Manatiy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 28 (29 January 2007)

MIGRATION – British subject entered Australia as of right in 1956 and left Australia in 1973 – claims, for the purposes of the Close Ties visa under the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2, Subclass 832, that she ceased to hold an "entry permit" by virtue of the entry into force of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – definition of "entry permit" for the purposes of a Close Ties visa.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 4(1), s 5(1), s 6, s 7, s 9, s 11, s 23, s 29, s 34
Immigration Act 1901-1949 (Cth) s 3(1)
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Reg 1.03, Schedule 2 Subclass 832
Migration Amendment Regulations 2000 (No 2) (Cth)

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, May 1958
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill 1994 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum

Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50; (2006) 230 ALR 370 cited
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51; (2001) 207 CLR 391 cited

Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, Federation Press 1998

MARY JANE MANATIY v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

No SAD 129 of 2006

FINN J
29 JANUARY 2007
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	SAD 129 OF 2006

BETWEEN:	MARY JANE MANATIY Applicant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent

JUDGE:	FINN J
DATE OF ORDER:	29 JANUARY 2007
WHERE MADE:	ADELAIDE

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY	SAD 129 OF 2006

BETWEEN:	MARY JANE MANATIY Applicant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent

JUDGE:	FINN J
DATE:	29 JANUARY 2007
PLACE:	ADELAIDE

1 The applicant, Mary Manatiy, has applied unsuccessfully for a Special Eligibility (Residence Class) (Class AO) visa: see Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2, Subclass 832. Her spouse is the secondary visa applicant. Her application to review the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal necessitates a rather tortuous journey through Migration legislation spanning more than half a century.

2 Mrs Manatiy, a British subject, was six years of age when she first came to Australia, in 1956. She travelled on her father’s passport, the stamped (though long since cancelled) original having been provided to the Tribunal. The relevant legislation governing entry into Australia at that time was the Immigration Act 1901-1949 (Cth) ("the Immigration Act"). As British subjects, Mrs Manatiy’s parents and family then had the right to enter and reside in "any part of the King’s Dominions except in so far as that right has been modified or abolished by positive law": Potter v Minahan [1908] HCA 63; (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 305. Though the Immigration Act, s 3(1) imposed some number of prohibitions upon immigration into Australia, none were applied to Mrs Manatiy or to her parents.

3 On 1 June 1959 the Immigration Act was repealed and the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Migration Act") came into force. The new Act abolished the common law right of British subjects to enter Australia. It imposed the requirement that any constitutional immigrant wishing to enter Australia had to possess an instrument described as an "entry permit": see s 6 (as enacted in 1958); see also Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51; (2001) 207 CLR 391 at [144]- [145].

4 Mrs Manatiy remained in Australia until 1973 when she left Australia. She was then aged 23. She returned to Australia in 1979 to visit her parents and she revisited Australia on several subsequent occasions before her entry in December 1998 on a visitor visa. She held a succession of such visas until she was granted a Bridging Visa on 12 March 2004 on account of the visa application which is the subject of these proceedings.

5 The class of visa Mrs Manatiy applied for is described in Sch 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 as a "Subclass 832 Close Ties" visa. For present purposes the particular requirements of cl 832 she claims she met were those of subcl 832.212(4). It provided:

6 The case advanced in this application – though not directly before the Tribunal – relates to the proper construction of subpara (e) of the above sub-clause and, in particular, of the terms "entry permit" in that subpara.

7 The Tribunal accepted a concession made by Mrs Manatiy’s solicitor that she did not hold an "entry permit" under the Migration Act. It regarded this concession as having been made correctly because it, in turn, erred as to what was the proper definition of an "entry permit" for the purposes of a Subclass 832 visa. The basis of this error – now accepted by the respondent Minister – is explained below.

8 In consequence of the concession so made, the case put to the Tribunal and rejected by it was that Mrs Manatiy "ceased to hold ... a substantive visa". She does not contest that conclusion in this application.

9 I have referred above to the change wrought in relation to British subjects by the enactment of the Migration Act 1958. On its coming into force, an immigrant who was not a holder of an entry permit became a prohibited immigrant upon their entry into Australia: s 6(1). I would note in passing that this Act had no presently relevant retrospective effect upon Mrs Manatiy and her parents. It did not seek to regulate the presence in Australia of persons who had lawfully entered the country prior to its commencement.

