Zelata Spelic v Grassia Investments Pty Limited [1992] ACTSC 33 (10 April 1992)

SUPREME COURT OF THE ACT

ZELATA SPELIC v. GRASSIA INVESTMENTS PTY. LIMITED
S.C. No. 330 of 1990
Negligence

COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Miles C.J.(1)

CATCHWORDS

Negligence - duty of employer to take reasonable care for safety of employee - plaintiff fell down stairs while carrying backpack vacuum cleaner - absence of waistband on backpack - foreseeable risk of injury - whether plaintiff contributorily negligent - no new question of principle.

Negligence - measure of damages - personal injury - aggravation of pre-existing degenerative spinal condition - loss of earnings and earning capacity.

Negligence - measure of damages - personal injury - non-pecuniary damage - pain and suffering.

Fox v. Wood [1981] HCA 41; (1981) 148 CLR 438

Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer [1977] HCA 45; (1977) 139 CLR 161

HEARING

CANBERRA
10:4:1992

Counsel for the plaintiff: B. Salmon, QC with B. Hull

Solicitors for the plaintiff: Wood Fussell

Counsel for the defendant: R. Williams, QC with R. Crowe

Solicitors for the defendant: Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDER

1. There be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $278,709.82.

DECISION

This is an action for damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff was injured on 1 April 1986 during the course of her employment as a cleaner with the defendant. She was cleaning the stairs between the fifth and sixth levels of the School of Music when she fell down those stairs and injured herself. She was cleaning the stairs by means of a vacuum cleaner attached to a backpack frame. Exactly how she came to fall is not clear.

2. The allegation of negligence on the part of the employer was reduced at the hearing to three main heads: failure to supervise the plaintiff in her activities; failure to ensure that the backpack was fitted with a waistband; and failure to ensure that the electrical cord attached to the vacuum cleaner did not gather on the stairs in loops, coils or bundles.

3. The staircase between the fifth and sixth levels was in two sections, the upper section of nine stairs and the lower section of 13 stairs. The treads were about 30 cm deep and the risers were 17 cm high. The width of the stairs was about 180 cm. There was a landing between the two sections of the staircase, each section running in the same direction from the landing and each parallel to the other. There was a handrail running down each side of the staircase at about waist height. There was a wall, apparently of brick or concrete, dividing each section of the staircase from the other. The electrical cord was plugged into a power point on the sixth level. That wall had a handrail attached to it. The location of the power point on the sixth level was such that the plaintiff found it expedient to drape the cord over the wall separating the two sections of the staircase when she was cleaning the bottom section of the staircase. If the situation is not made clear by my description, then I think it is better to simply refer to the many photographs in evidence rather than to take up more time with a more detailed description.

4. It is necessary to come to some conclusions about the probable explanations for the plaintiff's fall. Nobody saw her fall and she does not remember, and probably never knew, exactly what caused her to fall. The injury occurred at some time early in the morning. Her hours of work were 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. and her injury occurred at some time between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. The plaintiff had been engaged in this sort of work over a period of seven or eight years and on the day in question followed her usual practice in cleaning the stairs.

5. First she worked her way down the stairs, cleaning the treads with a brush attached to the hose of the vacuum cleaner. When the plaintiff reached the bottom of the lower section of the stairs, having cleaned the treads, she removed the brush attachment and commenced to work her way back up the stairs, this time cleaning the risers with the nozzle of the hose. As she worked her way back up the stairs in the direction from which she had come, it was inevitable that she would encounter the cord leading from the vacuum cleaner back to the power point. For reasons which are not clear, and which do not seem to me to matter, it was her practice to keep all the cord ahead of her as she proceeded up the stairs. This she achieved by flicking the cord ahead of her from time to time with the nozzle.

6. On the day in question, the plaintiff successfully negotiated and cleaned all the risers on the two sections of the staircase, passed the landing and had reached a position more than half way up the upper section of the staircase before her injury befell her. She said in evidence, and I accept, that her position was as shown in photographs 3 and 4, part of Exhibit B. She was on the extreme left of the staircase as she faced upwards. She had her left foot on the stair third from the top and her right foot on the stair fourth from the top. She noticed that the electrical cord was gathering near her feet to her right-hand side and slightly below where she was standing. Whether this meant that the particular part of the cord in question was on the stair lower than her right foot is not clear. The photographs, particularly photograph 2, suggest that the gathering of cord was on the same stair as her left foot, but in her evidence she said that the cord was "on a lower step that I was". I do not think that it is necessary to make a finding on this aspect in the plaintiff's case. In any event, she bent to pick up the cord. As she did so, she felt the vacuum cleaner strike either the wall or the handrail, she fell forward and remembers nothing further until she found herself on the landing. This means that she fell the distance covered by four or five stairs.

