Hartas v Brunec [2001] ACTSC 112 (23 November 2001)

Last Updated: 11 June 2002

Kathryn Hartas v Stephen Benedict Brunec [2001] ACTSC 112 (23 November 2001)

CATCHWORDS

DAMAGES - Personal injury - Three motor vehicle accidents - Soft tissue injuries - Attribution of damages for each accident - No issue as to principle.

Fry v McGufficke [1998] FCA 1499

Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 193 CLR 161

Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1

Van Gervan v Fenton [1992] HCA 54; (1992) 175 CLR 327

No. SC 125 of 1995

Coram: Master T. Connolly

Supreme Court of the ACT

Date: 23 November 2001

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )

) No. SC 125 of 1995

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )

BETWEEN: KATHRYN HARTAS

Plaintiff

AND: STEPHEN BENEDICT BRUNEC

Defendant

ORDER

Coram: Master T. Connolly

Date: 23 November 2001

Place: Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $12,543.

2. The defendant pay the plaintiffs costs, at the Supreme Court Scale.

1. This is a claim for damages for personal injuries arising from one of three motor vehicle accidents which occurred in the Australian Capital Territory between June 1992 and December 1994. Liability is admitted in respect of each accident. The plaintiff has sustained soft tissue injuries and ongoing neck problems, and there is a degree of commonality between the medical reports served by the plaintiff and the three defendants as to the genuine nature of these difficulties. The real issue is the attribution of responsibility for the plaintiff's condition between the three defendants. Although separate judgements will be delivered in respect of each defendant, it seems to me that a common set of reasons should be delivered so that each judgement can be understood in the context of the three accidents, which have clearly had a cumulative effect on the plaintiff, each going to the same condition in her neck. The three matters are Kathryn Hartas v Stephen Benedict Brunec [2001] ACTSC 112; Kathryn Hartas v Di Berry [2001] ACTSC 111 and Kathryn Hartas v Anthony Griffin [2001] ACTSC 110.

2. The plaintiff was born in Batlow in New South Wales in 1955, and educated to completion of year 10 at local schools. In 1973 she began nurse training at Woden Valley Hospital in Canberra, but she decided that she did not want to pursue this career, and in 1974 obtained office employment in an automotive spare parts business. She married in 1975, and after the sad loss of a child through cot death, gave birth to three other children between 1978 and 1987. She had ceased employment before the birth of her second child in 1978, but commenced her own small business as a florist in 1981, which she continued with until the birth of her fourth child in 1987. She says that the business had been successful and profitable when she was able to devote herself to running it, but she found that, with a new baby, she could not focus on the business, and it was not as profitable with a manager. She sold the business in 1987, and undertook some part time work in a nursing home. This was quite heavy work, in the nature of a nurses aide, but the plaintiff says she never had any difficulty with her neck or back.

3. In March 1991 she commenced employment in the office of a metal supplier in Fyshwick. She seemed also to continue with some part time nursing home work in the first year, but said that she had decided to only work in the full time job with Blackwoods, the metal goods wholesaler. The first accident occurred as she was at work undertaking banking duties, and her car was struck by an out of control vehicle at the intersection of Canberra Avenue and Geelong Street in Fyshwick. This accident was caused by the defendant Brunec. She said that the impact speed of this accident was in the order of 20 to 30 kilometres an hour, and the only damage to the vehicle she was driving was to the plastic front bumper assembly. The car was drivable. Ms Hartas said that she was upset and felt woozy and light headed, with a headache. She attended her general practitioner, Dr Quay, who says in his report of 26 May 1993 that on presentation on the day of the accident the plaintiff had neck pain and left arm pain. He diagnosed a neck strain, and prescribed anti-inflammatory medication. An x ray of the cervical spine was noted by Dr Quay to show, "straining of the spine consistent with muscle spasm."

4. The plaintiff's evidence was that she took about two weeks off work following this accident, but this cannot be accurate, because she was back at work by the time of the second accident, which occurred some 11 days after the first. She acknowledged in cross examination that the accident happened on a Friday, and she was back at work on the following Thursday. I am satisfied that the plaintiff generally gave truthful evidence in these proceedings, and I accept this merely as an error in recollection, quite understandable given that these events occurred over nine years ago. I am satisfied that the plaintiff had some time off work with neck pain, but was back on duty by 16 June.

