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Federal Court of Australia |
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIACATCHWORDS
Bankruptcy - applications for orders of discharge from bankruptcy under s.150 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 - objection to applications by official trustee on grounds of prematurity - whether presumption that bankrupts should be discharged by operation of law under s.149 - whether applicants need show special circumstances for discharge - relevant factors to consider in exercising discretion under s.150.Bankruptcy Act 1966 ss.73, 74, 149 and 150.
Bankruptcy - Application for discharge - Objections on grounds of prematurity - Whether presumption that bankrupts should be discharged by operation of law - Whether applicants need show special circumstances - Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 73, 74, 149 and 150. A report of a trustee in bankruptcy under s 150(3) may contain general submissions. The trustee is under a duty to ensure that the court has before it all material that will assist it in considering an application for discharge and is not bound by the rules of evidence. Although s 150(12) makes the trustee's report prima facie evidence of the statements contained in it, it is for the court to decide the weight to be given to each matter.
The court has a wide, unfettered discretion on an application for an early discharge of bankruptcy under s 150, Re Benda (1985) 6 FCR 346, followed.
Although an applicant need not show special circumstances to succeed, he must show some cogent ground for the exercise of discretion in his favour.
HEARING
Melbourne, 1985, July 23; August 21. 21:8:1985Solicitors for the applicants: P Bingham.
Solicitors for the Official Trustee: R Burzacott, Official Receiver.
GFV
ORDER
There be an order of discharge from bankruptcy.(NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in 0.36 of the Federal Court Rules.)
Orders that each of the bankrupts be discharged from bankruptcy.
DECISION
By separate applications dated 13 May 1985, the applicants have applied for orders under s.150 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act"), discharging them from bankruptcy. That section provides, so far as is relevant:"150.(1) A person who becomes, or has before the commencement of this
sub-section become, a bankrupt may apply to the Court for an
order of
discharge at any time after-
(a) his public examination has been concluded;
(b) the trustee has notified him in writing, that the trustee does not intend
to make an application for his examination under section
69; or
(c) the expiration of the period of 12 months commencing on the date of the
bankruptcy.
. . . . .
(3) On the hearing of an application under this section, the Court shall
take into consideration a report in writing by the trustee
concerning the
bankrupt, his conduct, trade dealings, property and affairs both in respect of
the period before and the period after
the applicant became a bankrupt.
(4) The Court may, in addition-
(a) hear, and put such questions as it thinks fit to-
. . . . .
(ii) a creditor whose debt has been proved;
(iii) the bankrupt; or
(iv) the trustee; and
(b) receive such other evidence as it thinks fit.
(5) The Court shall, if any of the matters specified in sub-section (6) is
established-
(a) refuse to make an order of discharge; or
(b) make an order of discharge but suspend the operation of the order as the
Court thinks proper, either unconditionally or subject
to conditions.
(6) The matters upon the establishment of which the Court may exercise the
powers specified in sub-section (5) are as follows:-
(a) that the bankrupt has omitted to keep and preserve such books, accounts or
records as sufficiently disclose his business transactions
and financial
position within the period of 5 years immediately preceding the date on which
he became a bankrupt;
(b) that the bankrupt has, after knowing himself to be insolvent, continued to
trade or obtained credit to the amount of $100 or upwards;
(c) that the bankrupt has contracted a debt provable in the bankruptcy without
having at the time of contracting it any reasonable
or probable grounds of
expectation (proof of which lies on him) of being able to pay it after taking
into consideration his other
liabilities at the time;
(d) that the bankrupt has failed to account satisfactorily to the trustee for
any loss of, or depreciation of, assets or for a deficiency
of assets;
(e) that the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, his bankruptcy by-
(i) rash or hazardous speculations;
(ii) unjustifiable extravagance in living;
(iii) gambling or wagering; or
(iv) culpable neglect of his business affairs;
(f) that the bankrupt has, within the period of 6 months immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition on which, or by virtue
of the presentation of
which, he became a bankrupt-
(i) put any of his creditors to unnecessary expense by a frivolous or
vexatious defence to an action brought against him; or
(ii) incurred expense by bringing a frivolous or vexatious action;
(g) that the bankrupt has, within the period of 6 months immediately preceding
the presentation of the petition on which, or by virtue
of the presentation of
which, he became a bankrupt, when unable to pay his debts as they became due,
given an undue preference to
any of his creditors;
(h) that the bankrupt has been guilty of fraud or fraudulent breach of trust;
or
(i) that the bankrupt has been convicted of an offence against this Act . . .
