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Supreme Court of the ACT Decisions |
Last Updated: 6 October 1999
CATCHWORDS
CORPORATIONS - winding up of - institution of proceedings against company after winding up commenced - whether separate proceedings - whether leave of the court required - s 471B Corporations Law.
JURISDICTION - Residential Tenancies Tribunal - lessor's notice to quit alleging existence of tenancy at will - notice issued prior to imminent repeal of Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT) - Whether Residential Tenancies Tribunal empowered to hear dispute - whether dispute governed by Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT) or Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) -- whether tenancy at will arises from a "lease" for the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT) - whether tenancy at will constitutes a "residential tenancy agreement" within the meaning of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) - no jurisdiction in Tribunal to hear proceedings where "residential tenancy agreement" not in issue.
CORPORATIONS - winding up of - whether court to terminate winding up proceedings where creditors restricted to plaintiffs as the controlling members of company and banks - failure of plaintiffs to establish that no other parties affected - no basis for termination - s 482 (1) Corporations Law.
The Corporations Law, s 471B, 482(1)
Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT) (repealed), s 8(1), 70, 63(5),
Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT), s 36, 115
Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT), ss 58(1)(d), 85(1), 89, 152, 153, 154
Residential Tenancies (Consequential Provisions) Act 1998, s 7
Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT), s 38
I & V Builders Pty Limited and Anor v Minister for Environment Land and Planning and Ors (ACTSC 16, 9 March 1999, Gallop J, unreported), referred to
Jakucs v Bartlett (1963) 80 WN 946; [1963] NSWR 1468, referred to
Picone v Grocery and General Merchants Ltd 81 WN (Pt 2) 78; [1964] NSWR 1018, considered
Doe d Groves v Groves (1847) 10 QB 486, cited
Smith v Overseers of Seghill (1875) LR 10 QB 422, cited
Buck v Howarth [1947] 1 All ER 342, cited
Wheeler v Mercer [1957] AC 416, cited
Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd v Crabbe [1958] 1 QB 513, cited
Goodtitle d Gallaway v Herbert (1792) 4 Term Rep 680, cited
Doe d. Jones v Jones (1830) 10 B&C 718, cited
Coatsworth v Johnson (1885) 55 LJQB 220, cited
Graham v Peat (1801) 1 East 244, cited
No. SC 182 of 1999
Judge: Higgins J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 27 May 1999
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC 182 of 1999
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN: ANTHONY GILBERT MARTIN
First Plaintiff
AND: SUE DOLORES MARTIN
Second Plaintiff
AND: BARRY ANTHONY TAYLOR
First Defendant
AND: INDIVIDUAL HOMES PTY LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 008 495 761
Second Defendant
Judge: Higgins J
Date: 27 May 1999
Place: Canberra
THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS IN RELATION TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
1. Whether the plaintiffs' implied tenancy at will on (sic) 8 Grund Place, Kambah commencing on the 23rd of October 1979 is paramount or to have priority, under sections 58(1)(d) and 85(1) of the ACT land Titles Act 1925, over the second named defendant's registration as proprietor of 8 Grund Place, Kambah on the 27th of November 1979.
NO.
2. Whether the first and or the second defendant is entitled to a Writ of Possession until the first and or second defendant pays into Court for the use of the plaintiffs the value of the improvements done by the plaintiffs on the said 8 Grund Place, Kambah, namely the sum of dollars (sic) $270,000 in accordance with sections 58(1)(d), 85(1), 89, 152, 153 and 154(1)(b) & (c) of the Australian Capital Territory Land Titles Act 1925.
NO.
3. Whether the winding up order of this Honourable Court of the 4th of May 1994 against the second named defendant should be terminated under section 482(1) of the Corporations Law.
NO.
4. Whether the Residential Tenancies Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction under sections 4(2)(a) and 115 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and section 70 of the ACT Landlord and Tenant Act 1949, to hear the application numbered RT615 of 1998 dated the 24th of December 1998 (based on the Notice to Quit dated the 18th of May 1998) by the second named defendant for a writ of possession of 8 Grund Place, Kambah in the Australian Capital Territory against the plaintiffs.
NO.
5. Whether the application in action R615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4, has any legal foundation.
NO.
6. Whether action RT615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4 is statute barred under section 11(1) of the Australian Capital Territory Limitation Act 1985.
