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Supreme Court of the ACT |
Last Updated: 10 November 2009
R v KATHERINE HAWCROFT [2009] ACTSC 145 (9 November 2009)
CRIMINAL LAW – stealing – indictment alleging theft of various sums of money – relevant amounts withdrawn and transferred from the accused’s bank accounts – whether conduct capable of constituting theft of money – whether conduct was dealing with choses in action – whether indictment capable of being made out
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)
Martinello v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 28
R v Capewell [1995] 2 Qd R 64
R v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R 433
Rigney-Hopkins v The Queen [2007] HCA Trans 209
Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369
No. SCC 426 of 2007
Judge: Marshall J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 9 November 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. SCC 426 of 2007
)
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
THE QUEEN
v
KATHERINE HAWCROFT
ORDER
Judge: Marshall J
Date: 9 November 2009
Place: Canberra
THE COURT FINDS:
1. The accused is charged with 230 counts of theft of various sums of money arising from her alleged use, for her own purposes, of trust funds held by in her capacity as trustee for five beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were her three children and two nieces.
2. Each of the charges arises under s 89 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), as in force at the relevant time.
THE ADMISSIONS
3. For the purposes of the trial, the prosecution sought and gained the following admissions from the accused. These admissions appear as agreed to by the accused, and any errors of expression were contained in the document provided to the Court:
“1. The accused is the daughter of the late Mr Victor Prineas (born 23/3/1917) who died on 5 April 1997 and the late Chrisoula Prineas (born 5/2/1920) who died on 2 December 1998. The late Mr Victor Prineas and the late Mrs Chrisoula Prineas had two other children, Phillip Prineas (born 6/6/1942) and Theodore Prineas (born 5/7/1947).
Account number- 732778-642555
Name - Mrs K Hawcroft
Address c/- Discount Gallery 55 Oatley Court Belconnen –
15A. At the end of December 2000 the balance of that account, 732778-642555, not including interest earned, was $336 488.70
Name; Katherine Hawcroft
Address; 50 Weedon Close, Belconnen ACT
Fund Allocation – 100% All Australian Tax Effective Share Fund (ATESF)
Commencement date; 21 May 2001
Initial deposit - $132314.50
Payment method – Direct deposit- BSB 032 778, Acc – 624555 – Acc name - K Hawcroft
ARE THE CHARGES CAPABLE OF BEING MADE OUT?
The Contentions
3. Counsel for the accused submits that the charges are not capable of being made out. He contends that if it is alleged that the accused used trust funds for her own purposes she did not steal sums of money, but rather, choses in action. In doing so, he relied on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Martiniello v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 28.
4. In Martiniello, the appellant had been convicted of charges of stealing choses in action belonging to a credit union. The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions after considering the form of the charges.
5. The credit union, in Martiniello, had provided the appellant with a credit card. Under an agreement between Australia Post and the credit union, credit card holders could use the Australia Post Bill Pay system to transfer funds from their bank accounts to their credit card accounts. Under that system, Australia Post remitted the sums in question to the credit union by an electronic transfer and sought to recoup the funds from a nominated bank account under an agreement with the relevant bank. If there were insufficient funds in the nominated bank account, an agreement between Australia Post and the credit union allowed for the reversal of any transfer of funds.
6. The counts in Martiniello all concerned withdrawals by use of a credit card of amounts standing to the appellant’s credit by reason of transfers from his bank. As the Court of Appeal said at [3]:
“In each case there had been insufficient funds in the nominated bank accounts to permit recoupment of the sums transferred but, for reasons that were not explained, Australia Post had never sought to recover any of the funds from either Cuscal [the credit union] or the appellant.”
7. The Court of Appeal went on to say, at [4]:
“The respondent alleged that the appellant’s persistent use of the Billpay system to arrange for successive transfers of funds from Australia Post could not have been attributable to a succession of honest mistakes that the appellant had made about the state of his bank accounts, but rather reflected a sustained course of dishonesty. If sustained, that may have supported charges of theft or misappropriation of funds from Australia Post but the appellant was not charged with offences of that character but only with stealing choses in action from Cuscal.”
8. Further, the Court of Appeal, at [5], said:
“A chose in action is, of course, simply a right enforceable by legal action and charges of this kind have inevitably raised questions about how an alleged offender may steal an incorporeal right, as distinct from money or chattels that may be picked up and carried away...”
9. Counsel for the appellant in Martiniello submitted that the credit union never owned the relevant choses in action. The Court of Appeal accepted that submission. It also noted at [8] the concession of the appellant’s counsel that:
“Australia Post may have had choses in action consisting of rights to recover from the appellant the monies remitted to Cuscal on his behalf, but submitted that Cuscal had not had any choses in action in relation to that money.”
10. The Court of Appeal in Martiniello at [10] referred to the judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Capewell [1995] 2 Qd R 64 in support of the proposition that a customer had a chose in action against a bank to the amount standing to the customer’s credit in her account even though the majority of the funds had been credited to that account in error.
