Re Laurence Charles O'Neil v Ian Douglas Wratten; the Commonwealth of Australia and Paul Anthony Murphy [1986] FCA 139 (2 May 1986)

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Re: LAURENCE CHARLES O'NEIL
And: IAN DOUGLAS WRATTEN; THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and PAUL ANTHONY
MURPHY
No. G286 of 1984
Customs - Seizure - Administrative Law - Jurisdiction

COURT

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Jackson J.

CATCHWORDS

Customs - customs warrant - powers exercisable if person failed to comply with requirement of officer - no requirement communicated - no failure to comply - material illegally obtained - whether admissible to determine whether reasonable grounds for belief that forfeited.

Seizure - whether service of notice of seizure sufficient to constitute seizure.

Administrative Law - application for review of decision to seize.

Jurisdiction - whether jurisdiction to determine whether goods are forfeited goods.

Toy Centre Agencies Pty Ltd v. Spencer (1983) 46 A.L.R. 351

Pearce v. Button (1985) 60 A.L.R. 537

Vickers v. Young (1982) 65 F.L.R. 260

17 Halsbury 4th Ed. para 489

Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v. Modern Cars & Caravans

(Kingston) Ltd (1966) 1 QB 764

Pearce v. Button (Full Court Federal Court 7 March 1986)

Frost v. Collector of Customs for Qld (Wilcox J. 26 November 1985)

Sandery v. Commissioner of Police, Australian Federal Police (Jackson J. 27

February 1986)

Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 7; (1981) 148 C.L.R. 457

Stack v. Coast Securities (No. 9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; (1983) 154 C.L.R. 261

HEARING

SYDNEY
2:5:1986

ORDER

It be declared that:

1. The decision of the first respondent that the
Mercedes Benz 500 SEC motor vehicle, the subject of
the proceedings, be seized in the exercise of the
powers conferred by s.203(2) of the Customs Act was
lawfully made.

2. The purported seizure of the said vehicle on 17th
July 1984 was not in pursuance of the provisions of
the Customs Act and was unlawful.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

DECISION

Under the provisions of s.203(2) of the Customs Act 1901 an "authorized person", a term defined in s.203(1), may seize:-

".. any forfeited goods or any goods that he believes
on reasonable grounds are forfeited goods."

2. "Forfeited goods" for the purposes of s.203(1) include goods which are forfeited to the Crown by reason of the operation of a provision of s.229(1) and the parts of s.229(1) presently relevant are ss.229(1)(a) and 229(1)(i), which provide that:-

"(1) The following goods shall be forfeited to the
Crown:

(a) All goods which are smuggled, or unlawfully
imported, exported, or conveyed.

(i) All goods in respect of which any entry invoice
declaration answer statement or representation
which is false or wilfully misleading in any
particular has been delivered made or produced."

3. The goods in question are a Mercedes Benz 500 SEC motor car which was transported to Australia from Tilbury in the United Kingdom in a container aboard the "Sydney Express". The "Sydney Express" left Tilbury on 9th June 1984 and berthed at Fremantle on 5th July. It thereafter called at Adelaide and Melbourne, berthing in Sydney on 16th July 1984.

4. On the next day the first respondent, an officer of Customs, forwarded to the applicant and to Overseas Containers Australia Pty Ltd notices stating that in accordance with the powers conferred by s.203 of the Customs Act he had that day seized the vehicle as forfeited to the Crown.

5. S.205(2)(b) of the Customs Act requires that such notices state the reason for seizure and they did so in the following way:-

"Entry for home consumption No. A4.188.0468. made on
6 July, 1984, and delivered to Customs on 9 July,
1984, is false in that the entry shows a value for
duty of $20,164.41 whereas in fact the correct value
for duty should have been shown as $42,674.49. An
Invoice, No. 33 dated 6 May, 1984, from Crowndeed
Associates Ltd., U.K., to Mr L. O'Neil, which was
produced to an officer of Customs on 10 July, 1984,
was false in that it showed the total price paid for
the subject vehicle to be L13,000.00 whereas in fact
the total price paid was L27,500.00. An attempt was
made to smuggle the subject vehicle through the
delivery to Customs of an entry and an invoice both
false in a particular. The vehicle is forfeited vide
section 229(i) of the Customs Act 1901."