10 Section 5(1) of the 1958 Act (as enacted) defined "entry permit" and "immigrant" to mean (unless a contrary intention appeared):

11 I would note in passing that it was the above definition of "entry permit" that was relied upon erroneously by the Tribunal. Mrs Manatiy clearly did not hold a visa under the original s 6 of the Act.

13 As is clear from s 7 and s 11, a person already in Australia could be granted a further entry permit as, for example, where a temporary entry permit was about to, or had, expired. Such permits would necessarily seem to be permits to remain in Australia, not permits to enter.

14 Finally I would note that s 9 of the Act, as enacted, provided that an entry permit lapsed upon the departure of the holder of an entry permit from Australia unless it contained a permission to be absent from Australia before expiry or cancellation of the permit.

15 As the Second Reading Speech on the 1958 Bill made plain, the Government of the day was mindful of the effect of the new entry permit system on British subjects, though it sought to provide reassurance to them. As the portfolio Minister said (see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, May 1958 at 1397):

16 Insofar as concerned Mrs Manatiy it was the 1958 Act in its above form that applied to her on her leaving Australia in 1973. If she wished to return to Australia she could not do so as of right: s 6(1) and s 9 of the Act.

19 The Migration Reform Act 1992 substituted a single form of authority (a "visa") to travel to, enter and remain in Australia for the then dual authority system of a visa which permitted travel to Australia and an entry permit which permitted a person to enter or remain in Australia. From the commencement of that Act entry permits ceased to be required. They were not, though, devoid of future significance.

20 When the Subclass 832 visa was introduced, the then subpara 832.212(4)(b) (now 832.212(4)(e)) referred only to ceasing to hold a substantive visa. It was amended by the Migration Amendment Regulations 2000 (No 2) (being Statutory Rules No 62 of 2000), which commenced on 1 July 2000. The amendment consisted of omitting the words "a substantive visa" and inserting the words "an entry permit or a substantive visa".

22 Importantly for present purposes, Reg 1.03 of the Migration Regulations 1994 defined "entry permit" as follows:

The definition so picked up was that introduced by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989, i.e. "entry permit" means "permission to enter or to remain in Australia". The Reg 1.03 definition (hence the 1989 Amendment Act definition) governs the meaning of that formula in relation to the requirements of Sch 2 for a Subclass 832 visa.

23 To revert to the Tribunal’s reasons, the mistake made in relation to accepting her solicitor’s concession was that it applied the original s 5(1) definition of the 1958 Act and not the quite differently worded definition picked up by Reg 1.03.

24 Finally, it was recognised at the time of the 1992 legislation that there was a small number of "absorbed persons" who were lawfully in Australia as permanent residents despite not holding entry permits. In the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 provision was made for a special class of permanent visa for such persons to be known as "absorbed person visas": see Migration Legislation Amendment Bill 1994, Explanatory Memorandum, paras 22-27. I would note in passing that, because of her departure from Australia in 1973, Mrs Manatiy rendered herself ineligible for such a visa: see the Migration Act 1958, s 23 (now 34); although British subjects who entered Australia prior to 1958 and who remained here thereafter could qualify for that visa. Apparently Mrs Manatiy’s mother holds such a visa. The point of present emphasis, though, is that the 1992 and 1994 legislation made possession of a valid visa the sole criterion for determining the lawful status of a non-citizen within Australia: see Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, Federation Press 1998, 52; on absorbed persons visas see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50; (2006) 230 ALR 370 at [12]- [22].

25 The respondent Minister has objected to the applicant seeking relief in this Court in respect of a claim which was not made to the Tribunal and which was disavowed by her solicitor. It is further contended that even if the case now sought to be put had been presented to the Tribunal it could not have succeeded. Mrs Manatiy did not meet the requirements of subpara 823.212(4)(e) in any event. In these circumstances it is said, even accepting that a common mistake was made by the Tribunal and Mrs Manatiy in relation to the applicable definition of "entry permit", it would nonetheless be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal.

26 Mr Ower for Mrs Manatiy in contrast has submitted that the case he now seeks to put concerning an entry permit clearly arose from the materials before the Tribunal and the mistake it shared with Mrs Manatiy’s solicitor was the cause of its not dealing with it.

27 I have heard full argument on the case put by Mrs Manatiy. As I am satisfied it must be decided adversely to her, I will give my reasons for that decision without dealing with the Minister’s primary objection as such.