5. She was again undertaking work duties, driving the same work car, when she was attempting to make a right hand turn from Wollongong Street in Fyshwick when she was struck in the rear by the defendant Berry. She estimated that this accident occurred at a speed of about 20 kilometres an hour, and that her vehicle was pushed forward about a metre. The car was again drivable. She says that she immediately felt a hot sensation over her head and shoulders, and attended on her general practitioner the next day. He diagnosed an aggravation of her earlier injury, and prescribed continued anti inflammatory medication, rest and physiotherapy. She thinks that she had about two weeks off work, returning on 3 July 1992.

6. She says that she was feeling uncomfortable about work due to her neck pain. She says that, perhaps understandably after two motor vehicle accidents within a fortnight in the work car, she was no longer sent out on the road on banking and cheque collection duties, and her work now involved sitting in front of a computer or operating a switchboard. She says that she made enquiries about part time work, but this was not company policy. She had further time off work in late July 1992, and resigned from Blackwoods in August 1992. She had been looking for a part time position, and obtained employment in the Department of Primary Industry.

7. There is a report in the plaintiff's case from Dr Keiller of 13 July 1992. He concluded that she had sustained soft tissue injuries to her neck in both accidents, and found limitation of movement to her neck. He noted a broad based disc bulge found on CT of 18 June 1992, but did not consider this related to the accident. He made the observation that the plaintiff had displayed an enthusiasm to return to her employment after each accident, and commented that she had an excellent attitude towards rehabilitation, "in spite of the fact that she has continuing headache and marked pain and stiffness of the neck."

8. Ms Hartas continued with her contract employment for 22.5 hours a week with the Department of Primary Industry in a clerical role until the contract concluded in May 1993, and she then found a position, through contacts she had made while working for the steel wholesalers, with a company involved in the construction and sale of metal garages and carports. She commenced duties in an office manager role for 25 hours a week in June 1993.

9. She saw Dr Keiller again in August 1993. He noted that she was enjoying the new job, which involved limited computer work, and was not undertaking active treatment, but took anti inflammatories and analgesics where necessary, and used a hot pack. He concluded that she had made progress, but, "still has significant symptoms and objective, abnormal signs to support her contention of ongoing pain." He felt that the prognosis was, "favourable to further resolution over the next two to three years", but that she would have intermittent stiffness in the neck over that time.

10. She was also seen at around this time by Drs Andrea and Andrews for the defendants. Dr Andrea accepted that both accidents caused soft tissue injuries to her neck, and that there was some limitation of movement to the neck and muscle spasm on examination. He found tenderness to the neck and restrictions of movement, and concluded that, "her symptoms are now fairly intermittent and are likely to lessen in frequency and severity." Dr Andrews concluded that:

"She has received soft tissue injury, some strain to the lower cervical facet joints. This flares up from time to time and may require the use of anti inflammatory agents and manipulative physiotherapy. I think in the longer term her neck condition will gradually resolve."

11. She saw Dr Keiller again for review in February 1994. He noted complaints of headaches, but said that:

"Apart from some minor local tenderness in the neck muscles, there were no abnormal physical signs. In particular there was no involuntary muscle spasm and there was a good range of normal movement without restriction or pain."

12. His conclusion was that the plaintiff in early 1994:

"still has genuine, nuisance value symptoms with interfere with her comfort and well being, but which do not cause any measurable impairment of function, such as to constitute disability as defined by the Tables of the American Medical Association."

13. He felt that she was stable at this time.

14. She saw Dr Corry in August 1994. He noted that: "she now has relatively minor symptoms and provided she paces herself and restricts heavier activities, her symptoms remain well controlled." He expressed the view that she could be expected to move to full hours.

15. Dr Keiller saw her again in August 1994, and said that there had been further improvement in her physical condition:

"but more obvious was the way in which she has come to terms with the residual symptoms, and her obvious emotional stability. She does still have neck pain, mainly of an aching character, but with acute spasms from time to time. Headaches, fortunately, are less........Her current symptoms will continue for the foreseeable future, but hopefully there will be further improvement with time, particularly if she continues with a home based exercise program on a regular basis, several times a day....She is fit to continue at her work at present, and I believe that in the near future she will probably build up he hours and resume a full working week."

