Bahonko v Sterjov [2007] FCA 359 (23 February 2007)

STANISLAWA BAHONKO v KOSTA STERJOV, LISA MILLER, SUSANNA STERJOV AND LAKOSTA CHILD CARE CENTRE AND KINDERGARTEN PTY LTD
VID114 OF 2006

JESSUP J
23 FEBRUARY 2007
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	VID114 OF 2006

BETWEEN:	STANISLAWA BAHONKO Applicant
AND:	KOSTA STERJOV First Respondent LISA MILLER Second Respondent SUSANNA STERJOV Third Respondent LAKOSTA CHILD CARE CENTRE AND KINDERGARTEN PTY LTD Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:	JESSUP J
DATE OF ORDER:	23 FEBRUARY 2007
WHERE MADE:	MELBOURNE

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	VID114 OF 2006

BETWEEN:	STANISLAWA BAHONKO Applicant
AND:	KOSTA STERJOV First Respondent LISA MILLER Second Respondent SUSANNA STERJOV Third Respondent LAKOSTA CHILD CARE CENTRE AND KINDERGARTEN PTY LTD Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:	JESSUP J
DATE:	23 FEBRUARY 2007
PLACE:	MELBOURNE

1 This proceeding is the consolidation of two proceedings commenced by the applicant in the court as follows:

2 On 22 September 2006, before the proceedings were consolidated, the applicant filed and served a Notice of Motion in the matter arising under the HREOC Act for the following orders:

3 For reasons unconnected with that Notice of Motion, Gray J is no longer hearing the proceeding which commenced before him under the WR Act. Further, since the date of that notice, as previously mentioned, the proceeding under the WR Act has been consolidated with the proceedings under the HREOC Act. What remains of the applicant's Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006 therefore, is her request for orders that new parties be added to the proceeding and her request for the respondents to produce various documents, and to do other associated things. The motion has been twice adjourned, and was most recently adjourned to this date.

4 During the interlocutory period of the consolidated proceeding, and previously of the separate proceedings, the applicant has issued a number of Notices of Motion. Two of them came before me on 7 February 2007, namely, a Notice of Motion dated 27 October 2006, and a Notice of Motion dated 5 February 2007. On 7 February 2007 I dismissed both of those motions for reasons which I then pronounced. I also ordered that the respondents have leave to file and serve their Further Amended Defence on 25 January 2007, and that that Further Amended Defence stand as their Defence in the consolidated proceeding. Apart from dealing with the motion dated 22 September 2006, the only other orders which I made on 7 February were to list the consolidated proceeding for trial on 2 April 2007, and to reserve costs.

5 By Notice of Motion dated 14 February 2007, the applicant has applied for leave to appeal from each of the orders, save for the costs order, which I made on 7 February 2007. That notice is returnable before the court on 27 February 2007, that is to say, next Tuesday. The notice also seeks an order that I stand down from hearing matter number VID 114 of 2006, which is now the consolidated proceeding.

6 The applicant has today moved, pursuant to a notice filed yesterday, that the hearing today, including the hearing of her Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006, be adjourned to a date to be fixed and that I stand down from hearing the consolidated proceeding. This morning the applicant affirmed an affidavit in support of her Notice of Motion filed yesterday. Mr McKenney, who appears on behalf of the respondents, did not oppose my dealing with the Notice of Motion or receiving the applicant's affidavit, notwithstanding the short service involved.

7 According to the grounds which may be discerned from the applicant's affidavit affirmed today, she seeks the adjournment of today's hearing first because of the Notice of Motion returnable on 27 February 2007, and secondly because of her associated application that I should stand down from the proceeding. The respondent opposes the motion insofar as it relates to the applicant's Notice of Motion for leave to appeal. The respondent contends that whether or not the orders which I made on 7 February 2007 are disturbed, so long as the applicant would seek to press for the orders of which she gave notice on 22 September 2006, it is in the interests of the efficient administration of justice that that matter be considered and dealt with. The respondents say that the question of a successful appeal from the procedural orders made on 7 February 2007 is not going to cut across the due resolution of the matters raised by the September Notice of Motion.