. . or of any other offence related to his bankruptcy.
(7) The Court shall not, under sub-section (5), suspend the operation of an
order of discharge subject to conditions that require,
or have the effect of
requiring, the bankrupt to make payments from his income at any time after the
expiration of the period of
5 years commencing on the date of the bankruptcy.
. . . . .
(9) Where none of the matters specified in sub-section (6) is established,
the Court may-
(a) refuse to make an order of discharge;
(b) make an order of discharge; or
(c) make an order of discharge but suspend the operation of the order as the
Court thinks proper, either unconditionally or subject
to conditions.
(10) The Court shall not, under sub-section (9), suspend the operation of an
order of discharge beyond the period of 3 years commencing
on the date of the
bankruptcy.
(11) The Court may, at any time while the operation of an order of discharge
(including such an order made before the commencement
of this sub-section) is
suspended, rescind or vary the order.
(12) A report referred to in sub-section (3) is, for the purposes of this section, prima facie evidence of the statements contained in it."
The applicants, a husband and wife, became bankrupt on 28 February 1984 upon the presentation of debtors' petitions pursuant to s.55 of the Act. Since that date the official trustee in bankruptcy ("the trustee") has administered their estates. In the absence of objections, the bankrupts would be discharged from bankruptcy by operation of law under s.149 of the Act on 1 March 1987, in just under 19 months time.
The official receiver appeared at the hearing of the applications on behalf of the trustee to oppose both applications. He indicated that the applications were seen as being something of a test case. His opposition is based solely on the grounds that the applications are premature. Details of the objections are set out in the reports of the trustee prepared pursuant to s.150(3). Notices of intention to dispute these reports were filed by the applicants on the day of the hearing. (It is not apparent that such notices were served on the trustee three days before the hearing date as required by rule 54 of the Bankruptcy Rules. However, no objection to the notices was taken by the trustee at the hearing).
A preliminary objection to the totality of the trustee's reports was taken by the solicitor for the applicants, on the grounds that they were not confined to the matters referred to in sub-s.(3), namely the bankrupts, their conduct, trade dealings, property and affairs in respect of the periods before and after they became bankrupt, but contained general submissions relating to the objection to the applications. I do not consider there is any substance in such an objection. Under s.150(12), the trustee's report is prima facie evidence of the statements contained in it. Clearly the trustee should not put forward irrelevant information, or intrude on the Court's functions (Re Nassoor (No.2) (1936) 8 ABC 194), nor should he take a partisan approach to the application by only putting forward material unfavourable to the applicant and supporting the trustee's opposition (Re Todd (1910) 10 SR (NSW) 281). However, the trustee is under a duty to ensure that the Court has before it all material that will assist it in considering an application for discharge, and is not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence (Re Gore (1942) QWN 6). It is for the Court to decide the weight to be placed on matters contained in the report, and the Court has a wide discretion as to which matters and what evidence it can take into account (s.150(4)). The material in dispute here was largely contained in a section of the report headed "General", and was directed to the operation of s.150 within the framework of the Act. It reproduced extracts from the Report of the Committee appointed by the Attorney General to review the Bankruptcy Law of the Commonwealth (the Clyne Committee Report), to which I will refer in greater detail later.
Whilst it might have been more appropriately put in the form of written submissions, the material was of assistance to me and sensibly alerted the bankrupts to the arguments. I see no reason for not considering it in determining whether discharge orders should be made.
The trustee's reports do not allege the existence of any of the grounds
specified in sub-s. (6), which would require the Court either
to refuse the
applications or to grant suspended orders only. The main thrust of the
trustee's objections is that the operation of
s.150 must be read in light of
the other provisions of the Act, and in particular s.149, which in so far as
it is relevant provides:
149. (1) Subject to this section, a person who becomes bankrupt after the
commencement of this section is, by force of this section,
unless sooner
discharged in accordance with section 150, discharged from bankruptcy upon the
expiration of 3 years from the date
of the bankruptcy.
. . . . .