16. By late 1994 I am satisfied on all of the evidence that the plaintiff had made a substantial recovery from her two accidents of June 1992, and that the soft tissue injuries sustained in those accidents were resolving and were then producing nuisance value symptoms, although I accept that her working hours remained limited due to the genuine ongoing disabilities. Her prognosis, on the consistent view of medical practitioners who had examined her in her own case as well as for the defendants, was positive. I also observe that doctors in both cases had made observations as to her genuineness, and her enthusiasm to continue in employment. I am satisfied that the full time duties at Blackwoods was not an appropriate long term option in 1992, and that her decision to move to alternative employment with shorter hours was appropriate.

17. I find that there had been no attendances on her general practitioner for treatment for neck problems in the twelve month period prior to the third accident in December 1994.

18. The third accident involving the defendant Griffin occurred as the plaintiff was driving her son to school, and came to a halt at the intersection of Dalrymple Street and La Perouse Street in Red Hill. She says that she noticed a car approaching and had to give way, but saw in her rear view mirror a four wheel drive vehicle approaching. She says that she swung around to check on the safety of her son in the back seat, and then there was a substantial impact. She says that this was a substantial accident, and her car was damaged and had to be towed away, with repair costs of about $8,000. She immediately felt pain over her head and shoulders.

19. She attended a different general practitioner near her home, and on 19 December 1994 saw her normal general practitioner, Dr Quay. He found a reduced range of movements in her neck, and initially diagnosed a prolapsed cervical disc. The plaintiff says that she took time off work over the Christmas period, and in January 1995 commenced a course of physiotherapy with Ms Bond, on Dr Quay's recommendation which extended to August 1995.

20. She was examined by Dr Roberts, in March 1995. He found restrictions in neck movement, and concluded that the plaintiff had sustained:

"continuing neck discomfort following this hyper extension injury on a background of having whiplash injury on a number of occasions. I believe that this had led to continuing discomfort in her neck, cervical and thoracic spine which is consistent with the ligament type sprain......I believe therefore that this lady is genuine, and has continuing neck discomfort as outline above, which is limiting her lifestyle to a fairly significant extent at the present stage."

21. After some time off work following the third accident the plaintiff returned to work on a part time basis in 1995, and in March 1995 was promoted to a managerial position with the garage company, on a full time basis. She continued to work full time until the end of June 1996. Mrs Hartas says that she continued to work on a full time basis despite increasing pain, and decided that she could no longer continue beyond June 1996. She had been undertaking treatment from Dr Leung, a Queanbeyan general practitioner with trigger point injections to her neck in January, March, May and June 1996. From that time she has embarked on numerous treatment regimes with the intention, I am satisfied, of getting back to work. From August 1996 she undertook treatment at the hands of Dr Still at the sports medicine centre in Turner. He felt that she may have sustained disc injury, and recommended a course of physiotherapy and appropriate pain management. She was referred to Ms Just, pain management counsellor with the Sutton and Williams Psychology Service in Canberra.

22. In cross examination Mrs Hartas acknowledged that there had been discussions with the owner of the garage business from about February 1996 in which he made it clear that he was going to wind up the business, and that the business was indeed wound up in the middle of that year. While I am satisfied that the plaintiff was having ongoing problems with her neck at this time, I also am satisfied that the plaintiff's job in fact came to an end at this time.

23. She saw Dr Roberts, an orthopaedic surgeon, in October 1996. He found genuine restriction of movement of her neck, and concluded that she had ongoing restrictions of movement and neck pain. He also noted difficulties with an arthritic hip, which it is common ground is not related to the motor vehicle accidents. He said in this report that

"I believe she is partially disabled at the present stage, rather than completely disabled. I believe that she has neck pain which is significantly impairing her ability to work, yet she may be able to perform some light duties for short periods of time, yet continuous hours of work and sitting at a desk with her neck in a fixed position, particularly looking at a keyboard type situation, would aggravate her neck condition and therefore should be avoided."

24. Mrs Hartas says that she was determined from mid to late 1996 to obtain relief for her condition, and so did not immediately seek alternative employment. I accept this statement, particularly given her history of seeking to rapidly return to work following the first two accidents, and then seeking alternative and more satisfactory employment. I also accept that, having obtained some relief, she has again re entered the work force, and is increasing her earnings.