8 The second aspect of the applicant's case is of more concern because, if it be the fact that leave to appeal is granted, and if it should ultimately be the case that I am required to stand down from the proceeding, there will be a real question raised, to say the least, of the propriety of my continuing to deal with pre-trial procedures and to make orders which are binding on the parties. I accept that, as I must, but at the same time I do not believe that I should, without a proper basis, discontinue the normal process of moving this proceeding towards trial and of dealing with interlocutory issues as they arise from time to time.

9 Insofar as the application is made that I stand down for reasons of bias, the applicant's grounds, as set out in her affidavit affirmed this morning, and as elaborated upon by her in submissions, are broadly as follows. First, the applicant points to the circumstance that on 7 February 2007 I gave the respondents leave to file and serve their Further Amended Defence on 25 January 2007 in the absence of any written application by them. The applicant says that this demonstrates a bias towards the respondents on my part.

10 Secondly, the applicant has exhibited to her affidavit a letter from the Registrar of this court of 12 January 2007 in which he referred to a direction made by me on that day pursuant to O 46 r 7A(2) of the Federal Court Rules, in respect of a document over the hand of the applicant and headed "In the Federal Court of Australia, Melbourne Registry, Justice North, Application for Reasons for Judgments Made on 10/01/07 in relation to". That issue concerned another proceeding commenced by the applicant in the court, VID855 of 2006. I have had no involvement in that proceeding, but on 12 January 2007 I gave a direction of the kind referred to in the Deputy District Registrar's letter. The applicant contends that that demonstrates that I am biased against her in this proceeding, and that she will not get a fair trial.

11 Thirdly, the applicant points to the circumstance that the interlocutory hearing on 7 February 2007 was originally listed for 9 February 2007. At the initiative of the court the original listing was brought forward by two days on account of the pressure of business that would be before the court on 9 February. This rearrangement was effected, so far as the applicant is concerned, by my associate telephoning her and proposing the new date. The applicant has told me this morning that when my associate telephoned she agreed to the new date. However, according to her affidavit and to what she has submitted this morning, shortly after she agreed to that rescheduling of the hearing before me she received a notification of a summons issued, she tells me, by the Victorian Government Solicitor, returnable on 9 February 2007 in the Practice Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria. As best I understand her argument in this regard, she says that that was a vexatious summons on the part of the Victorian Government Solicitor, and that the rescheduling of the hearing before me from 9 to 7 February 2007 made her available to attend the Practice Court on 9 February 2007. She contends that that constitutes circumstantial evidence that my associate had an arrangement of some kind with the Victorian Government Solicitor to facilitate the applicant's appearance in the Practice Court, when the applicant would, it seems, much prefer to have had the excuse of a proceeding in this Court for not having to attend before the Practice Court.

12 On behalf of the respondents, Mr McKenney submitted that I should not be deterred from exercising my normal judicial responsibility by the allegations which the applicant has made. He submitted that there was no evidence such as would support her assertion of bias.

13 I have considered the applicant's application that I stand down and the grounds upon which it is made. With respect to the leave granted to the respondents to file a Further Amended Defence, the basis upon which I gave this leave was manifest to all present on 7 February 2007, including the applicant. The applicant herself, as she made clear on that occasion, had seen a letter to the court from the respondents’ solicitors, explaining why they were late in filing that Further Amended Defence. I accepted their explanation, and I did so in a way which I considered to be both conventional and efficient in the way of dealing with such procedural oversights.

14 In relation to the direction which I gave on 12 January 2007, I can but say that that was a separate matter. Giving directions under O 46 r 7A is from time to time something which falls to members of this court. I do not know why I was asked to give that direction. It does not really matter. I was available at the time, and I considered that it was an appropriate step to take under the circumstances then obtaining.

15 In relation to what I can only describe as a highly circumstantial conspiracy theory about the reason for the hearing of the previous Notice of Motion being brought forward by two days, I am satisfied that there is no evidentiary or other substance in the very unusual allegation made by the applicant in that regard.