7. Those facts are clearly established by the evidence of the plaintiff, whom I accept as a witness of truth. Indeed they are hardly challenged by the defendant. There is evidence from an ergonomist, Dr John Olsen, to the effect that the plaintiff's injury could not have occurred in the way she described, but it transpires that Dr Olsen was acting upon information that the plaintiff's injury had occurred in a substantially different way, which is not necessary to discuss. Both parties have put in evidence several photographs in which various people are shown attempting to imitate the position of the plaintiff immediately before her fall. There is a danger in attaching too much importance to these photographs (particularly those of persons other than the plaintiff), as there is a danger in attaching too much importance to the statements in the reports of the ergonomists expressing their opinions about how the plaintiff happened to fall. Such opinion evidence is probably not admissible. In any event, I have little difficulty reaching the conclusion that the situation in which the plaintiff was placed was as follows. She was close to the left-hand side of the wall, originally facing towards the top of the stairs, then turning to face partly across the stairs to the right and partly up the stairs, then bending to retrieve the cord which was at the same level or a level lower than her right foot. It is likely that the plaintiff lowered herself by bending at the knees and at the same time leaning forward in a jack-knife position, so that the backpack projected out from her body and struck the handrail behind her (or, less likely, the left-hand wall). This had the immediate effect of tipping her over and down the stairs. I reject the opinion of Dr Olsen that if the frame of the backpack had struck the handrail, then it was more likely to keep the plaintiff upright than to cause her to lose balance. My findings on these questions of fact happen to coincide with the opinion of Dr Neil Adams, an ergonomist called on behalf of the plaintiff. My findings on these questions of fact are not affected by Dr Adams' expression of opinion, which, as I say, is on this aspect probably inadmissible anyway.

8. For reasons to which I will refer, I do not think that the facts so far found establish negligence on the part of the defendant. What is crucial is the effect, if any, of the absence of the waistband on the backpack. This is a matter that was dealt with in some detail by Dr Adams in his report and in his evidence. I think it is sufficient to say that the tests conducted by Dr Adams both by himself and under his supervision, confirm what is either a matter of common knowledge or a deduction from matters of common knowledge. That is to say that a waistband properly fitted would have the effect of securing the backpack more closely to the body of the wearer and would minimise lateral movement of the backpack. I do not think that it is to the point that the waistband would also restrain upward movement of the backpack beyond the shoulders of the wearer, in the direction of the head, because I do not think that it is probable that when the plaintiff attempted to reach for the electrical cord, she bent so low that the force of gravity would have had any effect which tended to move the backpack towards her head. However, given the clear fact that the plaintiff fell in the way already described, I think it is likely that at the commencement of the fall or imperceptibly thereafter, the weight of the vacuum cleaner on the frame, unrestrained by a waistband, caused the backpack to move laterally to the plaintiff's right. This, in my view, made it the more likely that the plaintiff was unable to check her loss of balance. The initial loss of balance aggravated or exacerbated the propulsive effect of the frame striking the handrail. In those circumstances, the combined effect of the impact with the handrail together with the shift of the weight of the backpack was likely to cause an appreciable movement of the centre of gravity of the plaintiff. As a result she lost control of her balance to the extent that she fell a distance of several stairs.

9. There is no doubt that a suitable waistband could easily have been supplied by the defendant and that the plaintiff had previously been supplied by the defendant with backpacks to which waistbands were attached. There is no explanation from the defendant about why the waistband was missing on this occasion. In my view, it was clearly foreseeable that a person like the plaintiff who was required to work on the stairs using a backpack would from time to time be required to bend and stoop in order to retrieve objects from the floor. In those circumstances there was a risk of the change of centre of gravity to which I have referred with the attendant danger of the change in the centre of gravity causing the wearer of the backpack to fall. The risk was foreseeable and appreciable and easily minimised by fitting a waistband to the backpack. In those circumstances, the defendant is liable for failure to take reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff and the plaintiff succeeds in negligence on that aspect.