Not necessary to answer.
1. By an originating application dated 16 March 1999, the plaintiffs sought relief described as "Rulings on the following points of Law". Six points were referred to in the following terms:
"1. Whether the plaintiffs' implied tenancy at will on (sic) 8 Grund Place, Kambah commencing on the 23rd of October 1979 is paramount or to have priority, under sections 58(1)(d) and 85(1) of the ACT Land Titles Act 1925, over the second named defendant's registration as proprietor of 8 Grund Place, Kambah on the 27th of November 1979.2. Whether the first and or the second defendant is entitled to a Writ of Possession until the first and or second defendant pays into Court for the use of the plaintiffs the value of the improvements done by the plaintiffs on the said 8 Grund Place, Kambah, namely the sum of dollars (sic) $270,000 in accordance with sections 58(1)(d), 85(1), 89, 152, 153 and 154(1)(b) & (c) of the Australian Capital Territory Land Titles Act 1925.
3. Whether the winding up order of this Honourable Court of the 4th of May 1994 against the second named defendant should be terminated under section 482(1) of the Corporations Law.
4. Whether the Residential Tenancies Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction under sections 4(2)(a) and 115 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and section 70 of the ACT Landlord and Tenant Act 1949, to hear the application numbered RT615 of 1998 dated the 24th of December 1998 (based on the Notice to Quit dated the 18th of May 1998) by the second named defendant for a writ of possession of 8 Grund Place, Kambah in the Australian Capital Territory against the plaintiffs.
5. Whether the application in action R615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4, has any legal foundation.
6. Whether action RT615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4 is statute barred under section 11(1) of the Australian Capital Territory Limitation Act 1985.
2. By Notice of Motion dated 23 March 1999, the defendants applied to "set aside" the originating application.
3. On 25 March 1999, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit, sworn by the first plaintiff, opposing that application.
4. That affidavit recites some facts which are not in dispute. The second defendant had been, before being subject to a winding up order, a corporation under the control of the plaintiffs. It was the registered proprietor of the Crown Lease over 8 Grund Place, Kambah, in the Australian Capital Territory. On that land is situated the personal residence of the plaintiffs. It is not clear what, if any, express agreement there had been between the plaintiffs and the second defendant to authorise their occupation of the premises prior to the winding up.
5. On 4 May 1994, the order for the winding up of the second defendant was made in this Court by Miles CJ. It was a part of that order that the first defendant be appointed liquidator.
6. On 30 June 1994, an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia against that order was dismissed. On 15 February 1994, an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was dismissed.
7. A meeting of creditors and contributories was purportedly held on 21 April 1995 at the plaintiffs' residence. It was called by the plaintiffs. No persons other than members of the plaintiffs' family were present. They nominated themselves as a Committee of Inspection and resolved to protest to various authorities concerning the conduct of the first defendant. The meeting was allegedly called and held because the first defendant had failed to do so. Indeed by letter dated 20 April 1995, Mr H J Kazar, on behalf of the liquidator, had expressly declined to do so.
8. Section 548 of the Corporations Law does, prima facie, impose a duty on a liquidator to convene such a meeting upon request. Section 552 enables a liquidator to apply to a Court to exercise the powers of a Committee of Inspection absent such Committee having been formed. That was not done either.
9. A liquidator, however, is permitted, by virtue of s 545 of the Law, to refrain from taking any step which would incur expense without sufficient available property to meet that expense. It is at least arguable that the first defendant was justified in taking the stand he did by virtue of that section. The evidence does not permit a finding one way or the other so as to resolve that issue.
10. It seems to me that, in any event, nothing turns on the question of the appointment or not of a Committee of Inspection.
11. For present purposes, the relevant subsequent events are those which relate to the action taken by the first defendant, in the name of the second defendant, to recover possession of the premises at 8 Grund Place, Kambah (the premises).
12. On 4 March 1997, a caveat asserting an interest in the land on behalf of the plaintiffs was ordered to be removed by Gallop J. An unregistered mortgage, purportedly favouring the plaintiffs, was declared void.
13. Relevantly, his Honour further declared that the second defendant was entitled to vacant possession of the land as against the plaintiffs.