25. Her general practitioner, Dr Quay, recommended a course of cognitive therapy for treatment of what he saw as a chronic pain syndrome in February 1997.She had been prescribed anti depressant medication by him. She was seen by Dr Knox, consultant psychiatrist, in November 1998. He reported that she was suffering from adjustment disorder with depressed mood, but noted that she had been in contact with the pain management clinic in Newcastle and was intending to pursue treatment there. She has also been seen by Dr Saboisky, consultant psychiatrist, for the defendants, and in his report of May 1999 he accepted that there was an adjustment disorder with anxiety and depression, but he expected a good prognosis.

26. In December 1998 she obtained part time employment as a console operator at two service stations in Fyshwick and Queanbeyan, working between 8 and 30 hours a week.

27. In May 1999 she underwent a series of treatments at the Mater Pain Service in Newcastle, under the supervision of Dr Govind, an occupational medicine physician. She has obtained relief from these treatments, which involve radio frequency denervation at the C2/3 and c 5/6 zygapophysial joints. In his report of August 2000 Dr Govind explained this procedure as follows:

"Given that the zygapophysial joints are tiny synovial joints which are not accessible to standard usual care, and given that there is no proven surgery for this condition, the nerves which innervate these joints (ie carry pain impulses to the brain) were coagulated using a heated electrode. The purpose of treatment is to stop the transmission of pain impulses. This does not represent a cure. It is the best we have to offer. Over a period 9-12 months the coagulum would dissolve, the nerve would regenerate, and the pain would return. On the average, the procedure needs to be repeated on an annual basis."

28. The plaintiff says that she has obtained benefit from these treatments, and indeed she has been able to increase both her hours and level of responsibility in her employment, to the point where she now has managerial responsibilities and acknowledges that her earnings exceed her pre accident levels. The procedures are not pleasant, involving the introduction of a heated electrode to the neck, and take some hours at the Newcastle pain clinic.

29. There can be some controversy within the medical fraternity over this type of treatment, but I note that in this case doctors who have reported for the defendants have expressed support for this regime in Mrs Hartas' case. Dr Andrea in his report of June 1999 said:

"This unit has considerable expertise in injuries to the facet joints caused by such injuries. She has already had what appears to be eight facet block injections in her neck with some considerable improvement. This treatment is not yet complete and she is likely to receive considerable benefit from it."

30. I am satisfied that the treatment is appropriate, and that the plaintiff should continue with the treatment under Dr Govind for the recommended period, which Dr Govind has said is ten years.

31. I turn now to the assessment of damages, which must be dealt with in respect of each tortfeasor, although it is necessary to take all of the circumstances into account. The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence is that the first two accidents were relatively low level soft tissue injuries, which were on the way to resolution, of a type that one might expect from relatively low impact collisions, although the second accident so close to the first accident has, I am satisfied, had somewhat of a greater impact. The plaintiff had been able to continue in the workforce, although making some changes after the second accident, and had not had any treatment arising from the accidents for twelve months before the third accident.

32. In respect of the first accident, I would award general damages in the sum of $8,000 only, taking into account the soft tissue injuries sustained in this low level impact, the and the plaintiff's return to the workforce shortly after the accident. This is all past loss, generating interest of $1,515. She incurred a loss of earnings in the sum of $183 for the days she was off work after the accident, but I am satisfied that there would have been some further residual time off work. I would award the sum of $1500 by way of past wage loss for this first accident. There was also a claim for loss of superannuation, a total sum of $505, and it seems appropriate to add half of this to the economic loss claim bringing it up to $1,752 which generates interest of $876. I am satisfied that the effects of the first accident would have resolved entirely by the mid 1990's, and so award no future loss. The plaintiff's medical expenses between the first accident and the third accident were $832.45, and it seems to me doing the best I can on all of the medical evidence which seems to indicate that these were accidents of about equal severity, that I should award $400 in respect of past out of pocket expenses, being slightly less than half, reflecting that the second accident so soon after the first probably indicated a larger need for medical expenses. I would award nothing for future care, being satisfied that the effects of the accident had resolved, and there had been no treatments in the year prior to the third accident.

33. This amounts to an award of $12,543 in the matter of Bruncec. While this is below the normal threshold for the jurisdiction of this court, it was necessary for all matters to be heard together, and it seems to me that the plaintiffs costs should be on the normal Supreme Court Scale.