(3) A bankrupt is not discharged from bankruptcy by virtue of this section
if-
(a) at the time when he would have been so discharged but for this
sub-section, he is still undischarged from an earlier bankruptcy;
(b) he has, since the date of the bankruptcy, again become a bankrupt;
(c) the Registrar, the Inspector-General or the trustee has entered, or a
creditor has, with the leave of the Court, entered, an objection,
in
accordance with the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner, to the
discharge of the bankrupt by force of this section and
the objection has not
been withdrawn or lapsed before the time when the bankrupt would have been so
discharged but for this sub-section;
or
(d) an order of the Court under sub-section (12) is in force in relation to
the bankrupt.
(4) An objection shall not be entered under paragraph (3)(c) otherwise than
on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) that the bankrupt is able, or is likely within 5 years from the date of
the bankruptcy to be able, to make a significant contribution
to his estate;
(b) that the discharge of the bankrupt by force of this section would
prejudice the administration of his estate;
(c) that the bankrupt has failed to co-operate in the administration of his
estate;
(d) that the conduct of the bankrupt, either in respect of the period before
or the period after the date of the bankruptcy, has been
unsatisfactory.
. . . . .
(12) The Court may, at any time before the discharge of a bankrupt, on the application of the Registrar, the Inspector-General, the trustee or a creditor, direct that the bankrupt shall not be discharged from bankruptcy by virtue of this section."
The trustee has submitted that s.149 creates a statutory bar to the discharge of an applicant's bankruptcy under s.150 unless the applicant can show "special merit" in his application. As I understand this argument, the trustee says in effect that the scheme of the Act creates a presumption that in the absence of the applicant proving special circumstances or "cogent reasons", a bankrupt to whose discharge there is no objection should be discharged by operation of law under s.149. He submits that the special factors which could be relevant to the granting of an order include: payment of proved debts in full, payment of a substantial dividend, advanced age, infirmity or lack of culpability. If the applicant cannot show the existence of such circumstances, a court should not make a discharge order under s.150. It was submitted that to hold otherwise would defeat the intention of the legislation as evidenced by s.149, and ss.73 and 74, which provide means by which a bankrupt may annul the bankruptcy if a composition of creditors or scheme of arrangement is accepted. In addition, the trustee argues that to allow bankrupts to receive discharge under s.150 within the three year period, without demonstrating special circumstances, would lead to an inordinate number of applications being brought, and a consequential increase in pressure on the Court's workload. It should not readily be assumed that this was the intention of the legislature.
In support of this approach, the trustee relies heavily on the report and recommendations of the Clyne Committee. That Committee reported to the Federal Government in 1962. It included as a schedule to its report a draft Bankruptcy Bill, which was to form the basis of the present Bankruptcy Act (see Re Mallan (1974) 6 ALR 161).
The Committee dealt with the question of discharge of bankruptcy in
paragraphs 225 to 238 of the report. It must be noted that until
then there
was no provision for automatic discharge. The Committee said, among other
things:
228. Evidence before the Committee shows that relatively few bankrupts apply
for a discharge, with the result that there is always
a very large number of
undischarged bankrupts in the community who ought not to be undischarged
bankrupts. The Committee is satisfied
that one substantial reason for this
situation is that many bankrupts are unaware of their right to apply for a
discharge.
229. A great many bankrupts are the victims of misfortune and it appears to
the Committee to be reasonable that they should receive
a discharge with the
minimum of trouble and expense. On the other hand, the dishonest bankrupt
ought not to be discharged except
under stringent conditions.
230. The Committee considers that it is undesirable, both in the interests of
the administration of estates and of the business community,
that there should
be a large number of undischarged bankrupts to whose discharge there would be
no objection and recommends that
a system of discharge by operation of law
should be introduced subject to the necessary safeguards in the interests of
creditors
and the community.
. . . . .
234. The Committee considers, however, that a bankrupt should have the right
to apply to the Court for an order of discharge at any
time after his public
examination has been concluded or dispensed with. This will cover both the
case of a person who is not eligible
for discharge by operation of law because
of an objection having been entered and the case of a bankrupt who desires a
discharge
earlier than he would obtain by operation of law.
235. The Committee recommends that, on the hearing of an application for an order of discharge, the Court should take into consideration any report of the official receiver or trustee concerning the bankrupt or his conduct, trade dealings, property and affairs and should be bound, if specified matters adverse to the bankrupt are established, to refuse to make the order or to make the order but suspend its operation as the Court thinks proper, either unconditionally or subject to conditions.
