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Supreme Court of the ACT |
Last Updated: 10 November 2009
R v KATHERINE HAWCROFT [2009] ACTSC 145 (9 November
2009)
CRIMINAL LAW – stealing – indictment alleging
theft of various sums of money – relevant amounts withdrawn and
transferred from the accused’s
bank accounts – whether conduct
capable of constituting theft of money – whether conduct was dealing with
choses in action
– whether indictment capable of being made out
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)
Martinello v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 28
R v Capewell [1995] 2
Qd R 64
R v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R
433
Rigney-Hopkins v The Queen [2007] HCA Trans 209
Attorney
General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369
No. SCC 426 of 2007
Judge: Marshall J
Supreme Court of the
ACT
Date: 9 November 2009
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ) No. SCC 426 of
2007
)
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
THE QUEEN
v
KATHERINE HAWCROFT
ORDER
Judge: Marshall J
Date: 9 November
2009
Place: Canberra
THE COURT
FINDS:
1. The accused is charged with 230 counts of theft of various sums of money
arising from her alleged use, for her own purposes, of
trust funds held by in
her capacity as trustee for five beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were her three
children and two nieces.
2. Each of the charges arises under s 89 of the
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), as in force at the relevant time.
THE
ADMISSIONS
3. For the purposes of the trial, the prosecution sought and
gained the following admissions from the accused. These admissions appear
as
agreed to by the accused, and any errors of expression were contained in the
document provided to the Court:
“1. The accused is the daughter of the late Mr Victor Prineas (born 23/3/1917) who died on 5 April 1997 and the late Chrisoula Prineas (born 5/2/1920) who died on 2 December 1998. The late Mr Victor Prineas and the late Mrs Chrisoula Prineas had two other children, Phillip Prineas (born 6/6/1942) and Theodore Prineas (born 5/7/1947).
Account number- 732778-642555
Name - Mrs K Hawcroft
Address c/- Discount Gallery 55 Oatley Court Belconnen –
15A. At the end of December 2000 the balance of that account, 732778-642555, not including interest earned, was $336 488.70
Name; Katherine Hawcroft
Address; 50 Weedon Close, Belconnen ACT
Fund Allocation – 100% All Australian Tax Effective Share Fund (ATESF)
Commencement date; 21 May 2001
Initial deposit - $132314.50
Payment method – Direct deposit- BSB 032 778, Acc – 624555 – Acc name - K Hawcroft
ARE THE CHARGES CAPABLE OF BEING MADE OUT?
The Contentions
3. Counsel
for the accused submits that the charges are not capable of being made out. He
contends that if it is alleged that the
accused used trust funds for her own
purposes she did not steal sums of money, but rather, choses in action. In doing
so, he relied
on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Martiniello v The Queen [2006] ACTCA 28.
4. In Martiniello,
the appellant had been convicted of charges of stealing choses in action
belonging to a credit union. The Court
of Appeal set aside the convictions after
considering the form of the charges.
5. The credit union, in Martiniello, had
provided the appellant with a credit card. Under an agreement between Australia
Post and
the credit union, credit card holders could use the Australia Post Bill
Pay system to transfer funds from their bank accounts to
their credit card
accounts. Under that system, Australia Post remitted the sums in question to the
credit union by an electronic
transfer and sought to recoup the funds from a
nominated bank account under an agreement with the relevant bank. If there were
insufficient
funds in the nominated bank account, an agreement between Australia
Post and the credit union allowed for the reversal of any transfer
of funds.
6. The counts in Martiniello all concerned withdrawals by use of a credit
card of amounts standing to the appellant’s credit
by reason of transfers
from his bank. As the Court of Appeal said at [3]:
“In each case there
had been insufficient funds in the nominated bank accounts to permit recoupment
of the sums transferred
but, for reasons that were not explained, Australia Post
had never sought to recover any of the funds from either Cuscal [the credit
union] or the appellant.”
7. The Court of Appeal went on to say, at
[4]:
“The respondent alleged that the appellant’s persistent use
of the Billpay system to arrange for successive transfers
of funds from
Australia Post could not have been attributable to a succession of honest
mistakes that the appellant had made about
the state of his bank accounts, but
rather reflected a sustained course of dishonesty. If sustained, that may have
supported charges
of theft or misappropriation of funds from Australia Post but
the appellant was not charged with offences of that character but only
with
stealing choses in action from Cuscal.”
8. Further, the Court of
Appeal, at [5], said:
“A chose in action is, of course, simply a right
enforceable by legal action and charges of this kind have inevitably raised
questions about how an alleged offender may steal an incorporeal right, as
distinct from money or chattels that may be picked up
and carried
away...”
9. Counsel for the appellant in Martiniello submitted that the
credit union never owned the relevant choses in action. The Court of
Appeal
accepted that submission. It also noted at [8] the concession of the
appellant’s counsel that:
“Australia Post may have had choses in
action consisting of rights to recover from the appellant the monies remitted to
Cuscal
on his behalf, but submitted that Cuscal had not had any choses in action
in relation to that money.”
10. The Court of Appeal in Martiniello at
[10] referred to the judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal
in R v Capewell
[1995] 2 Qd R 64 in support of the
proposition that a customer had a chose in action against a bank to the amount
standing to the customer’s credit in her account even though the majority
of the funds had been credited to that account in
error.