11. Counsel for the accused in the present case submits that the property alleged to be stolen must be identified correctly in the counts in the indictment. He contends that the right of the accused to draw on the amounts the subject of the counts should have been charged rather than the theft of the amounts themselves. Counsel refers to the distinction between “money” and “choses in action”. Counsel submits that each of the alleged thefts of money is, in reality, a diminution in a chose in action.
12. In response, counsel for the prosecution submits that the sum of $523,498.53, which the accused received from the sale of Victor Lodge and deposited into account number 732778-642555 in her name, belonged to the beneficiaries of the trust as an equitable interest. He contends that the value of that equitable interest was drawn down by the accused dealing with the trust money as if it were her own which equated to stealing the monetary value of these equitable interests.
Consideration of the Chose in Action Issue
13. For the purposes of resolving this issue, I will focus on the initial withdrawal from account number 732778-642555 in the sum of $2,000 on 16 November 2000, which is the subject of count 1 in the indictment.
14. On 16 November 2000, the accused withdrew $2,000 from the trust funds held by her as trustee on behalf of the five beneficiaries. The withdrawal consisted of $1,850 in cash and $150 to another account. If the accused had no entitlement to that $2,000, and otherwise no basis to withdraw those sums, the question is did the withdrawal of these sums amount to stealing $2,000 or stealing a chose in action to the value of $2,000?
15. As McPherson JA said in R v Capewell at 71:
“It is now well settled that the relation between banker and customer in operating a current account is that of debtor and creditor. Money banked to the credit of the account is not held by the banker as agent or trustee for the customer but becomes the property of the bank... The debt owed by the bank to the customer is a chose in action which is “property” within the meaning of s 408C(3)(a) [the relevant provision of the Queensland Criminal Code] and as such capable of being stolen, [or] misappropriated...
The sum, if any, for which a bank is indebted to a customer on current account varies according to amounts deposited to and withdrawn from the account. It is, however, the credit balance in the account from time to time that constitutes the customer’s chose in action.”
16. The Queensland Court of Appeal followed the analysis in Capewell in R v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R 433 at [43] per Jerrard JA (with whom Williams and Keane JJA agreed). Justice of Appeal Jerrard emphasised (including by a footnoted reference to Capewell) that a sum standing to the credit of a person in a bank account constitutes a chose in action; Rigney-Hopkins at [43]. A similar analysis was adopted by Lord Lane CJ in Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369 at 371. On 22 May 2007, the High Court refused special leave to appeal from Rigney-Hopkins noting that “[n]o error is apparent in the reasons of the Court of Appeal”, see Rigney-Hopkins v The Queen [2007] HCA Trans 209 at 2.
17. Applying Capewell and Rigney-Hopkins and by analogy, Martiniello, the correct analysis of count 1 is that if the accused stole something on 16 November 2000 when she withdrew $2,000 from account number 732778-642555, she stole a chose in action which belonged to the beneficiaries. The accused did not steal the $2,000 as charged in the indictment. The $2,000 was not the property of the beneficiaries but that of the bank. The beneficiaries’ property was a chose in action in respect of the sum of $523,498.53 of which $2,000 was a part.
18. The accused could have been properly charged with stealing a chose in action in the sum of $2,000 belonging to the beneficiaries. It could also be arguable that the accused may have been charged with stealing the $2,000 from the bank when she had no entitlement to withdraw the funds for her own use. Ultimately, however, if the accused stole anything, it was a chose in action and not the actual $2,000. Whatever the situation, in the current circumstances, no actual money can be said to have been stolen from the beneficiaries.
19. In Martiniello at [14], the Court of Appeal recognised that the problem caused by the credit union never having had a chose in action in respect of the relevant funds was capable of being avoided by laying charges concerning the funds from Australia Post. The Court of Appeal observed that it was only concerned with the charges on which the appellant was tried. It held that convictions on those charges could not be sustained.
20. Here, the accused cannot be convicted on any of the 230 counts in the indictment as framed. That is because she did not steal the sums alleged from the beneficiaries, as a matter of law, for the reasons explained above.
21. It is no answer to say, as submitted by counsel for the prosecution in reply, that in many instances funds were transferred between accounts held by the accused. In each case, provided all other elements of the relevant offence can be proved, the accused may be said to have stolen a chose in action where she had drawn down on the trust funds held by her for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
22. Charges must be framed with precision to identify correctly and allege properly the property to be stolen, in cases such as this one, in accordance with the principles of banking law discussed in Capewell and Rigney-Hopkins.
23. Each of the other 229 counts contained in the indictment allege thefts of money relating to the beneficiaries by the accused. Each suffer from the same defects as these discussed in the context of the $2,000 withdrawal which is the subject of count 1.
24. I direct that the accused be acquitted on all charges.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Marshall.
Associate:
Date: 9 November 2009
Counsel for the Crown: Mr C Todd
Solicitor for the Crown: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
Counsel for the Accused: Mr S Gill
Solicitor for the Accused: Ben Aulich & Associates
Dates of hearing: 7, 8, 9 September 2009
Date of judgment: 9 November 2009
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/act/ACTSC/2009/145.html