14. On 24 April 1998, however, an appeal against the orders made by Gallop J was, though otherwise dismissed, successful in having that latter order set aside. The basis for that decision was a point which had not been taken before the learned trial judge. The point was that recovery of possession of the land was subject to the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1949 (ACT) (L&TA). The submission was that there existed a tenancy at will between the plaintiffs and the second defendant which was, or may be, protected by the terms of that Act.
15. The Full Court noted that the purported assumption of adverse possession by the first plaintiff on 15 June 1989 and by the second plaintiff on 6 March 1990, pursuant to the invalid unregistered mortgage made it arguable:
"(9)...that such acts [ie of asserting possession against the registered proprietor] are incompatible with the nature of a tenancy at will. By such overt acts the [plaintiffs] may determine the tenancy, notwithstanding that the mortgages and the powers purportedly conferred thereby are void. This may, in turn, render the [plaintiffs] mere tenants at sufferance because thereafter they remained in possession without either the assent or dissent of the [second defendant]. Since it assumes a lack of agreement between landlord and tenant, a tenancy at sufferance can arise only by operation of law and would, therefore, not be caught by the definition of "lease" in the Landlord and Tenant Act".
16. However, the issue as to whether, after those overt acts, the second defendant had consented to the plaintiffs' occupation of the premises so as to establish or re-establish a tenancy at will, had not been ventilated at first instance. Accordingly, the appeal succeeded insofar as it concerned the declaration that the second defendant was entitled to vacant possession of the premises.
17. The second defendant had described the plaintiffs as "tenants at will" in a notice to them dated 9 July 1994. It was a notice purporting to terminate that tenancy. The issue as to whether, if that notice terminated the tenancy at will, the tenancy at will was later reinstated, expressly or implicitly, was not pursued either. The Full Court, as at 24 April 1998, assumed that a tenancy at will might fall within the definition of a "lease" under s 8(1) of the L&TA. However, that assumption was, in the circumstances, an obiter dictum. There has been a further Notice to Quit dated 18 May 1998. In that notice, the second defendant alleged that the plaintiffs were then tenants at will and purported to terminate that tenancy. It did not specify whether the tenancy at will resulted from some express or implied agreement or by operation of law.
18. The grounds for termination, as stated, were, simply, that the second defendant no longer wished to continue the tenancy. Vacant possession was demanded accordingly.
19. The plaintiffs did not accede to that demand. On 24 December 1998, therefore, the second defendant applied to the Residential Tenancies Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory for an order terminating the tenancy and for vacant possession pursuant to the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) (RTA). It did not and has not applied to this Court for an order that the plaintiffs deliver up possession of the land to the second defendant.
20. It is the validity of those proceedings before the Residential Tenancies Tribunal which is now under challenge. They have, I understand, been heard by Tribunal member Behnke on 12 March 1999. His decision is reserved.
21. The defendants contend that the proceedings in this Court required leave pursuant to s 471B of the Corporations Law. Of course, in one sense these are not separate proceedings. They challenge the validity of proceedings taken by the second defendant on the authority of the first defendant. The issues raised are questions of law not of fact. Consequently, it would not duplicate the Tribunal proceedings now to rule on those questions.
22. There is an issue raised as to the limits of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That issue can only be determined authoritatively by this Court (or on appeal from it).
23. If leave is required, it seems to me to be in the interests of justice to grant it.
24. It is also necessary to consider the contention of the plaintiffs that their tenancy at will is, in some fashion, protected by ss 58(1)(d) and 85(1) of the Land Titles Act 1925 (ACT) (LTA) and that ss 89, 152, 153(1)(2) & (3) and 154(1)(b) & (c) LTA require the second defendant, as a precondition to obtaining a writ of or order for possession, to pay into Court the value of the improvements erected upon the land.
The Land Titles Act (ACT) (LTA) and the plaintiffs' tenancy at will (Q1 & 2)
25. To speak of a tenancy at will having paramountcy or priority over the interest of a registered proprietor of a Crown Lease, is a clear legal misconception.
26. Section 58(1)(d) grants to the proprietor of a "prior tenancy" for a term not exceeding three years the right to encumber the estate of the registered proprietor with it even though the lease granting such tenancy is not itself registered. Otherwise any such previous tenancy would be destroyed upon the registration of a subsequent registered proprietor.
27. However, no issue as to the application or not of s 58(1)(d) LTA arises in this case. If the plaintiffs became tenants of the second defendant by agreement between them, then s 58 has no application to that tenancy. It has such validity as the agreement, express or implied, between them confers.