16 In summary, I consider that the applicant has demonstrated no legitimate basis upon which an objective observer might have a reasonable apprehension that I would not bring an open mind to the resolution of the questions which arise under the applicant's Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006, or indeed, of any of the questions that are going to arise at the trial of this proceeding. When a member of the court makes a decision of this kind, he or she does not do it because they have a desire to hear a particular proceeding. They do it because it is their duty and their function to administer justice. I think it is very much in the interests of justice that the case which the applicant makes against the respondent should go to trial, that the applicant should have her opportunity to put her allegations before the court, and I consider it to be my obligation to preside over such a trial.

17 As to the other aspect of the applicant's Notice of Motion filed yesterday, I agree with the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the fate of the orders which I made on 7 February 2007 will not bear upon the proper disposition of the applicant's Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006. As Mr McKenney pointed out, one of the orders sought in that notice is that new parties be added to the proceeding. Since the matter is listed for trial on 2 April 2007, if I should be persuaded that new parties need to be added to the proceeding, there is no time to be wasted in having them served and in hearing from them as to whether they would be ready to participate in a trial on 2 April 2007. I think it is very much in the interests of justice that this outstanding Notice of Motion be dealt with one way or the other, so that both sides in this consolidated proceeding can, with confidence, prepare themselves for the trial date.

18 For these reasons I propose to dismiss the motion of which the applicant gave notice on 22 February 2007.

19 On 22 September 2006, the applicant, in what was then matter VID 756 of 2006, gave notice of a motion which she proposed to move on 25 September 2006. That notice was subsequently adjourned on two occasions, and has come before me today. As I explained in reasons given earlier this morning, only paragraphs 2 and 4 of that motion remain alive for consideration.

20 I shall deal with paragraph 4 first. Under that paragraph, the applicant seeks that the respondents produce all documents, including computer records, from 2005 and reveal their advisers and informants before the date for trial can be set up. In her submissions before me this morning, the applicant has protested that the date for trial has been set without the steps sought under paragraph 4 of her Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006 having first been taken. However that may be, I propose to deal with the applicant's motion on the merits.

21 As a result of the submissions which she has made to me today, it appears that the applicant desires to produce a number of different outcomes under this paragraph of her Notice of Motion. First, she seeks that the respondents produce at trial all the documents which are referred to in their discovery list, verified by the affidavit of Kosta Sterjov sworn on 31 May 2006. Secondly, the applicant seeks to contest the claims for privilege made in the respondents’ discovery list, in which respect she relies upon so much of paragraph 4 of her Notice of Motion as seeks the revelation of the respondents’ advisers and informants. Thirdly, the applicant contends that the respondents have failed to discover documents which I should reasonably apprehend exist and are relevant to the proceeding, and she seeks, in effect, an order for better discovery. Fourthly, although this appears to be part of her complaint as to insufficient discovery, the applicant seeks access to what she describes as "computer records" from 2005, by which I understand she refers to some aspects of the records of the timing of the creation of documents by a computer so as to provide, in effect, an audit of the question whether documents which have been discovered by the respondents in this case were created on the dates which they bear on their face. Fifthly, although not covered by paragraph 4 of the Notice of Motion, the applicant has reminded me that she has what I would describe as a number of outstanding issues with respect to an inspection of documents which previously occurred, and she seeks, again, the inspection of all the respondents’ documents, and emphasises particularly the need for her to be shown originals, where they exist.

22 As to the applicant's request for the respondents’ discovered documents to be produced at trial, Mr McKenney, on behalf of the respondents, has assured me this morning that the respondents propose to follow exactly that course. That is to say, they propose to bring to the first day of the trial all of the documents which they have discovered. Upon my suggestion that the applicant might be more assisted if she were to be given access to these documents beforehand, Mr McKenney has offered an undertaking on behalf of the respondents, which I propose to accept, that the respondents will deliver to the Registry of the court all of the documents referred to on their verified list, including originals where they exist, at or before 12 noon on 29 March 2007. I propose to order that the applicant be permitted to inspect those documents within the Registry of the court by appointment. I had thought that the applicant might be more assisted by having access to the documents at an earlier date at the office of the solicitors of the respondents, but the applicant made it quite clear that she was not interested in any such proposal.