6. An application has been made to the Court under s.5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 for review of the decision to seize the vehicle and of certain other matters. The Court is also invited - if it is not otherwise necessary for it to do so - to decide the substantive question whether the motor vehicle was in fact "forfeited goods" for the purposes of ss.203(2) and 229(1) of the Customs Act. I shall discuss below whether I have jurisdiction to decide the latter question and, if the exercise of that jurisdiction be discretionary, whether I should exercise it, but before doing so I should say something more about the facts.

7. On or about 5th July 1984, the applicant had appointed S.B. Close & Co., Sydney customs agents, to be his agents for the importation of the vehicle and on 9th July, S.B. Close & Co. had delivered to the Collector of Customs at Sydney an entry for home consumption in respect of the vehicle. The documents produced to the Collector at that time included:-

(a) an invoice dated 6th May 1984 from Crowndeed
Associates Ltd in the United Kingdom to the
applicant, recording the sale of the vehicle to
him for a price of L13,000; and

(b) a request dated 10th May 1984 to the National
Australia Bank by Cars Cars Pty Limited (of
which the applicant was at all material times a
director) to issue a telegraphic transfer to
"Crowndeed Ltd" in the sum of L13,000 and to
debit the account of Cars Cars Pty Limited
accordingly.

8. I should also say that the invoice from Crowndeed Associates Ltd stated that the colour of the vehicle was silver and that the trim was blue.

9. On 12th July 1984 at premises at Newtown Street, Auburn, in the execution - or, as the applicant contends, purported execution - of a customs warrant issued under s.214 of the Customs Act, certain documents were obtained which were relied on by the first respondent in deciding to issue the notices of seizure.

10. Those documents were a cash payments book of Cars Cars Pty Limited, a cheque butt of that company, and a copy of the request for a telegraphic transfer for L13,000 to which I have earlier referred.

11. The cash payments book contains an entry which appears to show that on 10th May 1984, by a cheque the number of which ended in "936", Cars Cars Pty Limited paid to the National Australia Bank a sum of $42,674.49 in respect of a vehicle described as "500 SEC silver". The cash payments book contains no entry on 10th May 1984 showing a payment to that bank of a sum which would be appropriate to a telegraphic transfer of L13,000. The cheque butt records that on 10th May 1984 the company drew a cheque numbered 108936 for $42,674.49 in favour of National Australia Bank, and contains the notation "500 SEC Silver & Blue".

12. The first respondent has sworn, and I accept, that on the basis of the material to which I have referred, he believed that reasonable grounds existed to effect seizure of the vehicle, and in particular that the documentation showed that the true amount being paid to purchase the vehicle was $42,674.49 and not $20,164.41 being L13,000 converted to $A at the then rate of exchange.

13. I think it clear that the material to which I have referred would provide reasonable grounds for the belief that the vehicle fell within the description "forfeited goods" in s.203(2) because that material tended to show that the transaction referred to in the invoice and request for telegraphic transfer produced to the Collector on 9th July 1984 had not taken place, and that the true transaction was one in which the vehicle was being purchased for rather more than twice the price.

14. The result would be that the motor vehicle was one in respect of which, to put it at its lowest, an invoice which in terms of s.229(1)(i) was "false"(as meaning false in fact - Toy Centre Agencies Pty Ltd v. Spencer (1983) 46 ALR 351) or "wilfully misleading" had been "delivered made or produced".

15. I should also mention that reliance was placed by the respondents on that part of s.229(1)(a) which forfeits all "goods which are smuggled", the term "smuggling" being defined relevantly by s.4(1) to mean:-

"... any importation, introduction or exportation or
attempted importation, introduction or exportation of
goods with intent to defraud the revenue".

It seems to me unnecessary, however, to deal with that contention because the case is one to which s.229(1)(i) would clearly apply.

16. It is contended, however, that I should not have regard to the documents obtained on the execution, or purported execution, of the customs warrant to which I have referred, the basis of that contention being that the power to take possession of those documents had not arisen because there had been no failure to comply with a requirement to hand over such documents.