28. That is to the advantage of the plaintiffs to the extent that their interest as tenants at will is capable of recognition and, unless and until validly terminated, gives them a right of occupation as against the registered proprietor.
29. Section 85 LTA is not applicable. It grants protection, as against the proprietor of a registered lease, to tenants of premises who hold possession under an unregistered lease not exceeding three years in duration. There is, in this case, no registered lease nor any other tenancy intervening between the second defendant as registered proprietor and the plaintiffs.
30. The contention that the second defendant is obliged to provide security for improvements before becoming entitled to possession relies on ss 152, 153 and 154 LTA.
31. Again, this claim is misconceived. Section 152 (LTA) prohibits action for ejectment against a registered proprietor save in the enumerated circumstances. The plaintiffs are not registered as proprietors of the Crown Lease. At best they are "proprietors" of an interest as tenants at will. Even allowing that such an interest is a "sublease", s 89 LTA applies to sub-lessees the provisions of the LTA relating to lessors and lessees generally but "with such modifications and exceptions as the difference between a lease and a sub-lease requires". If the lease is validly terminated, of course, s 152 LTA will cease to afford protection to the estate of the former tenant, even if it had otherwise done so.
32. Allowing for those modifications, if the lessor - the second defendant - establishes that the lessees - the plaintiffs - are in default under their lease, or that their lease has been validly terminated, then the plaintiffs are not protected from ejectment by virtue of s 152 LTA.
33. Section 153 LTA, assumes that the second defendant would otherwise be entitled to possession but that the plaintiffs have personally made improvements to the property. However, what the plaintiffs in this case assert is that the second plaintiff provided to the second defendant the monies used by the latter to purchase the Crown Lease, including the improvements then and currently erected thereon. It has already been authoritatively determined that the provision by the second plaintiff of funds towards that purchase did not confer any caveatable interest on the plaintiffs or either of them. It has also been determined that unregistered mortgages asserting the existence of a charge over the Crown Lease in consequence of the provision of such funds were void and of no effect. This section does not provide any relief to the plaintiffs. They have provided no evidence that, as tenants, they have made any improvements to the property.
34. It follows that the only remaining remedy the plaintiffs may enjoy on account of the provision of funds towards the purchase of the land is to participate as a creditor or as creditors in the winding up of the second defendant.
35. There is nothing to support a conclusion that the action being taken by the defendants constitutes any kind of breach of trust or misappropriation of property.
36. It follows that the entitlement of the second defendant to seek an order for possession against the plaintiffs is not excluded or inhibited by the terms of the LTA.
The winding up order - s 482(1) Corporations Law (the Law) (Q3)
37. Section 482(1) of the Law does permit the Court to terminate a winding up. The plaintiffs suggest that the only creditors or contributories are themselves (and family members) and the banks who held security over the property. If the only unsatisfied creditors were the plaintiffs or, indeed, consenting members of their family, there might be some force in the contention that the winding up had ceased to serve any useful purpose.
38. As the defendants correctly submit, the onus is on the plaintiffs to show that there are no other affected parties. No such evidence is adduced. That the banks remain "interested", for example, is not excluded. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that no useful purpose relevant to the winding up would be served by the first defendant as liquidator obtaining possession of the land with a view to sale.
39. There is no basis shown for any stay or termination of the winding up.
The jurisdiction of the Residential Tenancies Tribunal and the validity of the proceedings before it (Q4 & 5)
40. Reliance is placed by the plaintiffs on s 70 of the L&TA. That section vested jurisdiction in matters arising under Part III of the L&TA (Recovery of possession of prescribed premises) in the Magistrates Court. That jurisdiction included the power to hear proceedings for possession of prescribed premises and to refuse or stay orders for possession whether on the grounds of non-compliance by the landlord with the terms of the Act or, ultimately, on hardship grounds. However, that Act was repealed with effect from 25 May 1998. That repeal coincided with the proclamation of the commencement of the RTA.
41. I note that the Notice to Quit of 18 May 1998, purportedly terminating the tenancy at will, predates that commencement date. It is, therefore, subject to the provisions, if otherwise applicable, of the Residential Tenancies (Consequential Provisions) Act 1998 (ACT).