23 As to the challenge which the applicant makes to the claims for privilege set out in Part 2 of the respondents’ verified list, the applicant has produced no evidence upon the basis of which I might recognise an apparent departure by the respondents or their legal advisers from the obligations which lie upon them in the matter of identifying documents otherwise discoverable in respect of which a legitimate claim of privilege might be made. I consider that, in the absence of such evidence, I have no alternative but to take the verified claims for privilege at face value, and to treat the documents referred to generically in Part 2 of the respondents’ list as legitimately the subject of those claims. To the extent that the contents of part two of the list imply that the respondents have taken the advice of other persons, and/or have received information from other persons, in the absence of at least some prima facie evidence to the contrary, I am bound to accept that those advisers and/or informants were providing advice or information, as the case may be, which was properly the subject of the privilege claims made.

24 As to the applicant's submission that a number of documents which may be supposed to exist have not been discovered at all by the respondents, I note that the applicant has referred to the following documents or categories of documents: a daily record book kept by the respondents; written references, or memoranda of unwritten references, obtained by the respondents in relation to the applicant's employment; communications, either in writing or evidenced by memoranda, between the respondents and the Department of Human Services; and the documentary results of Internet searches said to have been undertaken by the third respondent, Lisa Miller, about the applicant.

25 Giving the Notice of Motion an appropriate context within the Rules of Court, I consider that the applicant, in presently relevant respects, should be treated as moving the Court for an order under O 15 r 8 of those Rules. Under that rule, if it appears to the court from evidence, from the nature or circumstances of the case or from any document filed in the proceeding that there are grounds for a belief that some document or class of documents relating to any matter in question in the proceeding may or may have been in the possession, custody or power of a party, the court may order that that party file an affidavit stating whether that document or any document of that class is, or has been, in his possession, custody or power, and if it has been, but is not then, in his possession, custody or power, when he parted with it, and what has become of it. The question, therefore, is whether the evidence which has been filed, the nature of circumstances of the case or any document filed in the proceeding provides grounds for a belief that documents, or documents within a class, identified by the applicant in presently relevant respects are, or have been, in the possession, custody or power of the respondents. There is no evidence such as would sustain any grounds for such a belief. Neither is there any document already filed in the proceeding to which my attention has been drawn that would sustain such grounds. The real question is whether the nature or circumstances of the case would provide grounds for such a belief.

26 The case involves the termination of the applicant's employment by the respondents in November 2005. It is alleged that the termination occurred for discriminatory reasons, both under the WR Act and under the HREOC Act. The applicant has informed me that the respondents kept what she describes as a daily record book. Such a book has not apparently been discovered by the respondents, and there is nothing in the nature and circumstances of the case, as such, which would provide a ground for the court to believe either that such a book exists or, if it does, that it contains any entry which is or may be relevant to the present case. If there is such a book, and it does contain any such entry, of course, it should have been discovered.

27 The applicant's next category of documents are references, such as professional references, which were provided about her to the respondents. She told me that she provided the names of referees to the respondents. I do not know whether this is so, as I have no evidence on the subject. The applicant told me that her only evidence in this regard is what she described as common sense and reason. Although I accept that references are "commonly" obtained before people are taken into employment, the matter could not be put so high that the Court should infer that references were always obtained in every case. I do not think that the mere fact that this is a case about someone who was employed, and later dismissed, provides grounds for a belief that a document of that class necessarily exists.

28 The applicant said that she requested the respondents to contact the Department of Human Services before they employed her, and that it is most likely on the probabilities that the Department not only said something to the respondents about the applicant but did so in writing. Again, I consider that the reasonable possibility that such might have occurred is no ground for a belief that such a document in fact exists. As it happens, I have no evidence from the applicant that she did request the respondents to call the Department, but whether or not that happened, I consider that I am bound to take the respondents’ verified list at face value, and to assume that if such a document has not been discovered, then it does not exist.

29 With respect to the Internet search which the applicant says that Lisa Miller conducted, once again the applicant has not provided any evidence about the activities of Mrs Miller in this regard, and there is nothing in the material before me, or in the nature and the circumstances of the case, from which I would be justified in believing that a document of that kind necessarily existed.