34. In respect of the second accident, I would award general damages in the sum of $9,000 being slightly greater than the award in the first accident, reflecting the medical evidence of the impact of these two accidents. I have been mindful of the close connection between the two accidents, and the need to avoid in effect double compensation in regard to general damages. This is all for the past, reflecting my finding that the impact of these accidents was resolving and would have resolved by the mid 1990's. This generates interest of $1,702. In regard to economic loss, I award the balance of the wage loss sustained by the plaintiff up to the time of the third accident, which is $6,119, together with the other part of the past superannuation loss to the date of the third accident, which brings the total past economic loss claim to $6,317 which generates interest of $3,150. I make no award for future economic loss. I award out of pocket expenses of 432.45, being the balance of the out of pocket expenses to the date of the third accident, again reflecting the finding that there had been no treatment for twelve months prior to the third accident, and my finding that the effect of the first two minor soft tissue injuries was resolving at that time and would have resolved entirely.

35. This amounts to a total award in the matter of Berry of $20,601.45 which again is below the normal threshold for the Supreme Court, but because the matters had to be heard together, the plaintiff's costs should be at the normal Supreme Court scale.

36. The third motor vehicle accident, involving the defendant Griffin, seems to me on all of the evidence to have been the accident which has had the most substantial impact on the plaintiff. In respect of this accident, I assess general damages on the basis that the plaintiff was at 13 December 1994 substantially recovered from her two relatively minor soft tissue injuries to her neck, and had had no treatment for those earlier injuries for a year. She was working 25 hours a week, and had medical reports that indicated that recovery to full hours was likely, as I have found it to be. The accident was of significant force, involving a large four wheel drive vehicle striking her car and causing substantial damage, compared to the two relatively low speed low impact collisions of June 1992.

37. I have found that the plaintiff was substantially recovered at the time of this third accident, and it follows that in assessing her general damages, I attribute all of her problems since December 1992 in relation to her neck to the accident. I do not consider the problems due to her hip to be accident related, and I am also not satisfied that complaints of low back pain, which first were made in May 1995, are related to the accidents. This condition does not seem to have had an impact on her employment.

38. I assess the plaintiff on the basis of soft tissue injuries to her neck, with a degree of psychological sequelae as described by Dr Knox, noting that in his latest report of December 2000 he indicated a more favourable prognosis and varied his diagnosis to adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. He supported the ongoing treatment leading to improved pain management.

39. I take into account that the plaintiff has demonstrated an ongoing determination to improve her condition, and to maximise her ability to work. Her present treatment regime, which she says gives her relief, involves ongoing denervation to points in the cervical spine, involving some hours of painful and intrusive procedures, which have now been ongoing for some years, and which Dr Govind indicates will continue for ten years. Taking all of this into account, and being mindful of the earlier awards, I assess general damages in the sum of $48,000. I attribute $24,000 to the past, taking into account the need for ongoing intrusive procedures, generating interest of $3,336.

40. I accept that the medical costs incurred to from the third accident to the date of trial of $19,807.45 as claimed in the plaintiff's submissions are fully attributable to the third accident, and award this sum.

41. There will be a need for ongoing treatment for the next 10 years from Dr Govind which work out at a treatment every 9 months . These involve a cost of $46.87 per week. Rounding this up to $47 per week over 10 years gives a present value of $21,167, which when discounted for normal contingencies gives an award of $17,991. There will also be a need for quarterly visits to a general practitioner, ongoing pharmaceuticals, and the potential for some further psychological counselling, although I note the more favourable prognosis in Dr Knox's report, which is close to the view of Dr Saboisky for the defendants. I award the total sum of $28,000 for future out of pocket medical expenses.