17. The submission founds itself on s.214 of the Customs Act which provides relevantly that:-

"(1) Whenever information in writing has been given
on oath to the Collector that goods have been
unlawfully imported exported undervalued or
entered or illegally dealt with, or that it is
intended to unlawfully import export
undervalue enter or illegally deal with any
goods, or whenever any goods have been seized
or detained, the owner shall immediately upon
being required so to do by the Collector
produce and hand over to him all books and
documents relating to the goods so imported
exported entered seized or detained
undervalued or illegally dealt with, or
intended to be unlawfully imported exported
undervalued entered or illegally dealt with,
and of all other goods imported or exported by
him at any time within the period of 5 years
immediately preceding such request seizure or
detention, and shall also produce for the
inspection of the Collector or such other
officer as he may authorize for that purpose
and allow such Collector or officer to make
copies of or extracts from all books or
documents of any kind whatsoever wherein any
entry or memorandum appears in any way
relating to any such goods.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the
Comptroller or the Collector of Customs for a
State or Territory may issue to any officer of
Customs or officer of police a Customs
Warrant, in accordance with the form in
Schedule V, marked with a Customs stamp.

(2A) ...

(2B) ...

(3) If any person fails to comply with a
requirement by the Collector under this
section, an officer of Customs or officer of
police, having with him a Customs Warrant in
the form of Schedule V hereto, may, at any
time of the day or night, break open and enter
into any house, premises or place in which any
books or documents relating to the goods are
or are supposed to be, and search -

(a) the house, premises or place;

(b) any person therein or thereon; and

(c) any chests, trunks or packages therein or
thereon,

and take possession of, remove and impound any of
those books and documents which are found."

18. It is clear, it seems to me, that the powers conferred by possession of a customs warrant are exercisable, as s.214(3) says, if a person has failed to comply with a requirement under the section by one of the persons mentioned in the subsection.

19. In the present case all that occurred was that on 12th July 1984 Mr Ruys and other customs officers attended at premises at Newtown and spoke to a Marguerite O'Neil. The following, as deposed to by Mr Ruys, then occurred:-

"3. Upon arrival at the premises, I spoke to a
woman I now know as Marguerite O'Neil.

I said: I would like to speak with Mr O'Neil.

She said: He is not here and I don't know where he
is.

I said: Are you expecting him back this
afternoon.

She spoke to someone inside the room.

She said: No.

4. I then left and contacted Senior Inspector,
Investigations, Mr Paraggio. I had a short
conversation with him and I was instructed to
proceed with the Section 214 action.

5. I then returned to the premises at Newton
Street, Auburn, and informed Miss O'Neil and another
person I now know as Mr Caponas, the reason for our
visit.

I said: We are making enquiries into the
importation of a Mercedes Benz Motor Car
by Mr O'Neil on the vessel "Sydney
Express". I have here a Notice to
Produce Documents which requires Mr
O'Neil to hand over all documents
related to the importation of the
current Mercedes and all documents
related to all importations by Mr O'Neil
for the last 5 years.

6. I then read out aloud the Notice to Produce
Document. I informed Mr Caponas that as the Notice
could not be complied with by Mr O'Neil, I had no
alternative but to execute my Schedule V Warrant.

7. I instructed the Officers accompanying me to
search the premises. The search was completed at
approximately 5.20pm and a quantity of books of
accounts and documents were removed from the
premises."

20. As is apparent from the events to which I have referred a requirement in terms of s.214(1) was never communicated to the applicant. The applicant had thus never failed to comply with it in terms of s.214(3) and as Pincus J. said in Pearce v. Button (1985) 60 ALR 537 at 547:-

"The form of the Schedule V warrant, and the terms of
s.214(3), make it clear that the warrant authorizes
action by its holder only in the event of failure to
comply with the requirement in Form 61."

21. It is then contended for the applicant that in consequence of the matter to which I have just referred the material obtained on 12th July was "illegally obtained" and it should not be admitted for the purpose of determining whether there were reasonable grounds for the first respondent's belief that the goods were forfeited goods.

22. I am unable to accept that the evidence should not be admitted and used for that purpose, notwithstanding that it was "illegally obtained" in the sense to which I have referred.

