Although I would accept
that the term “activity or
operation” is one of extension, I also consider that it should be read
ejusdem generis with “business”, and therefore as a reference
to an existing businesslike entity or undertaking of some kind. Although
Atomos
had been incorporated at the relevant times, in no sense had it carried on
business, undertaken any “activity”
or “operated” such
as to enliven the terms of this provision.
- In
the circumstances, I propose to dismiss the applicant’s claim in contract
against Mr Young.
Disposition of the proceeding
- For
the reasons given above, I shall uphold the applicant’s claim for
permanent injunctions binding on Messrs Overliese
and Young, and Atomos, in
relation to the applicant’s confidential information which was
incorporated into the “ycalc”
spreadsheet. Otherwise, the
Application will be dismissed. I shall hear the parties on the orders necessary
to give effect to these
conclusions, and with respect to costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and
nine (109) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment
herein of
the Honourable Justice Jessup.
|
Associate:
Dated: 22 January 2010
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2010/13.html