10. I do not think that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the other aspects of her claim in negligence. As to the allegation of inadequate supervision, it is my view that the tasks to be performed by the plaintiff on the day in question were of such simplicity as to require no personal supervision. If she had been supervised, it is possible that a supervisor might have told the plaintiff to stand further from the wall or not to bend to pick up the electrical cord which was at the level of her lower foot or even below it, but I do not think that an adult person needs to be so closely supervised in such a straightforward task as cleaning stairs by means of a vacuum cleaner. Similarly, I do not think that the plaintiff should succeed on the allegation that it was negligent of the defendant not to devise or institute a system whereby the electrical cord did not gather in bundles or loops or coils on the stairs. It was suggested by Dr Adams in evidence that a retractable mechanism could have been attached to the vacuum cleaner to take up slack in the cord, but despite his many years in investigating matters of industrial safety in Australia and overseas (the very experience which entitles him to express expert opinion evidence) Dr Adams has never seen a retractable mechanism used with a backpack vacuum cleaner or recommended its use. Nor has Dr Olsen and I accept Dr Olsen's suggestion that the use of such a mechanism might not be practicable. Indeed it may give rise to dangers of a different nature, dangers which are not outweighed by the reduction of danger brought about by the adoption of such mechanical means.

11. On the issue of contributory negligence, I am quite satisfied that the plaintiff did nothing which constituted a failure to take reasonable care for her own safety. She was only doing what she had done many times before and in the same manner, and it had never been suggested to her on the part of the defendant that anything she was doing was wrong. She could have avoided the accident by standing a little further from the wall when she bent to pick up the cord and she should have realised that there is a particular danger in trying to pick up an object from a stair which is lower than the stair upon which one is standing, if in fact that was what occurred. The defendant bears the onus and I am not convinced that it was more likely than not that the cord was below the level of the plaintiff's right foot. It is consistent with the photographs that the cord was on the same level as the plaintiff's right foot. That does not mean, however, that having regard to the fact that it was her duty to get on with her job that it was unreasonable for her to behave in the way in which she did. There will be no apportionment for contributory negligence.

12. I turn to damages.

13. The plaintiff was born in Croatia on 17 November 1946. Although she finished school before she was 17 years of age, she went on to be trained and to obtain qualifications in Yugoslavia both as a buyer for a retail trade organization and as a health inspector. She worked as a cashier before and after her marriage in 1966. In 1967 she and her husband, a carpenter, migrated to Australia. They have three adult sons now aged 23, 21 and 20 years of age. A fourth child, Jasmin, is aged 9. All children still live at home.

14. Soon after the birth of the second child the plaintiff earned money by taking in ironing and minding other people's children. She later took up cleaning on a private basis, and later still she took in boarders whilst continuing to carry on ironing, child-minding and domestic cleaning. In 1978 she worked two nights a week as a waitress and after that for the first time started work in industrial cleaning five nights a week for four hours per night, whilst continuing to carry out the other income earning activities. From 1981 to 1982 she worked five days a week from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. as a shop assistant. She stopped that "full-time" work when her fourth child was born. In early 1983 she commenced cleaning for the defendant five days a week from 4 a.m. to 8 a.m. at the School of Music. She said in her evidence she was also working at some stage during the period thereafter in a supermarket as well as with other cleaning contractors, one of whom was called Marrapodi's Cleaning Service and another called Swan Services (ACT). At one stage after 1983 she was holding down three jobs, all of which, I understand, were part-time. The plaintiff was not very definite about dates and documentary evidence was not very supportive. But there can be no question that she was a hard-working woman who was particularly motivated to earn money to help put her children through tertiary education. In this regard she has been successful. Two of her sons are progressing through university courses and another has completed an apprenticeship as an automotive electrician.

15. In 1985 the plaintiff and the children went to Europe for an extended holiday and upon their return the plaintiff returned to work with the defendant. She also commenced work as a shop assistant in a delicatessen on Friday nights and Saturday mornings for which she was paid $80 per week gross.