42. That latter Act provides:
"7. Where -(a) before the commencement date -
(i) a lessor issued a notice to quit in accordance with the old Act; and
(ii) the notice had not expired;
(b) the lease or premises in relation to which the notice was issued is not a lease or are not premises to which the new Act does not apply; and
(c) the tenant does not quit the premises in accordance with the notice;
the lessor may apply to the Tribunal for a termination and possession order under section 47 of the new Act as if the notice to quit had been a termination notice in the prescribed form based on a ground for termination under the prescribed terms".
43. It is apparent that the Notice to Quit of 18 May 1998 neither conforms to the form of a notice of termination under the RTA nor is it a notice which would have conformed to the requirements of s 63 and 67 of the L&TA. It follows that s 7 does not assist to resolve the present matter (see also I & V Builders Pty Limited and Anor v Minister for Environment Land and Planning and Ors, ACTSC 16, 9 March 1999, Gallop J, unreported).
44. Section 63(5) of the repealed Act required a lessee to obey every term of the lease in question. However, a requirement to deliver up possession on its termination is not, relevantly, such a term. That is because in the absence or upon termination of a protected contractual tenancy, a statutory tenancy comes into existence - see Jakucs v Bartlett (1963) 80 WN 946; [1963] NSWR 1468. This relieves the tenant of the obligation to deliver up possession save upon a prescribed ground and in accord with the prescribed statutory procedure.
45. In Picone v Grocery and General Merchants Ltd 81 WN (Pt 2) 78; [1964] NSWR 1018, the Full Court expressly characterised "holding over" after expiry of an express lease of prescribed premises as a tenancy on sufferance (or at will) which attracted the protective equivalent of Part III of the L&TA, though that protected interest was not assignable. It is not every tenancy at will or on sufferance which is so protected. It must arise from the expiry of a lease of prescribed premises.
46. The Notice to Quit of 18 May 1998 had purported to expire at the expiration of thirty days from service of it.
47. However, as I have noted, that Notice was not based on a prescribed ground under the L&TA. Nor could it be regarded as having been given on a ground for termination under the prescribed terms referred to in s 47 RTA. It is not clear why it was conceded by the defendants that a tenancy at will arose rather than a tenancy on sufferance, but nothing turns on that for the purpose of the L&TA.
48. The tenancy asserted by the Notice to Quit, if at will, would have arisen upon the occupation of the premises by the plaintiffs with the consent of the second defendant - see Doe d Groves v Groves (1847) 10 QB 486; Smith v Overseers of Seghill (1875) LR 10 QB 422 and Buck v Howarth [1947] 1 All ER 342.
49. However, it is by no means clear that such a tenancy arises under a "lease" for the purposes of Landlord and Tenant Acts. A tenancy at will by operation of law rather than by agreement would not attract the protection of the L&TA - see Wheeler v Mercer [1957] AC 416. However, a tenancy at will or on sufferance is protected if it follows from the expiry of a tenancy to which the L&TA (or currently, the RTA) would apply - see Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd v Crabbe [1958] 1 QB 513. But that is because of the statutory protection afforded continued occupation following expiry or other termination of a residential lease.
50. The tenancy at will alleged in this case is not consistent with a tenancy created by, or following, the expiry by effluxion of time of a "lease" within the meaning of s 8(1) of the L&TA. The only certainty is that the tenancy at will itself has not been shown to be a tenancy to which the L&TA applied.
51. However, even if it was otherwise, the position is further complicated by the repeal of the L&TA itself on 25 May 1998. Prima facie, s 38 of the Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT) preserves the respective rights and liabilities of the parties but the power of the Magistrates Court to entertain proceedings with respect thereto has been withdrawn.
52. Whether or not proceedings could have been taken in the Magistrates Court is not relevant to the present proceedings. The question now at issue is whether the RTA applies to the tenancy at will alleged in the Notice to Quit dated 18 May 1998 and, more particularly, whether the Residental Tenancies Tribunal has any jurisdiction in the matter.
53. At common law a tenancy at will is terminable forthwith upon either party notifying a withdrawal of consent to it. That the Notice to Quit of 18 May 1998 clearly purported to do - see Goodtitle d Gallaway v Herbert (1792) 4 Term Rep 680.
54. It is not necessary that there be a notice to quit to terminate a tenancy at will - see Doe d Jones v Jones (1830) 10 B&C 718; Coatsworth v Johnson (1885) 55 LJQB 220.