11. Counsel for the
accused in the present case submits that the property alleged to be stolen must
be identified correctly in the
counts in the indictment. He contends that the
right of the accused to draw on the amounts the subject of the counts should
have
been charged rather than the theft of the amounts themselves. Counsel
refers to the distinction between “money” and “choses
in
action”. Counsel submits that each of the alleged thefts of money is, in
reality, a diminution in a chose in action.
12. In response, counsel for the
prosecution submits that the sum of $523,498.53, which the accused received from
the sale of Victor
Lodge and deposited into account number 732778-642555 in
her name, belonged to the beneficiaries of the trust as an equitable
interest.
He contends that the value of that equitable interest was drawn down by the
accused dealing with the trust money as if
it were her own which equated to
stealing the monetary value of these equitable interests.
Consideration of
the Chose in Action Issue
13. For the purposes of resolving this issue, I
will focus on the initial withdrawal from account number 732778-642555 in
the
sum of $2,000 on 16 November 2000, which is the subject of count 1 in the
indictment.
14. On 16 November 2000, the accused withdrew $2,000 from the
trust funds held by her as trustee on behalf of the five beneficiaries.
The
withdrawal consisted of $1,850 in cash and $150 to another account. If the
accused had no entitlement to that $2,000, and otherwise
no basis to withdraw
those sums, the question is did the withdrawal of these sums amount to stealing
$2,000 or stealing a chose in
action to the value of $2,000?
15. As
McPherson JA said in R v Capewell at 71:
“It is now well settled
that the relation between banker and customer in operating a current account is
that of debtor and creditor.
Money banked to the credit of the account is not
held by the banker as agent or trustee for the customer but becomes the property
of the bank... The debt owed by the bank to the customer is a chose in action
which is “property” within the meaning
of s 408C(3)(a) [the relevant
provision of the Queensland Criminal Code] and as such capable of being stolen,
[or] misappropriated...
The sum, if any, for which a bank is indebted to a
customer on current account varies according to amounts deposited to and
withdrawn
from the account. It is, however, the credit balance in the account
from time to time that constitutes the customer’s chose
in
action.”
16. The Queensland Court of Appeal followed the analysis in
Capewell in R v Rigney-Hopkins (2005) 154 A Crim R
433
at [43] per Jerrard JA (with whom Williams and Keane JJA agreed). Justice of
Appeal Jerrard emphasised (including by a footnoted
reference to Capewell) that
a sum standing to the credit of a person in a bank account constitutes a chose
in action; Rigney-Hopkins
at [43]. A similar analysis was adopted by Lord Lane
CJ in Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983)
[1984] 3 All ER 369 at 371. On 22 May 2007, the High Court
refused special leave to appeal from Rigney-Hopkins
noting that “[n]o
error is apparent in the reasons of the Court of Appeal”, see
Rigney-Hopkins v The Queen [2007] HCA Trans 209 at 2.
17. Applying Capewell
and Rigney-Hopkins and by analogy, Martiniello, the correct analysis of
count 1 is that if the accused
stole something on 16 November 2000
when she withdrew $2,000 from account number 732778-642555, she stole a
chose in action
which belonged to the beneficiaries. The accused did not steal
the $2,000 as charged in the indictment. The $2,000 was not the property
of the
beneficiaries but that of the bank. The beneficiaries’ property was a
chose in action in respect of the sum of $523,498.53
of which $2,000 was a
part.
18. The accused could have been properly charged with stealing a chose
in action in the sum of $2,000 belonging to the beneficiaries.
It could also be
arguable that the accused may have been charged with stealing the $2,000 from
the bank when she had no entitlement
to withdraw the funds for her own use.
Ultimately, however, if the accused stole anything, it was a chose in action and
not the actual
$2,000. Whatever the situation, in the current circumstances, no
actual money can be said to have been stolen from the beneficiaries.
19. In
Martiniello at [14], the Court of Appeal recognised that the problem caused by
the credit union never having had a chose in
action in respect of the relevant
funds was capable of being avoided by laying charges concerning the funds from
Australia Post.
The Court of Appeal observed that it was only concerned with the
charges on which the appellant was tried. It held that convictions
on those
charges could not be sustained.
20. Here, the accused cannot be convicted on
any of the 230 counts in the indictment as framed. That is because she did not
steal
the sums alleged from the beneficiaries, as a matter of law, for the
reasons explained above.
21. It is no answer to say, as submitted by counsel
for the prosecution in reply, that in many instances funds were transferred
between
accounts held by the accused. In each case, provided all other elements
of the relevant offence can be proved, the accused may be
said to have stolen a
chose in action where she had drawn down on the trust funds held by her for the
benefit of the beneficiaries.
22. Charges must be framed with precision to
identify correctly and allege properly the property to be stolen, in cases such
as this
one, in accordance with the principles of banking law discussed in
Capewell and Rigney-Hopkins.
23. Each of the other 229 counts contained in
the indictment allege thefts of money relating to the beneficiaries by the
accused.
Each suffer from the same defects as these discussed in the context of
the $2,000 withdrawal which is the subject of count 1.
24. I direct that
the accused be acquitted on all charges.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Marshall.
Associate:
Date: 9 November 2009
Counsel for the Crown: Mr C
Todd
Solicitor for the Crown: ACT Director of Public
Prosecutions
Counsel for the Accused: Mr S
Gill
Solicitor for the Accused: Ben Aulich &
Associates
Dates of hearing: 7, 8, 9 September
2009
Date of judgment: 9 November 2009
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