16. Immediately after her injury on 1 April 1986 the plaintiff was taken to Royal Canberra Hospital where she was admitted and kept for some ten days. She was seen there by Dr Chandran and upon her discharge she commenced to be treated by her local practitioner, Dr Harris, who prescribed physiotherapy, hot packs, traction and a cervical collar. Her complaints were of cervical and lumbar pain and there was restriction of movement in those areas. She was soon complaining also of pain radiating to the left arm and into the left leg and foot. X-rays taken on 17 April 1986 showed disc narrowing in the cervical area (the exact level being unclear) but nothing abnormal in the lumbar area. Her condition did not improve and she was referred to Dr Robson, a neurosurgeon. He considered that the X-rays showed marked trouble at levels C5-6 and C6-7 indicating a probable necessity for surgical intervention. Eventually the plaintiff submitted to a cervical graft at both levels. Contrary to the plaintiff's evidence, Dr Robson thought that the plaintiff made a satisfactory recovery and that the neck had "really been very little trouble ever since". However, by May 1987 the lower back pain had increased to such an extent that Dr Robson arranged for a myelogram to be performed. It showed "major disc bulges at L4-5 and L5-1". Dr Goldrick, to whom the plaintiff was also referred, thought she was overweight and put her on a weight reduction programme which had positive results, the plaintiff losing over eleven kilograms in three months. Dr Robson operated again in November 1987, this time to the lumbar spine, with bone grafts at the two levels previously mentioned. The plaintiff described very graphically in her evidence not only her pain but also her feelings of frustration and the like induced by the enforced immobility whilst in hospital. She said that by the time of her discharge some eight days later, she "lost the unbearable pain" associated with the operation itself, but was then overcome by other pains in her back spreading to her legs and that she is still "living with that". Soon after this time, she said she was so "pushed over the limits" that she was referred to a psychiatrist, Dr Lubbe, for advice and treatment.

17. The plaintiff was not very specific in her evidence about the location and nature of her symptoms, but there does not appear to be much dispute as far as the medical evidence is concerned relating to the general nature of the plaintiff's symptoms and her continuing disability.

18. Dr Newcombe, a neurosurgeon, saw the plaintiff for a second opinion on 3 October 1990. The history and complaints led him to the view that the disc bulges at C5-6 and C6-7 were contributing to the plaintiff's neck and arm pain, indicating continuing symptoms and unfitness and likely need for operative treatment. Dr Newcombe also expressed the view that the injury of 1 April 1986 caused an aggravation of cervical spondylosis and intervertebral disc protrusion. At that stage it did not appear that the lumbar symptoms were of any great significance.

19. On 11 January 1991 she was reviewed by Dr Andrews on the neurological aspects. He noted that there was chronic ongoing pain in both the cervical and lumbar regions with pain going from the base of her neck into the hands, the right more so than the left, constant pain at the base of the lumbar spine with a milder pain in the thoracic spine, sciatic pain extending down both legs to the feet, and headaches.

20. Although the plaintiff was referred to Dr Lubbe for treatment, she only saw the plaintiff once, on 23 November 1988. Dr Lubbe made the observation that the plaintiff was suffering from what was, from a psychiatric point of view, the equivalent of a grieving reaction, that is to say, reaction to the loss of the working life which had meant so much to her which was complicated by pain and marital troubles. When Dr Lubbe saw the plaintiff later for the purpose of a report on 6 March 1991, she concluded that the plaintiff, although still unhappy, did not have a clinical depressive syndrome, that she was suffering from chronic intermittent pain which, together with an unsatisfactory marriage and other difficulties in the household, had caused her to come to rather bitter terms with her injuries and their consequences. Dr Lubbe considered that the plaintiff could benefit from further counselling, but the plaintiff does not appear to have responded to any suggestion of that nature.

21. Dr Keiller, a surgeon, saw the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant on 18 September 1991. Her complaints to him are consistent with her evidence, although a little more specific.

22. I conclude that the plaintiff's lower back remains painful, the pain still radiating into the left leg as far as the toes, with a feeling of weakness in the left leg, numbness on the outer shin and sole of the foot. She has pain in her neck during activities such as lifting, bending and dressing. It is likely the present pain in the cervical area is at the C4/5 level. She cannot wear high-heel shoes. She has difficulty reversing a car. She has given up gardening and dancing. Her depression is occasionally so bad that she has to stay in her room all day rather than contributing to the tension within the family.