Clauses 149 and 150 of the draft Bill were subsequently enacted as ss.149 and 150 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The five year period for discharge of bankruptcy originally specified in s.149 was reduced to the present three year period by the Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1980. That Act also made significant amendments to s.150, including adding the present sub-ss.(7) to (12). Some further amendments were made to ss.149 and 150 by the Commonwealth Functions (Statutes Review) Act 1981.
The trustee argues that the above passages, recommending a system of discharge by operation of law, coupled with procedure for prior discharge upon the bankrupt's application, show an intention that s.149 is to "take precedence" over s.150. Unless a requirement on the applicant to show "special merit" is read into s.150, it would defeat that intention.
This argument is put notwithstanding the fact that neither s.150 nor the Committee's report expresses such a requirement. It is also contrary to an unreported decision of Toohey J. in this Court in Re Robert Benda (26 April 1985), where his Honour said "nothing in the section (s.150) points to the need for an applicant to establish special circumstances or the like". In his reports, the trustee concedes "this is beyond dispute but it is submitted that his Honour may have taken a different view if he had been asked to consider the conclusions of the Clyne Committee and the supporting reasons, and the need to preserve the benefits to unsecured creditors of Section 73". At the hearing the trustee argued that on that basis Re Benda should not be followed.
The applicants argue that a judge hearing an application brought under s.150 has a wide discretion, and that s.150 should not be read as subject to any presumption that, in the absence of special circumstances, a bankrupt should be discharged under s.149. They submit s.149 operates independently of s.150, as is evidenced by the words "unless sooner discharged in accordance with s.150" appearing in s.149(1). In addition, the provisions of ss.73 and 74 can have no bearing in the present circumstances. The trustee's reports state "there are no known realisable assets and it is unlikely that creditors will ever receive a dividend", and therefore there is no possibility of annulment following a composition of creditors or scheme of arrangement. The applicants submit that, as no matters have been raised against them under s.150(6), and as the trustee has alleged no adverse conduct on their part, they are entitled to an order of discharge. They say that, as both estates appear fully administered, continuing the period of bankruptcy would only cause "unnecessary trouble and expense" for both the trustee and the applicants.
The provisions of the Act empowering the Court to grant an order of discharge are contained in sub-s.(5) and (9) of s.150. If the Court is satisfied that one of the grounds (or "quasioffences": Re Reilly (1979) 23 ALR 357) in sub-s.(6) is established, the Court must either refuse to make an order of discharge, or make an order of discharge but suspend the operation of the order, either unconditionally or conditionally. The sub-section is expressed in a mandatory and not a permissive manner, and does not allow the Court to grant a discharge order other than a suspended one. In contrast, sub-s.(9), which comes into operation only when none of the matters specified in sub-s.(6) is established, allows the Court to make an unsuspended order of discharge in addition to the orders it can make under sub-s.(5) (Re Reilly, at p.363).
An application for discharge from bankruptcy is never treated lightly by the
Court. As with the granting of a sequestration order,
an application for
discharge involves looking beyond the interests of the applicant and his or
her creditors to considering both
the interests of the public and commercial
morality, (see Re Mallan (1975) 6 ALR 161, Re Harding (1981) 57 FLR 320 and Re
Reilly,
at p.365). The trustee reports to the Court on an application and may
appear at the hearing of the application to represent the public
interest. In
making a decision under s.150(9), the Court has a wide, unfettered discretion
(see Re Harding, and Re Gianacas (1983)
48 ALR 537). In Re Benda, Toohey J.
said:
"In the absence of one of the matters specified in sub-section 150(6), the Court has a broad discretion to make or refuse an order of discharge before the expiration of three years (sub-section 150(9)). Nothing in the section points to the need for an applicant to establish special circumstances or the like. But, even in the absence of the considerations mentioned in sub-section 150(6) or the lack of objection by creditors, the Court is obliged to look at all the circumstances including the conduct of the bankrupt and decide whether an early discharge is justified".
