Vera Stekovic v City Group Pty Limited; National Library of Australia and Email Furniture Limited [1994] ACTSC 110 (2 November 1994)

SUPREME COURT OF THE ACT

VERA STEKOVIC v. CITY GROUP PTY LIMITED; NATIONAL LIBRARY OF AUSTRALIA and
EMAIL FURNITURE LIMITED
No. SC611 of 1992
Number of pages - 14
Damages - Negligence

COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
HIGGINS J

CATCHWORDS

Damages - assessment - personal injuries - tort.

Negligence - plaintiff crushed between compactus - no apparent safety device - failure to warn of movement of compactus - defendants jointly liable.

HEARING

CANBERRA, 4-6 October 1994
2:11:1994

Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr G Lunney
Instructing solicitors: Romano and Co

Counsel for the First Defendant: Mr M Cranich

Instructing solicitors: Sly and Weigall

Counsel for the Second Defendant: Mr R Toner

Instructing solicitors: Australian Government Solicitor

Counsel for the Third Defendant: Mr G Richardson, SC

Instructing solicitors: Gary Robb and Associates

ORDER

The Court orders that:
There be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $176,556.45.

DECISION

HIGGINS J This is a claim for damages for personal injury caused to the plaintiff on 8 August 1990 in the course of her employment by the first defendant.

2. At the outset, the counsel for the defendants advised that it would be unnecessary for the court to determine which of the defendants was liable to the plaintiff. If there was to be a verdict for the plaintiff, it could be entered against the defendants jointly and severally without apportionment as between them.

3. The circumstances in which injury to the plaintiff occurred may be briefly stated. The plaintiff was employed by the first defendant as a supervisor of other employees of the first defendant at the National Library. She was required by her employer to carry out cleaning duties and direct other cleaners in accordance with instructions from a representative of the second defendant. She was directed to clean the floor area between the stacks of a newly installed set of compactus units. The units had been supplied and installed by the third defendant.

4. It appears that the stacks were moved by some kind of motor activated by controls on the outside of the stacks. It was the plaintiff's expectation that she, and her work mate, would progressively shift the one corridor between the stacks and clean the floor area so exposed, so that the whole area beneath the compactus units would be cleaned.

5. The plaintiff found that some of the controls were inoperative. To gain access between the relevant stacks it was necessary for the other cleaner, Lubica Jakovceska, and a male employee of the second defendant to move those particular stacks by pushing them. The plaintiff protested at the effort so required, but did accept that method of moving the stacks (which would not move as a result of activating the external controls).

6. Having done about three bays, the plaintiff found another stack that would not move. The male employee was not at his desk in the compactus room. The plaintiff went to find him. She was unsuccessful but, on her return, noticed a bay was open towards the other end of the compactus unit. The plaintiff went into it, intending to vacuum the floor with a vacuum cleaner attached to her back. Her workmate was doing something similar on the other side of the room in relation to another compactus unit.

7. The use of the vacuum cleaners is of relevance as the noise of them should have alerted any person who desired to activate the compactus units that cleaners might be in the open bay of the compactus units. That would be the more readily observable because of the electrical cord trailing out of the open bays to a power point. It would also have made it unlikely that a mere spoken warning would have been effective.

8. Whilst the plaintiff was vacuuming she was horrified to notice the stacks beginning to close upon her. She attempted to turn and flee out of the bay, but was unsuccessful. She called out to try and get whoever was, as she assumed, operating the compactus unit to cease causing it to close. However, the compactus continued to close in on her. She was crushed between the two stacks.

9. The defendants did not admit that in those circumstances the resultant injuries were occasioned by their negligence. However, they did not seriously dispute that a finding of negligence was inevitable.

10. There was no apparent safety device to enable the plaintiff to halt the movement of the stacks. If there was one, she was not instructed in its use. If someone moved the stacks, it could only have been an employee of the second defendant and that person clearly failed to warn anyone in the open bay that the stacks were about to move. If they moved spontaneously, then the machinery was clearly faulty and in such a way as to be likely to cause injury.

11. The evidence does not render one cause more likely than any other, but the manner in which the accident occurred makes it unlikely that it was due to anything other than the negligence of any of the defendants.

12. I find that the defendants are therefore liable to the plaintiff for the damage caused to her.

13. There is nothing to suggest any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

14. The real issue in the case centred on the nature and extent of the disabilities, if any, resulting from the crushing injury suffered by the plaintiff in the accident.