23. Dr Keiller thought on examination that some of the restrictions on movement in the neck were voluntary and the plaintiff complained of tenderness in situations which could not physically contribute to the feeling of pain. Dr Keiller discounts further surgery, despite suggestions made to the plaintiff by her own doctor following a discogram. The plaintiff herself is reluctant to have surgery and I think that it is only a remote possibility, having regard to the plaintiff's experiences in the past. Dr Andrews who gave evidence expressed a similar opinion.

24. There is also no question that at the time of her fall, the plaintiff had a degenerative spine, although at that stage without symptoms. The fall was a heavy one resulting in disc prolapse in the cervical region and the precipitation of symptoms in the lumbar spine. Surgery in both areas has, however, not relieved the plaintiff of her symptoms. Despite some initial relief after the first operation, there are increased symptoms in the cervical area above the operation site. It is likely that the operation itself set up further stresses in the cervical spine, already in a degenerative condition, resulting in or at least contributing to the continuing symptoms. For whatever reason the fall on 1 April 1986 was a substantial cause.

25. The plaintiff at the time of her fall was highly motivated to keep working, particularly in order to provide financial support for the education of her sons. She stated in evidence that she would have liked in addition to have kept a little money for herself. Both she and her sons were less than complimentary about the measure of support received from Mr Spelic. I think it likely in the circumstances that but for her injury and assuming continuing good health, the plaintiff would have tried to keep in part-time employment at least until the age of 55. But I am not convinced that there was a likelihood that she would have worked beyond age 60. I think that in any event, despite her past history, she was likely as she grew older not to want to work the long hours that she had worked in the past. Finally, it is not to be overlooked that the economic prosperity in Australia that brought the plaintiff and her husband here has not continued and its revival cannot be guaranteed. Few Australians can expect to be able to hold down two and three jobs at a time and employers can no more guarantee jobs than they can guarantee their own financial viability.

26. Added to these personal factors there is the medical evidence that the degenerative condition of the plaintiff's spine may have incapacitated her in any event without the injury of 1 April 1986. It is of course impossible to be certain about this, and insofar as the doctors have given opinions, they border upon the speculative. Dr Keiller expressed the view that the plaintiff could have worked to age 55 or 60 without supervening incapacity. Dr Newcombe thought she would have developed significant symptoms at about age 55 to 60. The possibility of supervening incapacity but for her injury was the more likely if she continued to work in industrial cleaning with the defendant.

27. There is no doubt, however, that the results of the injury have had a very severe effect on the plaintiff's way of life and will continue to do so. I accept the evidence of her sons relating to her change in disposition and to the fact that she now does very little around the house compared with her industrious devotion to such matters prior to her injury. As I understand the effect of such evidence, the plaintiff's sons claim to do virtually all the household chores except for some of the washing. However, it still appears that the plaintiff does the cooking and she does not complain that others have to do the shopping. She said in her evidence that if she had not been injured she would have continued the household duties without expectation of any real assistance from her sons and that she would have continued, for instance, to make their beds each day. This is indicative, I think, of a little self-delusion. One of the sons said in evidence that he spends about fourteen hours a week on household chores. I cannot reject his sworn evidence, but one so devoted to the task would, I think, have been likely to have contributed substantially in any event even if his mother had not been injured. In addition to her work with the defendant, as I have said, the plaintiff was working eight hours a week in a delicatessen at the time of her injury. She seeks to have her loss of earning capacity assessed on the basis that she would have continued to earn about $80 per week before tax in addition to what she would have earned with the defendant, and would have continued to so earn indefinitely.

28. With respect to past loss of earning capacity, it is agreed that if the plaintiff had remained in employment with the defendant working twenty hours a week and had worked also for eight hours a week as a shop assistant, her actual loss of earnings from the date of accident until the date of hearing would have been $76,932 after tax. If she had worked only as a cleaner, her actual loss of earnings would have been $55,728 after tax. Whichever approach be adopted, the figure would have to be discounted slightly for the possibility of degeneration rendering her incapable in the meantime. If one takes the higher figure, one has to discount it further for the possibility that the plaintiff would not have worked such long hours, particularly with regard to employment other than cleaning. If one adopts the lower figure, one should add to it a factor to allow for the possibility that the plaintiff might have engaged in work other than cleaning. Taking all those factors into consideration, I think that an appropriate figure for past loss is $65,000.