30 Turning to the question of computer records, I do not think that the nature and the circumstances of this case, as such, provide grounds for the belief that such documents exist, and would be discoverable in the normal course. I have no evidence about the nature of the documents to which the applicant refers. I rather gather that she has in mind some documents of a technical nature, possibly ones which would need to be created for the purposes of complying with her request. I know nothing about the relevant aspects of the operation of computers, and I think that the material upon which the applicant moves in this respect is quite inadequate to provide grounds for a belief of the kind that is referred to in O 15 r 8.

31 Finally, with respect to the applicant’s request for further inspection, as distinct from production, of all the documents in the proceeding, I consider that her interest in seeing the original documents will be sufficiently satisfied if she avails herself of the opportunity to inspect them in the Registry of the court on 29 or 30 March. As I have indicated above, I gave her the opportunity to attend the office of the respondents’ solicitors some time in advance of those dates, but it was not an opportunity of which she wished to avail herself. Further, Gray J previously ordered that discovered documents be inspected by the parties, and such inspection occurred in early July 2006. To the extent that the applicant has provided an evidentiary basis for her allegation that she was not then shown the originals of certain documents which may be important in the proceeding, her affidavit of 10 July 2006 refers to, and exhibits copies of, three documents only which are in this category. I considered whether to require the respondents to allow further inspection of those three documents, but the applicant made it quite clear both that she wanted a further inspection of everything, and that she was not going to undertake that inspection at the respondents’ solicitors office. I do not believe I should impose upon the respondents the additional and unnecessary cost of facilitating a further inspection of documents which have already been inspected. Neither do I believe that I should require them to incur the cost occasioned by removing all the documents which are covered by their discovery to some external location. They apparently did that once in July 2006, and nothing which the applicant has put before me has satisfied me that that exercise should be repeated.

32 I shall, therefore, dispose of paragraph 4 of the applicant's Notice of Motion of 22 September 2006 by accepting the respondents' undertaking to which I have referred and by ordering that the applicant have leave to inspect the documents produced in the Registry of the Court by the respondents pursuant to their undertaking, upon appointment.

33 I turn next to paragraph 2 of the applicant's Notice of Motion. Under that paragraph the applicant sought that new parties be added to the proceeding arising under the HREOC Act, namely the Commonwealth Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, the Commonwealth Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, and the Victorian Minister for Human Services. Since it was also the applicant's motion that that proceeding be joined with the proceeding arising under the WR Act, and since that joinder has since been effected, I am prepared to consider the appropriateness of the addition of new parties by reference to the consolidated proceeding in its now form.

34 The question whether a person not presently a party to a proceeding should be added thereto stands to be decided under O 6 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules. The question is whether the person ought to have been joined as a party in the first place, or should now be joined to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon.

35 I consider first whether any of the proposed additional parties ought to have been joined as parties in the first instance. The only proper respondent to an application under s 170CP of the WR Act is the employer by whom it is alleged that the applicant's employment was terminated unlawfully pursuant to s 170CK, s 170CL or s 170CN of that Act. There is no suggestion that any of the proposed additional parties was relevantly the employer of the applicant. Accordingly, I would reject the applicant's motion insofar as it is based upon the proposition that these parties, or any of them, ought to have been joined originally.

36 Under s 46PO of the HREOC Act, an application to the court may be made only in relation to "unlawful discrimination by one or more of the respondents to the terminated complaint". The "terminated complaint" to which the section refers is the complaint in the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the termination of which gave rise to the court's jurisdiction. In the present case, none of the parties proposed to be added was a respondent to the applicant's complaint in the commission. In the circumstances, none could have been joined as a respondent to these proceedings, and none can now be joined upon the basis that they ought to have been joined originally under par (b) of r 8(1) of O 6 of the Rules of Court.

37 I turn next to the question arising under par (a) of that sub-rule, namely, whether any or all of the persons now sought to be joined is, or are, necessary to be joined to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon.

38 Insofar as it arises under the WR Act, the applicant's application is based upon an allegation that she was dismissed from her employment for reasons which were, at the relevant time, proscribed under s 170CK(2) of that Act. In allegations set out in her Statement of Claim dated 24 March 2006, the applicant referred to circumstances which might, arguably, arise under par (f) of s 170CK(2) of the WR Act From what appears in the Statement of Claim, termination of employment by reason of race, colour, religion, political opinion, national extraction and/or social origin may become relevant at trial.