Damages
15. The plaintiff is 53 years of age. She was born in Bosnia and migrated to Australia with her husband in 1969. She had only four years of schooling. She had been employed picking grapes, woodmill labouring, dressmaking and cleaning.

16. Since 1975 the plaintiff has been employed as a cleaner. As at the date of the accident, she was employed as a supervisor.

17. Following her release from the compactus unit the plaintiff says that she felt pain down her left side. She went home about 2.00pm. She reported for the next shift, 6.00pm to 10.00pm, but could not work. She was collected by her daughter and son-in-law.

18. Next day the plaintiff reported for the morning shift, 6.00am to 2.00pm. She felt "terrible". There was pain in the middle of her chest, left side and back. As she passed the security desk she fainted. Her supervisor was summoned and took her for an X-ray. She then consulted her general practitioner, Dr Roach.

19. Physiotherapy was recommended. The plaintiff found it of some temporary assistance. After about a week she attempted to return to work. However, it seems that her doctor had recommended light duties only. She was not medically cleared to return to full duties.

20. The plaintiff recalls later attempting cleaning work but felt faint again. She has not returned to work since that time.

21. The plaintiff has continued to suffer pain. She reports being troubled by recurrent nightmares such as being on a tall building and waking in fear of falling. She has developed a breathing difficulty which affects both swallowing and speaking. She feels that some "lump" is rising in her throat and she needs to press it down to speak comfortably.

22. Various doctors have attempted to treat her without success.

23. The plaintiff's marriage does not seem to have been a happy one. Her husband drank heavily and was occasionally violent but after an episode before her accident, where she left the home and took out a domestic violence order, the physical violence ceased. However, her husband still drinks to excess.

24. The plaintiff receives help with housework and shopping from her daughter who is married.

25. The plaintiff complains that she is physically weak, particularly on the left side. Her sleep is disturbed. She now has headaches and takes medication.

26. In brief, the plaintiff presents as a seriously handicapped person. She talks slowly pressing her right hand, and sometimes her left hand, into her lower throat frequently. Her speech is weak at times. She frequently gasps for breath and sighs.

27. It was suggested to the plaintiff in cross-examination that she was grossly exaggerating her disabilities and was, indeed, fit to return to work if she chose to.

28. The plaintiff was shown a video depicting her shopping with her daughter. It was suggested to her that she did not always place her hand on her throat when she appeared to be speaking. It was also suggested that whilst the film was being shown she had placed her hand on her throat just to demonstrate how sick she was.

29. The plaintiff, in response, conceded that she did not always have to place her hand on her throat to speak. "Sometimes, when I'm calm, I don't do it" she was reported as saying. She did agree that the film showed a fair representation of her in her daily life.

30. The plaintiff conceded that she would sometimes go to shops alone, driving a motor vehicle. She concedes that she is capable of doing housework although she avoids heavy work.

31. The work colleague present at the time of the accident, Lubica Jakovceska, confirmed in her evidence that the plaintiff has changed since her accident. She observed that the plaintiff had lost weight and appears to find it hard to breathe. The plaintiff complains that she cannot work and puts her hand on her chest to speak. The witness agreed that the plaintiff has more recently put weight on.

32. The plaintiff's daughter, Millie Novakevic, also gave evidence. She also attested to a change in the plaintiff since the accident. Before, she had worked a 12 hour day and did all the housework and gardening. Now, she is not well, lies down a lot, is always upset. Mrs Novakevic now does a lot of the heavy work. She sees her mother every day. She conceded that some of the assistance she gave was not necessitated by her mother's condition but simply to keep the latter company. She estimated she gave 3-4 hours of assistance weekly. Most or all of that seemed to refer to "heavy work", but that was not made very clear. At one stage in her evidence she seemed to assert that she had never seen her mother speak over the last few years without placing her hand on her throat. Later in her evidence she agreed that sometimes her mother would speak without doing that.

33. That led to a suggestion that Mrs Novakevic was exaggerating her evidence to help her mother.

34. It was apparent that the demeanour of the plaintiff was exaggerated. The symptoms, as she reported them, seemed out of all proportion to the admittedly distressing accident she had suffered.

35. It is obviously possible that the patent exaggeration by the plaintiff of her symptoms is due to a desire to obtain damages to which she would not, objectively, be entitled. At the other end of the spectrum, her exaggeration may reflect psychosomatic but genuinely perceived symptoms.