23. In reaching that conclusion I am content to assume for present purposes, without deciding, that (as Pincus J. said in Pearce v. Button (supra) at 552) there is a discretion in civil cases as well as in criminal cases to exclude evidence illegally obtained. That assumption having been made, however, there seems no reason why the considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion should not in general be similar to those applying in the exercise of the like discretion in criminal cases. That view was adopted by Pincus J. in Pearce v. Button (supra) at 552, and I agree that it states an appropriate test to be applied, once the assumption is made that there is such a discretion. The considerations relevant to the discretion in criminal cases are discussed in The Queen v. Ireland [1970] HCA 21; (1970) 126 CLR 321, Bunning v. Cross [1978] HCA 22; (1978) 141 CLR 54 and Cleland v. The Queen [1982] HCA 67; (1982) 151 CLR 1.

24. The present case is one where in my view it is clear that the discretion should not be exercised to result in the exclusion of the evidence. There is nothing to suggest that the view of the officer executing the warrant, Mr Ruys, was other than a mistaken view of the effect of the relevant legislative provision. It was not a deliberate disregard of its terms. Further, the nature of the present proceedings is such that a review of the decision to seize is sought. The decision to seize was made by Mr Wratten, and it would be a curious result of the exercise of the discretion if the materials upon which Mr Wratten in fact based his opinion could not be given in evidence. I therefore decline to exclude the evidence.

25. The second question which arises, however, is whether the goods were "seized" in fact.

26. As I have said earlier the purported execution of the customs warrant took place at premises at Auburn on 12th July 1984. The first respondent later inspected the documentation obtained and formed the view that reasonable grounds existed to effect seizure of the vehicle. He prepared the notices of seizure and on 17th July 1984 after referring both notices of seizure to Mr McDonald, the Assistant Collector, Investigation for his information and approval, forwarded the notice addressed to the applicant by registered mail. The notice addressed to Overseas Containers Australia Pty Limited, as the first respondent deposed in his affidavit:-

".. was delivered by myself in the company of
Officer C. Mitchell and was handed to Mr Keith
Gregory, Supervisor, Overseas Containers Pty
Limited".

27. The passage from the first respondent's affidavit which I have just quoted is the only evidence on the manner in which the seizure was effected, if effected it was. In my view, however, seizure under the Act involves something more than service of the notice of seizure required by s.205(2).

28. In this regard the scheme of the Act makes it clear enough that "seizure" is an event temporally prior to service of the notice of seizure. The sequence of events is that "seizure" is made under s.203(2) by an "authorized person", who may be an officer of Customs or a member of the Defence Force of or an officer of police. Leaving aside "narcotic-related goods", the goods are then to be taken to an "approved place" (ss.204(2), 204(3) and 204(5)), they having first been delivered to an officer of Customs, if the authorized person was not an officer of Customs.

29. When one goes to s.205(2) it is apparent that its terms draw a distinction between "seizure" and service of the notice required by s.205(2). S.205(2) is as follows:-

"(2) Subject to this section, where goods are seized
under section 203, the responsible person shall, as
soon as is practicable, serve on the owner of the
goods or the person who had possession, custody or
control of the goods immediately before they were
seized, either personally or by post, a notice in
writing -

(a) identifying the goods;

(b) stating that the goods have been seized under
section 203 and specifying the reason for the
seizure;

(c) setting out the terms of the provisions of
sub-section (6); and

(d) specifying, and setting out the address of, an
appropriate person and stating that any notice
under sub-section (6) is to be given to that
person."

and the terms of that subsection indicate clearly that "seizure" does not occur by service of the notice of seizure. It is an event which has already taken place. Of course, if the "responsible person" for the purposes of s.205(2) were the "authorized person" effecting the seizure, the time elapsing between the act of seizure and the service of the notice of seizure might be brief indeed, but the Customs Act clearly requires that the events be treated as separate. The view that seizure and service of the notice of seizure are separate events, the latter following upon the former, is supported by the way in which Morling J. in Vickers v. Young (1982) 65 FLR 260 at 269 and Lockhart J. in Toy Centre Agencies Pty Ltd v. Spencer (supra) at 356 summarized the legislation. Their Honours were not dealing with the point presently in question, of course, but the approach which each took is consistent with the view which I have expressed.