55. Of course, had the plaintiffs been regarded as merely tenants on sufferance then, subject to any statutory protection, the second defendant as registered proprietor could have recovered possession as if the tenants were mere trespassers - see Graham v Peat (1801) 1 East 244. That it has not chosen to do so. However, that is not relevant for present purposes. At issue here is whether the proceedings before the Residential Tenancies Tribunal are competent to achieve that result.
56. The RTA confers jurisdiction on the Residential Tenancies Tribunal in respect of a "tenancy dispute". It has jurisdiction under s 115 "to hear and determine any matter that may be the subject of an application to it under [the RTA] or the prescribed terms". A residential tenancy agreement, to which the RTA applies is statutorily continued notwithstanding that its term has expired - see s 36 RTA.
57. However, the tenancy at will alleged in these proceedings is not itself a "residential tenancy agreement" within the meaning of the RTA any more than it would have been a "lease" for the purposes of the L&TA.
58. The tenancy alleged by the defendants was not a tenancy granted "for value", nor is it established that it was granted pursuant to an "agreement", express or implied, with the plaintiffs. It would be entirely inappropriate for such an arrangement to be subject to "prescribed terms" or to be terminable only in accordance with s 36.
59. The Tribunal is a body of limited jurisdiction. It has no general power to make orders for possession of premises where the right to possession does not arise out of the termination of a residential tenancy agreement. It has no power to order possession in the circumstances alleged by the second defendant in the proceedings before the Tribunal.
60. It follows that questions four and five must be answered favourably to the plaintiffs.
Limitation Act 1985 - Application thereof - Q6
61. The plaintiffs' contentions fail to take account of the continuing nature of a tenancy at will. It continues until terminated by withdrawal of consent to it. On termination by withdrawal of the landlord's consent, a tenant at will becomes a tenant on sufferance. Unless the registered proprietor's title was to be extinguished by adverse possession no question of a limitation period would arise.
62. It is, however, unnecessary to address this question as the proceedings before the Residential Tenancies Tribunal are and were incompetent ab initio.
Summary
63. The questions raised by the plaintiffs, for the foregoing reasons, are answered as follows:
"1. Whether the plaintiffs' implied tenancy at will on (sic) 8 Grund Place, Kambah commencing on the 23rd of October 1979 is paramount or to have priority, under sections 58(1)(d) and 85(1) of the ACT land Titles Act 1925, over the second named defendant's registration as proprietor of 8 Grund Place, Kambah on the 27th of November 1979.
NO.
2. Whether the first and or the second defendant is entitled to a Writ of Possession until the first and or second defendant pays into Court for the use of the plaintiffs the value of the improvements done by the plaintiffs on the said 8 Grund Place, Kambah, namely the sum of dollars (sic) $270,000 in accordance with sections 58(1)(d), 85(1), 89, 152, 153 and 154(1)(b) & (c) of the Australian Capital Territory Land Titles Act 1925.
NO.
3. Whether the winding up order of this Honourable Court of the 4th of May 1994 against the second named defendant should be terminated under section 482(1) of the Corporations Law.
NO.
4. Whether the Residential Tenancies Tribunal of the Australian Capital Territory has jurisdiction under sections 4(2)(a) and 115 of the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 and section 70 of the ACT Landlord and Tenant Act 1949, to hear the application numbered RT615 of 1998 dated the 24th of December 1998 (based on the Notice to Quit dated the 18th of May 1998) by the second named defendant for a writ of possession of 8 Grund Place, Kambah in the Australian Capital Territory against the plaintiffs.
NO.
5. Whether the application in action R615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4, has any legal foundation.
NO.
6. Whether action RT615 dated the 24th of December 1998 mentioned above under item 4 is statute barred under section 11(1) of the Australian Capital Territory Limitation Act 1985.
Not necessary to answer.
64. I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Ruling herein of his Honour, Justice Higgins.
Associate:
Date: 27 May 1999
Counsel for the First and Second Plaintiffs: First Plaintiff in Person
Counsel for the First and Second Defendants: Mr F J Purnell SC
Solicitor for the First and Second Defendants: Mallesons Stephen Jaques
Date of Hearing: 1 April 1999
Date of Reasons for Rulings: 27 May 1999
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