In exercising its discretion under sub-s.(9) the Court is not restricted to consideration of matters of the type listed in sub-s.(6), although these of course will be relevant. Other relevant circumstances that may be taken into account include such diverse matters as: the age of the applicant (Re Mallan), the magnitude of the deficiency in the estate (Re Harding), the number of creditors (Re Benda and Re Reilly), the objections to the application of, or absence of objections from, creditors (Re Gianacas and Re Benda), the applicant's "culpability" in entering into the original debts (Re Benda), his present domestic, social and financial circumstances, whether he is in employment or whether his bankruptcy is affecting his chances of obtaining employment (Re Gianacas and Re Benda), any contribution he has made to the estate since its sequestration, his general conduct in dealing with the trustee, and even the effect of the social stigma of bankruptcy.
The above list is by no means an exhaustive one, and each application must, of course, be viewed in the light of its own circumstances.
I find myself unable to accept the submission of the trustee that, in the absence of "special merit" there is a presumption that a bankrupt should not be discharged for three years or that a bankrupt should await discharge by operation of law under s.149, rather than seek an order under s.150.
There is no such presumption evident either in the wording of the section, or in the legislative intent behind that wording as evidenced by the report of the Clyne Committee. Section 149 clearly can only come into operation if the bankrupt has not been sooner discharged under s.150. The introduction of a provision giving effect to automatic discharge was not intended to affect those bankrupts who wished to apply to the Court for discharge. It was designed specifically to overcome the fact that "many bankrupts (were) unaware of their right to apply for a discharge" under the law as it then stood, which led to the existence of "a very large number of undischarged bankrupts in the community who ought not to be undischarged bankrupts". (See the Clyne Committee report, paragraph 228).
If the legislature had intended to create such a "presumption" it would have been a relatively simple matter to incorporate it into s.150. In fact s.150 does contain a specific time limitation. Under s.150(1) a bankrupt may not apply for discharge until his public examination is concluded, the trustee advises him that he will not be examined under s.69 of the Act, or "after the expiration of the period of twelve months commencing on the date of the bankruptcy". In my opinion it would be somewhat strange for Parliament to have expressly placed such a time restriction on the issuing of an application, to have intended to include a presumption that a bankrupt should not be discharged under s.150 within three years, but to have left that as a matter for inference.
This is not to say that the length of time which the bankruptcy has run
prior to the making of an application is not a relevant
consideration when
exercising the discretion granted under s.150(9). Indeed this was expressly
stated by Lockhart J. in Re Reilly,
where his Honour said at p.366:
"In my opinion once the public examination of the bankrupt has been concluded
or the court has directed that a public examination
should not be held or the
Registrar has dispensed with a public examination (s 150(i)(a) and (b)), the
bankrupt is entitled to apply
for an order of discharge at any time.
Sub-section (1) of s.150 says so expressly. Whether the application is made a
day, a year
or more than a year later, has no bearing on the competency of the
application but it is a matter which the court may consider in
exercising its
discretion.
In Re Gaskell (1904) 2 KB 478, Vaughan Williams LJ said at p.482: "After all, the overriding intention of the legislature in all Bankruptcy Acts is that the debtor on giving up the whole of his property shall be a free man again, able to earn his livelihood, and having the ordinary inducements to industry. Sometimes it is not right that the bankrupt should be free immediately; he must pass through a period of probation and theoretically there may be cases in which he ought not be free at all, but prima facie he has to give up everything he has, and on doing that he is to be made a free man".
I respectfully agree with his Honour. Whilst the Court may have some regard to the fact that the legislature considers three years an appropriate time limit for the discharge of a bankrupt who has not sought to apply to the Court, I would not place any greater emphasis on it than that.
Similarly, I do not believe the existence of s.73 adds support to the trustee's submission. Whilst the prospect of payment to the creditors, or a composition of creditors, may be relevant factors to consider in exercising the discretion granted under s.150, the fact that such a composition or a scheme of arrangement may be possible will not necessarily defeat an application for early discharge, which could be granted, but suspended on conditions, in an appropriate case.
I turn now to the circumstances of the applications before me. The applicant's are presently aged 29 years and 27 years, the husband being the elder. They have two children aged 8 years and 4 years who are totally dependent on them for support. They have had a difficult married life from a financial viewpoint.
It appears that they took out a loan with a finance company in 1976 to finance the purchase of a motor vehicle. It was at about that time that their first child was born. Unfortunately, shortly thereafter, the applicant husband lost his job. He was then in and out of work for a considerable period, during which the applicants were evicted from their home and moved to Housing Commission accommodation, had difficulty in meeting their financial commitments, and went further into debt. Their problems were compounded by a recovery program instituted by the Department of Social Security for a previous Social Security overpayment. This greatly reduced the money received by the applicants in unemployment benefits.