36. I bear in mind, also, that the plaintiff's cultural background may lead her to express herself in an exaggerated way in order to impress upon her audience the fact that she genuinely feels unwell and unable to cope. In this context, the medical evidence is of critical significance.

37. From the outset, medical practitioners have concluded that the physical injury sustained by her does not explain her reported symptoms.

38. In his report of 14 September 1990, Dr Roach, her then general practitioner, commented:

Radiographs etc have not shown any serious damage but she has been
and still is upset more by the emotional aspect rather than the
physical aspect of her injuries.

39. He concluded:

The longer she spends away from work the harder it will be to
convince her that her injuries are minor.

40. The picture remained the same as at his next report of 7 March 1991. Subsequently, on Dr Roach's retirement, his partner, Dr Carter, continued ongoing care of the plaintiff. The latter's opinion, as at 24 March 1994, was:

... she is hopelessly,
(a) psychologically and
(b) (query) physically unfit for any form of work.

41. There were, of course, physical examinations and tests carried out at Dr Roach's request.

42. Dr Gytis Danta, a neurologist, examined the plaintiff on 12 October 1990. He found no neurological signs to explain her symptoms. In his report dated 9 April 1991 he concluded that she had adjusted very badly to the pain and disability she had experienced. His prognosis was:

Unless she responds to counselling, I think the prognosis is very
poor and she is likely to continue with her chronic pain and
disability for very many years if not indefinitely.

43. When Dr Danta later saw the plaintiff, on 24 March 1994, she was affecting a clutching at her throat when speaking. Her lack of response to pinprick in the left arm and left leg was "diffuse". She was taking pain killers. His conclusion, as expressed on 25 March 1994, was:

The patient has the chronic pain syndrome and has obviously poorly
adjusted to the chronic pain. This renders the prognosis very
poor and she is likely to continue with pain indefinitely.

44. Her chest and throat symptoms, including the breathing and swallowing difficulties, were investigated by Dr Mark Bassett, a gastroenterologist. He concluded, in his report dated 6 September 1994, that:

... the chest pain did not have a gastrointestinal origin ... It
is not uncommon for patients to describe functional upper
gastrointestinal symptoms when under stress or when particularly
anxious and this might have been the basis for those symptoms.

45. The plaintiff was referred also to Dr T G Lithgow, a pain management specialist. He first saw the plaintiff on 12 September 1991. There was complaint of recurrent dreams of falling off a roof screaming and dying, being in a car falling into water, suffocating and dying.

46. Dr Lithgow commented, in a report dated 13 April 1994, that:

This injury appears to have triggered a post trauma response and
widespread neuropathic pain syndrome.

47. He characterised the plaintiff's responses to examination to find the extent of pain as "bizarre". Dr Lithgow stated that if the pain had been caused by injury to and/or dysfunction of the nervous system, autonomic changes such as swelling might be expected. However, he did not observe any significant autonomic changes.

48. Dr John Corry, a rehabilitation specialist, had been asked to assess the plaintiff's prospects for rehabilitation. He had seen her first on 6 November 1990. He found considerable over-reaction and inconsistency of responses. He reported on 15 September 1992 that:

... she was able to use her left arm and leg in reflex automatic
fashion without problems, but with voluntary activity there was
variable weakness and coarse tremor.

He considered that the plaintiff was disabled as a result of post traumatic stress disorder with severe and generalised anxiety.

49. Dr Corry last saw the plaintiff on 9 May 1994, according to the last report tendered which was dated 19 May 1994. He noted X-ray and MRI scan results indicating minor degenerative changes in the cervical and lumbar spine, but concluded that:

... there has been an extreme emotional reaction which is part of
a post traumatic stress disorder and there are a number of
conversion symptoms including aphonia (loss of voice) and
formication (crawling sensation of the skin).

Dr Corry was convinced from the outset that the problem was mainly, if not entirely, psychiatric. He did notice, on one occasion, swelling of the left arm. It may be noted that Dr Lithgow considered that this was indicative of the presence of neuropathic pain.

50. As a result of the spinal changes, the plaintiff was also referred to Dr Raymond Newcombe, a neurosurgeon. He saw the plaintiff on 30 October 1992. In his report, dated 14 June 1994, Dr Newcombe noted that the plaintiff's claimed sensory loss, "... did not conform to any anatomical distribution of nerves". He confirmed that there was evidence of cervical and lumbar spondylosis. In his opinion:

Some aggravation of both of these features may also have occurred
in the injury but there is functional elaboration in addition to
neck and low back pain as a consequence of such aggravation.