28 The simple and direct answer to the present application is that when Mrs Manatiy entered Australia in 1956 and while she remained in Australia until 1973, she did so in virtue of a legal regime which did not require her to have permission so to enter or to reside in Australia. As a British subject, proof of which was provided in her father’s passport, she had a right to enter Australia. While British subjects seeking to enter Australia after the coming into force of the Migration Act were required to obtain an entry permit permitting them to enter and remain in Australia, Mrs Manatiy’s continued presence in Australia from that time was unaffected by this legislative change. Her right to remain in Australia existed in virtue of the lawful rights she had when she entered Australia in 1956. It was not abrogated by the Act. Nor did the Act abrogate any permission she had to enter Australia. Her original entry was as of right, none of the prohibitions of s 3(1) of the Immigration Act having application to her. Until her departure in 1973 she belonged to a class of persons lawfully in Australia who stood outside the entry permit regime for so long as they continued to remain in Australia. It was only when the universal system of visas for non-citizens was instituted in the 1992-1994 reforms that the existence of this class itself required address: see Nystrom at [14]-[16]. The principal response, as I have noted, was to be found in the deeming provision of s 23 (now s 34) of the Migration Act which effected the grant (subject to limitations) of absorbed person visas. One of its applications was to members of the class I have noted above who satisfied the requirements of s 23: on s 34 see Nystrom at [18]-[22].

29 Mrs Manatiy’s entry into Australia in 1956 and her remaining in Australia until 1973 were not in virtue of any permission given by the Commonwealth under either the Immigration Act or the Migration Act. In consequence, she could never "cease to hold an entry permit ... before turning 18" for the purposes of subpara 832.212(4)(e). I accept the Minister’s submission in this respect as also the submission that it would be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal because of the Tribunal’s mistake as to the proper meaning to be ascribed "entry permit" in that subpara. The actual result would remain the same.

30 In reaching this conclusion I have implicitly rejected the case put by the applicant. Though it has shifted somewhat in the course of written and oral submissions, it is premised on the agreed proposition that the preposition "or" in the operative (1989) definition of "entry permit", i.e. "permission to enter or remain in Australia" is to be read disjunctively. While I agree with this premise as far as it goes, it does not in my view capture the full scope and burden of the 1989 definition. Considered in the context of the entry permit system instituted in the 1958 Act, the definition had to accommodate itself to multiple possibilities. I simply instance (a) permissions to enter for a purpose but not to remain; (b) permissions to enter and to remain; and (c) permissions to remain, the non-citizen being already in Australia. To be added to these were those permissions which facilitated, as well, re-entry into Australia. A consequence of this, in my view, is that the preposition "or" in the 1989 definition on its proper construction is to be read as "and/or", i.e. conjunctively and disjunctively to accommodate the above possibilities. Thus a person who has permission to enter and to remain in Australia has an entry permit, not two such permits. I would note that such was made explicit in the original s 6(3) of the 1958 Act, as it is currently (in relation to visas) in the present s 29 of the Migration Act.

31 On the limited premise I noted above, the applicant’s case is that on the commencement of the 1958 Act she ceased to have permission to enter Australia (i.e. to re-enter without a permit to enter) and, as that occurred before she turned 18, she thus complied with the requirement of subpara 832.212(4)(e).

32 My earlier conclusion that Mrs Manatiy was not the holder of an entry permit at any time from 1956 (when she entered Australia) until 1973 (when she left Australia) is sufficient to dispose of this submission. But even if it be accepted contrary to my view that the rights she had as a British subject could properly be characterised as giving "permission to enter or reside in Australia" – i.e. as being an "entry permit" for Subclass 832 visa purposes – the permission she had was one to enter and reside in Australia. Mrs Manatiy, as she was bound to, has conceded that her residence in Australia after 1958 and until 1973 was not unlawful. In other words, the "permission" she had was unaffected by the 1958 Act for as long as she remained in Australia. Both her entry and remaining were, and remained, lawful and the "entry permit" continued in effect. For the purposes of subpara 832.212(4)(e) she did not, in consequence, cease to hold an entry permit.

33 I will order that the application be dismissed. I will, as requested by Mr Ower, hear the parties on the question of costs.

I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Finn.

Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr S Ower

Solicitor for the Applicant:	McDonald Steed McGrath

Counsel for the Respondent:	Mr M Roder

Solicitor for the Respondent:	Sparke Helmore

Date of Hearing:	27 October 2006 and 23 November 2006

Date of Judgment:	29 January 2007

Federal Court of Australia

Manatiy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 28 (29 January 2007)