30. The effect of "seizure" is not specifically defined by the Act, although the terms of ss.205(2), 205(6), 205(8), 207(1)(a), 208A(1) and 208B(1) suggest that the effect of seizure is to place the person seizing, and later the "appropriate person" referred to in s.205(1), in possession of the goods, in lieu of the person previously having "possession, custody or control". The Act also does not define the acts necessary to constitute "seizure" but I see no reason why the statements in 17 Halsbury 4th Ed. para.489, adopted by Edmund Davies J. in Lloyds and Scottish Finance Ltd v. Modern Cars and Caravans (Kingston) Ltd (1966) 1 QB 764 at 776, do not apply. Those statements are:-

"For an act of the sheriff or his bailiff to
constitute a seizure of goods it is not necessary
that there should be any physical contact with the
goods seized, nor does such contact necessarily
amount to seizure. An entry upon the premises on
which the goods are situate, together with an
intimation of an intention to seize the goods, will
amount to a valid seizure, even where the premises
are extensive and the property seized widely
scattered, but some act must be done sufficient to
intimate to the judgment debtor or his employees that
a seizure has been made, and it is not sufficient to
enter upon the premises and demand the debt. Any act
which, if not done with the court's authority, would
amount to a trespass to goods will constitute a
seizure of them when done under the writ. Whether or
not there has been a seizure is a question of fact."

31. In this case no step whatsoever was taken to effect a seizure, and I am of the view that the vehicle was not seized in accordance with the Act.

32. It is thus necessary to consider the course which should be taken in relation to the matter.

33. As is apparent from the views which I have so far expressed, I consider:

(a) that the decision to seize was lawfully made;
but
(b) that the motor vehicle was not lawfully seized
on 17th July 1984.

34. Physical possession of the motor vehicle was taken, however, on 23rd July 1984 and the vehicle was taken to the Department of Administrative Services Depot at St. Mary's. The motor vehicle was delivered to the applicant in November 1984 pursuant to s.208 upon his giving security to pay the value of the vehicle if it was condemned as forfeited plus a security for the amount of the duty payable. The vehicle has since been sold by the applicant.

35. It follows from the reasons which I have expressed that:-

(a) the notices of 17th July were not validly
given, because no seizure had taken place;
(b) ss.205(6) and 208A have not come into play;
and
(c) if the events of 23rd July 1984 amounted to
seizure, no notice under s.205(2) has been
given consequent upon that seizure.

36. The question then arises whether I can or should enter upon the question whether the motor vehicle was in fact "forfeited goods".

37. There are three possible sources of jurisdiction to enter upon that question.

38. Until the decision of the Full Court in Pearce v. Button (7th March 1986, as yet unreported), the first such source was the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act itself, and in particular s.16(1)(c). See the decision of Pincus J. at first instance in Pearce v. Button (supra), Frost v. Collector of Customs for Queensland, Wilcox J., unreported 26th November 1985 and my own decision in Sandery v. Commissioner of Police, Australian Federal Police unreported, 27th February 1986.

39. It seems clear, however, that the decision of the Full Court in Pearce v. Button should be treated as deciding that s. 16(1)(c) confers no such jurisdiction. See the observations of Fox J. in that case at 12 and of Spender J. at 18. Lockhart J. (at 17) did not find it necessary to determine the question. The basis on which the Court arrived at that conclusion appears to me to have been that once it was conceded, or found, that the decision to seize was authorized by s.203(2) in the sense that the goods were believed on reasonable grounds to be forfeited goods, the seizure was lawful and the goods might lawfully be retained pending the resolution, in other proceedings, of the question whether they were in truth "forfeited goods". In other words the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act did not itself confer the relevant jurisdiction.

40. The second possible source of jurisdiction is s.32(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 which to the extent that the Constitution permits confers on the Court jurisdiction in matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that are associated with matters in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked.

41. Although differing views were expressed in Philip Morris Inc v. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 7; (1981) 148 CLR 457 as to the ambit of s.32(1) - see Stack v. Coast Securities (No.9) Pty Ltd [1983] HCA 36; (1983) 154 CLR 261 at 292 - it seems clear enough that s.32(1) is effective to confer on the Court jurisdiction in matters of federal jurisdiction not otherwise specifically conferred on the Court, provided that the "association" required by s.32(1) exists. See Philip Morris Inc v. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd at 494-5, 506, 520, 538-9, 547.