51. Dr Corry referred the plaintiff for psychiatric examination and treatment.

52. Dr W Mickleburgh, a psychiatrist, saw the plaintiff first on 18 February 1992. He formed the view that the plaintiff suffered from:

... a generalized anxiety state resulting from a post traumatic
stress disorder, her pain may be psychogenic...

He considered she was at risk of "... sliding into a chronic accident victim role".

53. In a subsequent report, dated 5 April 1994, Dr Mickleburgh, having reviewed the plaintiff, noted "some swelling of her left hand and arm". There was an overlay of depression. He considered that "the dysphonia may be due to a conversion reaction".

54. The plaintiff was referred by Dr Mickleburgh for psychological counselling but this has not produced any dramatic lessening of the plaintiff's symptoms.

55. In oral evidence, Dr Mickleburgh was asked to explain his diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. He agreed that in some respects the plaintiff's condition did not fit the diagnostic indications for post traumatic stress disorder (309-89, DXM III).

56. He also agreed that the stresses in the plaintiff's life before the accident were such as to predispose the plaintiff to the type of psychological collapse she appeared to have sustained.

57. Whether the correct label to apply to the plaintiff's condition was "post traumatic stress disorder" or "generalised anxiety disorder", both being referred to in exhibit B, Dr Mickleburgh did refer, in his reports, to the presence of a "generalised anxiety state".

58. The central question is whether the plaintiff in fact suffers from the symptoms she claims to experience. If she does then, whatever the correct description of the causative condition, it is to be regarded as a serious and well-entrenched psychiatric disorder.

59. The defendant, on that issue, tendered medical reports from three doctors. Those doctors were not required to attend for cross-examination, but the plaintiff's counsel indicated that this was on the understanding, which was accepted by counsel for the defendants, that the conclusions expressed, adverse to the plaintiff's credibility, were objected to. It was also to be understood that Dr Shoulder was excused from attendance on the basis that, insofar as his opinion differed from that of Dr Mickleburgh, it was not conceded to be correct.

60. I will consider first the report of Dr James Scott-Findlay, a medico-legal consultant surgeon, dated 8 March 1993. He saw the plaintiff on 2 March 1993. The ultimate conclusion to which he came was not controversial, that is, that the plaintiff's problems are more psychological than physical. However, some comments in the report do seem inappropriate. For example, there is a comment that,

She refused to answer the questions put to her and insisted on
telling her own story and this was mainly to justify her being
in that position and to justify the claims she later made.

61. Whilst one can sympathise with the examining doctor's difficulty in extracting a useful history, it was gratuitously offensive and scientifically unsound for him to presume that the difficulty he experienced was some sort of device to support a false claim. Such an opinion has no place in a supposedly objective expert report. It tends to cast doubt on the objectivity of the examiner.

62. Dr Scott-Findlay's report is in marked contrast to that of Professor John Wright, a specialist surgeon whose report dated 11 March 1993 was also tendered by counsel for the defendant. His conclusion was consistent with all other experts in failing to find an organic cause sufficient to explain the plaintiff's symptoms, but refrained from reflecting upon the plaintiff's credibility. It was objectively and analytically expressed.

63. The critical expert reports for the defendant were those of Dr Robert Shoulder, a psychiatrist. His initial report was dated 12 March 1993 and related to an examination of 11 March 1993. Unfortunately, that report is marred by an obvious attempt to step outside the role of scientific expert into that of an advocate or investigator assisting the cause of the party engaging him.

64. In relation to her history of poking a finger into the base of her throat, for example, he observed:

I noted that when she had been waiting in my colleague's waiting
area she did not do this manoeuvre at the times when I noticed her
including when I spoke to her.

65. The plaintiff claims that "this manoeuvre" is necessary when she feels a lump rising from her oesophagus area. She does not claim that it arises in the circumstances referred to by Dr Shoulder. Accordingly, the observation is not particularly relevant. It serves only to reveal an attitude of apparent bias against the plaintiff on the part of Dr Shoulder.

66. There are two conclusions to which Dr Shoulder comes in his first report. The first is that the plaintiff does not meet the diagnostic standard for post traumatic stress disorder. Having considered the terms of the standard and the objective criteria based both on Dr Shoulder's observations and the plaintiff's own evidence, I agree. Indeed, Dr Mickleburgh conceded that not all criteria were met.

