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Supreme Court of the ACT |
Last Updated: 16 September 2010
MICHAEL JOSEPH IMBRIANO v CRAIG ANTHONY
FARAM
[2007] ACTSC 91 (29 October 2007)
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
No. SCA 32 of 2006
No. SCA 34 of 2006
Judge: Higgins CJ
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 29 October 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SCA 32 of
2006
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
ON APPEAL FROM THE MAGISTRATES COURT
BETWEEN: MICHAEL IMBRIANO
Appellant
AND: GEOFFREY DAVID HYDE
Respondent
No. SCA 34 of 2006
BETWEEN: MICHAEL IMBRIANO
Appellant
AND: CRAIG ANTHONY FARAM
Respondent
ORDER
Judge: Higgins CJ
Date: 29 October 2007
Place: Canberra
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Appeal against sentence upheld.
2. Confirm head sentence of 19 months
imposed by the learned Magistrates but set commencement date 23 February 2007
for those sentences.
3. Direct Mr Imbriano be released after serving nine
months of imprisonment on the terms of the Good Behaviour Order set out
herein.
1. In relation to the appeal in respect of Magistrate Fryar’s decision,
the actual charges and the sentences imposed are set
out in the appeal book. It
is not necessary to go over it again except to say that Mr Imbriano had an
unenviable record of
disobedience to or ignoring the fact of a suspension of
driving licence, even when imposed by courts. He did have a record which
included other offences which, I suppose, are not directly relevant for present
purposes. On the credit side of the ledger, if it
be so, is the fact that there
are indeed some convictions which he managed to acquire which related to drug
use and/or possession.
So clearly there was an issue, as Magistrate Fryar
recognised, of addressing a drug addiction problem which her Honour noted
and
indeed addressed.
2. He was facing then a number of driving matters, of
driving whilst suspended. There was also potential for a considerable amount
in
terms of fines. Her Honour convicted him of all those various offences and
imposed sentences of imprisonment. One is a sentence
of six months cumulative
on a previous matter in which he was sentenced to four months, the total of
which amounted in essence to
16 months imprisonment. Her Honour then set a
non-parole period of eight months, providing therefore eight months on parole
during which he could address, if he chose to do so, the drug issues which he
had.
3. In essence I do not disagree with that head sentence, but the
matter is complicated by the further matters which came before Magistrate
Burns.
On those matters there was a sentence on five charges before his Honour, of a
total of six months imprisonment. His Honour
made three months of that
cumulative upon the previous sentence imposed by Magistrate Fryar. His Honour
was in error in the sense
that the sentence imposed by her Honour had been
suspended by the lodgement of the notice of appeal in respect of that matter, so
his Honour was unable to make such an order.
4. If his Honour had done
otherwise then there would have been a sentence of immediate imprisonment
backdated to take account of the
time when Mr Imbriano was, in respect of
the matters in question, taken into custody, which I am assured is roughly about
three
months. So he would have had to serve three months imprisonment.
5. As I say, the fact that there are two appeals and the sentences are
suspended, even if I was to say, as I am in effect saying,
that I do not see
anything wrong with the sentences the magistrates imposed, there is still a
necessity to restructure those sentences
in view of the fact that they have been
imposed one to be cumulative upon the other, which they could not be, and also
on the basis
that there needs in any event to be a resetting of the commencement
date for those sentences.
6. There has, I suppose to this extent, been a
recalculation placed before me of the time Mr Imbriano actually spent in
custody,
including the time which I would call a discretionary period when he
was in fact in police custody, but being part of a day is not
a time required to
be taken into account by the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005. It seems to me as a
matter of justice that, having regard to the length of those times, they should
be taken into consideration.
I do propose to do so. As I indicated, there were
three days upon which he was so held and it seems to me that having regard to
those times, including the time for the part of the following day which is again
not required to be taken into account, there should
be an allowance of two days
made in respect of all of that.
7. He has spent some time in residential
rehabilitation. Again that time is not required to be taken into account
because it is not
in custody in the sense in which that term is used in the
Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005. Nevertheless, there has been judicial sanction
for taking it into account in a general way and I have indicated that I propose,
as a matter of rule of thumb to take account of one day for two days thus spent,
which roughly is 17 days. That leads me to
conclude that the resetting of
the sentences imposed by the learned magistrates should be such that their
sentences will commence
on 23 February 2007.
8. So I am confirming the
sentence of Magistrate Fryar of 16 months imprisonment, confirming the
sentence of six months
imposed by Magistrate Burns and, allowing as his
Honour did, three months of that to be accumulated with the sentence already
imposed. That creates a sentence of 19 months. The non-parole period
imposed by her Honour is set aside because of the second
sentence. Therefore, a
non-parole period or other disposition must be set. I consider, in the present
circumstances, that there
ought to be substituted an order that Mr Imbriano
be released after serving nine months of that 19 month term of imprisonment
upon him entering into Good Behaviour Order in the sum of $1,000 to be of good
behaviour for a period of two years from that date,
that is the date of his
release, and that during that period he be subject to the supervision of the
Chief Executive of Corrective
Services and obey the reasonable directions of the
Chief Executive or his delegate and that may include such directions as may be
thought appropriate with respect to drugs, be it rehabilitation, counselling or
otherwise. During the course of that good behaviour
order he is to abstain from
the use of illicit drugs.
9. Just to make it plain, Mr Imbriano, when
you are released, which will not be immediately but will be shortly, you will be
under an order not to use illicit drugs. If you should do so, and Corrective
Services are empowered to impose tests upon you from
time to time as random
tests to discover whether you are using drugs or not, you will be brought back
before the Magistrates Court
to be re-sentenced.
10. Otherwise than that I
make no further orders on the appeal. The appeal is upheld merely to that
extent.
I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Chief Justice Higgins.
Associate:
Date: 29 October 2007
Counsel for the appellant: Mr K Archer
Solicitor for the appellant: Legal
Aid Office (ACT)
Counsel for the respondent: Mr S Drumgold
Solicitor for
the respondent: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions
Date of hearing: 29
October 2007
Date of judgment: 29 October 2007
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