42. In the present case I would regard the determination of the question whether the motor vehicle was forfeited as being an associated matter in terms of s.32(1) in that it appears to me to arise out of facts which are substantially the same as, or are closely connected with (see the remarks of Gibbs J. in Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (supra) at 495-496), those involved in the determination of the matter arising under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act in relation to the belief that the goods were forfeited goods.

43. I am also of the view that the associated matter is one which is a matter of federal jurisdiction in that the Commonwealth's right to seize and retain the goods arises under a law of the Commonwealth (the Customs Act) in terms of s.76(ii) of the Constitution. It is true to say that if proceedings were instituted against the Commonwealth in a court of a State to recover the goods, the proceedings would be, or be likely to be, proceedings deriving their form from the general law, and that reliance on the Customs Act would be a matter of defence for the Commonwealth, but the whole jurisdiction exercised by the court of the State would be federal. See Felton v. Mulligan [1971] HCA 39; (1971) 124 CLR 367, Moorgate Tobacco Company Limited v. Philip Morris Incorporated and anor. [1980] HCA 32; (1979) 145 CLR 457 at 476 and Stack v. Coast Securities (No. 9) Pty Ltd (supra) at 291.

44. It is necessary to consider, however, whether the view which I have just expressed remains open in the light of the decision of the Full Court in Pearce v. Button (supra).

45. In that regard it is clear that Fox J. was of the view that s.32(1) did not confer the necessary jurisdiction. See at 13. Although as will be apparent from the foregoing remarks I am unable, with respect, to agree with his reasons for arriving at that conclusion, I should follow that conclusion if it be that it represents the view of the Full Court in that case.

46. The other members of the Court in that case were Lockhart J. and Spender J.. Lockhart J. did not deal with the question. I think, however, that Spender J. was directing his attention to the issue, and arriving at a similar conclusion when he said, at 18-19:-

"If this be wrong, it is possible to envisage
many situations involving, for instance,
persons, deportation or promotion, where the
Federal Court will, under the guise of reviewing
decisions associated with those questions, be
asked to, and be empowered to, make declarations
going to the factual merits of the decision.
That was not the purpose of the Judicial Review
Act, and I do not think that is its effect."

(Emphasis added)

47. Accordingly I am of the view that Pearce v. Button has decided that s.32(1) is not a relevant source of jurisdiction.

48. The third possible basis is the accrued jurisdiction of the Court. "Accrued" jurisdiction refers in this context to the decision of non-federal issues arising as part of a single controversy of which the federal issues in which jurisdiction is specifically conferred on the Court form part. See Stack v. Coast Securities (No.9) Pty Ltd (supra) at 294. For the reasons which I have earlier given, the determination of the question whether the motor vehicle was "forfeited goods" would be a matter of federal jurisdiction, and one to which the accrued jurisdiction in this sense could have no relevance. If it be, however, that the notion of "accrued jurisdiction" includes jurisdiction in both federal and non-federal matters (see per Murphy J. in Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (supra) at 521 and in Stack v. Coast Securities (No.9) Pty Ltd (supra) at 299) or if it be, as Fox J. thought in Pearce v. Button (supra), that the issue of forfeiture is non-federal, the question would yet remain whether the Court should exercise its discretion to determine the issue.

49. In my view the discretion, if the case be one to which the accrued jurisdiction is relevant, should be exercised against determining the question whether the goods were forfeited.

50. I take that view because in Pearce v. Button (supra) both Fox J. (at 14) and Spender J. (at 19) indicated their views that at least as a general proposition it was inappropriate for the Court in proceedings commenced under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act to go on to decide questions such as whether the goods were forfeited goods. The present case contains no special features which would take it outside the normal run of cases, and I think that I should follow that indication. In the exercise of my discretion I decline to exercise the accrued jurisdiction.

51. The orders which it seems to me appropriate to make in the light of the views which I have expressed are:-

1. I declare that the decision of the first
respondent that the Mercedes Benz 500 SEC
motor vehicle, the subject of the proceedings,
be seized in the exercise of the powers
conferred by s.203(2) of the Customs Act was
lawfully made.

2. I declare that the purported seizure of the
said vehicle on 17th July 1984 was not in
pursuance of the provisions of the Customs Act
and was unlawful.