67. The second is, however, that the plaintiff is "a malingerer". That conclusion was, in my view, outside of the claimed area of expertise of Dr Shoulder. It is a conclusion that the plaintiff is deliberately assuming the symptoms of which she complains. The judgment thus made is one relating to the plaintiff's credibility. It is, of course, a possible explanation for the plaintiff's presentation. However, it is not the only explanation. It is also possible that the plaintiff suffers from the symptoms of which she complains but the diagnostic label suggested by Dr Mickleburgh is not the most appropriate one. I attach no evidentiary value to Dr Shoulder's opinion in this second respect and I consider that it was inappropriate for him to express it.

68. There was a second report from Dr Shoulder dated 10 June 1994. He commenced it by recounting that the plaintiff on seeing him had "unleashed a storm of abuse". The relevance of this comment to a psychiatric opinion was not explained. It certainly reveals, once more, a lack of professional detachment.

69. Dr Shoulder asked the plaintiff about the drugs she was taking. There was a prescription for 50 tablets shown to him, dated 27 April 1994. She was reported as saying that she took one every night and got a fresh supply when needed. The doctor shared this thought with those to whom his report was addressed:

I calculated that, had she been taking it (sic) in the fashion
that she stated, there would be more than thirty tablets gone from
the supply of 50. In truth however there were 43 tablets present
...

This is not the kind of observation which should be included in an expert report. The observation is irrelevant to any medical opinion. It is not even very cogent. The plaintiff was not asked to explain the discrepancy, so it is simply not known whether the current supply had been obtained on 27 April 1994 or later, or whether, even so, it had been supplemented by the remainder, if any, of any previous supply. Of course, there is no objection to an examining doctor otherwise communicating to the defendant's solicitors possible discrepancies relevant to the plaintiff's credit. This observation, in a report intended to be offered in evidence, tends to reduce the prospects for acceptance of the objectivity of Dr Shoulder's opinion.

70. Dr Shoulder's report otherwise addresses the issue as to whether the plaintiff's reported symptoms meet the diagnostic standard for post traumatic stress disorder. He adheres to his previous view that they do not and, for reasons already stated, I agree with that conclusion.

71. The question nevertheless remains for me to determine as to whether or not the plaintiff is truthfully reporting her symptoms as she perceives them or whether she is exaggerating them, not merely for emphasis, but deliberately pretending to have them when she does not. In that respect, the surveillance material is of considerable value.

72. It was the defendants' contention that video film of the plaintiff demonstrated that her claim that she suffered aphonia and/or aphagia was false. It was then to be inferred, it was contended, that her claim to suffer from other disabilities was equally false.

73. The surveillance film showed the plaintiff moving slowly, even ponderously. It showed her entering and exiting a motor vehicle gingerly and slowly. It was certainly consistent with the bodily pain from which she claimed to suffer. Mostly she was with her daughter but she did on one occasion so enter a vehicle when her daughter was absent and, so far as she is likely to have been aware, unobserved by any person she knew. She is shown frequently, when apparently speaking or preparing to speak, clutching her left hand to the base of her throat.

74. There are occasions when the plaintiff apparently speaks, albeit briefly, without clutching at or placing a hand on her throat.

75. The surveillance material covers a wide time range. In the first few segments her daughter is pregnant, in the last few she has a small child apparently 12 months or so of age and is no longer pregnant. Over that entire period the plaintiff is observed from time to time to place her left hand on her throat.

76. It is possible that this gesture is part of a pretence. If it is, it has been very consistent. Although there was an element of exaggeration in the plaintiff's presentation in court relative to that shown on the film, it was basically similar to her presentation under surveillance.

77. I have regard also to Dr Mickleburgh's evidence that the aphonia and aphagia are, in his opinion, anxiety conversion reactions. Thus, when distracted and not anxious, it is to be expected that the plaintiff will demonstrate disabilities inconsistently.

78. It follows that, in the absence of any significant contradictory evidence, notwithstanding the opportunity for it to have been found, I am persuaded that the plaintiff's account of her symptoms reflects the truth as she perceives it.

79. Albeit subject to some exaggeration for the purpose of emphasis, the plaintiff is significantly disabled and unhappy. The question of her future nevertheless presents some difficulty.

80. She has assumed the role of a chronically disabled person. She moves slowly, there is some underlying pathology which provide a basis in reality for some of the pain which she experiences. It is unlikely she will return to work.