42. Past wage loss has been calculated at $56,944 to November 2000, at which time the plaintiff's earnings from her management position with the service stations exceeded what her pre accident earnings would have been. It seems to me that the way counsel for the plaintiff has approached past economic loss has been entirely appropriate. This award accepts that the period during which the plaintiff was out of the workforce was attributable to the effects of the accident. I have found that, even though the plaintiff had said that she ceased work in June 1996 entirely due to her neck pain, the job was coming to an end in any event. I also acknowledge that doctors in her case have reported that she had a residual economic capacity at this time. I have been impressed, however, by the plaintiff's attempts over the years to continue at work, and to increase her hours. The past wage loss claim has not been made at all for the period from the accident to June 1996 when she was working full time hours for the garage company. I accept that during this time she was pushing on in quite inappropriate employment. I accept that, from late 1996, she has been focussing on rehabilitation, and that since 1998 she has found relief from the pain management regime, and has re entered the work force, at first on a part time basis, and then increasing both her hours and her rate of remuneration, so that no claim is made beyond November 2000. Even if I was wrong in attributing the period out of the workforce from June 1996 to mid 1998 to her accident alone, it seems to me that this arguable over compensation should be balanced by the period from the accident to June 1996 when no claim is made because she was working full hours. During this period, it seems to me, her economic capacity was still reduced, as it was in the period post November 2000, when again no claim is made because her earnings have exceeded her pre accident base. The full amount of $56,944 seems to me to be appropriate in all of the circumstances of the case, and I award this. Interest on this sum should only run from 1 July 1996, as she was not in fact out of funds during the period of full time employment, which results in an interest award of $15,375.

43. There is a claimed loss of superannuation for this period of $4,606, which I am satisfied is made out, and again should attract interest from 1 July 1996 only, being a sum of $1,243.

44. I am satisfied that the plaintiff, even though she is now earning more than her pre accident earnings, is entitled to a buffer claim in respect of reduced economic capacity. There will be actual wage loss for the future, even assuming that she continues with her present employment, because she will need to take five weeks off work every nine months associated with the pain management treatments under Dr Govind. She is now earning $652.50 net per week, so this amounts to 6.67 weeks off per year, being $4,192.10 per year, or a net loss of $80 per week over 10 years, being a present value of $30,710, applying a 15% allowance for contingencies and a discount rate of 3%. This is an actual loss which I would award, and I would add to this a buffer to take into account loss of alternative employment opportunities in the bookkeeping office manager field, as I am satisfied that long hours at a computer would be inappropriate for this plaintiff. Applying the principles in Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1, and being mindful of what the Full Court of the Federal Court said concerning buffer awards in Fry v McGufficke [1998] FCA 1499, I would award the sum of $60,000 for future economic loss, inclusive of any loss to superannuation benefits.

45. A Griffiths v Kerkemeyer (1977) 193 CLR 161 claim was made in respect of these accidents, but it seems to me that this is not made out in respect of the first two accidents, where the disability was relatively minor, and any adjustment to normal household routines part of the ordinary give and take of domestic relationships as discussed in Van Gervan v Fenton [1992] HCA 54; (1992) 175 CLR 327 at 343. The plaintiff gave evidence of her sons providing an hour of domestic assistance a week on an ongoing basis, but again this seems to me hard to push beyond the general give and take of domestic relationships, given that nature of the injuries here. I am satisfied, however, that the plaintiff does have an accident related need for care and assistance from a member of her family (or someone else) to attend with her for the visits to the Newcastle pain management clinic. The medical evidence is that the plaintiff can only be discharged into the care of another person. The alternative would be for the plaintiff to have to rest as an inpatient after each treatment, which would push up the cost of future medical care, and it seems to me that the defendant cannot have the benefit of day treatments without acknowledging the cost of a carer. This has been identified as three days at twelve hours per day, at a rate of $15 per hour. This amounts to $1,080 for the past two trips to Newcastle. I would award the sum of $2,000 for past care, based on the Newcastle trip, and some additional assistance to cover the periods immediately after treatment, inclusive of interest.

46. For the future, I accept the claim for one trip every nine months for 10 years. This amounts to a claim of $13.85 per week, which over 10 years amounts to $6,255. I accept that there may be a degree of additional care above this figure to cover the periods immediately after treatment, and award the sum of $10,000 as a buffer for all future domestic assistance.

47. This amounts to a total award of $249,311.45 which I consider appropriate in all of the circumstances for the third accident and award, with costs.

I certify that the preceding forty seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of Master T. Connolly.

Associate:

Date: 23 November 2001

Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr Nock

Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Vandenberg Reid

Counsel for the Defendant: Mr Stretton

Solicitor for the Defendant: Abbott Tout

Date of hearing: 15 & 16 October 2001

Date of judgment: 23 November 2001