39 By reason of orders previously made by the court, the applicant's proceeding arising under the HREOC Act, is limited to those of her allegations which arise under the RD Act. Essentially, the applicant will allege that she was dismissed from her employment by reason of her race, colour, or national or ethnic origin.

40 When the applicant's Notice of Motion was originally filed, it was not supported by affidavit. However, on 27 October 2006, the applicant filed an affidavit affirmed by her that day, in which she set out the grounds upon which she would rely in support of her motion. In relation to the Commonwealth Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, the applicant said, (using the paragraph numbers in her affidavit):

41 In the paragraphs of her affidavit to which I have just referred, the applicant appears to allege that the Commonwealth Minister's participation is necessary because of his responsibility for the terms of the legislation under which she brings one of her applications, and for the departmental policies and practices which are said to nullify the applicant's legal rights in her employment and in the face of the law. Manifestly, propositions of this kind would not sustain the joinder of a Minister of the Crown to the consolidated proceeding, in either or both of its aspects. Indeed, had the Minister originally been joined for these reasons only (and ignoring for the moment the technical incompetence of any such joinder) the joinder would, I consider, most probably have been set aside as an abuse of process.

42 To the extent that the applicant seeks the joinder also of the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, I consider that the proper respondent, if there were to be one, would be the Minister, and that the appropriate response to such an application would be as I have already stated.

43 In her affidavit of 27 October 2006 the applicant provided the following grounds for the joinder of the Victorian Minister for Children and Human Services, (again using paragraph numbers in her affidavit):

44 In this respect the applicant appears to be saying that, as a publicly funded institution, the childcare centre for which the respondents were responsible has had correspondence with the Minister's department which may be relevant in the proceeding, and that the Minister or the department has documents, or is referred to in documents, which may be relevant, may have power to give instructions that an employee be supervised, and has policies and practices which are said to discriminate against the applicant in her professional life and which would nullify her professional opportunities, and future possibilities of employment, in early childhood education. As to the latter aspect, I am not persuaded that the broad and specific allegations made by the applicant in her affidavit have, even prima facie, any relevant connection with the conduct of the respondents the subject of her allegations in the consolidated proceeding. Indeed, I consider that an attempt to introduce such matters as the policies and practices followed by the Minister - particularly to the extent that they are said to bear upon the applicant's professional opportunities and future possibilities - could have a tendency diametrically opposed to that referred to in par (b) of r 8(1) of O 6.

45 As to the connection between the Minister, or her department, and documents which may be relevant to the consolidated proceeding, I can see no reason why the due and fair administration of justice would require the Minister to be joined as a party. Indeed, to join another person as a party to an existing proceeding for no purpose other than to obtain access to documents which may be in the control of that person would, in my view, amount to an abuse of process. From the exchanges which I have had with the applicant on previous interlocutory occasions, I am satisfied that she is well aware of the procedural options available to a litigant with respect to obtaining, and presenting to the court, documents which are required for the proper presentation of her case.

46 As to the suggestion that the Minister's joinder as a party is necessary because of what is said to be her capacity to give directions for the supervision of employees, I am not persuaded either that any present issue raised in the consolidated proceeding would require the investigation of such matters or, if it did, that such investigation could not be economically and fairly conducted without the Minister being present in the capacity of a respondent. As I have said earlier in these reasons, because of the limited scope of the statutes under which each of the original proceedings was brought, the Minister could not have been made a respondent in the first instance. That is to say, no relief could have been sought against her (and, as it happens, none was). I accept that this consideration may not always be dispositive in an application under par (b) of r 8(1) of O 6, but it would, I consider, be a most unusual case in which the court took the view that it was necessary to join a new party as a respondent in order to determine, effectively and completely, the matters in dispute when no relief could have been, or could now be, sought against that party. In my view the present is a long way from being such an unusual case.

47 I propose therefore, to dismiss paragraph 2 of the applicant's Notice of Motion dated 22 September 2006.

I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Jessup.

Counsel for the Applicant:	The applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the Respondent:	M G McKenney

Solicitor for the Respondent:	F Vitiello

Date of Hearing:	23 February 2007

Date of Judgment:	23 February 2007