81. However, I consider that it is likely that her present state of anxiety and depression will alleviate once the need to demonstrate her invalidism is removed. It is that need which, I believe, presently subconsciously exacerbates her symptoms.

82. I take account also of the fact that, whilst she had a good previous work record and was apparently conscientious and diligent, her marriage could not have been described as a happy one. She already had a great deal of unhappiness and stress in her life.

83. I assess general damages at $35,000.00 of which I apportion $10,000 to the future. Interest on general damages will be $2,125.00.

84. Loss of earning capacity presents a more difficult problem. The plaintiff was working long hours at the time of her accident. She was clearing $525.00 weekly. Part of the reason she was working so hard was that she was thereby escaping, to an extent, from her husband. She was also contributing strongly to the household income at a time when her son was still dependant. It seems to me that shortly after 1990, she would have reduced her hours to a normal shift. This would be for two reasons. The first being the unlikelihood of work being available to the extent that it previously was. The second being that, once her son (then aged 16) had ceased to be dependant, her need to work long hours would be less.

85. I do not doubt she would have continued work for as long as she felt able. I also believe that the first defendant would have continued to employ her for as long as it had work she could do. It had after all, promoted her to the position of supervisor. It did not suggest in evidence that there had been any dissatisfaction with her services.

86. However, there is some doubt as to how long she might have continued with what was, after all, a physically demanding job. She had some signs, albeit asymptomatic of degenerative spinal disease. More significantly, she was psychologically vulnerable to any injury which might seem to her to threaten her capacity to continue to work.

87. I would assess the likelihood of the plaintiff working to age 65 as a cleaner at supervisor or any other level to be no better than 50:50. Her chances of working to age 60, however, would have been much better.

88. Had she continued to work the hours she did work as at August 1990, her present earnings would be $608.00 per week net.

89. Past economic loss on that basis would have been $128,124.00. That accords with calculations made in accordance with exhibit 17. However, a reduction of that sum must be made to reflect the probability of decreased earnings and other unfavourable vicissitudes occurring. I would award $90,000.00.

90. Interest on that loss is to be allowed only to the extent that it exceeds compensation payments made. The total paid to 3 October 1994 was $65,452.93. The current rate is $495.32 per fortnight. I therefore allow interest on (in round figures) $24,000.00. That interest amounts to $13,875.00 (in round figures).

91. Tax paid has been $4,400.00. I do not have figures for tax paid after 3 October 1994 but I will allow $4,450.00 to take account of additional tax to date.

92. Future economic loss has to take account both of the likelihood of reduction in the rate of earning and the greater than usual likelihood of the plaintiff not working full-time to age 65. An appropriate award is, in my opinion, $112,000.00

93. The rate for domestic assistance was agreed to have been $14.00 per hour at the time of the accident and $18.00 per hour currently. The rate of assistance required is not easy to assess but I consider Mrs Novakevic, the plaintiff's daughter, was fairly accurate in her description and assessment of the assistance she gave. Apart from mere company and volunteered work, not strictly required, her estimate was 3-4 hours weekly. Some of that, no doubt, could have been required in any event had the plaintiff's physical or mental state deteriorated otherwise. Hence there must be some discount for vicissitudes and, perhaps, a degree of unconscious exaggeration. I would proceed on the assumption that 2 hours per week domestic assistance has, on average, been necessary. I award $5,675.00 for the past.

94. The future need for domestic assistance is complicated by the same factors as affect the future economic loss attributable to this accident. I award $12,600.00 for the future.

95. Hospital and medical expenses are agreed at $11,331.45. I award that sum.

96. Future medication and medical attention was not precisely quantified. There is a need for future counselling and for medication for both pain and relief from the effects of anxiety and depression. I feel that need will lessen, at least so far as the effects of this accident are concerned. I award $1,500.00 for this purpose.

97. The total figures are, in summary:

General Damages $35,000.00
Interest thereon 2,125.00
Past loss of earning capacity 90,000.00
Interest thereon (as to $24,000.00) 13,875.00
Fox v Wood - tax paid 4,450.00
on compensation payments
Griffiths v Kerkemayer
- Past 5,675.00
- Future 12,600.00
Past Hospital and Medical expenses
11,331.45
Future loss of earning capacity $112,000.00
Future expenses 1,500.00
TOTAL $288,556.45

The total is $288,556.45. I consider that sum to be appropriate and order judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants accordingly. I will hear the parties as to costs.