The outlook apparently improved during the period from 1979 to 1981, when the applicant husband was in permanent employment. But their second child, who was born in 1981, was unfortunately ill for a substantial part of his early life. This resulted in expensive pharmacy, hospital and medical expenses. At the same time the applicants moved back into private rental accommodation, but slipped further into debt. They sought financial assistance and counselling, and the applicant wife was able to gain some part-time employment. However, their second child then became seriously ill and the applicant husband again lost his job. This, coupled with the Social Security recovery program which was still continuing, created such financial hardship that they sought refuge in voluntary bankruptcy.
The deficiencies in the applicants' estates were not substantial. The husband's statement of affairs disclosed six unsecured creditors for amounts totalling $4,236.00. Four creditors lodged proofs of debt with the trustee. Total assets amounted to $2,267.00, of which the largest sum was for household furniture and effects. His wife's situation was similar, with liabilities of $3,881.00 and no realisable assets. Neither applicant was the subject of a public examination, and the trustee reports that in each case there is no serious prospect of payment of a dividend to the creditors.
At the date of bankruptcy, the applicant had obtained part-time employment as a barman and was earning an average of $90.00 nett per week. His wife was working part-time with the Footscray City Council, earning an average of $85.00 nett per week.
The applicants submit that since their bankruptcies, their positions have improved significantly. The husband applicant obtained full-time employment with the Victorian Railways in June 1984, earning $504.00 nett per fortnight. The applicant wife has a part-time job assisting bankrupt persons with information and emotional support. They have recently been able to meet recurring expenses, including health care costs which are still substantial, and now consider they can adequately support their family.
In support of the applications, the applicants' solicitor put before me a number of matters that, in his submission, should lead me to exercising my discretion in favour of making discharge orders. First, he says the continuing existence of the bankruptcy is hindering the applicants' rehabilitation. Although he expressed this in four different ways, in my opinion the submissions really amount to one argument - that the applicants and their family are continuing to suffer from the adverse effects of the social stigma of bankruptcy. Secondly, he placed reliance on the fact that the trustee does not allege unsatisfactory conduct on the part of the applicants. Thirdly, he argued that the applicants were in no way "culpable" for the bankruptcy, which I take to mean that they were victims of misfortune rather than persons who wilfully, capriciously or negligently entered into debt. Finally, he submitted that there is nothing to be gained in this case by the applicants continuing in bankruptcy. The estates in both cases have been fully administered, and there is no real prospect of creditors receiving a dividend. To continue the bankruptcies until their expiration under s.149 would, it is argued, only waste time and add to expense.
Although I have stated that I am of the opinion that there is no presumption that a bankrupt should be discharged by effluxion of time under s.149, it does not follow that every applicant under s.150 is entitled to a discharge simply by reason of the fact that there is nothing to be said against the granting of that order. The Court still must be persuaded to exercise its discretion in favour of the granting of a discharge order. It is for the applicants to persuade it. Whilst I agree with Toohey J. in Re Benda that an applicant need not show "special circumstances" to succeed, he or she must, in my opinion, show some cogent ground or grounds for the exercise of that discretion in his or her favour. A mere dislike of being bankrupt - a consciousness of the stigma of bankruptcy, attaching to all bankrupts but felt more by some than by others, cannot of itself be enough.
I regard the present case as being very close indeed to the borderline of successful applications for discharge and I have been in considerable doubt as to how I should exercise my discretion.
I have finally decided to exercise it in favour of the applicants, because I accept that their insolvency was the result of factors beyond their control - the chronic illness of a child and periodic unemployment, in spite of a continuing willingness to work. The debts were not for large amounts, relatively speaking, and they were mainly for rent and household requirements. They did not result from extravagant living, and this was not even a case of a risky business venture proving unsuccessful. It seems that, since their voluntary bankruptcies, the applicants have behaved responsibly and have managed to lift themselves to a position where they can be confident of discharging any future debts as they fall due. I think, on a fine balance, that their lack of original culpability and later efforts to redeem themselves should be recognized by an early discharge from bankruptcy. I see no point in delaying that discharge any further.
There will accordingly be an order of discharge from bankruptcy in each case.
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