29. With regard to future loss, I start with an assumption that the plaintiff probably would have worked to age 55. On the Australian life tables for a person of her age at 3 per cent discounted investment, a multiplier of 440 is to be applied. A loss of earnings predicted at $210 net per week, the earnings of a cleaner for twenty hours a week, gives a present value of $70,000. This figure has to be added to and discounted. It is to be added to because of the possibility that the plaintiff might have continued in a second job. It has to be discounted because of the ordinary vicissitudes and particularly because of the possibility of earlier intervening degeneration of the plaintiff's spine. I have looked at various hypotheses and applied the arithmetic to them. It is not necessary to set out the details. In the result I am of the view that the factors requiring a discount and the factors requiring an addition cancel each other out. I think that an appropriate measure of damages for loss of future earning capacity after taking into account all contingencies is $70,000.

30. There is agreement as to out-of-pocket expenses amounting to $23,752.43 and as to the Fox v. Wood [1981] HCA 41; (1981) 148 CLR 438 component of $8,357.39.

31. There remains the claim under the principle laid down in Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer [1977] HCA 45; (1977) 139 CLR 161. The decision of the High Court in that matter was not intended to provide a windfall for dutiful relatives of injured persons following a convenient rearrangement of household tasks. However, when a friend or member of the family performs gratuitously services which would have been reasonable to expect the plaintiff to engage commercially if the plaintiff had been in a position to afford it, an appropriate component must be built into the award of damages. The plaintiff indeed had a friend come from Sydney to assist her for two weeks after one of her operations and this was clearly a situation in which the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for what she would have paid for commercial help during that period. I am confident that the son who at present carries out the household chores to the tune of fourteen hours a week, will not continue to do so for the rest of the plaintiff's life. Some of the time he spends on the present household chores would have to be spent on something similar if he lived somewhere else by himself, or with friends, or even if he married. A letter from a commercial organization sets out the commercial rates, such information being supplied on the understanding that barristers agree to accept the letter as evidence and that no subpoena will be issued for substantiation of fact. The rates range from just under $10 an hour at the time the plaintiff was injured to just under $15 per hour at the present time. Allowing for about five hours a week over the period, I award $18,000 for past services. As to the future, again allowing for about five hours a week or $75 at current rates, I would allow $25,000 for the future, not being convinced that once the assistance ceases to be forthcoming from the sons that the plaintiff will then engage paid help.

32. The plaintiff says that she pays about $8 a week for medication. This has been no doubt taken into account in respect of past out-of-pocket expenses. For the future I expect that she will probably continue to incur such expenses for some considerable time. However, I am certainly not convinced that she will incur them for the rest of her life. I think it is more likely than not that at some stage, should the medication continue to be necessary, most of the expenses will be paid for by some means or other but probably not by the plaintiff. I would award $5,000 under this head.

33. The plaintiff has clearly suffered greatly as a result of her injury. There is a psychological component to her condition and there is a possibility that she will improve somewhat in the future, but I do not think that the possibility is great nor that the extent of recovery would be very substantial. For this component I award $60,000, which I consider to be consistent with recent awards in this Court and decisions of the Federal Court sitting on appeal from this Court. I apportion $30,000 as to the past. Interest on the past component should be calculated at 4 per cent and the result reduced by half because it is impractical to try to divide the award for past pain and suffering into separate periods where the pain and suffering may be greater or less in some periods than in others. Taking the broad view that the pain and suffering was suffered more or less evenly throughout the period, the interest calculated at 4 per cent will be reduced by half.

34. The result then is as follows:
Past loss of earning capacity $ 65,000.00

Out-of-pocket expenses $ 23,752.43
Fox v. Wood $ 8,357.39
Future loss of earning capacity $ 70,000.00
Gratuitous domestic services - past $ 18,000.00
Gratuitous domestic services - future $ 25,000.00
Future medical expenses $ 5,000.00
Pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life $ 60,000.00
Interest on past componet $ 3,600.00
Total: $278,709.82

35. On a global review this appears to be a rather high award of damages to the plaintiff in all the circumstances. Upon analysis, it appears that the awards for out-of-pocket expenses and gratuitous domestic services are perhaps higher than usual, assuming that there is a "usual" case. I do not consider that it is appropriate to reduce the total award simply because of an impression that it seems high, nor that there has been any overlapping of the various heads of damage. The plaintiff is at liberty to enter judgment for $278,709.82. Unless the parties wish to be heard, I propose to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs.